what is required for moral responsibility? - Galen Strawson's Basic Argument

[a mere housewife]

Personally, I thought Ryan was saying that the preconditionfor moral responsibility was God's sovereignty. But if 'even the wind and the waves' obey Him, then the precondition for moral responsibility can't be wholly covered by 'authority' (is 'agency' implied in the wind and the waves?).

The clarification was helpful to an onlooker

 

[MW]

He is, after all, the First Mover. I qualified "moving" by the use of the phrase secondary causes, which I would think clearly takes God out of the realm of being a sinner.

No, it doesn't. When you explain that God moves second causes in the mere sense of causing movement, that is neutral. This is the very same action by which He moves all things; it cannot therefore be a specific action which can explain how Adam sinned. It is always the second cause which brings in the element of sin. God moves to action; He never moves to sinful action. Yet you have stated God is "moving them by secondary causes to act in accordance with new inclinations." This makes God the author of Adam's sin.

You begin by saying that there is no mystery in how an upright man became a sinner and you close with telling us that he possessed the possibility of sinning due to his nature. That much is true. However, I do not see how you address what so many have found so mysterious, which his how sin came from a non-sinful person. My previous post makes an attempt at that, whereas your post would only seem to set up the question by stating the facts which both Arminians and Calvinist agree upon.

I stated that Adam was "mutable" and "earthy." That is all that is needed to explain Adam's actions and it doesn't involve making God the author of sin.

Moreover God decreed that Adam would be influenced in the manner that he was.

Divines distingush between the absolute decree and its execution by means of secondary causation for the very purpose of showing how God is not an agent in human acts of sin. You would do well to learn and imitate that distinction.

 

[MW]

And if I can chime in, Ryan said that responsibility implies authority and sovereignty, not necessarily that sovereignty implies responsibility.

Exactly.

I thought you were trying to explain moral responsibility within a deterministic view, not simply to prove determinism. I apologise if I misunderstood the nature of your statement.

 

[Ron]

He is, after all, the First Mover. I qualified "moving" by the use of the phrase secondary causes, which I would think clearly takes God out of the realm of being a sinner.

No, it doesn't. When you explain that God moves second causes in the mere sense of causing movement, that is neutral. This is the very same action by which He moves all things; it cannot therefore be a specific action which can explain how Adam sinned. It is always the second cause which brings in the element of sin. God moves to action; He never moves to sinful action. Yet you have stated God is "moving them by secondary causes to act in accordance with new inclinations." This makes God the author of Adam's sin.

You begin by saying that there is no mystery in how an upright man became a sinner and you close with telling us that he possessed the possibility of sinning due to his nature. That much is true. However, I do not see how you address what so many have found so mysterious, which his how sin came from a non-sinful person. My previous post makes an attempt at that, whereas your post would only seem to set up the question by stating the facts which both Arminians and Calvinist agree upon.

I stated that Adam was "mutable" and "earthy." That is all that is needed to explain Adam's actions and it doesn't involve making God the author of sin.

Moreover God decreed that Adam would be influenced in the manner that he was.

Divines distingush between the absolute decree and its execution by means of secondary causation for the very purpose of showing how God is not an agent in human acts of sin. You would do well to learn and imitate that distinction.

Matthew,

I think at times I could say the sky is blue and you would deny it. The distinctions you think I should learn are throughout my posts. For some reason you aren't willing to see them but so many others do.

Take care,

Ron

 

[MW]

I think at times I could say the sky is blue and you would deny it. The distinctions you think I should learn are throughout my posts. For some reason you aren't willing to see them but so many others do.

If you say the sky is blue when in fact it appears black, yes, I would deny it. Please concentrate on the specific statements I have addressed and leave personal innuendo at the door. You have alleged that God moves men by secondary causes to act in accordance with new inclinations. Either defend the statement or repudiate it, but please do not make this personal.

 

[Knight]

I thought you were trying to explain moral responsibility within a deterministic view, not simply to prove determinism. I apologise if I misunderstood the nature of your statement.

If an indeterminate position is incompatible with God's eternal omniscience, would you not agree determinism is necessary? And if determinism is necessary, would you not agree that autonomy is unnecessary to be morally responsible? I was under the impression we both submitted to logic and Scripture.

 

[JTB]

I think at times I could say the sky is blue and you would deny it. The distinctions you think I should learn are throughout my posts. For some reason you aren't willing to see them but so many others do.

If you say the sky is blue when in fact it appears black, yes, I would deny it. Please concentrate on the specific statements I have addressed and leave personal innuendo at the door. You have alleged that God moves men by secondary causes to act in accordance with new inclinations. Either defend the statement or repudiate it, but please do not make this personal.

If God is not using secondary means to cause men to change/move from an inclination to obey (Adam prior to the Fall) to an inclination to disobey (Adam during the Fall), then you must posit a cause external to God's determination.

That God uses means that cause man's inclinations toward sin does not imply that God is the proximate cause of sin, nor does it imply that God is morally culpable for sin. The inclination still arises from within the man, according to his willingness. The point Ron is making is simply that man's willingness cannot occur apart from God's sovereign determination of it.

If God is the sole determination of all things, what can escape His determination/causation?

 

[MW]

If an indeterminate position is incompatible with God's eternal omniscience, would you not agree determinism is necessary?

