Derrida and Van Til compared and contrasted.

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Does the following clarify at all?

We use mystery in two different contexts. (a) That which is known only to God. (b) That which God has revealed but is beyond reason to verify. The former is "the secret things" of Deut. 29:29, while the latter is "the mystery of godliness" of 1 Tim. 3:16. Most of what we are discussing revolves around the latter. That which may be known is known by revelation, not reason, but sanctified reason is used ministerially to understand and apply it. Insofar as reason cannot verify the facts of revelation, godliness will bow before the "mystery." Insofar as reason is necessary to understand and apply the facts of revelation, godliness demands the full exertion of our mental powers to the glory of God.
 
First, the historical error: the Investigations were published posthumously. No one in Wittgenstein's lifetime knew the full extent of his critique except for those who knew him personally.

Anscombe, who as far as I know, had no allergies to metaphysics compiled at least one version.


a) This development was inconsistent with the Tractatus. The Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism never understood the Tractatus. If they had, they would have become existentialists (Wittgenstein didn't think that existentialism was philosophy---he thought it much more important).

Yes but you speak of him as if his thought is a. true and b. totally consistant. Although he admited that the Tractatus was inconsistant with itself, it was speaking about those things which It claimed could not be spoken of.


b) The Investigations do not claim to be the end of philosophy, but the transformation of philosophy. The later Wittgenstein believed philosophy to be about the clarification of language and the untangling of conceptual confusion---it was to be a kind of grammatical therapy. Thus further developments are not necessarily inconsistent.

This is quite close to Derrida's critique of western metaphysics. But it is irrellivant, you assume that Wittgenstien had no internal inconsistancies that could be developed in the sort of directions that Strawson and others have. He assumed that there could be no such thing as metaphysics because predefined it in a way that made no such language game possible. But if we simply ask why such a definition of metaphysics is the only one he could only say "just because it makes my system work".

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Actually, no. Meaning, in most cases, for Wittgenstein, is use. So a word with no use would be meaningless. Again, his question would be whether language and meaning need accounting for beyond this and what kind of confusions led us to think that it did.

With Wittgenstein, it's not going to reduce to anything except your assertion that he is wrong unless you end up giving external counterexamples from ordinary use. The later Wittgenstein's system is consistent with itself (the Tractatus, of course, is self-conscious of the fact that it is senseless but necessary, but the Investigations don't have this problem).

And I would say that this is exactly what Starwson does in his transcendental argument for particulers. He shows from ordinary use that we cannot develop a language game that does not involve particulers. Like Van Til who used Idealism as a springboard for apologetics I am doing the same. I am using his insights to not because he is totally correct but it is a nice avenue to develop a transcendental argument in a liguisticlly minded philosophical culture. I do the same thing for moral issues working the critiques of postmodern society through the work of Levinas and Derrida. I than turn around and show how hopelessly inconsistant they were and how how Chrietian Theism can get what they wanted to get.
 
We use mystery in two different contexts. (a) That which is known only to God. (b) That which God has revealed but is beyond reason to verify. The former is "the secret things" of Deut. 29:29, while the latter is "the mystery of godliness" of 1 Tim. 3:16.

I like this.

Just to clarify, I do agree, Philip, that we are not supposed to leave our brains at the door in theology and chalk it up to mystery. I also believe that there are dangers in saying "...we're holding these two things in tension..." when an obvious logical contradiction exists. Lutheran theology, in my estimation, can be shown to be incoherent on the issue of monergistic grace and baptismal regeneration. Scripture has revealed the former and not the latter and appealing to mystery does not eliminate the reader of Scripture from the proper use of hermeneutics.

I didn't weigh in in order to start an aside. My answer was to the OP. As I said, I don't think Van Til's agenda was to create a replacement analytical philosophy. It's interesting that his disciples say they're systematizing what he left undone but I'm not convinced that was his aim. I see him as contrasting human systems with a reliance on the Creator for revelation. Where he shows that each of those systems fall under their own weight and show men to be fools he does not offer to erect an edifice in its place that is a philosophy for reality organized around Reformed principles. I think many of the things he said that can better be understood in the archetypal/ectypal paradigm are unnaturally fit within a human philosophical framework because some are only comfortable as viewing reality according to philosophical systems.
 
What I'm concerned about are those who see philosophy as the full way of apprehending divine things. Some are so enamored by the complexity of the tools of philsophy that they forget that there is knowledge beyond which we can grasp and have to depend upon God. Some have recast whole Reformed faith into a systematic theology that comports with analytical philosophy and do not have the humility to stop short of where God's revelation has ceased and believe philosophy gives them license to speculate into hidden things.

Which is why I prefer the way Van Til handles these issues in particulerly in Christian Apologetics and The Defense of The Faith. He lays out Reformed Theology first, than works out some basic philosophical consequences of it. Lastly he develops his apologetic from there. I think all in all you are right. If it doesn't pass the great judgment it doesn't count, that is a just an unbiblical idea (one that I don't see anyone here espousing). But I agree with you that it is dangerous to let philosophy dictate how we do theology. It is theology that dictates how do philosophy.

In the book Revelation and Reason there are some notable essays on this subject. Lane Tipton's essay "Paul's Christological Inerpretation of Creation and Presuppositional Apologetics" in he gives an excellent exccegetical framework for a philosophy that is "according to Christ". Also to see a good paradighm of how to navigate responsebly through the murky waters of philosophical discussions see in this book the essay by Michael W. Payne. It is entitles "The Fate of Apologetics in an Age of Normal Nihilism". Also a good use of the development of logic for the purposes of Van Til's method is seen in Don Collet's essay in this book called "Van Til and Transcendental Argument".

All of these, and the others in the book, show a good way to deal with and interact with philosophy.
 
I'd have to think that Ludwig would be after you with that red-hot poker just like he was Karl Popper!

I read that Popper came to Cambridge prepared to argue with the earlier Wittgenstein but encountered the later Wittgenstein, philosophically speaking. That is one reason their discussion got to "heated". Amazon.com: Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers (9780066212449): David Edmonds, John Eidinow: Books. Excellent book on that encounter.
 
