what is required for moral responsibility? - Galen Strawson's Basic Argument

[steven-nemes]

I want to leave a brief comment before responding to some of the posts here.

I am inclined to think libertarianism about the will is true, and am leaning towards a Molinistic understanding of the reconciliation of divine providence/human freedom. Now Ron supposedly thinks that I am an Arminian, thereby, but I don't understand that all: (i) I don't believe any of the points of Arminianism, whereas I believe all the five points of Calvinism; (ii) J.I. Packer is Reformed and I remembering hearing that he believes in LFW. So I am hardly the first.

I'd be willing to argue LFW and in fact I will probably post later today in response to the various posts addressed at me above. (Ron says not to reply to him anymore; fine by me.)

I hope that adopting this view doesn't put me in any "trouble" with the admin, though I don't know why it is that it should--you could quote me a line from the WCF from the section on free will and I'd agree with it, assuredly. So it is not as if I became Arminian, despite what Ron says. I am just changing my understanding of predestination/sovereignty, etc.

 

[JTB]

I want to leave a brief comment before responding to some of the posts here.

I am inclined to think libertarianism about the will is true, and am leaning towards a Molinistic understanding of the reconciliation of divine providence/human freedom. Now Ron supposedly thinks that I am an Arminian, thereby, but I don't understand that all: (i) I don't believe any of the points of Arminianism, whereas I believe all the five points of Calvinism; (ii) J.I. Packer is Reformed and I remembering hearing that he believes in LFW. So I am hardly the first.

I'd be willing to argue LFW and in fact I will probably post later today in response to the various posts addressed at me above. (Ron says not to reply to him anymore; fine by me.)

I hope that adopting this view doesn't put me in any "trouble" with the admin, though I don't know why it is that it should--you could quote me a line from the WCF from the section on free will and I'd agree with it, assuredly. So it is not as if I became Arminian, despite what Ron says. I am just changing my understanding of predestination/sovereignty, etc.

Steven,

There is obvious confusion in your thinking, for otherwise you would be articulating a view and defending it as your own, rather than leaning one way or another. Also, confusion is revealed in the fact that you consider Calvinism or Reformed theology compatible with LFW. That some who claim the title of Reformed believe in LFW is not a legitimate argument. People, even relatively intelligent people, often believe contradictory claims are both true. Further, a blanket assertion to a clause in the WCF does not imply that you have grasped its truth against all contradictory claims. The PCUSA comes to mind as an entire denomination (though not including every individual church) that affirms the Confession while denying a great many of its doctrinal statements.

I cannot speak for the administrators here as to the consequences of your conduct according to their rules, but from what I've witnessed, your approach in this thread and others is not the posture of a novice or a student who seeks to learn from those with greater wisdom and acumen. Rather, your posture is that of one who has already mastered the arguments--despite your own admission that you are unsure of what exactly you believe to be true.

In my opinion, you are more deserving of rebuke than continued patience, for you have not demonstrated that you respect what others who outstrip you in knowledge and experience have been graciously offering you.

 

[Philip]

Seven,

LFW is incompatible with any sort of foreknowledge on God's part, which is why those philosophies which accept LFW are called incompabilist, whereas Calvinism has (apart from certain extreme positions--Gordon Clark comes awfully close) historically been compatibilist, which uses the Edwardsian definition.

 

[greenbaggins]

Calvinists have always held to free will in the sense that any being can do whatever it is in his nature to do.

This is more food for thought for Confessor and Philip, though I'm addressing this to Lane since it has to do with something he and I discussed a while back, which his most recent post reminds me of for various reasons. I could imagine that Confessor and Philip might find this matter somewhat interesting. It has to do with the often claimed premise that Adam, prior to the fall, could have chosen contrary to how he chose.

Lane,

The nature of man, whether pre-fall, post-fall and unconverted, post fall and converted, or glorified, does not affect this discussion in the least. LFW is simply the power of contrary choice and liberty is the ability to choose as we want. The nature, which you seem to like to bring up, does not determine the actual choice; it only determines the kinds (or category) of choices that will be made. This common mistake, which a quote from John Frame I employ below demonstrates, can lead to more serious mistakes.

Your remarks remind me of an exchange we had quite some time ago.

You and I have discussed this matter of LFW on GB. The gist of that discussion was put on my site: Reformed Apologist: Reformed Folk & The Power of Contrary Choice

You and I had an enormous disagreement on this subject of LFW. You even went so far to assert that I as"outright denying that Adam was created righteous and innocent, contrary to all the Reformed confessions." The stakes were high we might say, for I was thought to have denied the Confession!

I think it is worth rehearsing this discussion because discussions over LFW will eventually get back to the garden and even to God’s often time supposed freedom to choose contrary to how he has. If LFW was ever possible for any moral creature, then why not for all moral creatures, so the argument goes. Yet, if LFW is a philosophical surd, then neither God nor Adam has / had it, which gives heartburn to many.

Libertarian free will (LFW) can simply be defined as the ability to choose something different than what will be chosen. My position on the matter is straightforward. LFW is a philosophical surd. If it is true that one can choose something different than he will, then the future God believes will come to pass might not come to pass; and even if the future does come to pass as God believes, he will not have been thoroughly justified in his belief. He would have just been lucky, or at best very insightful.

John Frame once noted: “I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.”

I resonated with John’s observation the very first time I read his lament. This is a very serious matter. These men to whom John refers may have very well been ordained and licensed in Reformed denominations (or have gone on to teach other men at seminary; or even have their own Blog!) - yet without any appreciation for the implications of their religious philosophy as it pertains to free will.

In our discussion, Lane, you asserted that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did, which of course I denied (and in that instance challenged the notion). You went on to say to me that “The pre-Fall and post-Fall distinction is what is completely escaping you.” On this matter I agree with John Frame... "the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense."

I asked you: “Did the metaphysics surrounding LFW change with the fall?”

You responded with: "The mechanics of how man chooses something are the same before and after: he can always choose what his nature determines that he can choose.”