What is "an indeterminate position?" To what position does "indeterminate refer?"

 

[MW]

If God is not using secondary means to cause men to change/move from an inclination to obey (Adam prior to the Fall) to an inclination to disobey (Adam during the Fall), then you must posit a cause external to God's determination.

This language is completely foreign to discussions on the sovereignty of God with respect to the fall of man. First, Adam was made upright but mutable. The fact that he was mutable meant that he could disobey God. There was no need to "change/move" an inclination in Adam. Secondly, no orthodox theologian says that God changes/moves men to sin as a First Cause. We do not say He commits sin, but reject the very notion as blasphemy. We say He "permits" sin. It is a decreed permission, but it is permission nonetheless, which removes His agency from the act of sin.

If God is the sole determination of all things, what can escape His determination/causation?

I believe that God has decreed all things that shall come to pass. I also maintain that God offers no violence to the freedom of the will but men act in full accord with their own choices. I don't see a contradiction in those two views because I can distinguish betwen the decree and its execution (Shorter Catechism answer 8). The decree is absolute while the execution takes contingency and conditionality into account as things which God has also decreed. We can speak of ultimate causality so far as the decree of all things is concerned. But in terms of the execution of the decree we only allow active influence in relation to grace and redemption; we must deny active influence in relation to sin and damnation because the Bible rejects all thought that God sins or tempts to sin, or damns men for any reason other than their own voluntary choice to sin.

 

[JTB]

This language is completely foreign to discussions on the sovereignty of God with respect to the fall of man. First, Adam was made upright but mutable. The fact that he was mutable meant that he could disobey God. There was no need to "change/move" an inclination in Adam. Secondly, no orthodox theologian says that God changes/moves men to sin as a First Cause. We do not say He commits sin, but reject the very notion as blasphemy. We say He "permits" sin. It is a decreed permission, but it is permission nonetheless, which removes His agency from the act of sin.

If Adam had no inclination to sin because he was created upright, then his inclination would have to change in order for Adam to commit sin. The only way in which Adam's inclination could occur apart from God's sovereign determination is by recourse to LFW. Do you affirm LFW? The language of "permission" and "passive" rather than "active" don't explain God's determination. How does God "permit" and what does it mean for God to act "passively"? It is in your explanation of these terms where we will see whether or not we agree or disagree with the definition of God's determination.

I believe that God has decreed all things that shall come to pass. I also maintain that God offers no violence to the freedom of the will but men act in full accord with their own choices. I don't see a contradiction in those two views because I can distinguish betwen the decree and its execution (Shorter Catechism answer 8). The decree is absolute while the execution takes contingency and conditionality into account as things which God has also decreed. We can speak of ultimate causality so far as the decree of all things is concerned. But in terms of the execution of the decree we only allow active influence in relation to grace and redemption; we must deny active influence in relation to sin and damnation because the Bible rejects all thought that God sins or tempts to sin, or damns men for any reason other than their own voluntary choice to sin.

I don't understand what you mean by "takes contingency and conditionality into account." Do you mean that God uses secondary means to ensure that the sins that He has decreed to occur will necessarily occur, or do you mean something else?

I also do not understand what you mean by "allow active influence. . .deny active influence." What is the difference between "active influence" and "passive influence" as you understand it?

I recognize your affirmation of patently Reformed phrases, but subscription to certain language is not the same as explaining what is understood by that language. From your posts, I am not able to discern what is your understanding of the language. The fault may be mine, or perhaps you are merely tagging terms apart from definite explanation. Either way, I'd appreciate it if you would provide (or repeat) your definitions.

 

[MW]

If Adam had no inclination to sin because he was created upright, then his inclination would have to change in order for Adam to commit sin.

Again, you are failing to understand the "upright" condition of Adam. He was not confirmed upright. He was made with the possibility of sinning. Therefore no new inclination was introduced in order to "move" him to sin. Free agency chose to receive the error of the serpent and subsequently to partake of the forbidden fruit. There is nothing libertarian about this because God did not creat Adam with a "necessity" to obey.

Turretin discusses this with biblical sensitivity in his Institutes, 1:606-611. It is folly for an individual to continue defending a radically curious and potentially dangerous theory when he has been instructed otherwise. Why don't you take some time to digest what has been introduced to you. It might just open the door to a fuller understanding of the subject.

 

[JTB]

If Adam had no inclination to sin because he was created upright, then his inclination would have to change in order for Adam to commit sin.

Again, you are failing to understand the "upright" condition of Adam. He was not confirmed upright. He was made with the possibility of sinning. Therefore no new inclination was introduced in order to "move" him to sin. Free agency chose to receive the error of the serpent and subsequently to partake of the forbidden fruit. There is nothing libertarian about this because God did not creat Adam with a "necessity" to obey.

Turretin discusses this with biblical sensitivity in his Institutes, 1:606-611. It is folly for an individual to continue defending a radically curious and potentially dangerous theory when he has been instructed otherwise. Why don't you take some time to digest what has been introduced to you. It might just open the door to a fuller understanding of the subject.

