jwright82
Puritan Board Post-Graduate
Here is an excellant article comparing Van Til's thought to the Postmodern thinker Derrida.
Derrida, Van Til and the Metaphysics of Postmodernism.
Derrida, Van Til and the Metaphysics of Postmodernism.
Derrida and Van Til compared and contrasted.
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Van Til's "critique" of postmodernism doesn't go far enough because all it does is to provide an alternative. If we read the later Wittgenstein rather than Derrida as the prophet of postmodernism, the Van Tillian critique fails because the question goes beyond the question of grounding to the question of whether that question is even legitimate.
Whether it arises from conceptual confusions. Wittgenstein would argue that the question of grounding is confused, given that meaning is determined by context.
jwright82
Puritan Board Post-Graduate
But he does. Reformed theology is the alternative. Van Til's critique is of autonomous reasoning and its rational/irational dichotomy.
And yet twice he thought he ended philosophy itself only to be proven wrong in his lifetime. Twice his thought was developed into further philosophical analisys.
Wittgenstein would have said that human activity provides necessary context.
First, the historical error: the Investigations were published posthumously. No one in Wittgenstein's lifetime knew the full extent of his critique except for those who knew him personally.
a) This development was inconsistent with the Tractatus. The Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism never understood the Tractatus. If they had, they would have become existentialists (Wittgenstein didn't think that existentialism was philosophy---he thought it much more important).
b) The Investigations do not claim to be the end of philosophy, but the transformation of philosophy. The later Wittgenstein believed philosophy to be about the clarification of language and the untangling of conceptual confusion---it was to be a kind of grammatical therapy. Thus further developments are not necessarily inconsistent.
Loopie
Puritan Board Freshman
Philip,
I would argue that God is the context of all things AND that he determines the context of all things. In other words, any piece of information that we have is not complete unless it be understood in reference to God (creator, sustainer of all things). At the same time, God in his eternal foreknowledge and decree ORDAINED the context of all things. I know things in their context because God has created the context (environment, society, location, culture, etc.), and because God created me with the ability to understand and communicate things to others. For this reason we can say that the ultimate context includes God, and is determined by him. I hope this helps clarify what I was trying to say.
I would argue that God is the context of all things AND that he determines the context of all things. In other words, any piece of information that we have is not complete unless it be understood in reference to God (creator, sustainer of all things). At the same time, God in his eternal foreknowledge and decree ORDAINED the context of all things. I know things in their context because God has created the context (environment, society, location, culture, etc.), and because God created me with the ability to understand and communicate things to others. For this reason we can say that the ultimate context includes God, and is determined by him. I hope this helps clarify what I was trying to say.
Loopie
Puritan Board Freshman
Philip, I was not sure if you were advocating Wittgenstein's philosophy, or if you were critical of his philosophy (but were simply trying to describe how HE would view things). After reading a bit about Wittgenstein's personality, I do not doubt that he would dispute whether its a theory at all. I mean, he was an unbeliever, and so to submit himself to the one true God is not something that he would be willing to do. Ultimately, no amount of rational thinking or logical discussions will lead an unbeliever to repent and change his or her mind. Salvation is not simply in the mind or the heart, but is spiritual first and foremost.
I mean, there have been so many times where I thought that if I just said the 'right' words in the 'right' order at the 'right' time, that I could cause an unbeliever to repent and become a Christian. But this is completely wrong. If an unbeliever is unwilling to see the truth of God, then no amount of words will convince them. Only God, in replacing their heart of stone with a heart of flesh can open their eyes. My job is to simply share the gospel. And even though I believe presuppositional apologetics (and the transcendental argument) is the 'best' or 'most biblical' method of apologetics, in the end it is not guaranteed to convince the unwilling unbeliever. That is in God's hands, and he is free to use whatever means (such as our method of apologetics) to call an unbeliever to repentance.
I mean, there have been so many times where I thought that if I just said the 'right' words in the 'right' order at the 'right' time, that I could cause an unbeliever to repent and become a Christian. But this is completely wrong. If an unbeliever is unwilling to see the truth of God, then no amount of words will convince them. Only God, in replacing their heart of stone with a heart of flesh can open their eyes. My job is to simply share the gospel. And even though I believe presuppositional apologetics (and the transcendental argument) is the 'best' or 'most biblical' method of apologetics, in the end it is not guaranteed to convince the unwilling unbeliever. That is in God's hands, and he is free to use whatever means (such as our method of apologetics) to call an unbeliever to repentance.