But it is irrellivant, you assume that Wittgenstien had no internal inconsistancies that could be developed in the sort of directions that Strawson and others have. He assumed that there could be no such thing as metaphysics because predefined it in a way that made no such language game possible.

Not quite. His charge was that metaphysics was a confusion. Strawson disagrees, but in that case he's not being consistent with Wittgenstein. I have no objections to departure from Wittgenstein, given that I'm a Christian, not a Wittgensteinian, but it's important to recognize that when Strawson does this, he is indeed departing from Wittgenstein rather than being consistent with him.

He is not redefining metaphysics, merely allegating its former questions to epistemology and language.

He shows from ordinary use that we cannot develop a language game that does not involve particulers.

Again, Wittgenstein wouldn't agree to the form of the argument. Transcendental argumentation depends on an internal critique that simply doesn't work with Wittgenstein because his method is to launch a de jure attack on your critique.

As you know, I'm critical of transcendental argumentation in general because it depends either on an inductive argument or else it reverses itself and reduces to a deductive argument. It is one thing to have a metaphysic to ground phenomena in, but the argument for that metaphysic depends on a number of philosophical and linguistic assumptions which, when called into question, prove hard to demonstrate.

All of these, and the others in the book, show a good way to deal with and interact with philosophy.

I'd just suggest reading Anselm's Proslogion chapter 1.
 
Which is why I prefer the way Van Til handles these issues in particulerly in Christian Apologetics and The Defense of The Faith. He lays out Reformed Theology first, than works out some basic philosophical consequences of it. Lastly he develops his apologetic from there.

Scholasticism as a whole developed its prolegomena in retrospect of its dogmatics. If I recall correctly Richard Muller has a section on this in PRRD.
 
Philip, I must disagree with your statement that the transcendental argument depends on induction or deduction. I would say that the TA solves the problem of induction (or deduction) that David Hume presented. In my discussions with atheists concerning morality, presupposing God is the only way to determine a system of objective morality while being consistent. It is the atheistic worldview that ends up running into the problem of induction/deduction based on its presuppositions.
 
I would say that the TA solves the problem of induction (or deduction) that David Hume presented.

What problem? The problem is only present if you are an empiricist. I am wonderfully free of any urge to be an empiricist, so I simply end up saying "nuts" to Hume. Transcendental reasoning depends on connections that have to be established by appeal to necessary principles, which have to be established by means of logic.
 
You believe that TA depends on connections that you don't think exist? Could you please elaborate your statement? I honestly am trying to understand where you are coming from. For starters, what do you believe to be the 'starting point' or foundation, for knowledge, morality, and existence?
 
You believe that TA depends on connections that you don't think exist?

I didn't say that. I said that for the argument to work, these connections have to be proven, not simply asserted.

For starters, what do you believe to be the 'starting point' or foundation, for knowledge, morality, and existence?

Depends on whether we are talking about the order of being, in which case it is God, or whether we are talking about the order of knowing, in which case it is the self (Calvin begins the institutes with this distinction). I realize that the latter is considered autonomous by certain Van Tillians (Greg Bahnsen, for instance) but that depends on how you define autonomy.

Is autonomy the principle of starting an argument from a basis other than God? If so, then very few Christians have ever produced an argument that was not autonomous (in fact, the ontological argument is the only one I can think of that isn't). Bahnsen, by the way, uses this definition as a hammer to try and smash Schaeffer and Gordon Clark as examples of autonomous reasoning (whether one buys Clark's philosophy is another matter, but autonomous reasoning should not be in the list of accusations).

On the other hand, autonomy more likely means an attitude of independence of God---an attempt to use reason to break free from creation as created. In this sense, I think that one could maintain a distinction between order of being and order of knowing without the charge of autonomy being levelled.
 
Which is why I prefer the way Van Til handles these issues in particulerly in Christian Apologetics and The Defense of The Faith. He lays out Reformed Theology first, than works out some basic philosophical consequences of it. Lastly he develops his apologetic from there.

Scholasticism as a whole developed its prolegomena in retrospect of its dogmatics. If I recall correctly Richard Muller has a section on this in PRRD.

You know I had the pleasure of reading that book so long ago, back when I couldn't appreciate do to lack of knowledge. I want it very badly but alas I can't afford it right now. I agree as far as I understand. In Revelation and Reason two essays, Horton and Jue, deal exactly with Van Til's actual relation to Reformed Scholasticism and they say the same thing as you do. You would know about Scholasticism more than I would so I can only agree with you. On the other hand I do feel that Van Til did interact with philosophy in a very helpful way as illustrated by those works I mentioned. I mean just the tables of contents show what he thought about the relationship. I also feel that without understanding both his method of interacting with philosophy and the philosophical climate he was unquestionably dealing with will lead to a misunderstanding of him.

I all in all feel that you and Rich are right on and probably wouldn't disagree with me.




Philip, I must disagree with your statement that the transcendental argument depends on induction or deduction. I would say that the TA solves the problem of induction (or deduction) that David Hume presented. In my discussions with atheists concerning morality, presupposing God is the only way to determine a system of objective morality while being consistent. It is the atheistic worldview that ends up running into the problem of induction/deduction based on its presuppositions.

I agree that it is a problem. But I would stress that it is a problem in theory more than practice. Atheists can live very moral lives without any theory of ethics. But you are right in the apologetical argument to push them at these points. Van Til's main thrust was to say make more sense out things than me. My brother is an atheist and the other night I ended my conversation with like this. I said "can you make more sense out of things than me?" He said "no he couldn't", I said "well I'm telling you to think about it, when your'e doing whatever think about it", I think that such practical methods can be drawn from Van Til and used very effectivly. I know that such statements lack philosophical precision but they can be persuasive to the unbeleiver. So I guess what I am saying is keep up the good work.


Not quite. His charge was that metaphysics was a confusion. Strawson disagrees, but in that case he's not being consistent with Wittgenstein. I have no objections to departure from Wittgenstein, given that I'm a Christian, not a Wittgensteinian, but it's important to recognize that when Strawson does this, he is indeed departing from Wittgenstein rather than being consistent with him.