Possibility does not equal actuality. In an upright and morally blameless condition, it is just as possible for Adam to avoid sin as to commit it. That is the meaning of Augustine's own dictum posse non peccare - able not to sin. If one is able, then the possibility is affirmed, but not the actuality. I'm afraid you haven't yet dealt with the central matter.

As for Turretin, I have not read the passage, and I do not have the book, but perhaps there is a place online I might read it (or you could reproduce it for me)? I am aware, however, that R.L. Dabney argued against Turretin's view on this very issue, so the citing of an authority here hardly solves the matter. As you say, free agency made the choice, but how free agency operates within God's sovereign determination has not been explained by anyone other than Ron. If you are going to disagree in a substantial way rather than quibbling with language, you have the burden to refute the argument and also assert an alternative definition. I haven't seen either.

Furthermore, I see no grounds for you considering what has been set forth as a "radically curious and potentially dangerous theory." God's exhaustive determination of all things does not imply moral culpability for sin on His part. We both affirm that, but you have yet to explain a definite view of how determination and the inclination to sin are compatible. You have affirmed that they are, but have not provided any demonstration. Ron, much earlier in the thread, provided both affirmation and demonstration.

I would like to digest your view, and perhaps even gain fuller understanding from it, but as yet it is still indistinguishable to me what exactly your view explains with regard to Adam's liberty and God's determination. I will remind everyone watching again: to affirm the language of Scripture, the Confession, and the Catechisms is not the same as providing an explanation of what those affirmations mean.

 

[MW]

As you say, free agency made the choice, but how free agency operates within God's sovereign determination has not been explained by anyone other than Ron. If you are going to disagree in a substantial way rather than quibbling with language, you have the burden to refute the argument and also assert an alternative definition. I haven't seen either.

I did refute the argument -- God is not the author of sin; Ron's explanation makes God the author (mover) of Adam's "new inclination" to sin. Nothing more need be said. Your defence of this kind of language which Ron has used only demonstrates that you have been infected with the same disease. You would do well to read Turretin for an antidote before proceeding any further.

The importation of philosophical concepts like libertarian or necessitarian views of the will is unnecessary for understanding the subject. Such views pertain to "natural" choice, not "moral" choice. Anyone who has studied the philosophical question will understand this. The philosophical question is no part of the "moral" choice which Adam made. Should one avail himself of the Cunningham article which I have referenced he will soon see that philosophical necessity is not an intrinsic part of the Calvinist system.

 

[Philip]

The importation of philosophical concepts like libertarian or necessitarian views of the will is unnecessary for understanding the subject. Such views pertain to "natural" choice, not "moral" choice. Anyone who has studied the philosophical question will understand this. The philosophical question is no part of the "moral" choice which Adam made.

Actually, Matthew, libertarian choice vs. compatibilist choice seems to be precisely the debate here--the question is one of moral ability.

Libertarianism would state that the will is morally free whereas compatibilism says that it is bound by desires. This is precisely what the discussion turns on: is Edwards' definition the proper one?

This is probably the single hardest question that Calvinism has to deal with: how do we explain the metaphysical necessity of Adam's choice to sin without implicating God? We have to say that God ordained the choice--though that does not implicate God. The question is how Adam came to have the desire to sin when He was created perfect.

 

[JTB]

As you say, free agency made the choice, but how free agency operates within God's sovereign determination has not been explained by anyone other than Ron. If you are going to disagree in a substantial way rather than quibbling with language, you have the burden to refute the argument and also assert an alternative definition. I haven't seen either.

I did refute the argument -- God is not the author of sin; Ron's explanation makes God the author (mover) of Adam's "new inclination" to sin. Nothing more need be said. Your defence of this kind of language which Ron has used only demonstrates that you have been infected with the same disease. You would do well to read Turretin for an antidote before proceeding any further.

The importation of philosophical concepts like libertarian or necessitarian views of the will is unnecessary for understanding the subject. Such views pertain to "natural" choice, not "moral" choice. Anyone who has studied the philosophical question will understand this. The philosophical question is no part of the "moral" choice which Adam made. Should one avail himself of the Cunningham article which I have referenced he will soon see that philosophical necessity is not an intrinsic part of the Calvinist system.

Reverend Winzer,

You did not demonstrate, but rather asserted, that Ron made God the "author" of sin. One is quite puzzled as to what exactly is meant by God being the "author" of sin. Lane, in an earlier post, made use of an analogy that compared God's determination to Shakespeare's "authorship" of his plays. To me such language seems entirely too ambiguous for clear understanding.

Also, you have now provided two citations for me to read, but if their arguments are so indispensable, one would expect that you could provide the relevant arguments that pertain to the discussion. As for your comments regarding the language of philosophy, I find them entirely irrelevant to the current matter. I did not ask you to provide a philosophical justification with regard to natural or moral categories. The very fact that you introduce a distinction between "natural" and "moral" abilities leads me to believe that you are confused as to what exactly is being asked.

I simply want you to explain how it is that God exhaustively determines all things according to his eternal decrees, and yet Adam's liberty to choose according to his strongest desire remains un-coerced. As much as you say that this "natural" ability does not pertain to Adam's "moral" choice, we must still know what you think about how Adam's moral choice to sin arose from a nature that had no original inclination to sin, being that Adam was created morally upright.