Eric, what I'm trying to suggest is that transcendental argumentation doesn't necessarily work, even on a logical level, with someone unless they accept your terms---and I'm not sure how you would convince them to do so. With a philosopher like Wittgenstein (followed through consistently) it doesn't work because the way he defines things defangs any sort of argumentation along those lines. You suggest that he's trapped us in Plato's Cave again, and he asks why you think it's a cave.
As I've said here and in previous discussions, the key to unravelling Wittgenstein is to find ordinary use that is clearly metaphysical. You have to appeal to something outside the system because an internal presuppositional critique is ruled out by definition.
As I've said here and in previous discussions, the key to unravelling Wittgenstein is to find ordinary use that is clearly metaphysical. You have to appeal to something outside the system because an internal presuppositional critique is ruled out by definition.
Loopie
Puritan Board Freshman
Well, the only thing to appeal to 'oustide the system' is God. Yet this is what the transcendental argument does. If our theology is based upon scripture, so should our apologetic method. In studying many different apologetic methods, the transcendental argument seems to be the most biblical. Why not let scripture define our apologetic, just like it defines our theology?
I still don't quite see how Wittgenstein's method is so strong as to be logically consistent. Regardless of how he 'defines' things, based on those definitions his system would be inconsistent, because his system cannot account for anything (existence, knowledge, morality). He must appeal to God for those things.
If he asks me why I think its a cave, I would say that we choose the term 'cave' because it represents the situation that his philosophical system is presenting. It is simply an analogy, or figure of speech. I would let him define it however he wants, and then show him how his definition is inconsistent. The only way to avoid inconsistency on his part would be to CHANGE definitions of things mid-stream. Yet to redefine something like that would be a sign of inconsistency, and ultimately, a failed argument.
I still don't quite see how Wittgenstein's method is so strong as to be logically consistent. Regardless of how he 'defines' things, based on those definitions his system would be inconsistent, because his system cannot account for anything (existence, knowledge, morality). He must appeal to God for those things.
If he asks me why I think its a cave, I would say that we choose the term 'cave' because it represents the situation that his philosophical system is presenting. It is simply an analogy, or figure of speech. I would let him define it however he wants, and then show him how his definition is inconsistent. The only way to avoid inconsistency on his part would be to CHANGE definitions of things mid-stream. Yet to redefine something like that would be a sign of inconsistency, and ultimately, a failed argument.
Alan D. Strange
Puritan Board Senior
Philip:
I am not a student of Wittgenstein in the way that you evidently are. Yet, I would challenge your contention that the transcendental proof fails with him. I think that it proves precisely what it aims to prove. Wittgenstein remains unpersuaded, however. The task of apologetics, we all recall, is not persuasion but proof.
Wittgenstein, as I read him, does indeed deconstruct our approach to him. But he deconstructs his own project. It seems to me that he commits metaphysical suicide with his linguistic approach, particularly luring us along in the Tractatus and then laughingly taking it all away. There certainly are proximate insights in him. I think you're right that he perhaps more than Derrida is to be wrestled with in terms of our engagement of post-modernism. Ultimately, though, all seems reduced, potentially, to sound and fury signifying nothing. Except that that sentiment itself must mean something. I see Wittgenstein as unable to get out of his own way as is so with all unbelieving philosophers, though done with apparent considerable sophistication. It all reduces to nonsense, though, and it is not intelligible.
Peace,
Alan
I am not a student of Wittgenstein in the way that you evidently are. Yet, I would challenge your contention that the transcendental proof fails with him. I think that it proves precisely what it aims to prove. Wittgenstein remains unpersuaded, however. The task of apologetics, we all recall, is not persuasion but proof.