He is not redefining metaphysics, merely allegating its former questions to epistemology and language.

Oh I agree with all that. Yeah Strawson is departing from him for sure. My point is that you can depart and develop his ideas in areas that he would not aprove. By the way I would be very intersted in reading your thesis on Wittgenstein if you don't mind sending it to me, I think you have my email already.


Again, Wittgenstein wouldn't agree to the form of the argument. Transcendental argumentation depends on an internal critique that simply doesn't work with Wittgenstein because his method is to launch a de jure attack on your critique.

As you know, I'm critical of transcendental argumentation in general because it depends either on an inductive argument or else it reverses itself and reduces to a deductive argument. It is one thing to have a metaphysic to ground phenomena in, but the argument for that metaphysic depends on a number of philosophical and linguistic assumptions which, when called into question, prove hard to demonstrate.

I can see your point. Have you gotten the book Revelation and Reason yet? If not you should there is an essay on the logical developments of TA by Don Collet. Although in all of our discussions I have basicaly pulled from that essay along with Bahnsen's work so it may not be worth your while. I do recomend it anyway.


I'd just suggest reading Anselm's Proslogion chapter 1.

You know I have not read that yet but the more you talk about it I want to read it. So I'll let you know what I think.
 
Depends on whether we are talking about the order of being, in which case it is God, or whether we are talking about the order of knowing, in which case it is the self (Calvin begins the institutes with this distinction). I realize that the latter is considered autonomous by certain Van Tillians (Greg Bahnsen, for instance) but that depends on how you define autonomy.

Philip,

Just curious, but wouldn't the order of knowing still begin with God? I mean, EVERYTHING that we humans know was known by God first and foremost. Our knowledge is simply a derivative knowledge from him, since it is by his will and decree that we are able to know anything. We know what God chooses to reveal to us. I believe that Van Til argued this point (someone please correct me if I am wrong). So I do not think that we as humans (in our knowledge) are autonomous. We depend on God just as much for our knowledge as we do for our existence and our morality.
 
Depends on whether we are talking about the order of being, in which case it is God, or whether we are talking about the order of knowing, in which case it is the self (Calvin begins the institutes with this distinction). I realize that the latter is considered autonomous by certain Van Tillians (Greg Bahnsen, for instance) but that depends on how you define autonomy.

Philip,

Just curious, but wouldn't the order of knowing still begin with God? I mean, EVERYTHING that we humans know was known by God first and foremost. Our knowledge is simply a derivative knowledge from him, since it is by his will and decree that we are able to know anything. We know what God chooses to reveal to us. I believe that Van Til argued this point (someone please correct me if I am wrong). So I do not think that we as humans (in our knowledge) are autonomous. We depend on God just as much for our knowledge as we do for our existence and our morality.

Van Til called it "thinking God's thoughts after Him".
 
Just curious, but wouldn't the order of knowing still begin with God?

Of course not. Did you start with God when you learned to speak? Did you construct theological arguments when you learned to read?

We know what God chooses to reveal to us.

Careful, we're approaching epistemic occasionalism (Gordon Clark) here.

So I do not think that we as humans (in our knowledge) are autonomous.

Define autonomy. Autonomy is an attitude not a set of attributes or a metaphysical state.

We depend on God just as much for our knowledge as we do for our existence and our morality.

Yes, but that's not what we're talking about in the order of knowing. In the order of knowing, we're not talking about truth-makers or the ontological grounding for knowledge: we're talking about the subjective process of acquiring knowledge. I look in front of me and form the belief that there is a desk in front of me. What I don't do is formulate an argument for the existence of the desk metaphysically---because that's just silly. This goes back to Moore's argument for how I know that I have hands: there it is.
 
Just curious, but wouldn't the order of knowing still begin with God?

Of course not. Did you start with God when you learned to speak? Did you construct theological arguments when you learned to read?

We know what God chooses to reveal to us.

Careful, we're approaching epistemic occasionalism (Gordon Clark) here.

So I do not think that we as humans (in our knowledge) are autonomous.

Define autonomy. Autonomy is an attitude not a set of attributes or a metaphysical state.

We depend on God just as much for our knowledge as we do for our existence and our morality.

Yes, but that's not what we're talking about in the order of knowing. In the order of knowing, we're not talking about truth-makers or the ontological grounding for knowledge: we're talking about the subjective process of acquiring knowledge. I look in front of me and form the belief that there is a desk in front of me. What I don't do is formulate an argument for the existence of the desk metaphysically---because that's just silly. This goes back to Moore's argument for how I know that I have hands: there it is.

Philip,

Actually, I would argue that we DID start with God when we learned to speak. This may not have been conscious, but consider the argument in Romans chapter 1 that ALL have knowledge of the truth (but suppress it). God has made things VERY clear so that man is without excuse.

Romans 1:18-20 (NASB)
18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness,
19 because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them.
20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse.

Also consider this example from Luke's gospel:

Luke 1:39-45 (NASB)
39 Now at this time Mary arose and went in a hurry to the hill country, to a city of Judah,
40 and entered the house of Zacharias and greeted Elizabeth.
41 When Elizabeth heard Mary's greeting, the baby leaped in her womb; and Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit.
42 And she cried out with a loud voice and said, "Blessed are you among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb!
43 "And how has it happened to me, that the mother of my Lord would come to me?
44 "For behold, when the sound of your greeting reached my ears, the baby leaped in my womb for joy.
45 "And blessed is she who believed that there would be a fulfillment of what had been spoken to her by the Lord."

We see here that even in the womb, John the Baptist lept for joy at the presence of the Lord.

So again, I would say that ALL knowledge does indeed begin with God. That is why the natural man is guilty of suppressing the truth. How could he suppress something if he did not somehow know it? He knows the truth, but is unwilling to acknowledge it as truth (and instead calls it falsehood).

In the end I feel I am leaning more towards Van Til than Gordon Clark in this matter. As for autonomy, I agree that no human is autonomous in a metaphysical state. But I also do not believe that a human is autonomous in the epistemological state. A man does not autonomously know things. All of his knowledge begins with God, yet he suppresses the truth in unrighteouness.