On a final point, you say that "philosophical necessity is not an intrinsic part of the Calvinist system," and while it is true that not all views of determinism are compatible with Calvinism, it does not alter the fact that Calvinism is a system that affirms determinism, namely, God's Sovereign and Providential determination. Unless you wish to deny such a view, it would be expected that you could provide an explanation of the salient points of determinism within the Calvinist system that are being asked of you.

Recall that I'm not especially concerned with what Turretin or Cunningham have to say, although I would find their views interesting to be sure. I am primarily interested in your understanding; your explanation. How is it that I may know that what Turretin and Cunningham say is what you understand them to mean, unless you articulate to me what you understand their meaning to be?

If you wish to provide a refutation using the salient arguments from Turretin and/or Cunningham, by all means do so. But telling me to read them gives me nothing at all of what you yourself understand. And lest there be confusion as to my repetitiveness, I assure you that it stems from an earnest desire to meet with your mind, and not as an attempt to avert the issue or feign ignorance. I promise you that I will give my hearty thanks and rejoicing when I am able to discern what exactly your view is--even if I find myself in complete disagreement with that view. As yet I remain in the dark as to what exactly it is you understand when you affirm the language you have been affirming.

~Joshua

 

[MW]

Actually, Matthew, libertarian choice vs. compatibilist choice seems to be precisely the debate here--the question is one of moral ability.

No, everyone agrees that Adam had moral ability. As per WCF 9.1, we are working with the definition of free will that "God hath endued the will of man with that natural ability, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil." Combatibilism seeks to show how this freedom accords with a deterministic worldview. It stresses that the will is free to choose according to inclination and understanding. It has nothing to do with an ability of the will with respect to good or evil per se. Hence non Calvinists and even non Christians can incorporate it into their systems.

Our discussion is in the realm of WCF 9.2. We are asking how Adam, having freedom to do what is good (moral), nevertheless chose what is evil (moral). As this section of the Confession states, Adam had this ability, but was mutable; and because he was mutable, he might fall. The answer therefore does not lie in philosophical theories as to the natural power of the will, for these only concern the power of the will to choose to act in accord with the determinate counsel of God, and do not pertain to the will towards good or evil in particular.

 

[JTB]

Actually, Matthew, libertarian choice vs. compatibilist choice seems to be precisely the debate here--the question is one of moral ability.

No, everyone agrees that Adam had moral ability. As per WCF 9.1, we are working with the definition of free will that "God hath endued the will of man with that natural ability, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil." Combatibilism seeks to show how this freedom accords with a deterministic worldview. It stresses that the will is free to choose according to inclination and understanding. It has nothing to do with an ability of the will with respect to good or evil per se. Hence non Calvinists and even non Christians can incorporate it into their systems.

Our discussion is in the realm of WCF 9.2. We are asking how Adam, having freedom to do what is good (moral), nevertheless chose what is evil (moral). As this section of the Confession states, Adam had this ability, but was mutable; and because he was mutable, he might fall. The answer therefore does not lie in philosophical theories as to the natural power of the will, for these only concern the power of the will to choose to act in accord with the determinate counsel of God, and do not pertain to the will towards good or evil in particular.

The Confession uses "natural" in conjunction with moral ability in sections 9.3 and 9.4 without the assumption of their being entirely unrelated. Indeed, to make a distinction between what man has by nature and what man has morally is to set up a distinction whereby morality is either unnatural, or nonnatural--that is, having nothing to do with nature--despite the Confession (and Scripture) distinctly discussing our moral abilities in terms of our nature (pre-fall, fall, redeemed, and glorified).

 

[Philip]

What these definitions do mean, though, is that Adam could not have sinned unless he had the desire to sin. Unless you want to maintain that Adam's will was undetermined (and I think we have to say that it was determined), then we have to ask how Adam could have had a desire to sin, being made perfect.

When I speak of "moral ability" I am speaking of desires. Right now, I have the moral ability to type this response--how do I know this? Because I am doing it. In this sense, every choice is a moral one. Adam could not do what he was not inclined to do.

 

[MW]

You did not demonstrate, but rather asserted, that Ron made God the "author" of sin. One is quite puzzled as to what exactly is meant by God being the "author" of sin. Lane, in an earlier post, made use of an analogy that compared God's determination to Shakespeare's "authorship" of his plays. To me such language seems entirely too ambiguous for clear understanding.

The language is in the Confession and has been stated with the clear intent to preserve the integrity of God's holiness in relation to sin and reprobation. I do not need to rehearse all the exegetical, historical, dogmatic, and pastoral steps which lead up to the conclusion in order to substantiate it as an essential point of reformed theology. It is a boundary marker for discussion on the sovereignty of God, and any explanation of causality which goes beyond that boundary marker is not an explanation of reformed theology but a corruption of it.

Also, you have now provided two citations for me to read, but if their arguments are so indispensable, one would expect that you could provide the relevant arguments that pertain to the discussion.

I could, but I don't have time to do your work for you. Read the sources for yourself, become knowlegeable about how such points are discussed WITHIN the boundaries of reformed orthodoxy, and then I believe we will be able to have a profitable discussion. I really can't understand the mindset which refuses to learn more in order to discuss a subject more intelligibly. A refusal to learn more simply turns into a share your ignorance session. Why would I or any sensible person want to participate in such a discussion?