Wittgenstein, as I read him, does indeed deconstruct our approach to him. But he deconstructs his own project. It seems to me that he commits metaphysical suicide with his linguistic approach, particularly luring us along in the Tractatus and then laughingly taking it all away. There certainly are proximate insights in him. I think you're right that he perhaps more than Derrida is to be wrestled with in terms of our engagement of post-modernism. Ultimately, though, all seems reduced, potentially, to sound and fury signifying nothing. Except that that sentiment itself must mean something. I see Wittgenstein as unable to get out of his own way as is so with all unbelieving philosophers, though done with apparent considerable sophistication. It all reduces to nonsense, though, and it is not intelligible.
Peace,
Alan
Eric, this is what I've been trying to get at: Wittgenstein would claim that all you are asking is a grammatical question---and a confused one at that.
Inconsistent with what?
I wouldn't say that, given that the philosophy is perfectly capable of being understood (intelligare---to understand).
This is one of those things (and James and I have had this discussion before) that I'm not sure of, which is how a transcendental argument proves anything. If I deconstruct worldview A and prove that it fails to account for phenomenon X (whatever that would entail---accounting for stuff is a tricky business) and then present my own system, what exactly have I proved? I have proved, at best, that they are operating under a flawed system, and that I have a system that does the job better. What I have not given, though, is a compelling reason why they ought to believe my system---all I've proven is that I have a nice theory. Gottfried Leibniz has a wonderfully complex and logically-tight system, which is probably more logically consistent than my own and can account for just about anything you throw at it: it also happens to be incredibly silly and there's no good reason why I ought to accept it.
Alan D. Strange
Puritan Board Senior
Philip:
I agree that it's capable of being understood. But not in terms of Wittgenstein's worldview, which cannot account for intelligibility and, consistent with itself, is meaningless. We can all understand it when we borrow, without telling or realizing, a view of the world that enjoys internal consistency and coherency and can make sense of things: the Christian worldview. If Wittgenstein's view of the world were true, his system would not be intelligible. Because our view of the world is true, it is, but not on its own terms.
And what does the transcendental proof demonstrate? The impossibility of the contrary--that Wittgenstein's approach reduces, on its own terms, to nonsense and that all that it problemizes, or rejects, from revelation, is rendered intelligible in and only in a Christian worldview. Thanks for the Leibniz, though. He's always fun to ponder!
Peace,
Alan
I agree that it's capable of being understood. But not in terms of Wittgenstein's worldview, which cannot account for intelligibility and, consistent with itself, is meaningless. We can all understand it when we borrow, without telling or realizing, a view of the world that enjoys internal consistency and coherency and can make sense of things: the Christian worldview. If Wittgenstein's view of the world were true, his system would not be intelligible. Because our view of the world is true, it is, but not on its own terms.
And what does the transcendental proof demonstrate? The impossibility of the contrary--that Wittgenstein's approach reduces, on its own terms, to nonsense and that all that it problemizes, or rejects, from revelation, is rendered intelligible in and only in a Christian worldview. Thanks for the Leibniz, though. He's always fun to ponder!
Peace,
Alan
Actually, no. Meaning, in most cases, for Wittgenstein, is use. So a word with no use would be meaningless. Again, his question would be whether language and meaning need accounting for beyond this and what kind of confusions led us to think that it did.
With Wittgenstein, it's not going to reduce to anything except your assertion that he is wrong unless you end up giving external counterexamples from ordinary use. The later Wittgenstein's system is consistent with itself (the Tractatus, of course, is self-conscious of the fact that it is senseless but necessary, but the Investigations don't have this problem).
How? I've never quite understood how it does this. I've seen it asserted quite a lot, but never actually demonstrated. Maybe I just don't have the conceptual tools to see how it works, but all I see it doing with a given worldview is:
a) deconstruction
b) presentation of a Christian treatment
What I haven't see is a conclusive demonstration that Christianity is the necessary condition for a given phenomenon (like rationality). Ontologically, of course, I believe that it is sufficient and necessary, but logically I'm not sure a strict proof is possible without recourse to the kind of deductive arguments that Van Til disliked (though if Van Til is right in his metaphysics, then such proofs ought to be possible).
He, Bishop Berkeley, and the young Edwards are always lots of fun.