Your response made me somewhat suspicious of a couple of things and I believe those suspicions were confirmed in what followed. As I pointed out to you then, the nature does not determine the choice; it only determines the kinds of choices that will be made. I said: “The nature determines no action of choice. The nature simply determines the moral quality of the particular choice that will necessarily occur according to the inclination at the moment of choice. So then, an unregenerate man will sin; his nature determines that he must. His nature, however, does not determine what sin he will choose.” Consequently, LFW is not concerned with the general category of choice (whether it is sinful or not), which is dictated by one’s nature, but rather, it is concerned with what the specific action will be.

You ended up skipping over that part and went on to affirm what I believe to be a very common, philosophical contradiction.

You stated: “Let me state that again: Adam could NOT have thwarted God’s will in the garden.” Plus you stated: “What I am saying is that Adam could have willed to do the right thing.” “Are you denying that Adam could have chosen to obey?”

That is what I want to zero in on here. For if you are correct with regard to Adam in the garden, then there is no reason why we should think that today we do not have the freedom to choose contrary to how we do choose. Again, the issue is not a matter of whether we're convereted or not but whether we are able to choose something different than what we end up choosing. If Adam, as you say, truly could have chosen contrary to how he did (which would mean he could have truly thwarted God's decree), then his radical freedom would imply that he had LFW. The "pre-fall distinction" would have had no bearing on such radical freedom to choose something different than the specific x he chose. The nature, in this case mutable, only speaks to the category of choices that can come from the strongest inclination.

The contradiction I found in your statement is that if Adam truly could have acted contrary to how he did (as you said), then Adam truly could have thwarted God’s will in the garden (which you denied). No appeal to the pre-fall state can save such a logical contradiction, which was precisely John Frame’s point. Your position was indeed most clear: It was impossible for Adam to have acted contrary to God’s decree AND Adam could have chosen to obey, which would have been to act contrary to God's decree. That’s Molinism and not Calvinism, I'm afraid.

You also asserted that I “deny that Adam was created with the power to obey.”

That, of course, is also false and cannot be logically deduced from my writings. As I clearly noted: “YES Adam prior to falling had the ‘power’ to perform spiritual good. I was most clear in my affirmation that Adam had the power to obey. Nonetheless, the power to obey does not imply that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did anymore than a car’s power to run can direct the car in a direction contrary to the way in which it ends up moving! It was clear to me that you had confused the "power" the Confession speaks of with the "power of contrary choice". You assumed that Adam had the power to choose contrary to how he did, which is LFW, and not something the Confession affirms.

Toward the end of our discussion you stated this (just prior to locking the thread): “you are using the term “molinist” as if it was all about Adam’s will before the Fall, and wasn’t about middle knowledge and man’s ability after the fall. You cannot project the one onto the other, like you are so obviously doing. I am very tired of this thread, and am therefore closing it.”

I was hesitant to even try to address this remark on my Blog because of what I believed to be the lack of clarity of the statement. It actually seemed to me (at least at the time) to be more of an emotional outburst than anything else. Let me simply say that you are in 100% agreement with Alvin Plantinga and W.L. Craig in what you affirmed back then with regard to Adam’s will and God’s decree. In other words, you affirmed the tenets of Molinism when you said that Adam could have acted differently (LFW) than he did, while also maintaining that God’s plan could not have been thwarted in the least (Exhaustive Foreknowledge). Those two tenets (LFW and EF) as an unbreakable unit are upheld by Molinists, not Calvinists.

Now you might wish to say that Adam could have chosen differently had he wanted, just like you and I can choose differently should we want. However, that would undermine your underlying defense of Adam’s radical freedom, which you narrowly indexed to the “pre-fall distinction” (that I was thought to have been missing in your estimation). In other words, you bolstered you argument for Adam’s ability to choose contrary to how he chose by attributing Adam’s alleged radical freedom to choose (contrary to how he did) to the “pre-Fall distinction”, affirming my suspicion that you fall into the category of those examined by John Frame. I find no discernable difference between your philosophy and those to whom John made reference. Both you and they say that Adam, due to his pre-fall state, could have chosen other than he did. That is to affirm LFW, at least for Adam prior to the fall. If he had it then, why can’t we have it now? Again, LFW is a metaphysical concept that is not peculiar the four states of man.

Cheers,

Ron

Thank you, Ron, for such a detailed delineation of your position. I think I understand you a bit better now. Please forgive me for the blog thing. I think I was under the impression that you were simply hounding me, and I was getting tired of feeling that way, plus I didn't have the time to devote to the question.

I honestly think we agree more than you seem to think we do. From the perspective of God's decree, Adam could not have done anything different than what he did, for it was God's will that the Fall should happen.

All I was really trying to say was that Adam was created in a state of integrity. Therefore, from the perspective of Adam facing the choice before him, he had it in him to choose the right thing, since his nature was created as innocent. Otherwise, he could have fallen before the time of the actual Fall, could he not? He was innocent and upright up until the time he let Satan in the garden (which is what I believe was the first sin of Adam and Eve: they were priests of the Garden-temple, and were thus supposed to keep it holy). To go back to the play analogy I used earlier, the script for the Fall was written in eternity, and could not have played out any differently. The only thing I am trying to protect here is the integrity of Adam's created state, which, as Augustine puts it, was able either to sin or not to sin, posse peccare et posse non peccare. He was not created with a sin nature. You would agree with that, would you not? To say that does not feel like libertarian free will to me. The sinner who has been regenerated also has the God-given ability not to sin, at least in a relative sense. But he can also sin. He can't do anything other than what God has decreed. Of course, this must be modified by the fact that our sin nature is still operating, even in all our good works, such that they are always tainted, and thus we cannot offer anything to God that is unblemished. Nevertheless, there are still good works that a Christian can do by the grace of God that can be called good works. And I think we agree that people always choose what they want.

Where I am still a little uncomfortable with your phrasing of things is that it still seems to me that you are denying the state of integrity that Adam had. He was without sin in any way shape or form before the Fall, was he not? If that is so, what are the implications of that for how Adam made his choice? And is it legitimate to posit different layers of causality here (my illustration also comes from Frame, by the way)?

 

[Confessor]

I think an important clarification might be that when perceiving Adam over an interval, e.g. from his creation through the Fall, there were instances both of sinning and of not sinning (obviously the latter outnumbering the former), and therefore he was able to sin and not to sin; but when we perceive Adam at a particularity, e.g. at the moment he chose to fall, there was nothing he could do but fall (for that is what God decreed).