I simply want you to explain how it is that God exhaustively determines all things according to his eternal decrees, and yet Adam's liberty to choose according to his strongest desire remains un-coerced.

The use of the word "move" has nothing to do with the language of "determination." As noted, you are out of the realm of the decree and into the realm of its execution when you are discussing how Adam received "new inclinations." Again, I ask you to become acquainted with the way the subject is usually discussed.

As much as you say that this "natural" ability does not pertain to Adam's "moral" choice, we must still know what you think about how Adam's moral choice to sin arose from a nature that had no original inclination to sin, being that Adam was created morally upright.

It has already been explained. Mutability, probation, and earthiness. If you would like to know more then why don't you ask a question pertaining to the explanation provided; denying that it is an explanation is ridiculous seeing as it has been used by reformed theologians for generations.

On a final point, you say that "philosophical necessity is not an intrinsic part of the Calvinist system," and while it is true that not all views of determinism are compatible with Calvinism, it does not alter the fact that Calvinism is a system that affirms determinism, namely, God's Sovereign and Providential determination. Unless you wish to deny such a view, it would be expected that you could provide an explanation of the salient points of determinism within the Calvinist system that are being asked of you.

As stated, there is nothing salient here. Philosophical necessity pertains to the will as will. It can explain the will's determination to this or that action, but it cannot explain the will's choice of good or evil in themselves.

 

[MW]

What these definitions do mean, though, is that Adam could not have sinned unless he had the desire to sin.

"Sin" is a moral relation. It is not an action in and of itself. "Desire to sin" is a relative value, not a physical quality. If a man has intercourse with a woman the action is not sin in itself. It the woman is his wife, it is good. If the woman is not his wife, it is evil. Eating from the tree was an action indifferent in itself. It became morally evil when God prohibited it. Hence the "sin" was not in the action, but in the prohibition. Philosophical necessity can explain why Adam might choose one action over another. It cannot explain why he would choose "sin" over "righteousness." WCF 9.2, following holy Scripture, provides the explanation; the answer is not to be found in the philosophy of men.

 

[Confessor]

This brings to mind for me a vague conception of choice as defined in three parts: the action in itself, the motive for an action, and some third thing which I cannot remember. (And I'm not positive if there are three total, either.) Can anyone provide the correct view of this? I think it would be fruitful to the discussion.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

JTB,

Re-read the Board rules you agreed to.

Also, read some posts about the nature of the Confessions or about how to perform hermeneutics altogether. While it has become popular, in recent years, to push authorial intent from written documents in order to make a text a playground for the reader, this is destructive to not only Christian thought but to human thought.

Matthew has given you some historical background to the use of words in the Confession. You may not like his explanation but you cannot simply respond in a "seems to my bare reading of how I use natural or understand philosophy" to state that the explanation is wrong.

You would do well to pick up Mueller's work Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. You may not think it much cares what stream the Reformed tradition is standing in but this board very much cares. If you don't like to discuss issues within that tradition then this is a free country but the boundaries of this board were clearly spelled out when you clicked "I Agree" to them. I ask you let your Yes be Yes to that agreement whether you read it fully or not.

 

[JTB]

The language is in the Confession and has been stated with the clear intent to preserve the integrity of God's holiness in relation to sin and reprobation. I do not need to rehearse all the exegetical, historical, dogmatic, and pastoral steps which lead up to the conclusion in order to substantiate it as an essential point of reformed theology. It is a boundary marker for discussion on the sovereignty of God, and any explanation of causality which goes beyond that boundary marker is not an explanation of reformed theology but a corruption of it.

I haven't questioned the language of the confession. I have affirmed it. I have simply asked you to explain what you think is the meaning. If one cannot explain the meaning of terms, one does not know the terms. If one refuses to explain the meaning of terms, one is not being charitable to one's interlocutor.

I could, but I don't have time to do your work for you. Read the sources for yourself, become knowlegeable about how such points are discussed WITHIN the boundaries of reformed orthodoxy, and then I believe we will be able to have a profitable discussion. I really can't understand the mindset which refuses to learn more in order to discuss a subject more intelligibly. A refusal to learn more simply turns into a share your ignorance session. Why would I or any sensible person want to participate in such a discussion?

You have yet to prove where I have crossed any boundaries. You have made several assertions, but an assertion isn't proof. I am sure that if I made an assertion regarding your views, you would require me to provide substantial reasoning to demonstrate that the assertion is valid rather than just an opinion. I only expect what I would expect others to hold me accountabel for. Also, I think it is a gross misunderstanding to complain that I am unwilling to learn. I have asked you, at least three times now, to interact directly with me, and not send me after readings that you should be capable of using yourself in your own arguments. My ignorance of what Turretin or Cunningham have to say does not mean I am ignorant of the chief matters being discussed. Why would any sensible person refuse to provide arguments that he says he has read elsewhere?

The use of the word "move" has nothing to do with the language of "determination." As noted, you are out of the realm of the decree and into the realm of its execution when you are discussing how Adam received "new inclinations." Again, I ask you to become acquainted with the way the subject is usually discussed.