Alan D. Strange
Puritan Board Senior
The impossibility of the contrary means, as you say, that every other world view can be deconstructed and shown to be internally inconsistent and incoherent, requiring Christian presuppositions, like the one and many of the ontological Trinity, for those world views to enjoy intelligibility. The Christian worldview can account for everything that the other world views cannot. It's the only one left standing. I don't concede, btw, that Wittgenstein's language games render anything intelligible, just clever, and I reject his own sort of utilitarian definition of intelligible. Nonetheless, I have not studied his posthumous work carefully. That all came out quite after all my formal philosophical studies!
Now I know what you mean and see something of the problem in terms of what you call "logically ...a strict proof." Why is Christianity necessary for rationality, e.g.? Because the laws of logic, causality, induction, etc. cannot account for themselves and are necessary preconditions for rationality. Christianity can account for them. That makes it sufficient but does it make it necessary?
David Reiter, in the 2011 (v. 7) Confessional Presbyterian argues that "a transcendental argumment intended to establish the necessity of God's existence must be purely transcendental--i.e., it must be composed exclusively of necessary truths" (250). Reiter interacted with Collett and Choi in particular (the former of whom has defended CVT's approach in the WTJ and in the Frame festschrift) , arguing that a modal not merely a generic form of the TAG is needed. You and other interested readers can check that out in the appropriate places.
Peace,
Alan
Now I know what you mean and see something of the problem in terms of what you call "logically ...a strict proof." Why is Christianity necessary for rationality, e.g.? Because the laws of logic, causality, induction, etc. cannot account for themselves and are necessary preconditions for rationality. Christianity can account for them. That makes it sufficient but does it make it necessary?
David Reiter, in the 2011 (v. 7) Confessional Presbyterian argues that "a transcendental argumment intended to establish the necessity of God's existence must be purely transcendental--i.e., it must be composed exclusively of necessary truths" (250). Reiter interacted with Collett and Choi in particular (the former of whom has defended CVT's approach in the WTJ and in the Frame festschrift) , arguing that a modal not merely a generic form of the TAG is needed. You and other interested readers can check that out in the appropriate places.
Peace,
Alan
This is starting to sound like a version of the teleological argument (using the principle of sufficient reason).
So would Anselm's ontological argument be a form of TAG (albeit, in reverse)? Did CVT ever interact with Anselm's argument in his work (I recall him mentioning Anselm approvingly as an aside between Augustine and Thomas in A Survey of Christian Epistemology, but I haven't found any other references).
When we talk about necessity, are we referring to logical necessity (true in all possible worlds) or ontological necessity (contingently necessary in the way that this world operates)?
And I don't think he'd concede yours either. Intelligibility is one of those tricky concepts where I'm personally more likely to go with ordinary use for my definition (but then again, I generally agree with Thomas Reid on philosophy of language).
At any rate, my approach, in my analysis of Wittgenstein on religion, is proceeding on the basis that his attempt (and the attempts of his followers) to defang Christianity's claims fails and thus Christian belief (regardless of truth-value) serves as a counter-example to his deconstruction of metaphysics.
I know my analysis of this issue is always limited by the limitations of my study of Philosophy but I'm not convinced that the solution to a worldview constructed by men is a redeemed worldview that will be understood by men. I see in Van Til a point of contact in the Reformed Tradition to the Archetypal/Ectypal distinction in theology where the former represents God's comprehensive knowledge of Himself and the latter represents all revelation that is condescended to creaturely understanding.
TAG, as I see it, is the result of Van Til's writing being wrest from the historic Reformed understanding of revelation and re-cast into human philsophical forms by his disciples. He didn't attempt to form a Metaphysic, Epistemology, and Ethic that could be compared to other worldviews to show "...see this is the most logically coherent and so choose this...."
As I said, I lack the terminological precision to fully critique the problem but I think any attempt to fill human philosophical categories with the ideas of "knowledge as revelation to the creature" does justice to what it is that we have when Christ praises His Father for revealing to us "...the wisdom of the age to come." Men who abandon a crreaturely dependence upon the Creator for knowledge can hear no voice but their own and it simply will not do to try to place the totality of Natural and Special revelation into a system where they can examine it independently and come to a conclusion that they accept or reject it.