Whenever we talk about man's moral ability, the only way to incorporate separate possibilities into it (posse peccare et posse non peccare), is to discuss separate instances, for we can never do except that which God decreed us to do. Otherwise, our inclinations must pinpoint us to a specific choice, whenever we are discussing a specific point in time rather than an interval.

 

[Ron]

To nobody in particular (or to all my brothers and sisters on the Puritian Board):

I said many years ago that one of the biggest threats to Reformed theology is the high-Arminianism of Molinism. Many have been taken captive by its subtle charm, but in the final analyses it is nothing more than dressed-up Arminianism. There's really nothing new under the sun.

Below I have tried to address, although briefly, Libertarian free will (LFW) and its implications with respect to what is commonly called the "five points". LFW is the pillar upon which Molinism stands or falls; so if LFW is not compatible with the five points, then neither can be Molinism.

To affirm libertarian freedom and all its implications is to deny the intentions of the “five points”.

I found it easier to discuss LFW as it comes to bear upon the five points in an unusual order of ITPUL.

I
For libertarians, men can choose between alternatives with equal ease - according to their own agent-causation, from a posture of neutrality. Accordingly, to affirm LFW is to deny that irresistible grace is necessary for a dead man to repent and believe.

Moreover, libertarians affirm that the only choices men can be held morally responsible for are choices that are libertarian in nature. The reason being, it is held by libertarians that choices that are caused by something other than the agent (such as in the case of irresistible grace) are deemed as robotic puppetry and consequently not morally relevant with respect to human responsibility. However, when man chooses according to irresistible grace, the choice made is indeed morally relevant with respect to human responsibility, which is contrary to the libertarian tenet that only agent-caused choices are relevant in this way. Coming to Christ by irresistible grace is in fact the most morally relevant choice a man will ever make and one for which he will be held accountable to have made. Consequently, one may not affirm irresistible grace on the suppositions peculiar to LFW.

T
If man can come to Christ apart from irresistible grace, then he cannot be totally depraved by definition.

P
Sophisticated libertarians can affirm “eternal security” but NOT the grace required for the perseverance of the saints, which is nothing other than God’s preservation of the saints. This is a bit nuanced (but not too bad) so bear with me. The bottom line is this: Perseverance of the saints entails God’s keeping of the saints throughout the Christian life by the sovereign and will-invading power of the Holy Spirit". The doctrine of perseverance, therefore, presupposes that our persevering faith is not according to a will that is so free as to be able to reject Christ but rather our perseverance is according to a faith that is sovereignly sustained by the Holy Spirit.

The way in which some libertarians can hold onto "eternal security", which is not the same thing has upholding perseverance of the saints, is thusly:

For the libertarian, the reason God’s elect will not deny the faith is not because God will complete the work he has begun in men by causing them to truly believe until the day of Jesus Christ. Rather, the reason one will not lose his salvation is merely because God has chosen to actualize a world in which those that come to Christ according to their LFW will also choose by that same LFW not to depart from Christ. Although tricky-Molinists can affirm eternal security in this way, they cannot do justice to the distinctly Calvinistic teaching that it is God who by his sovereign grace causes men to persevere. What must be grasped is that perseverance is not only concerned with the final result of bringing many saints to glory, but rather it is concerned with God’s part in how that end is achieved. Perseverance plainly teaches that man is kept by God. Whereas the tenets of LFW suggest that it is man - not God - who ultimately causes himself (through agent-causation) to (a) differ from another, (b) come to Christ and (c) remain in Christ. In sum, for the libertarian who affirms eternal security (not all do), it is accomplished this way: God chose to actualize a world in which those who come to Christ will cooperate according to their LFW and choose to remain in Christ, but it is possible that they won’t (due to their LFW) even though they will (also due to their LFW). They do not persevere by the Calvinistic notion of sovereign grace, but rather they persevere by cooperating with the quality of grace that God offers all men.

U
Unconditional election entails that God chooses men without any consideration for foreseen faith. For the libertarian, the proposition, “Ron would believe in such a circumstance if presented the gospel” is not grounded in God’s determination but in man’s free agency. For the libertarian, whether one is elect-able unto salvation is dependent upon whether the man would believe (according to the non-gift of LFW) if presented the gospel, which is conditional election. The doctrine of unconditional election presupposes that God could have elected unto salvation any fallen man had we wanted. Given LFW, it was only feasible that God could have chosen in Christ those who would cooperate with resistible grace.

L
The eternal design was that Christ's substitionary and vicarious death was on behalf of only those who were (a) unconditionally elected in Christ, (b) totally depraved and (c & d) needed irresistible and persevering grace both to come to Christ and remain in him. Accordingly, a philosophy that damages any of the other four points also undermines particular redemption.

Unworthy but His,

Ron

 

[JTB]

All I was really trying to say was that Adam was created in a state of integrity. Therefore, from the perspective of Adam facing the choice before him, he had it in him to choose the right thing, since his nature was created as innocent. Otherwise, he could have fallen before the time of the actual Fall, could he not?

Lane, if I may be permitted to join in the discussion between you and Ron here. . .

Not being possessed by his plunge into sin, Adam, prior to his fall, was capable of choosing to obey. Indeed, in every moment that he did not desire to eat of the fruit of the tree, he was obeying. It does not follow that upon this ability he could not have sinned sooner than he did. Rather, it is solely upon God's decree that the time of the Fall occurred when it occurred. Why? Because Adam, being mutably righteous (able to sin), was only preserved in his righteousness by the grace of God (God's determination to keep Adam from circumstances wherein Adam would choose to disobey).

Even the fallen Adam, and thus all subsequent humans, are kept from sin or brought into sin by God's determination of circumstances (secondary means). For example, had God so desired, He would have arranged it so that David desired to go to war instead of remaining behind and committing adultery with Bathsheba. From the opposing side, it was by God's determination of circumstances that David was desirous to fight Goliath for the sake of God's own name.

Each of these examples demonstrate the combatibilism of Calvinist doctrine; namely, that God operates by secondary means to determine the actions of men, who freely choose to act according upon their strongest desire. Nothing within the states of men (pre-fall, fall, regenerate, glorified) changes the nature of man's choosing and God's determination.