I don't think you have grasped Ron's meaning expressed in the term "move." You have not established what is the relation between God's decree and His execution of it. You have used words like, "active" and "not active," but you haven't defined what you mean by those terms. Language policing only makes sense when you have definitions to mark your terms. I don't mind dropping "move" if you can give me what you think is the definition of the terms you are using. Otherwise, to affirm your terms is to affirm something, the meaning of which has not been given. Such an affirmation on my part would be made in ignorance, which I can hardly believe you would want from any concientious person. Mind you, the ignorance has nothing to do with ignorance of the Confession or its terms, but rather ignorance of what you, yourself mean when you use the terms.

It has already been explained. Mutability, probation, and earthiness. If you would like to know more then why don't you ask a question pertaining to the explanation provided; denying that it is an explanation is ridiculous seeing as it has been used by reformed theologians for generations.

It has not been explain, sir. I have asked you how it is that Adam, whose inclination in Creation was to obey, for he was created morally upright, could change to an inclination to disobey. That he was mutable does not explain the change itself, but rather the possibility of change. I have argued that possibility is not the same as actuality, which I cannot believe anyone would disagree with, although they are free to do so if they can. Furthermore, my denial that YOU have explained anything is NOT a denial that OTHERS have explained something. Just because I argue that you haven't given me an explanation of your own thoughts does not mean that I'm denying other Reformers. A man can only speak for himself, as to what he thinks, and you have not yet clearly articulated the definitions of your terms. I assure you that my concern is with you, and not with the Reformed tradition, the Confession, or any particular Reformer.

As stated, there is nothing salient here. Philosophical necessity pertains to the will as will. It can explain the will's determination to this or that action, but it cannot explain the will's choice of good or evil in themselves.

Could you provide more than an assertion here, please? It is my understanding that nothing occurs "in and of itself" apart from its relation to God's decrees. Otherwise, things would have independent existence. Now, you may wish to bracket consideration of relations in order to elucidate a particular aspect of the idea under consideration, but it still remains a requirement to place it once more in relation to the decree, since the decree determines all things. You have yet to demonstrate the relationship between the decree and its execution. You have asserted several things, which I have pointed out above, but you have not given me the meaning of your terms, or arguments producing validity that your assertions are correct in your understanding.

Re-read the Board rules you agreed to.

I am aware of the rules, and thank you for the reminder. I am not denying the Confessional language. I am only unclear as to Mr. Winzer's own understanding of the meaning of the Confession, and more particularly his view on the matters immediately above. If you believe I have behaved disrespectfully, I would be pleased if you would point it out, and I will repent of my error in conduct, if it be so.

[quote"semper fi"]Also, read some posts about the nature of the Confessions or about how to perform hermeneutics altogether. While it has become popular, in recent years, to push authorial intent from written documents in order to make a text a playground for the reader, this is destructive to not only Christian thought but to human thought.[/quote]

I don't understand why you would even mention this at all. Do you suspect me of playing fast and loose with language? All I have done is asked for a definition of terms. That is hardly out of the question I would think.

Matthew has given you some historical background to the use of words in the Confession. You may not like his explanation but you cannot simply respond in a "seems to my bare reading of how I use natural or understand philosophy" to state that the explanation is wrong.

Historical background is not the same as the definition of terms. I am satisfied with Rev. Winzer's historical background. I am unclear as to what he thinks the terms in this discussion mean. If you can show me where he has explained his terms by way of definition, I would be very thankful. Also, I think you have mischaracterized my replies to Rev. Winzer. I have not produced a novel interpretation of natural or philosophy. I have cited where the Confession uses the terms natural in conjunction with moral, where Rev. Winzer has asserted that they are entirely separate. That seems to me like a discrepancy that requires more argumentation than bald assertions.

You would do well to pick up Mueller's work Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. You may not think it much cares what stream the Reformed tradition is standing in but this board very much cares. If you don't like to discuss issues within that tradition then this is a free country but the boundaries of this board were clearly spelled out when you clicked "I Agree" to them. I ask you let your Yes be Yes to that agreement whether you read it fully or not.

I appreciate your zeal to defend the Confessions, but I am quite puzzled as to why you or Rev. Winzer have seen me deny the language or meaning of the Confession. I have repeatedly pointed out that affirming the language of the Confession is not the same as having explained its meaning. Liberal Reformed denominations often affirm the language of the Confession while denying the meaning. I would think it would be encouraged for folks here to ask one another to explain what they think the language means, rather than simply accept that they confess whatever is stated to be true.

 

[Knight]

If an indeterminate position is incompatible with God's eternal omniscience, would you not agree determinism is necessary?

What is "an indeterminate position?" To what position does "indeterminate refer?"

The position that - due to creaturely autonomy - God is ultimately not the cause of all things.

 

[Prufrock]

As has been stated several times, the question is not a philosophical question, but a theological question; thus, it does not properly concern the issues of determinism, compatiblism, libertarianism, etc. And though I am perhaps least able to present a convincing or thorough defense or explanation of the Reformed position, I will nevertheless attempt one that may be considered somewhat satisfactory.