I think men like systems because they think that if they have a system they can comprehend reality and then categorize all experience by the system. The truth is that we were never created to live apart from dependence upon God for our knowledge or thinking. We never come to a point where we have understood revelation and it doesn't cut and divide our thoughts and intentions. The hope I have when I'm counseling someone is not my profound understanding of the Word that I can then paste onto a problem. In fact, I'm taught by God that I don't even understand my own heart and that He alone understands and instructs me by the things He reveals to me. Likewise, at best I can be an instrument in the Lord's hands to bring any individual to God's revelation and let the Great Physician do the unique work in every person's life that He alone is capable of performing.
TAG, as I see it, is the result of Van Til's writing being wrest from the historic Reformed understanding of revelation and re-cast into human philsophical forms by his disciples. He didn't attempt to form a Metaphysic, Epistemology, and Ethic that could be compared to other worldviews to show "...see this is the most logically coherent and so choose this...."
As I said, I lack the terminological precision to fully critique the problem but I think any attempt to fill human philosophical categories with the ideas of "knowledge as revelation to the creature" does justice to what it is that we have when Christ praises His Father for revealing to us "...the wisdom of the age to come." Men who abandon a crreaturely dependence upon the Creator for knowledge can hear no voice but their own and it simply will not do to try to place the totality of Natural and Special revelation into a system where they can examine it independently and come to a conclusion that they accept or reject it.
I think men like systems because they think that if they have a system they can comprehend reality and then categorize all experience by the system. The truth is that we were never created to live apart from dependence upon God for our knowledge or thinking. We never come to a point where we have understood revelation and it doesn't cut and divide our thoughts and intentions. The hope I have when I'm counseling someone is not my profound understanding of the Word that I can then paste onto a problem. In fact, I'm taught by God that I don't even understand my own heart and that He alone understands and instructs me by the things He reveals to me. Likewise, at best I can be an instrument in the Lord's hands to bring any individual to God's revelation and let the Great Physician do the unique work in every person's life that He alone is capable of performing.
Alan D. Strange
Puritan Board Senior
Philip:
As you know there have been reconstructions of Anselm's argument (Plantinga, e.g.) and I have heard in lecture Bahnsen and Frame say positive things (as well as critical things about his effort) that might suggest something along the lines of your suppositions. I do not believe that CVT ever addressed it in the way that more recent scholars have. Anselm's argument is quite intriguing and not as easily dismissed as Kant and company have.
I thought that you might raise a question about necessity, and I think it has to be ontological necessity personally. If you're a Reidian, and that's interesting to me as a Hodge researcher, I'd have to think that Ludwig would be after you with that red-hot poker just like he was Karl Popper!
Have you published anything on your analysis of Wittgenstein on religion? I'd be interested to see that.
Peace,
Alan
As you know there have been reconstructions of Anselm's argument (Plantinga, e.g.) and I have heard in lecture Bahnsen and Frame say positive things (as well as critical things about his effort) that might suggest something along the lines of your suppositions. I do not believe that CVT ever addressed it in the way that more recent scholars have. Anselm's argument is quite intriguing and not as easily dismissed as Kant and company have.
I thought that you might raise a question about necessity, and I think it has to be ontological necessity personally. If you're a Reidian, and that's interesting to me as a Hodge researcher, I'd have to think that Ludwig would be after you with that red-hot poker just like he was Karl Popper!
Have you published anything on your analysis of Wittgenstein on religion? I'd be interested to see that.
Peace,
Alan
No question he might brandish something at me (then again, maybe this time he'd remember the poker principle). On the other hand, I think Reid anticipates and pre-empts a good deal of what Wittgenstein is doing. He's essentially doing ordinary language analysis in his critique of Hume.
I haven't published anything period. I'm just an undergraduate and became interested in the subject after attending a series of lectures by P.M.S. Hacker on Wittgenstein last spring. I ended up writing a brief critique of Wittgenstein on religion afterward, but it was rather weak and hasty (though some of the research is still proving useful). I'm currently working on a senior thesis deconstructing Wittgenstein and D.Z. Phillips on Christianity and providing a starting point for further development of a theory of religious language.