The presence or lack of sin does not impinge upon the ability to make a choice according to one's strongest desire, as Ron has already said.

Where I am still a little uncomfortable with your phrasing of things is that it still seems to me that you are denying the state of integrity that Adam had. He was without sin in any way shape or form before the Fall, was he not? If that is so, what are the implications of that for how Adam made his choice? And is it legitimate to posit different layers of causality here (my illustration also comes from Frame, by the way)?

Ron's point has no relevancy upon Adam's integrity, for Adam's integrity is irrelevant to the nature of choice in compatibilism, as expressed above. That Adam was without sin made absolutely no difference upon his ability to choose according to his strongest desire. The analogy is, in my opinion, more confusing than helpful. Analogies rely upon one or more points of similarity, while discarding all other possible similarities. Therefore, it is more helpful to simply identify the specific character of the idea than to risk misunderstanding or confusion that arises from irrelevant or even contradictory elements in the analogy.

Grace and peace,

~Joshua

 

[greenbaggins]

All I was really trying to say was that Adam was created in a state of integrity. Therefore, from the perspective of Adam facing the choice before him, he had it in him to choose the right thing, since his nature was created as innocent. Otherwise, he could have fallen before the time of the actual Fall, could he not?

Lane, if I may be permitted to join in the discussion between you and Ron here. . .

Not being possessed by his plunge into sin, Adam, prior to his fall, was capable of choosing to obey. Indeed, in every moment that he did not desire to eat of the fruit of the tree, he was obeying. It does not follow that upon this ability he could not have sinned sooner than he did. Rather, it is solely upon God's decree that the time of the Fall occurred when it occurred. Why? Because Adam, being mutably righteous (able to sin), was only preserved in his righteousness by the grace of God (God's determination to keep Adam from circumstances wherein Adam would choose to disobey).

Even the fallen Adam, and thus all subsequent humans, are kept from sin or brought into sin by God's determination of circumstances (secondary means). For example, had God so desired, He would have arranged it so that David desired to go to war instead of remaining behind and committing adultery with Bathsheba. From the opposing side, it was by God's determination of circumstances that David was desirous to fight Goliath for the sake of God's own name.

Each of these examples demonstrate the combatibilism of Calvinist doctrine; namely, that God operates by secondary means to determine the actions of men, who freely choose to act according upon their strongest desire. Nothing within the states of men (pre-fall, fall, regenerate, glorified) changes the nature of man's choosing and God's determination.

The presence or lack of sin does not impinge upon the ability to make a choice according to one's strongest desire, as Ron has already said.

Where I am still a little uncomfortable with your phrasing of things is that it still seems to me that you are denying the state of integrity that Adam had. He was without sin in any way shape or form before the Fall, was he not? If that is so, what are the implications of that for how Adam made his choice? And is it legitimate to posit different layers of causality here (my illustration also comes from Frame, by the way)?

Ron's point has no relevancy upon Adam's integrity, for Adam's integrity is irrelevant to the nature of choice in compatibilism, as expressed above. That Adam was without sin made absolutely no difference upon his ability to choose according to his strongest desire. The analogy is, in my opinion, more confusing than helpful. Analogies rely upon one or more points of similarity, while discarding all other possible similarities. Therefore, it is more helpful to simply identify the specific character of the idea than to risk misunderstanding or confusion that arises from irrelevant or even contradictory elements in the analogy.

Grace and peace,

~Joshua

My argument was not that Adam could not have sinned sooner than he did, but that he did not sin sooner than he did. The point I was trying to draw from that is what you actually said, namely, that before the Fall Adam was capable of choosing to obey. It is a fallacious extension of my argument, therefore, to say that my position requires that Adam could not have sinned sooner. Ultimately speaking, Adam's fall was timed according to God's decree. From the perspective of the decree, there is no other time it could have happened. I think we are agreed on that. We are also agreed that God's decree is the ultimate cause of all things. We are further agreed that God uses secondary causation.

I cannot agree with this statement: "That Adam was without sin made absolutely no difference upon his ability to choose according to his strongest desire." And the reason for that is that Adam's strongest desire changed drastically after the Fall from what it was before the Fall. There is an ability to obey that Adam completely lost in the Fall. This is why I am hesitant to say that in terms of our free will, there was no change in compatibilism from before to after in terms of the Fall. We agree that it was a compatibilist freedom both before and after the Fall. But the compatibilism changed due to Adam's changed nature. The desire changed, and so therefore did the entire direction of Adam's choice-making.

You have not stated why you think the analogy I used is problematic. You only asserted that it was confusing. In what way is it confusing?

 

[Ron]

My dear brother Lane,

Thank you so much for your most kind post to me. It is quite an encouragement to me personally. You are more than forgiven. And I can certainly appreciate the circumstances of not having time, etc. to devote to things. Please don’t give that matter another thought.

Regarding the subject at hand, I most certainly agree that Adam was created without a sin nature. He was created upright, in innocence and without any inclination toward sin. Yet he was mutable, which means that had God wanted he could have decreed that Adam fall, which is what God wanted, hence the fall. It is also true as you say that Adam could not do anything other than what God had decreed. I’d like to interpret everything else you said through that one foundational premise, which is Adam (and presumably us after Adam) could not / cannot do anything other than what God had / has decreed. That is to say that Adam could only do what God had decreed, and we can only do what God has decreed.

With respect to the pre-fall nature of Adam, we can also agree that it would have been consistent with Adam’s nature for God to have decreed (had He wanted) that Adam remain upright and innocent longer, or even indefinitely. Just as it would have been consistent with Adam’s nature (being mutable) for God to have decreed that Adam fall from innocence, which in God’s wisdom is the decree we live under. Notwithstanding, in neither scenario could Adam operate contrary to the decree, just like we cannot act contrary to the decree today.