Since you (JTB) have been referred to Turretin above, I will do you the favor of explicating the distinctions which he makes, and which the content of your posts suggests would be useful to you. After dismissing the monstrous Pelagian/Socinian/Arminian notion that the explanation for man's fall must be sought in a certain inborn inclination to sin, he proceeds to state matter-of-factly (as has been done above):

No other [explanation] more suitable can be granted than by returning to the mutability and liberty of the first man, as one who was created indeed just and holy, but mutably. Institutes, IX.vii.iv​

Now, as you have indeed stated, mutability itself is not sufficient as an explanation of the cause, as it simply "indicates the possibility of the fall and is the cause sine qua non." And for this reason, the theologian introduces the distinction of mutability itself and the *act* of mutability, with "the former denot[ing] a power which could be inclined to evil, but was not yet inclined; the latter, however, designat[ing] the actual inclination to evil itself (condemned by the law of God) and the fountain of all sin."

Thus, the mutability and free-will of man is taken in conjunction with the false idea implanted in his mind by the Serpent, which now begins to serve as a satisfactory explanation (since the issue at hand is not philosophical, but theological). Since the help or assistance given to Adam can be bifurcated into 1.) The Power of Not sinning (which he always had, even in the moment of his first sin); and, 2.) The Efficacious grace, which was undeserved, which served as "an action or efficacious motion to good." Thus, when this actual motion to good was withheld, and man was (though retaining his ability not to sin) left, as it were, to his own mutability, he willingly succumbed most freely to the false idea of the Devil, without receiving any impelling action or motion from God toward a new inclination. And thus, theologically, we are able to prevent God from being the author or "incliner" of man's sin: he has not given to him a new desire, he has not taken away his liberty to not sin, etc.

 

[JTB]

First off, let me say thank you very much Prufrock for providing the relevant arguments from Turretin. I am pleased to interact with them, as well as your own comments.

As has been stated several times, the question is not a philosophical question, but a theological question; thus, it does not properly concern the issues of determinism, compatiblism, libertarianism, etc. And though I am perhaps least able to present a convincing or thorough defense or explanation of the Reformed position, I will nevertheless attempt one that may be considered somewhat satisfactory.

To separate theology and philosophy is to divide knowledge unnecessarily. Surely God's Word provides sufficient information to determine of what nature was Adam's inclination to sin, and how that inclination occurred within the sovereign determination of God. To argue that determinism is not a theological matter seems more destructive than helpful.

Since you (JTB) have been referred to Turretin above, I will do you the favor of explicating the distinctions which he makes, and which the content of your posts suggests would be useful to you. After dismissing the monstrous Pelagian/Socinian/Arminian notion that the explanation for man's fall must be sought in a certain inborn inclination to sin, he proceeds to state matter-of-factly (as has been done above):

No other [explanation] more suitable can be granted than by returning to the mutability and liberty of the first man, as one who was created indeed just and holy, but mutably. Institutes, IX.vii.iv​

Now, as you have indeed stated, mutability itself is not sufficient as an explanation of the cause, as it simply "indicates the possibility of the fall and is the cause sine qua non." And for this reason, the theologian introduces the distinction of mutability itself and the *act* of mutability, with "the former denot[ing] a power which could be inclined to evil, but was not yet inclined; the latter, however, designat[ing] the actual inclination to evil itself (condemned by the law of God) and the fountain of all sin."

I have no disagreements at all with the above.

Thus, the mutability and free-will of man is taken in conjunction with the false idea implanted in his mind by the Serpent, which now begins to serve as a satisfactory explanation (since the issue at hand is not philosophical, but theological). Since the help or assistance given to Adam can be bifurcated into 1.) The Power of Not sinning (which he always had, even in the moment of his first sin); and, 2.) The Efficacious grace, which was undeserved, which served as "an action or efficacious motion to good." Thus, when this actual motion to good was withheld, and man was (though retaining his ability not to sin) left, as it were, to his own mutability, he willingly succumbed most freely to the false idea of the Devil, without receiving any impelling action or motion from God toward a new inclination. And thus, theologically, we are able to prevent God from being the author or "incliner" of man's sin: he has not given to him a new desire, he has not taken away his liberty to not sin, etc.

Ignoring the distinction between philosophy and theology (a distinction that remains unclear to me by the way you use it), it does not seem that Turretin has answered the question at issue, and even the best reading inclines him to what I'm advocating. If it required the removal of efficacious grace in order for Adam to, of his own willing, incline to sin, then we see that in terms of the decree and its effect God's determination has ensured the result. Turretin does not specific in particular what the withholding of grace entails, but we must surley agree that while Adam was sinless, it was due to God's preserving grace, keeping Adam from a situation wherein his inclination to sin should arise.

That Adam sinned according to his strongest desire, and that the inclination to sin arose from within himself is not disputed. What is disputed, which Rev. Winzer asserted (but I don't see Turretin arguing at all) is that Adam's inclination did not need to change in order for Adam to be inclined to sin.

Here is one of his relevant quotes:

Again, you are failing to understand the "upright" condition of Adam. He was not confirmed upright. He was made with the possibility of sinning. Therefore no new inclination was introduced in order to "move" him to sin. Free agency chose to receive the error of the serpent and subsequently to partake of the forbidden fruit. There is nothing libertarian about this because God did not creat Adam with a "necessity" to obey.

To put his argument into an easier to see form:

1. Adam was created mutable and upright.
2. Mutability implies the possibility of sin.
3. To possess the possibility of sinning requires no new inclination to actually sin (unstated premise)
4. Therefore no new inclination was introduced in order to incline Adam to sin.