Alan D. Strange
Puritan Board Senior
All the best with the thesis; it sounds fascinating. Are you doing this with Professor Davis? Pardon me, I should not get so personal: simply enjoy and learn all you possibly can and keep Bach's motto ad maiorem Dei gloriam (also the Jesuit's, but never mind) before you.
Peace,
Alan
Peace,
Alan
Loopie
Puritan Board Freshman
I know I am not knowledgeable enough to deeply discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy. What I do believe though is that we cannot separate philosophy from theology (our apologetic should be derived from scripture, just like our theology is). Today I found a quote from Bahnsen on the AOMin.org blog, and I wanted to go ahead and post that for everyone's enjoyment:
"Both disciplines [theology and philosophy] answer similar questions (about reality, knowledge, and conduct), even if in somewhat different terms and settings. However, some would argue that the way in which philosophy attempts to answer those questions is different from the way in which theology does so. But such a view incorporates two objectionable assumptions. First, it assumes (perhaps from the long tradition of men doing philosophy with an autonomous attitude) that philosophy is in its very nature something that does not stand under the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ. Those who work in submission to the Lord, accordingly, are automatically disqualified from doing ‘philosophy.’ – despite the fact that the critics of this mentality have their own lords and ultimate commitments. Second, it assumes that man’s reasoning and interpretation of experience can be made intelligible outside of the worldview provided by divine revelation – thus begging from the outset the very question pursued by the Christian philosopher.” Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 52.
"Both disciplines [theology and philosophy] answer similar questions (about reality, knowledge, and conduct), even if in somewhat different terms and settings. However, some would argue that the way in which philosophy attempts to answer those questions is different from the way in which theology does so. But such a view incorporates two objectionable assumptions. First, it assumes (perhaps from the long tradition of men doing philosophy with an autonomous attitude) that philosophy is in its very nature something that does not stand under the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ. Those who work in submission to the Lord, accordingly, are automatically disqualified from doing ‘philosophy.’ – despite the fact that the critics of this mentality have their own lords and ultimate commitments. Second, it assumes that man’s reasoning and interpretation of experience can be made intelligible outside of the worldview provided by divine revelation – thus begging from the outset the very question pursued by the Christian philosopher.” Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 52.
Well observed and stated, Rich. If all this discussion on Witt. demonstrates anything it must surely be that language is meaningless without the meaning that the revelation and reconciliation of God in Christ gives to us.
Yes, as a matter of fact.
I'm not criticizing the use of philosophy as a tool to understand theology but philosophy as a paradigm by which all knowledge must fit. There are insights into understanding thinking and logic that philosophy affords us but some seek to make all knowledge of revelation to be fit within a descriptive schema that men have constructed. I view philosophical systems as a way of providing an analogy of knowledge but it falls short. Philosophy may attempt to describe love but the Psalmist declares there are some things too wonderful to describe like a man with his wife. I may be able to logically describe the power of a thunderstorm but there are some things that are revealed by the Lord through His created order that defy our ability to systematize.
What I'm concerned about are those who see philosophy as the full way of apprehending divine things. Some are so enamored by the complexity of the tools of philsophy that they forget that there is knowledge beyond which we can grasp and have to depend upon God. Some have recast whole Reformed faith into a systematic theology that comports with analytical philosophy and do not have the humility to stop short of where God's revelation has ceased and believe philosophy gives them license to speculate into hidden things.
In the end, I'm indebted to many disciplines that keep me from making sloppy mistakes about God's revelation. As an example, hermeneutics is a science with rules that can be clearly followed to prevent one from making simple-minded mistakes on how to understand the Scriptures. That said, once I have apprehended what a Scripture verse may be telling me, there is a knowledge that I must depend upon that escapes me. There is power and help from the Spirit that I cannot comprehend or call down simply because I think I understand what it says. There are things beyond understanding that I must cry out in desperation. I am united to Christ by faith and the way He works and wills in me to do His good pleasure is something that only the Divine can understand.
Theology is the queen of the sciences and philosophy is but the handmaid.
Rich, would you say that there's a difference between accepting the limits of our understanding and sloppiness? Too often I do see folks just playing the "mystery" card right off the bat without asking the hard questions. I hear what you're saying and you're right that it's a problem that too many reformed folks have succumbed to, but I'm not sure that it's the problem we're facing right now. I don't want Christianity to be just another philosophical system, but neither do I want to believe naively or fall into mysticism. It seems that there is a place for mystery where God reveals Himself and we shut up, but I also want to avoid not thinking deeply enough.