Prelapsarian considerations:

Consistent with Adam’s mutable pre-fall nature was his innocence; yet being mutable, he could fall from that innocence with utter consistency toward his mutable soul. Whereas after the fall, all we do must be tainted with sin and that cannot change outside of glorification. Therefore, it was available for God (had he wanted) to decree that Adam not sin, but given the fall it was not available to God to decree that we not sin since all our actions must be tainted with sin this side of glory. Notwithstanding, those are distinctions without a relevant difference. The pre-fall / post-fall ontology of man is not a relevant distinction with respect to Adam being more free than we to act contrary to God’s decree. Again, with respect to acting contrary to the divine decree, not even God can do that; it’s an impossibility. Consequently, introducing the pre-fall state of Adam only clouds the issue of whether Adam could have chosen contrary to the decree. There is simply no additional freedom that Adam had relevant to us with respect to operating outside God’s decree.

With all those agreements aside, and putting aside the pre-fall distinction:

If Adam in his pre-fall nature could not act contrary to the decree that he would fall, then how can it be logically maintained (without equivocation) that Adam could have not sinned?

My brother, you're a literature guy. I'm not. So, if we’re going to progress in this discussion, I think we’re going to have to leave Shakespeare out of it and speak with very precise terms and phrases that I can understand. I’m not sure I can grasp phrases like “layers of causality”. I would take that to mean secondary causes, but that would not seem to fit well with what you have been suggesting. Also, I don't know what to make of statements like “that does not feel like libertarian free will to me”. Sometimes things don't feel the way they are. I bring these small matters to your attention not to be mean spirited but in an effort to give this matter the precision it will require if we hope to make progress. Also, I am going to do my best not to let this discussion morph into something other than a discussion that challenges this syllogism:

Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree
God decreed that Adam sin
Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree that Adam sin

You have both affirmed and denied the major premise and consequently the conclusion.

If you are too busy to discuss this matter, I'll certainly understand. PLEASE do not feel any pressure to continue with me.

Blessings,

Ron

 

[JTB]

My argument was not that Adam could not have sinned sooner than he did, but that he did not sin sooner than he did. The point I was trying to draw from that is what you actually said, namely, that before the Fall Adam was capable of choosing to obey. It is a fallacious extension of my argument, therefore, to say that my position requires that Adam could not have sinned sooner. Ultimately speaking, Adam's fall was timed according to God's decree. From the perspective of the decree, there is no other time it could have happened. I think we are agreed on that. We are also agreed that God's decree is the ultimate cause of all things. We are further agreed that God uses secondary causation.

I cannot agree with this statement: "That Adam was without sin made absolutely no difference upon his ability to choose according to his strongest desire." And the reason for that is that Adam's strongest desire changed drastically after the Fall from what it was before the Fall. There is an ability to obey that Adam completely lost in the Fall. This is why I am hesitant to say that in terms of our free will, there was no change in compatibilism from before to after in terms of the Fall. We agree that it was a compatibilist freedom both before and after the Fall. But the compatibilism changed due to Adam's changed nature. The desire changed, and so therefore did the entire direction of Adam's choice-making.

You have not stated why you think the analogy I used is problematic. You only asserted that it was confusing. In what way is it confusing?

Lane,

You have missed the point in the several points I pointed out above.

First, my point was that, from the consideration of Adam's nature alone (apart from considering God's decree), he could have sinned at any point. All that was lacking was the set of circumstances that would place Adam in a position favorable to the desire to sin. God withheld those circumstances, therefore Adam could not have sinned sooner. But from that standpoint of his ability to sin, he was always and at every point able to sin.

Second, you are still confused about the distinction between the ability to choose according to one's strongest desire (compatibilist free will) and what one's strongest desires may possibly be. At no point is an actual choice other than what is one's strongest desire. That one's strongest desire is always sinful (post-fall state) does not alter anything regarding the nature of choice itself. Choice is always strongest desire. Sinful choice or obedience choice are always choice that is the strongest desire within the individual. The metaphysical nature of choice is not changed.

Third, as for the analogy:

Shakespeare and one of the characters of his play. Shakespeare and Iago, for instance, operate on different levels entirely. Can Iago actually do anything other than what Shakespeare wrote for him to do and say? Well, no. But when one enters the level of the play, everything is different and feels different. If you are Othello in the play, for instance, Iago's actions do not seem forced at all by Shakespeare. Now, of course, all analogies will break down somewhere, for Othello does not know about Shakespeare, whereas we know at least some things about God, and hopefully we know God Himself. However, the analogy of the different levels on which causality happens is, I think, a helpful way of thinking about this. But libertarian freedom (the ability to do A and the opposite of A in any and all circumstances) is contrary to the sovereignty of God and is Pelagian. Calvinists have always held to free will in the sense that any being can do whatever it is in his nature to do. God cannot sin, and sinful man cannot please God. But God wrote the script, even if the characters are not forced. The reason they are not forced is that God's causality and our free will operate on different levels.

The very fact that you admit the analogy breaks down seems enough to me to demonstrate that it can become confusing and is less helpful than a discreet definition of terms and relations. But let's consider some relevant aspects of the analogy anyway. An author often times rewrites a character according to a change of mind. The characters in the play are not aware of whether or not the story is complete. Therefore, by the same analogy, we could argue that God has not finished writing the play and is free to change his mind concerning the characters. The analogy doesn't prevent us from this argument, because, as characters in God's play, we cannot know if He has made up his mind yet. Obviously my use of the analogy contradicts the basic doctrine of God's immutability, but that exemplifies my point. Analogies don't give discreet definitions and relations, but assume whatever definitions and relations are in the mind of the one trying to interpret the analogy.

 

[Confessor]

First, my point was that, from the consideration of Adam's nature alone (apart from considering God's decree), he could have sinned at any point. All that was lacking was the set of circumstances that would place Adam in a position favorable to the desire to sin. God withheld those circumstances, therefore Adam could not have sinned sooner. But from that standpoint of his ability to sin, he was always and at every point able to sin.

I don't want to presently divert the discussion, but I would very much like to discuss this later. Not necessarily that I disagree, but I find it interesting.

 

[Ron]

First, my point was that, from the consideration of Adam's nature alone (apart from considering God's decree), he could have sinned at any point. All that was lacking was the set of circumstances that would place Adam in a position favorable to the desire to sin. God withheld those circumstances, therefore Adam could not have sinned sooner. But from that standpoint of his ability to sin, he was always and at every point able to sin.