The problem is that Adam, by virtue of being created upright, even in his mutable state, was inclined to be upright. So then, the possibility of sinning, not being sufficient for actual sin, requires a new inclination to arise within Adam toward sin. Ron's point, which is the point I've been laboring to affirm as not only Reformed, but true, is that the inclination is ultimately indexed to God's determination, without God being culpable for Adam's own inclination and willing sin.

Inclinations do not arise in a vacuum, but require cirumstances in which they arise. God is the one who determines the situations in which inclinations arise, and therefore knows precisely what will in fact incline any man to sin. Why else do we pray in the Lord's prayer "lead us not into temptation," unless we know that God is able to keep us from situations where we would be inclined to sin rather than to obey?

For God, there are no truly contingent effects, therefore Adam could not have chosen otherwise than Adam did, for God decreed that Adam should sin. Dabney couldn't have been more right when he commented: "But in a metaphysical point of view, I cannot but think that Turretin has made unnecessary and erroneous concessions. The future acts of free agents fall under the class of contingent effects: i.e., as Turretin concedes the definition, of effects such as that the cause being in existence, the effect may, or may not follow. (For instance: the dice box being shaken and inverted, the dice may or may not fall with their first faces uppermost.)... But let me ask: Has this distinction of contingent effects any place at all, in God's mind?"

 

[Philip]

As a point of context, the position that JTB is defending is within the sphere of Reformed orthodoxy, being advocated in Calvin as well as by Dabney and Gordon Clark. If you consider these thinkers to be unconfessional on this point, then please just state it.

That said, I do tend to think that the authorial perspective on God's determination is helpful.

One memorable villain from literature is Uriah Heep from David Copperfield. We can say that Charles Dickens indeed was the ultimate cause of Uriah Heep's dishonesty and crimes in the sense that he conceived of and wrote the character of Uriah Heep--nonetheless, we do not blame Charles Dickens for the evil: we blame Uriah Heep. We don't blame Shakespeare for the murder of Duncan: we blame Macbeth. Why? Because it was Macbeth who did it. We analyze not Shakespeare's motive for wanting Duncan dead, but Macbeth's motive for murdering Duncan.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Also, read some posts about the nature of the Confessions or about how to perform hermeneutics altogether. While it has become popular, in recent years, to push authorial intent from written documents in order to make a text a playground for the reader, this is destructive to not only Christian thought but to human thought.

I don't understand why you would even mention this at all. Do you suspect me of playing fast and loose with language? All I have done is asked for a definition of terms. That is hardly out of the question I would think.

Yes, I do. When you say:

The Confession uses "natural" in conjunction with moral ability in sections 9.3 and 9.4 without the assumption of their being entirely unrelated. Indeed, to make a distinction between what man has by nature and what man has morally is to set up a distinction whereby morality is either unnatural, or nonnatural--that is, having nothing to do with nature--despite the Confession (and Scripture) distinctly discussing our moral abilities in terms of our nature (pre-fall, fall, redeemed, and glorified).

You are divorcing the WCF from it's original intent (how the author's used the terms) and drawing your own conclusions about what you believe the WCF states based on how you read it.

If you truly want to understand then creating a dilemma in Matthew's presentation based on your a-historical reading of terms is not the way to go about it.

You're skating on thin ice.

I'm not asking you to interact with my warning. It is a warning. Heed it.

 

[MW]

This is my final response.

I haven't questioned the language of the confession. I have affirmed it.

Your words were, "One is quite puzzled as to what exactly is meant by God being the "author" of sin." "To me such language seems entirely too ambiguous for clear understanding." That is not affirmation. As pointed out, the Confession makes the statement denying authorship of sin in order to set a boundary to discussions on God's sovereignty. Finding the statement puzzling merely blurs that bondary line.

You have yet to prove where I have crossed any boundaries.

If you support Ron's use of "move" then you have crossed the boundary line. God moves no man to sin. God moves all things to action. "Sin" is entirely the responsibility of the sinner.

I don't think you have grasped Ron's meaning expressed in the term "move."

You have asserted several things, which I have pointed out above, but you have not given me the meaning of your terms, or arguments producing validity that your assertions are correct in your understanding.

Discussion presupposes shared language. I use terms as they are commonly used in reformed theology. Seeing as you have presented yourself as knowing this subject to such an extent that you can dogmatise about it, and have undertaken to criticise my explanation of the subject, one would expect you to know these words without having to have somebody define them for you.

In summary. God is not the author of sin. God moves no man to sin. To suggest otherwise is to impugn the holiness of God. It suffices to explain the first sin that Adam, although upright, was mutable, which means he was able to sin; that the probation placed him in a situation where sin could be presented to him; and that his earthiness made him susceptible to desire that which was forbidden him. "Sin" is a moral relation, not a natural act; therefore the determination of the will was a moral consideration, not a natural consideration. Philosophical necessity might explain why men choose to act in one way over another but it cannot account for "moral" values. The theological answer -- mutability, probation, earthiness -- suffices to explain the first sin without impugning the holiness of God or having recourse to human speculation.

The maxim of the Bible is, I believe therefore I speak, not, I speculate therefore I speak.