Yes you look in front of you and you believe that there is a desk in front of you. But again, you also subconsciously believe MANY other things concerning that desk (how it got there, what its made of, who made it, why is it there, etc.). Many of these things you assume, but others you have to seek out more information. Yet I would argue biblically that you (as the natural man) DO have knowledge of God as the creator of all things (including the desk), yet you suppress that knowledge.

Would you say that the fact that the desk exists is a brute fact? Or would you agree with me when I say that there are no 'brute' facts? As an example I would like to refer to the story of Jesus and the blind man:

John 9:1-12 (NASB)
1 As He passed by, He saw a man blind from birth.
2 And His disciples asked Him, "Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he would be born blind?"
3 Jesus answered, "It was neither that this man sinned, nor his parents; but it was so that the works of God might be displayed in him.
4 "We must work the works of Him who sent Me as long as it is day; night is coming when no one can work.
5 "While I am in the world, I am the Light of the world."
6 When He had said this, He spat on the ground, and made clay of the spittle, and applied the clay to his eyes,
7 and said to him, "Go, wash in the pool of Siloam" (which is translated, Sent). So he went away and washed, and came back seeing.
8 Therefore the neighbors, and those who previously saw him as a beggar, were saying, "Is not this the one who used to sit and beg?"
9 Others were saying, "This is he," still others were saying, "No, but he is like him." He kept saying, "I am the one."
10 So they were saying to him, "How then were your eyes opened?"
11 He answered, "The man who is called Jesus made clay, and anointed my eyes, and said to me, 'Go to Siloam and wash'; so I went away and washed, and I received sight."
12 They said to him, "Where is He?" He *said, "I do not know."

In this story we see that multiple different people are looking at this blind man. Do they all KNOW that the man is blind? Sure, but all facts are interpreted facts. The disciples IMMEDIATELY assume that SOMEONE sinned, either him or his parents, and that is WHY he was born blind. If an atheist were to walk by the blind man, he might also agree with the fact that the man is blind, but that isn't the end of it. The atheist would ASSUME that it was through natural means, perhaps a genetic defect, and that there really is no rhyme or reason for it (just survival of the fittest). Yet in the end BOTH the atheist and the disciples would be wrong. Their knowledge of the fact was wrong. They KNEW that the man was blind, but they were all wrong regarding the How and Why. In the end it is Jesus who declares the true reason WHY he was born blind, in order that God might be glorified.

Bringing this back to the discussion of the desk, I would say that the statement: "there is a desk in front of me" does not exist in a vacuum. Also included are the basic questions (Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How). The knowledge of the atheist who looks at the desk is an incomplete and ultimately false knowledge. He suppresses the truth of God, and so therefore is left with falsehood. The desk cannot be TRULY known outside of its relationship to the creator, to God. Anyone who looks at that desk and acknowledges the existence of the desk also acknowledges the existence of God, for the desk cannot be known apart from its reference to God. Yet the natural man seeks to separate the desk from God, to KNOW the desk apart from God. This is just a suppression of the truth, and so what the natural man has instead is falsehood.

For this reason it is very important that our apologetic be derived from scripture, just like our theology. I think this was the goal of Van Til.
 
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Actually, I would argue that we DID start with God when we learned to speak. This may not have been conscious, but consider the argument in Romans chapter 1 that ALL have knowledge of the truth (but suppress it). God has made things VERY clear so that man is without excuse.

Yes, all have knowledge of the truth and suppress it, but if you take this line of reasoning to be about epistemology you will eventually conclude that there is no such thing as autonomous reasoning and that accusing anyone of such is mere meaningless invective.

We see here that even in the womb, John the Baptist lept for joy at the presence of the Lord.

All that this shows is that infants are capable of being regenerate.

Would you say that the fact that the desk exists is a brute fact?

Depends on how we're defining brute facts.

But again, you also subconsciously believe MANY other things concerning that desk (how it got there, what its made of, who made it, why is it there, etc.).

Sure---that's the way I'm constituted. There's all kinds of epistemic practices that kick in automatically that lead to my believing that there is a desk---no question. But here's the thing: the metaphysical story I tell about the desk isn't going to change my belief that there is, in fact, a desk. And you still haven't shown how I can reason from the existence of God to the existence of the desk.

The desk cannot be TRULY known outside of its relationship to the creator, to God.

What kind of a statement is this exactly? I don't know desks: I know that there is a desk. I know persons, groups of persons, and places, but I don't know objects. I know things about objects, how to use them, etc.---but I don't know objects (German has two different words here for knowledge, by the way, which distinguish what I mean).

Their knowledge of the fact was wrong. They KNEW that the man was blind, but they were all wrong regarding the How and Why.

This is a non-sequitor. People knew that the world was round before they knew that the earth revolved around the sun and they knew that the earth revolved around the sun before they understood the laws of physics that make this possible. Just because you don't actually know the answer to all five questions doesn't mean that you don't know it. The disciples knew that the man was blind.

Again, how did you learn to speak: epistemology is about getting to know the particulars, not about organizing them correctly or coming up with a nice metaphysical story. An atheist plumber who can fix my pipes knows more about them than a Christian plumber who can't. The best theology in the world won't get the pipes fixed.

As for autonomy

Which definition are you using? Bahnsen's or Frame's? Also, give me a definition of "knowledge" while you're at it. The way you're using the word seems to be out of accord with the way we ordinarily use it.

Autonomy is not a state, but an attitude. No one begins with God---not in the ordinary sense of beginning. You begin with the self, and you discover that you are created in His image. The fallen self rejects this, but this does not invalidate the real knowledge of self or of particulars. Again, if my atheist plumber can fix the pipes, then I assume that he has actual knowledge of plumbing. Not pseudo-knowledge, actual knowledge.
 
Philip,

Allow me to better explain my position. I do believe that Romans 1 is a very important statement concerning the state of man, and his knowledge. You agreed with me that we all have knowledge of the truth concerning God. Yet look carefully at what the verse says:

Romans 1:20 (NASB)
20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse.