I don't want to presently divert the discussion, but I would very much like to discuss this later. Not necessarily that I disagree, but I find it interesting.

Brothers,

Especially in the realm of the human will, we must be careful not to index the necessity of occurrences to particulars without reference to God’s pre-interpretation of those particulars. In other words, the inclination of the will is not necessitated by a set of circumstances alone. Therefore, we may not say that had the state of affairs been earlier, the resultant choice would have been the same. It is God who determines whether and how a set of circumstances (a state of affairs) will incline the will. We may not presume that God must apply the same resultant behavior to external states of affairs located at different points in time. Such thinking tends toward fate, not providence.

Best wishes,

Ron

 

[Ron]

Colossians 2:8 Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.
​

Steven,

Allow a simpleton to speak. I understand the good and necessary and required function of apologetics and philosophy in defense of the faith; however, they should be based on our presuppositional belief that what the Scriptures say are unequivocally true. When anti or extra biblical concepts start coming into the picture, we should be careful to not let it drive one to think through the heathen's eyes to the point of obsession that we are being "spoil[ed] through philosophy ... not after Christ." At such a time, it's time to get grounded again. Let God be true and every man a liar, no matter how enticing, intrigue-inducing, or intellectually stimulating a philosophical speculation might seem. I say answer not a fool according to his folly.

You are no simpleton brother (as I'm sure you know). That was sound advice.

Thank you for that!

Ron

 

[greenbaggins]

My dear brother Lane,

Thank you so much for your most kind post to me. It is quite an encouragement to me personally. You are more than forgiven. And I can certainly appreciate the circumstances of not having time, etc. to devote to things. Please don’t give that matter another thought.

Regarding the subject at hand, I most certainly agree that Adam was created without a sin nature. He was created upright, in innocence and without any inclination toward sin. Yet he was mutable, which means that had God wanted he could have decreed that Adam fall, which is what God wanted, hence the fall. It is also true as you say that Adam could not do anything other than what God had decreed. I’d like to interpret everything else you said through that one foundational premise, which is Adam (and presumably us after Adam) could not / cannot do anything other than what God had / has decreed. That is to say that Adam could only do what God had decreed, and we can only do what God has decreed.

With respect to the pre-fall nature of Adam, we can also agree that it would have been consistent with Adam’s nature for God to have decreed (had He wanted) that Adam remain upright and innocent longer, or even indefinitely. Just as it would have been consistent with Adam’s nature (being mutable) for God to have decreed that Adam fall from innocence, which in God’s wisdom is the decree we live under. Notwithstanding, in neither scenario could Adam operate contrary to the decree, just like we cannot act contrary to the decree today.

Prelapsarian considerations:

Consistent with Adam’s mutable pre-fall nature was his innocence; yet being mutable, he could fall from that innocence with utter consistency toward his mutable soul. Whereas after the fall, all we do must be tainted with sin and that cannot change outside of glorification. Therefore, it was available for God (had he wanted) to decree that Adam not sin, but given the fall it was not available to God to decree that we not sin since all our actions must be tainted with sin this side of glory. Notwithstanding, those are distinctions without a relevant difference. The pre-fall / post-fall ontology of man is not a relevant distinction with respect to Adam being more free than we to act contrary to God’s decree. Again, with respect to acting contrary to the divine decree, not even God can do that; it’s an impossibility. Consequently, introducing the pre-fall state of Adam only clouds the issue of whether Adam could have chosen contrary to the decree. There is simply no additional freedom that Adam had relevant to us with respect to operating outside God’s decree.

With all those agreements aside, and putting aside the pre-fall distinction:

If Adam in his pre-fall nature could not act contrary to the decree that he would fall, then how can it be logically maintained (without equivocation) that Adam could have not sinned?

My brother, you're a literature guy. I'm not. So, if we’re going to progress in this discussion, I think we’re going to have to leave Shakespeare out of it and speak with very precise terms and phrases that I can understand. I’m not sure I can grasp phrases like “layers of causality”. I would take that to mean secondary causes, but that would not seem to fit well with what you have been suggesting. Also, I don't know what to make of statements like “that does not feel like libertarian free will to me”. Sometimes things don't feel the way they are. I bring these small matters to your attention not to be mean spirited but in an effort to give this matter the precision it will require if we hope to make progress. Also, I am going to do my best not to let this discussion morph into something other than a discussion that challenges this syllogism:

Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree
God decreed that Adam sin
Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree that Adam sin

You have both affirmed and denied the major premise and consequently the conclusion.

If you are too busy to discuss this matter, I'll certainly understand. PLEASE do not feel any pressure to continue with me.

Blessings,

Ron

I honestly do not feel that I would disagree with any of what you've written here. You affirmed what I was desiring to protect, which is the innocence of Adam (I totally agree that it was a mutable innocence). I agree also with the syllogism. I am content to leave it at that. One could profitably go on to talk about the difference between God's perspective and our perspective, but that, I feel is a discussion for another time.

 

[greenbaggins]

My argument was not that Adam could not have sinned sooner than he did, but that he did not sin sooner than he did. The point I was trying to draw from that is what you actually said, namely, that before the Fall Adam was capable of choosing to obey. It is a fallacious extension of my argument, therefore, to say that my position requires that Adam could not have sinned sooner. Ultimately speaking, Adam's fall was timed according to God's decree. From the perspective of the decree, there is no other time it could have happened. I think we are agreed on that. We are also agreed that God's decree is the ultimate cause of all things. We are further agreed that God uses secondary causation.

I cannot agree with this statement: "That Adam was without sin made absolutely no difference upon his ability to choose according to his strongest desire." And the reason for that is that Adam's strongest desire changed drastically after the Fall from what it was before the Fall. There is an ability to obey that Adam completely lost in the Fall. This is why I am hesitant to say that in terms of our free will, there was no change in compatibilism from before to after in terms of the Fall. We agree that it was a compatibilist freedom both before and after the Fall. But the compatibilism changed due to Adam's changed nature. The desire changed, and so therefore did the entire direction of Adam's choice-making.

You have not stated why you think the analogy I used is problematic. You only asserted that it was confusing. In what way is it confusing?

Lane,

You have missed the point in the several points I pointed out above.