Also, as one who will (Lord willing) be going into the field of philosophy, there's a certain sense in which I'd like to be able to communicate my belief in the terms of my discipline.
Rich, would you say that there's a difference between accepting the limits of our understanding and sloppiness? Too often I do see folks just playing the "mystery" card right off the bat without asking the hard questions. I hear what you're saying and you're right that it's a problem that too many reformed folks have succumbed to, but I'm not sure that it's the problem we're facing right now. I don't want Christianity to be just another philosophical system, but neither do I want to believe naively or fall into mysticism. It seems that there is a place for mystery where God reveals Himself and we shut up, but I also want to avoid not thinking deeply enough.
Also, as one who will (Lord willing) be going into the field of philosophy, there's a certain sense in which I'd like to be able to communicate my belief in the terms of my discipline.
Alan D. Strange
Puritan Board Senior
Good discussion, men. I appreciate it.
I assign Scott Oliphint's excellent book, Reasons for Faith, whose subtitle is Philosophy in the Service of Theology and that's how it should be, philosophy as servant to theology. Wittgenstein, as brilliant as he was, is a fool because he denies God, rendering his philosophy nonsense. This is what I was getting at before Phil and I got into a few particulars with respect to him, CVT and so forth.
I certainly agree with Rich, Eric, and Matthew that faith is foundational, as I am sure Phil does as well. Fides quaerens intellectum is surely the motto of us all. Let me pick up on one point of Phil's, however, that has to do with both philosophy and theology. He has a good point, I think, about folk adducing mystery too readily. Sometimes , when I am attempting to work through with students the great theological and Christological challenges of the fourth and fifth centuries and hold their feet to the fire to have them understand what was going on, they sometimes despair of, say, Leo's Tome as being too exacting and demanding in its thought. In other words, they don't want to think through all the issues involving the blessed Holy undivided Trinity or the hypostatic union with respect to our Lord Jesus Christ. It's only when one has got all the issues on the table and thought through them, seeing the implications, for e.g., of perichoresis, that one can marvel at the mystery and see the true incomprehensibility of our God. We have no right to invoke mystery or incomprehensibililty before we've even learned and worked through the implications of our theology and Christology. Particularly theological students, would-be ministers, need to work through these things so that they can minister to God's people and know how to engage their theological questions and not quickly dismiss all their questions as "mystery." If Phil was getting at something along those lines, I think that's a valid consideration.
Peace,
Alan
I assign Scott Oliphint's excellent book, Reasons for Faith, whose subtitle is Philosophy in the Service of Theology and that's how it should be, philosophy as servant to theology. Wittgenstein, as brilliant as he was, is a fool because he denies God, rendering his philosophy nonsense. This is what I was getting at before Phil and I got into a few particulars with respect to him, CVT and so forth.
I certainly agree with Rich, Eric, and Matthew that faith is foundational, as I am sure Phil does as well. Fides quaerens intellectum is surely the motto of us all. Let me pick up on one point of Phil's, however, that has to do with both philosophy and theology. He has a good point, I think, about folk adducing mystery too readily. Sometimes , when I am attempting to work through with students the great theological and Christological challenges of the fourth and fifth centuries and hold their feet to the fire to have them understand what was going on, they sometimes despair of, say, Leo's Tome as being too exacting and demanding in its thought. In other words, they don't want to think through all the issues involving the blessed Holy undivided Trinity or the hypostatic union with respect to our Lord Jesus Christ. It's only when one has got all the issues on the table and thought through them, seeing the implications, for e.g., of perichoresis, that one can marvel at the mystery and see the true incomprehensibility of our God. We have no right to invoke mystery or incomprehensibililty before we've even learned and worked through the implications of our theology and Christology. Particularly theological students, would-be ministers, need to work through these things so that they can minister to God's people and know how to engage their theological questions and not quickly dismiss all their questions as "mystery." If Phil was getting at something along those lines, I think that's a valid consideration.
Peace,
Alan
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