So we see that God's eternal power, divine nature, and invisible attributes have been CLEARLY seen, through WHAT HAS BEEN MADE (all of creation) so that they are without excuse. I would argue, based on this passage, that if a person sees a desk (or any object for that matter) he is seeing CLEARLY the evidence of God's handiwork. He has knowledge of the truth of God based on even the simplest object that he sees (a tree, a leaf, a baby, a star). Since he is born of a sinful nature, he suppresses that knowledge. If we both agree that the natural man 'suppresses the truth', then it MUST mean that he already has (in some sense) knowledge of what is true (in this case, God's nature and attributes). One cannot suppress something that one does not have in some sense. I would say that in this case it is in a spiritual sense.

The point is that when you do look at a desk, you immediately have already answered one of the six questions (Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How). I mean, as soon as the light reflects back from the object and is processed into your brain, the VERY FIRST thing you do (subconsciously) is answer the WHAT question. What is it that I am looking at? I know that you don't actually ask yourself this question slowly, word for word, in your mind, but it is the very first thing you answer. So again, to simply STOP there and say that you now have knowledge of the truth is to separate the 'what' question from ALL the other questions. You essentially have tried to take this desk OUT of context (the context being that it is God's creation).

Ultimately it comes down to what scripture declares (and scripture needs to be the foundation for philosophy, not just our theology and apologetic method). If you agree with me that men suppress the truth, and that this truth is evident in ALL of God's creation (even the smallest object), then we must agree that EVERY man, if he has knowledge of ANYTHING, has that knowledge BASED on an innate knowledge of God (that he suppresses inside himself). Thoughts?

By the way, I would like you to explain how your philosophy is derived from scripture. Would you agree that we must allow God's word to be the foundation and source of our philosophy, theology, and apologetic? (Please understand that I am not trying to be mean or anything like that, but am trying to better understand your position, and where you are coming from)
 
One cannot suppress something that one does not have in some sense. I would say that in this case it is in a spiritual sense.

Let me explain here what I think is in view: the knowledge of God that man has is what is known as "tacit knowledge." This is knowledge that comes subconsciously and is only ever acknowledged when it becomes an issue. For example, I'm learning German, and I'm starting to realize that there's a logic behind which words are masculine, which are feminine, and which are neuter, but it's not something where I could ever tell you why. Any linguist can tell you that there's no conscious rationale behind it---yet somehow it makes sense that Land is neuter and Madchen is masculine.

The natural knowledge of God is like this: the natural man sees the world around him and ought to understand the logic behind it. He ought to see creation as creation, but he doesn't because of sin. He suppresses the truth in unrighteousness such that it's right in front of him and he can't see it.

I mean, as soon as the light reflects back from the object and is processed into your brain, the VERY FIRST thing you do (subconsciously) is answer the WHAT question.

No, I don't. I find myself thinking "desk." It doesn't make a whole lot of sense to talk about subconscious questions. Unless I'm thinking about something consciously (in language) then I can't very well ask myself questions.

So again, to simply STOP there and say that you now have knowledge of the truth is to separate the 'what' question from ALL the other questions. You essentially have tried to take this desk OUT of context (the context being that it is God's creation).

This is sounding awfully Leibnizian. Taking something out of context does not entail lack of knowledge. Again, just because I'm misled about Newtonian Physics and quantum does not mean that I can't know that the earth goes around the sun.

If you agree with me that men suppress the truth, and that this truth is evident in ALL of God's creation (even the smallest object), then we must agree that EVERY man, if he has knowledge of ANYTHING, has that knowledge BASED on an innate knowledge of God (that he suppresses inside himself).

You have it backward. Romans says that God's attributes are clearly shown from creation, not the other way around. Paul doesn't say that our knowledge of creation is logically derived from our knowledge of God's invisible attributes. Paul is saying that since God has made Himself known through creation (general revelation) man is without excuse because he suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. Man knows because he ought to know.

Again, we're talking kinds of knowledge here and they are important to distinguish, given that we use the word in so many ways.
 
Philip,

I honestly do not see how I have it backwards. I agree that Paul does not say explicitly that ALL of our knowledge comes from God. Yet I think that this is a conclusion that we could rightfully make. I mean, if God's attributes are made evident from ALL of creation, doesn't this mean that when you look at ANYTHING, it is pointing back to God? God's mark of ownership and authorship is seen on ALL of creation. Consider that since we are made in the image of God, then to even KNOW ourselves means that we KNOW God (yet we willfully suppress that knowledge).

Furthermore, if man is suppressing this EVERY time he looks at ANY part of creation (including himself) than it must means that he in some way KNOWS it (in order to suppress it).

So in the end, I honestly do think Romans 1 leads to the conclusions I mentioned above. I have yet to see how you would use scripture to support your philosophy, and how exactly you come to hold the philosophy that you have. Do you believe that men naturally can KNOW things apart from any knowledge of God? If they can TRULY KNOW something without having ANY knowledge of God, then how has God made his attributes evident, and how are they without excuse? Again, I am simply trying to better understand YOUR position and philosophy, and how it relates to what scripture reveals.

Also, consider your example of knowing that the earth revolves around the sun (or that the sun will rise tomorrow). Hume of course would show you that you cannot TRULY know that the sun will rise (based on his presuppositions), but that is a different topic. If a man KNOWS that the earth revolves around the sun, then doesn't this knowledge somehow reveal (or point to) God's attributes? If the sunrise reveals God's attributes, then it must be true that in some way the man who sees the sunrise KNOWS that God has created the earth and the sun to act the way that they do (but he suppresses that knowledge). So again, he cannot KNOW anything apart from his innate knowledge of his creator (which he is held accountable for suppressing).
 
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If we read the later Wittgenstein rather than Derrida as the prophet of postmodernism

I missed this before, I would argue that there are many prophets of postmodernism. For me the premier one would be Richard Rorty, he synthesized all the prophets into one view (adding a little bit of origenality). Anyone wanting to read his most developed thought should read the essays in this book:
Amazon.com: Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) (Volume 3) (9780521556866): Richard Rorty: Books.
 