First, my point was that, from the consideration of Adam's nature alone (apart from considering God's decree), he could have sinned at any point. All that was lacking was the set of circumstances that would place Adam in a position favorable to the desire to sin. God withheld those circumstances, therefore Adam could not have sinned sooner. But from that standpoint of his ability to sin, he was always and at every point able to sin.

Second, you are still confused about the distinction between the ability to choose according to one's strongest desire (compatibilist free will) and what one's strongest desires may possibly be. At no point is an actual choice other than what is one's strongest desire. That one's strongest desire is always sinful (post-fall state) does not alter anything regarding the nature of choice itself. Choice is always strongest desire. Sinful choice or obedience choice are always choice that is the strongest desire within the individual. The metaphysical nature of choice is not changed.

Third, as for the analogy:

Shakespeare and one of the characters of his play. Shakespeare and Iago, for instance, operate on different levels entirely. Can Iago actually do anything other than what Shakespeare wrote for him to do and say? Well, no. But when one enters the level of the play, everything is different and feels different. If you are Othello in the play, for instance, Iago's actions do not seem forced at all by Shakespeare. Now, of course, all analogies will break down somewhere, for Othello does not know about Shakespeare, whereas we know at least some things about God, and hopefully we know God Himself. However, the analogy of the different levels on which causality happens is, I think, a helpful way of thinking about this. But libertarian freedom (the ability to do A and the opposite of A in any and all circumstances) is contrary to the sovereignty of God and is Pelagian. Calvinists have always held to free will in the sense that any being can do whatever it is in his nature to do. God cannot sin, and sinful man cannot please God. But God wrote the script, even if the characters are not forced. The reason they are not forced is that God's causality and our free will operate on different levels.

The very fact that you admit the analogy breaks down seems enough to me to demonstrate that it can become confusing and is less helpful than a discreet definition of terms and relations. But let's consider some relevant aspects of the analogy anyway. An author often times rewrites a character according to a change of mind. The characters in the play are not aware of whether or not the story is complete. Therefore, by the same analogy, we could argue that God has not finished writing the play and is free to change his mind concerning the characters. The analogy doesn't prevent us from this argument, because, as characters in God's play, we cannot know if He has made up his mind yet. Obviously my use of the analogy contradicts the basic doctrine of God's immutability, but that exemplifies my point. Analogies don't give discreet definitions and relations, but assume whatever definitions and relations are in the mind of the one trying to interpret the analogy.

I do not feel that I missed your point at all with regard to the first part. My point is that, before the Fall, Adam's strongest desire could have been sin or not sin. After the Fall, Adam's strongest desire was always sin (though, of course, which sin that would be was undetermined, humanly speaking, and completely determined, from the perspective of the decree). Thus, both before the Fall and after, it is a compatibilist free will, but the Fall altered the compatibilist free will in the sense that it was no longer free to choose the good, or even to desire the good. I agree that the definition of of CFW is that the will will always choose what it wants the most. Of course, what it wants the most is always defined by the nature of the person. The structure of that CFW remains the same both before and after the fall. However, the directions in which it could head were severely limited after the Fall. The problem I had was that your statement was not qualified in terms of the thing which was desired. I cannot think that the thing desired is a completely separate item from the structure of CFW. CFW is hampered by the Fall in terms of the range of choices. This is what I was trying to say.

As to the analogy, any analogy can look ridiculous if pressed too far. The only thing the analogy was meant to show was a possible model for how God's sovereignty and man's responsibility co-exist. The nature of the whole picture of what actually happens introduces us into much murkier waters. If understood only concerning this one point, then I think the analogy is still helpful. Your critique of it does not address the precise point which it was meant to illustrate, but rather goes into other areas which it was not meant to touch in the first place.

 

[MW]

We can accept that a sinner might choose one sin over another. He might choose to be covetous instead of a glutton, for example, and therefore make choices which reflect a covetous character. He might have chosen to be either, might he not? Either way, he chooses to sin by necessity, but the sin he chooses is a matter of liberty.

I raise this for the sake of helping us to clearly locate where the bondage of the will comes to be applied in reformed theology, i.e., in the moral rather than the natural ability of the one who exercises free agency. I recommend William Cunningham's "Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity," in his volume on the Reformers, for a helpful discussion of this subject. His thesis is (p. 483), 1) "There is nothing in the Calvinistic system of theology, or in the Westminster Confession of Faith, which precludes men from holding the doctrine of philosophical necessity." 2) "There is nothing in the Calvinistic system of theology, or in the Westminster Confession, which requires men to hold the doctrine of philosophical necessity." I believe he has made a convincing case for his thesis.

 

[Confessor]

First, my point was that, from the consideration of Adam's nature alone (apart from considering God's decree), he could have sinned at any point. All that was lacking was the set of circumstances that would place Adam in a position favorable to the desire to sin. God withheld those circumstances, therefore Adam could not have sinned sooner. But from that standpoint of his ability to sin, he was always and at every point able to sin.

I don't want to presently divert the discussion, but I would very much like to discuss this later. Not necessarily that I disagree, but I find it interesting.

Brothers,

Especially in the realm of the human will, we must be careful not to index the necessity of occurrences to particulars without reference to God’s pre-interpretation of those particulars. In other words, the inclination of the will is not necessitated by a set of circumstances alone. Therefore, we may not say that had the state of affairs been earlier, the resultant choice would have been the same. It is God who determines whether and how a set of circumstances (a state of affairs) will incline the will. We may not presume that God must apply the same resultant behavior to external states of affairs located at different points in time. Such thinking tends toward fate, not providence.

Best wishes,

Ron

Ron,

Do you think it would be safe to say that if God had a person with a certain inner/mental state of X (consisting of all their inner workings: inclinations etc.) in a certain external state of affairs Y, then the same result would occur as if X and Y were conjoined at another point in time?

It seems that you're guarding against the mentality that external affairs alone guide our behavior. Is that correct?

