Hauerwasian critique of Natural Law ethics

[RamistThomist]

A few disclaimers. I actually like St Thomas Aquinas. I appreciate many medieval insights. Secondly, I am not using this critique as a sub-argument for theonomy. Far from it. In fact, I would rather the T-word not even enter the discussion. Anyway, here is Stanley Hauerwas' critique:

Emphasis on the distinctiveness of Christian ethics does not deny that there are points of contact between Christian ethics and other forms of social life. While such points frequently exist, they are not sufficient to provide a basis of a "universal ethic" grounded in human nature per se. Attempts to secure such an ethic inevitably result in a minimalistic ethic and often one which gives support to forms of cultural imperialism, which can then be taken to underwrite forms of coercion.

(Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 60-61).

I actually disagree with the last two clauses because: 1) not all forms of cultural imperialism are bad; 2) this usually doesn't happen anyway.

Jamie Smith goes on to say,

Formally speaking, the norms of human social life, and therefore the norms for ethical action, are determined by the telos of a community; this telos is both revealed and unfolded in a particular story that sustains and orients this community. As such, the norms for communal life are story-relative and therfore distinct to that community. More specifically, for the CHristian community, the norms for social life and ethical action are specified by a distinct telos, communion with God and neighbor, which is itself specified only in the distinct Christian story embodied in God's revelation in Scripture.

(Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 240).

 

[Backwoods Presbyterian]

I have had the displeasure of reading several of Hauerwas' works for Seminary and find him quite distasteful.

 

[RamistThomist]

I have had the displeasure of reading several of Hauerwas' works for Seminary and find him quite distasteful.

Agreed. I am pro-holy violence and pro-Christendom. Definitely not a Hauerwasian, but I do like this one critique.

 

[Backwoods Presbyterian]

Agreed.

 

[Jim Johnston]

A few disclaimers. I actually like St Thomas Aquinas. I appreciate many medieval insights. Secondly, I am not using this critique as a sub-argument for theonomy. Far from it. In fact, I would rather the T-word not even enter the discussion. Anyway, here is Stanley Hauerwas' critique:

Emphasis on the distinctiveness of Christian ethics does not deny that there are points of contact between Christian ethics and other forms of social life. While such points frequently exist, they are not sufficient to provide a basis of a "universal ethic" grounded in human nature per se. Attempts to secure such an ethic inevitably result in a minimalistic ethic and often one which gives support to forms of cultural imperialism, which can then be taken to underwrite forms of coercion.

(Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 60-61).

I actually disagree with the last two clauses because: 1) not all forms of cultural imperialism are bad; 2) this usually doesn't happen anyway.

Not many NL guys argue that a "universal ethic based on human nature" exist from the "basis* that there is commonality between multiply ethics. Aquinas didn't argue that way. It has to do with the function and prupose of man.

Not to be rude, but if man didn't have a rectum would sodomy be immoral?

Jamie Smith goes on to say,

Formally speaking, the norms of human social life, and therefore the norms for ethical action, are determined by the telos of a community; this telos is both revealed and unfolded in a particular story that sustains and orients this community. As such, the norms for communal life are story-relative and therfore distinct to that community. More specifically, for the CHristian community, the norms for social life and ethical action are specified by a distinct telos, communion with God and neighbor, which is itself specified only in the distinct Christian story embodied in God's revelation in Scripture.

(Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 240).

I don't understand this critique. Is it one?

God instantiated the human race. God instantiated how they are to function. How they would flourish best. God designed us in such a way that certain things are wrong in light of his design. Had he given us infallible truth detectors as part of our cognitive facuty, would 'bearing false witness' be a functional category anymore?

That's why lying isn't absolutely wrong. It's intended to promote human flourishing (as one intention among many). If that goal cannot be reached, that may affect whether the ethic holds in that instance. Case in point: hidding a woman from her frenzied husband who knocks on your door looking for her, "Where is my wife?", he asks. If you lie, was it immoral?

Also, it is used to benefit your *neighbor.* Those in need most are your neighbor. The man ceases to be your neighbor in this instance. He's not living according to his proper design. You could say he's an imporperly functioning moral agent. Proper function comes into play here just as much as epistemology, I'm led to believe.

 

[RamistThomist]

A few disclaimers. I actually like St Thomas Aquinas. I appreciate many medieval insights. Secondly, I am not using this critique as a sub-argument for theonomy. Far from it. In fact, I would rather the T-word not even enter the discussion. Anyway, here is Stanley Hauerwas' critique:

Emphasis on the distinctiveness of Christian ethics does not deny that there are points of contact between Christian ethics and other forms of social life. While such points frequently exist, they are not sufficient to provide a basis of a "universal ethic" grounded in human nature per se. Attempts to secure such an ethic inevitably result in a minimalistic ethic and often one which gives support to forms of cultural imperialism, which can then be taken to underwrite forms of coercion.

(Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 60-61).

I actually disagree with the last two clauses because: 1) not all forms of cultural imperialism are bad; 2) this usually doesn't happen anyway.

Not many NL guys argue that a "universal ethic based on human nature" exist from the "basis* that there is commonality between multiply ethics. Aquinas didn't argue that way. It has to do with the function and prupose of man.

Not to be rude, but if man didn't have a rectum would sodomy be immoral?

Jamie Smith goes on to say,

Formally speaking, the norms of human social life, and therefore the norms for ethical action, are determined by the telos of a community; this telos is both revealed and unfolded in a particular story that sustains and orients this community. As such, the norms for communal life are story-relative and therfore distinct to that community. More specifically, for the CHristian community, the norms for social life and ethical action are specified by a distinct telos, communion with God and neighbor, which is itself specified only in the distinct Christian story embodied in God's revelation in Scripture.

(Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 240).

I don't understand this critique. Is it one?

That wasn't really a critique. They were both excerpts from the same book. Smith was expounding a point. The critique was actually a footnote in the book and wasn't part of his main point--just an interesting footnote.

God instantiated the human race. God instantiated how they are to function. How they would flourish best. God designed us in such a way that certain things are wrong in light of his design. Had he given us infallible truth detectors as part of our cognitive facuty, would 'bearing false witness' be a functional category anymore?

That's why lying isn't absolutely wrong. It's intended to promote human flourishing (as one intention among many). If that goal cannot be reached, that may affect whether the ethic holds in that instance. Case in point: hidding a woman from her frenzied husband who knocks on your door looking for her, "Where is my wife?", he asks. If you lie, was it immoral?

Also, it is used to benefit your *neighbor.* Those in need most are your neighbor. The man ceases to be your neighbor in this instance. He's not living according to his proper design. You could say he's an imporperly functioning moral agent. Proper function comes into play here just as much as epistemology, I'm led to believe.

I will have to think about all that. Thank you for your response.

 

[JohnOwen007]

Expanding on Tom's good post, it seems to me that when it comes to social ethics and it's relation to moral law, telos alone is reductionist. Telos is certainly important, but there is also the motivation for actions, and the morality of the actions themselves (deontology). All three elements are needed for a full-orbed biblical ethic.

When it comes to political theology Oliver O'Donovan's defense of Christendom (of a sort) is superb (found in Desire of the Nations). I highly recommend it, even though it is a very tough read. It's well worth persevering. He gives a scathing critique of Hauerwas' (derived really from John Howard Yoder) politics.

Moreover, his work on The Just War Revisited is also brilliant, particularly in light of the building popularity of the neo-anabaptistic non-violence movement. What is interesting in this later work, is that O'Donovan condemns any just war that is motivated by self-defense. Interesting.

God bless.

 

[RamistThomist]

Excepting his work on Just War, I have read everything O'Donovan has written.

 

[RamistThomist]

Expanding on Tom's good post, it seems to me that when it comes to social ethics and it's relation to moral law, telos alone is reductionist. Telos is certainly important, but there is also the motivation for actions, and the morality of the actions themselves (deontology). All three elements are needed for a full-orbed biblical ethic.

When it comes to political theology Oliver O'Donovan's defense of Christendom (of a sort) is superb (found in Desire of the Nations). I highly recommend it, even though it is a very tough read. It's well worth persevering. He gives a scathing critique of Hauerwas' (derived really from John Howard Yoder) politics.

Moreover, his work on The Just War Revisited is also brilliant, particularly in light of the building popularity of the neo-anabaptistic non-violence movement. What is interesting in this later work, is that O'Donovan condemns any just war that is motivated by self-defense. Interesting.

God bless.

While in Desire of the Nations OO did pay homage to a "natural moral law," in Resurrection and Moral Order he was more critical of natural law.

 

[JohnOwen007]

Excepting his work on Just War, I have read everything O'Donovan has written.

Yes it's like that isn't it! Once I read Resurrection and Moral Order I felt compelled to read anything by OO I could get my hands on. I've just recently finished The Ways of judgment--brilliant stuff. He has helped me understand the role and purpose of the state with great clarity.

Blessings dear brother.

 

[RamistThomist]

Excepting his work on Just War, I have read everything O'Donovan has written.

Yes it's like that isn't it! Once I read Resurrection and Moral Order I felt compelled to read anything by OO I could get my hands on. I've just recently finished The Ways of judgment--brilliant stuff. He has helped me understand the role and purpose of the state with great clarity.

Blessings dear brother.

RMO was quite difficult, but I knew I was dealing with a great mind. His recent works with his wife, particularly Bonds of Imperfection were qiote gppd/