I agree that Paul does not say explicitly that ALL of our knowledge comes from God.

Eric, it's mediate knowledge. Again, you're going Clarkian here. It's not immediate knowledge of God, but evidence of the work of God in creation which is plain to all, yet sinful man suppresses. God is revealed in creation---that's what Paul is saying. In order to suppress the truth in unrighteousness, though, sinful man has to know and be aware of creation. You're right: we ought to know God---but in this case, it doesn't matter where you start. If you start with the self, you will end up getting to God. If this view of creation is correct, then all argumentation is transcendental.

Do you believe that men naturally can KNOW things apart from any knowledge of God?

Depends on what we mean by knowledge of God. If we mean knowledge-that-is-suppressed-and-ought-to-be-known, then no. If we mean personal knowledge of God given by revelation and the illumination of the Spirit, then yes---the non-regenerate know things.

If they can TRULY KNOW something without having ANY knowledge of God, then how has God made his attributes evident, and how are they without excuse?

Because they are there for all to see. Fallen man is like one who goes looking for a colossus while refusing to note that he is standing on its nose.

If the sunrise reveals God's attributes, then it must be true that in some way the man who sees the sunrise KNOWS that God has created the earth and the sun to act the way that they do (but he suppresses that knowledge).

But that doesn't mean that he doesn't know that the sun rose. You're moving from suppressing knowledge of God to denying that unbelievers have knowledge of particulars but haven't shown a necessary connection between the two. Further, you're still not defining "knowledge" here and your argument may be based on an equivocation.

As for my Scriptural basis, this is simply how I read Romans 1.
 
Philip,

I must respectfully disagree with you when you say that it is not immediate knowledge of God. You say that it is "evidence of the work of God in creation which is plain to all", yet you seem to then want to say that it is not a type of knowledge of God. If God is made evident by creation, then when we perceive creation we cannot avoid knowing God in some sense. It is a knowledge of God that we suppress and are held accountable for. I mean, when you consider ANY small part of creation, it has God's handiwork written all over it. When you look at another person, you are looking at a creature made in the image of God whether you like it or not, whether you even believe it or not. The moment you 'know' that there is a person in front of you, you also 'know' that the person is made in the image of God. Naturally we suppress this innate 'knowledge' but we still have it, and cannot avoid having it no matter what. Even the person who 'knows' less than you about the world is held accountable for suppressing the knowledge of the truth. I mean, by simply existing we have enough of a 'knowledge' of our creator that we are held accountable for suppressing it. Do you deny this?

I must disagree with you that the non-regenerate truly KNOW things. I mean, you are essentially saying (or suggesting) that the unregenerate are capable of having a correct knowledge of something WITHOUT having ANY knowledge of God. Let me ask you this, can the unregenerate correctly KNOW themselves while having absolutely no knowledge of God? How would that make sense in light of Romans 1? If a person truly KNOWS something, while at the same time has absolutely NO knowledge of God in any sense of the term, then what exactly are they suppressing, and how are they held accountable for it?

You said that "Fallen man is like one who goes looking for a colossus while refusing to note that he is standing on its nose." This proves the very point that I am trying to make. He can only REFUSE to note something if he is aware of it in some innate way (people don't refuse things that they are absolutely and completely ignorant of). In this statement you make it seem like he SHOULD easily see that he is standing on the nose of the colossus (and I would agree that he SHOULD). Let me ask you this: Why SHOULD he clearly acknowledge this? I would answer that he SHOULD acknowledge it because deep down he already knows it is true but is suppressing that knowledge. It has been made clear to him, but in his mind it is not clear at all. In his mind there is NO evidence that he is standing on the nose of the colossus. So I would say that he does indeed have knowledge of that colossus, but he still wants to find a different one.

This reminds me of what Dr. James White said in one of his broadcasts concerning Christopher Hitchens. White simply suggested two facts concerning Hitchens: 1) Hitchens KNOWS that God does not exist, 2) Hitchens HATES God. This is exactly in line with what Romans 1 teaches. The atheist is so convinced that God does not exist that he actually might make the claim that he KNOWS God does not exist. Yet at the same time he hates God. This simply reveals that in some way the atheists innately 'know' that God exists, but they suppress it to the extreme. They hate God with every breath they take, while at the same time asserting that there is no evidence that he exists. You don't see them hating Santa Clause or the Easter Bunny (or other imaginary creatures) this way, but boy do they hate the God that they assert is just as imaginary.

In the end I really do hope that you will present me with your system of philosophy, and how you would go about apologetics. I honestly am trying to understand where you are coming from, and I am curious as to how much you have read from Van Til, Oliphint, and Bahnsen. Where do you begin in YOUR understanding of philosophy? What is your starting point for apologetics, and how do you build the philosophical system that you hold to? I am very curious about this and would love to hear more when you get the chance.
 
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Hey, gents. Good discussion. I won't jump in this late to take it off course, but I'll simply add a few comments that might lead to conversations in other threads.

1) Philip, I pretty much agree with what you're saying here, but I'd love to talk more some time about the value of transcendental argumentation.

2) James, man, you read a lot of philosophy. I'll probably be coming to you with questions sometime. Do you see yourself more as a philosopher or as someone who uses philosophy for more theological and apologetical interests?

3) To all, I find Van Til, or more accurately Van Tillianism, to be extremely problematic. It's interesting to me that almost every philosophical discussion on PB, even ones that don't have his name in the thread title, winds up coming back to him. My problem is not so much with the content of the philosophy as with the attitude of many who employ it. They think that because they read Van Til, they know philosophy, and they don't need to know other philosophers. Their approach to philosophy is aggressive and subversive; they read other philosophers in order to do transcendental deconstructions (not Derrida's kind) on their work. It seems to me that many Van Tillians, when they bother to engage philosophers, do so in order NOT to learn from the experience. I'm afraid this attitude, which probably does stem from Van Til's conclusions (but not his own method, which was quite porous and eclectic), is ultimately harmful because of its isolationism.
 
2) James, man, you read a lot of philosophy. I'll probably be coming to you with questions sometime. Do you see yourself more as a philosopher or as someone who uses philosophy for more theological and apologetical interests?

Well I am flattered that you say that, yes I will attempt to answer your questions as best I can (but I make no promises that I can answer them). Just for the record Philip has a much greater understanding of analytical philosophy than I do so I may refer you or anyone to him for those specific philosophical questions, but there are many that I can answer.

I see myself as doing more apologetical work, I love philosophy itself. So I would in a perfect world do apologetics and philosophy at the same time, I do have a deep passion for theology. In fact any truly christian philosophy will be apologetical on some level. I have enjoyed the fact that so many people have helped me in my theological learning on this site. My most comfortable area is philosophy though.


3) To all, I find Van Til, or more accurately Van Tillianism, to be extremely problematic. It's interesting to me that almost every philosophical discussion on PB, even ones that don't have his name in the thread title, winds up coming back to him. My problem is not so much with the content of the philosophy as with the attitude of many who employ it. They think that because they read Van Til, they know philosophy, and they don't need to know other philosophers. Their approach to philosophy is aggressive and subversive; they read other philosophers in order to do transcendental deconstructions (not Derrida's kind) on their work. It seems to me that many Van Tillians, when they bother to engage philosophers, do so in order NOT to learn from the experience. I'm afraid this attitude, which probably does stem from Van Til's conclusions (but not his own method, which was quite porous and eclectic), is ultimately harmful because of its isolationism.

I kind of agree with you here. You know Dr. Oliphint somewhere, I can't recall off the top of my head, that VanTillians at times could project an apathy towards philosophy but that we need VanTillian philosophers out there. I think the test for good christian philosophy is Van Til's interactions with Dooyeweerd. He criticized where he deserved it and praised him where he deserved that. In the end you get a view of christian philosophy that is truly biblical.
 
Charlie,

I completely agree with you that many people who employ Van Tilliasm do so in a very aggressive way, and perhaps with a condescending attitude. In my own experience I always make it my effort not to do this, but always just go back to scripture (which needs to be the foundation). Reading multiple philosophers/theologians definitely helps to grow one's experience and understanding of the situation. It also helps (at least in my case) to develop a greater appreciation for Van Til's work. I too would love to discuss any philosophical questions with you, and honestly would love to know how exactly Van Tilliasm is problematic (you alluded to a problem with those who employ it, not with the system itself).
 
I must respectfully disagree with you when you say that it is not immediate knowledge of God.

Oh? So when I look at anything, it bears witness to God in the sense that God uses it as an occasion to impose knowledge on the mind? The knowledge of God in general revelation is a mediate knowledge, not an immediate one. It is a conclusion that ought to follow and which we ought to see, but refuse to see through. Immediate knowledge of God, though, is found when God illumines our hearts and regenerates us by the Spirit. Immediate knowledge is when God reveals Himself directly rather than simply through creation.

Why SHOULD he clearly acknowledge this?

Because it's what he's looking for and it's right there.

In the end I really do hope that you will present me with your system of philosophy

That's part of the problem: I'm not interested in coming up with a system of philosophy. I'm interested in finding solutions to problems.

Where do you begin in YOUR understanding of philosophy?

With what I have. As a Christian, I look to Scripture as a starting point and a deciding consideration in answering many questions. But I'm also interested in the why: how do the Scriptural considerations play out in reality? I also begin from the kinds of claims that we make in everyday life. I look at how words are used ordinarily and try to figure out what kinds of practical assumptions we are making. Consider these four claims:

"I know that Jesus rose from the dead"

"I know that I was raised in Virginia"

"I know that Lee lost the Battle of Gettysburg."

"I know my friend Jed."

"Chattanooga? I know that town."

"I know how to tie a bow tie."

"I know God."

In all of these cases the word "know" is being used very differently, and in my philosophy, I am interested in exploring these differences.

To all, I find Van Til, or more accurately Van Tillianism, to be extremely problematic. It's interesting to me that almost every philosophical discussion on PB, even ones that don't have his name in the thread title, winds up coming back to him.

I'll go ahead and say that whatever my beliefs, I'm never going to be a Van Tillian for the simple reason that I'd rather not identify with a single figure (other than Jesus), however useful. I'll also say that I find Van Til rather useful in many ways for a big-picture view, but I think it needs more nuance, certainly, than some have given. Van Til was not trying to be systematic.

There's also, I think, a lack of emphasis on the fact that knowing God personally is paramount. In preaching the Gospel, we are, in a sense, making formal introductions, asking "Mr. Smith, I'd like to introduce you to a very dear friend of mine. He's our creator, our sustainer and our Lord." There's a real sense in which the unbeliever doesn't know God: he is afraid of God and doesn't understand that God is good.
 
Philip,

You asked me the following question: "So when I look at anything, it bears witness to God in the sense that God uses it as an occasion to impose knowledge on the mind?"

I would honestly say that when you look at anything you cannot avoid having a knowledge of God at the same time. When you look at another human being, the moment you say 'I know that there is a person in front of me' you also 'know' in an innate sense that the person was created by God. God is making his divine attributes clear when you look at the person in front of you. Whether you call it mediate or immediate knowledge, these things occur simultaneously. The moment that you look at a person and fail to acknowledge the handiwork of God, you have sinned by suppressing the truth. I do not think that there is a moment in time when an unbeliever claims to 'know' that there is another human being in front of them without at the same time suppressing the truth of God. It is because of our sinful nature that the way we naturally see the world is broken.

I mean, consider the atheists. Has God failed to provide enough evidence for them? Not at all. The only other option then is that something is wrong with them, and their entire perspective. And that is exactly the case. So as long as they remain slaves to sin, their perspective will never be correct on anything.

Consider the following example. Did Pontius Pilate 'know' that Jesus was standing in front of him? At first glance we would say, 'Yes'. But let me ask you this. In this sentence how do we define 'Jesus'? Did Pontius Pilate 'know' that the eternally begotten Son of God, the God-Man, was standing in front of him? I would say that innately he did know this, but suppressed it. Yet in Pilate's opinion the Jesus standing in front of him was just another Jewish man, and no more than a popular teacher. So if Pilate were to claim that he 'knew' that Jesus was standing in front of him, would he be correct? No, because his understanding of who Jesus was (his definition of Jesus) was NOT correct.

How many people today claim to 'know' Jesus? Yet it is important to ask them what Jesus they are talking about (they might be only referring to a prophet, or a great teacher). Unless they are referring to the eternal Son of God, the second person of the Trinity, then their claim to knowledge is false.

For this reason I would say that a person cannot truly 'know' anything without knowing God. Any unbelieving person who claims to know anything is making a false claim unless they 'know' the Lord. Of course, people still claim to 'know' things, but they are simply referring to a false knowledge that is based on a broken perspective of the world (a perspective where they attempt to 'know' and 'interpret' the universe apart from God). At the same time, there is an innate knowledge of God that is suppressed AT ALL TIMES by the natural man. There is not a moment on earth where the natural man is not suppressing the truth in unrighteousness. When referring to the natural man one cannot separate a perception of the world (and a so-called 'knowledge' of things) from the suppression of the truth (the two are hand-in-hand, and simultaneous).

That is why I would conclude that when an unbeliever claims to 'know' anything, what he is really doing is trying to interpret the universe while suppressing his innate knowledge of his Creator. His knowledge is therefore false and incorrect. Only the regenerate man can truly 'know' things, since his perspective is no longer broken and he is know longer trying to interpret the universe apart from God.

Let us consider the statements that you used as examples:

"I know that Jesus rose from the dead" (The unbeliever would have a false knowledge of Jesus, because he would not recognize him as the Jesus of scripture)

"I know that I was raised in Virginia" (The unbeliever has a false knowledge of Virginia because he does not recognize the people of Virginia as created in the image of God, nor does he recognize the land of Virginia as being part of God's creation)

"I know that Lee lost the Battle of Gettysburg." (The unbeliever has a false knowledge of Lee because he does not recognize Lee as a creature in the image of God)

"I know my friend Jed." (The unbeliever has a false knowledge of Jed because he does not view Jed as created in the image of God)

"Chattanooga? I know that town." (The unbeliever has a false knowledge of Chattanooga because he does not view it of a town inhabited by God's creatures)

"I know how to tie a bow tie." (The unbeliever has a false knowledge of himself because he does not recognize himself as created in the image of God)

"I know God." (The unbeliever has a false knowledge of God because he does not acknowledge the attributes of God that are described in scripture)

Now if a believer made these statements he would be making these statements from a perspective of someone who 'knows' the Lord (he no longer suppresses his innate knowledge of God, but now in fact embraces it). He would not be interpretting the universe apart from his knowledge of God. The unbeliever attempts to 'know' things apart from 'knowing' God, and all that results is that he has false knowledge.

I would agree with you that the use of the term 'know' is different in each of the statements above. Yet the unbeliever is always WRONG when he uses that term, because his perspective of the world around him is always wrong (because he constantly suppresses the truth of God).

I also agree completely that we need to use scripture as the basis for our apologetic. It just seems like you are so against the transcendental argument and presuppositional apologetics. I honestly am trying to understand why you think the TA is wrong, and why you disagree with it (if my understanding of your perspective is wrong, please correct me). I don't consider myself tied to Van Til in such a way that I ignore scripture. It is like calling ourselves Calvinists. We call ourselves Calvinists because we believe that what Calvin championed was biblical. Many people say that instead of following Calvin we should be following Jesus. Yet they do not realize that we consider Calvin to be following biblical principles, and to be correctly adhering to Jesus' teachings. Perhaps that is why it is better to use the term 'Reformed', which I try to do now so as to not cause people to immediately close their ears because I am a Calvinist.
 
I lied. I'm jumping in. Forgive me.

Eric, I'll bite on this idea that the unbeliever does not know anything unless he knows God. I think it's based on an equivocation of the word "know." Simply, you're importing weight to it that you would not in an ordinary use context, as I think Philip would put it.

In all of your responses to Philip's statements, you claim that an unbeliever does not really know the person/place/skill/statement because he is lacking some OTHER piece of information that serves to place it in context. On a general level, you seem to be saying that in order to know X, I have to know every possible piece of information that would contextualize X. However, this is clearly an unusable criterion of knowledge. Imagine the following conversation, between two believers, just to simplify things:

"Hey, do you know Samantha Green?"
"Sure, I went to high school with her."
"Do you know her social security number, current dating status, weight, and favorite animal?
"Uhh... no."
"Then you don't really know Samantha Green."

You see my point, I'm sure. Just how much information do I need to know somebody/something? Given such a criterion, I think it would be possible to argue that nobody knows anything.

But perhaps you could make a more nuanced argument: One does not have to know all contextualizing information about a thing, person, etc. However, God is the most important reality (Reality?) and thus is the most important contextualizing factor for any given thing/object. So, lacking a correct knowledge of God in relation to subject X is such a significant lack of contextualizing knowledge that it disqualifies claims to know X.

Now, if that is the argument being made, I find it better than the first, and theologically provocative in some ways, but still lacking. It still doesn't give a coherent account of our ordinary use of the term "know." If I can't get my bow tie tied, and I ask my unbelieving friend to help me, and he does, can I really turn around and tell him that he does not know how to tie a bow tie because he does not correctly perceive himself as created in the image of God? That's absurd.

Furthermore, we need to work by a process of elimination. The sentence "I know Chattanooga" can either be true, false, or further qualified. You have denied that the unbeliever can say, "I know Chattanooga." So, you must be committed to the premise, "You (the unbeliever) do not know Chattanooga." If you opt for the third, that the unbeliever has a qualified knowledge of Chattanooga, then you concede the premise that the unbeliever does have some knowledge. Any response other than a flat denial of knowledge leads to that conclusion. However, if you stick to the premise that the unbeliever does not know anything in any sense, then he does not know God either, a clear violation of your position. Thus, some qualification seems inevitable.

Thus, I think you're left with the attenuated position, "The unbeliever lacks a significant contextualizing fact about any given subject such that claims to knowing subjects must be understood in a qualified manner." That's a defensible position, I think, but hardly remarkable.
 
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