 

[charliejunfan]

God caused and I have no right to ask why

 

[JTB]

I do not feel that I missed your point at all with regard to the first part. My point is that, before the Fall, Adam's strongest desire could have been sin or not sin. After the Fall, Adam's strongest desire was always sin (though, of course, which sin that would be was undetermined, humanly speaking, and completely determined, from the perspective of the decree). Thus, both before the Fall and after, it is a compatibilist free will, but the Fall altered the compatibilist free will in the sense that it was no longer free to choose the good, or even to desire the good. I agree that the definition of of CFW is that the will will always choose what it wants the most. Of course, what it wants the most is always defined by the nature of the person. The structure of that CFW remains the same both before and after the fall. However, the directions in which it could head were severely limited after the Fall. The problem I had was that your statement was not qualified in terms of the thing which was desired. I cannot think that the thing desired is a completely separate item from the structure of CFW. CFW is hampered by the Fall in terms of the range of choices. This is what I was trying to say.

As to the analogy, any analogy can look ridiculous if pressed too far. The only thing the analogy was meant to show was a possible model for how God's sovereignty and man's responsibility co-exist. The nature of the whole picture of what actually happens introduces us into much murkier waters. If understood only concerning this one point, then I think the analogy is still helpful. Your critique of it does not address the precise point which it was meant to illustrate, but rather goes into other areas which it was not meant to touch in the first place.

Thanks for the clarification. Your first paragraph is exactly what I was trying to express. I'm not arguing that we ought to separate the ability to choose from the inclination of any choice, but rather that they need to be distinguished (not unlike distinguishing God's attributes, though God is a most simple and inseparable unity).

As for the analogy, you may have it if you wish. Many people find benefit from analogies. I find them less definite than most people seem to assume.

Grace and peace,

~Joshua

-----Added 11/19/2009 at 07:55:50 EST-----

Brothers,

Especially in the realm of the human will, we must be careful not to index the necessity of occurrences to particulars without reference to God’s pre-interpretation of those particulars. In other words, the inclination of the will is not necessitated by a set of circumstances alone. Therefore, we may not say that had the state of affairs been earlier, the resultant choice would have been the same. It is God who determines whether and how a set of circumstances (a state of affairs) will incline the will. We may not presume that God must apply the same resultant behavior to external states of affairs located at different points in time. Such thinking tends toward fate, not providence.

Best wishes,

Ron

Point well taken Ron. My aim was simply to identify that Adam's mutability made him capable of sinning at any point that God so desired Adam to sin. That God used one set of circumstances does not imply that He was bound to those circumstances by something in the circumstances themselves, but rather, because they were according to His own desire, as you said.

 

[py3ak]

I recommend William Cunningham's "Calvinism and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity," in his volume on the Reformers, for a helpful discussion of this subject. His thesis is (p. 483), 1) "There is nothing in the Calvinistic system of theology, or in the Westminster Confession of Faith, which precludes men from holding the doctrine of philosophical necessity." 2) "There is nothing in the Calvinistic system of theology, or in the Westminster Confession, which requires men to hold the doctrine of philosophical necessity." I believe he has made a convincing case for his thesis.

Available here.

 

[JTB]

I don't want to presently divert the discussion, but I would very much like to discuss this later. Not necessarily that I disagree, but I find it interesting.

Brothers,

Especially in the realm of the human will, we must be careful not to index the necessity of occurrences to particulars without reference to God’s pre-interpretation of those particulars. In other words, the inclination of the will is not necessitated by a set of circumstances alone. Therefore, we may not say that had the state of affairs been earlier, the resultant choice would have been the same. It is God who determines whether and how a set of circumstances (a state of affairs) will incline the will. We may not presume that God must apply the same resultant behavior to external states of affairs located at different points in time. Such thinking tends toward fate, not providence.

Best wishes,

Ron

Ron,

Do you think it would be safe to say that if God had a person with a certain inner/mental state of X (consisting of all their inner workings: inclinations etc.) in a certain external state of affairs Y, then the same result would occur as if X and Y were conjoined at another point in time?

It seems that you're guarding against the mentality that external affairs alone guide our behavior. Is that correct?

I believe Ron is reminding us of what he articulated in his post to Lane, namely, that all considerations of determination must inevitably and finally trace back to God's sovereign will, and not anything in the particulars being examined (e.g., human will, circumstances). It is not simply the combination of circumstances and mental states and willing of the human that accomplishes x in y. Rather, it is simply that God determines that x shall occur in y, therefore x indeed occurs in y.

 

[Ron]

I don't want to presently divert the discussion, but I would very much like to discuss this later. Not necessarily that I disagree, but I find it interesting.

Brothers,

Especially in the realm of the human will, we must be careful not to index the necessity of occurrences to particulars without reference to God’s pre-interpretation of those particulars. In other words, the inclination of the will is not necessitated by a set of circumstances alone. Therefore, we may not say that had the state of affairs been earlier, the resultant choice would have been the same. It is God who determines whether and how a set of circumstances (a state of affairs) will incline the will. We may not presume that God must apply the same resultant behavior to external states of affairs located at different points in time. Such thinking tends toward fate, not providence.

Best wishes,

Ron

Ron,

Do you think it would be safe to say that if God had a person with a certain inner/mental state of X (consisting of all their inner workings: inclinations etc.) in a certain external state of affairs Y, then the same result would occur as if X and Y were conjoined at another point in time?

It seems that you're guarding against the mentality that external affairs alone guide our behavior. Is that correct?

Ben,

Working backwards, yes, I am guarding against the notion that external affairs alone incline the will.

As for your first question, no, I cannot go along with that either. Given two different points of time, which are two different points in history, which are two different points in redemptive history, God’s purposes can be different. Given different purposes, God might not want to give the increase that he might otherwise give at another point in redemptive history. So for example, if it were possible for the same relevant state of affairs that were present at the moment of your conversion to be transported to A.D. 70, why would it be necessary that God convert you under those same circumstances at a different point in redemptive history? That would be to make God a slave to externals as opposed to the externals working God’s purposes. Now I’m not suggesting that God doesn’t truly respond to externals. He indeed responds to the movements he brings to pass according to his divine decree, which he purposed in himself. But notwithstanding, God’s purposes can be vastly different under similar, or in our hypothetical discussion even identical, relevant circumstances. For instance, God is using you now over the internet as a vessel of honor. Maybe he would have preferred (had he desired another world) to use you at another point in history as a vessel of destruction, even under the same relevant circumstances that he was pleased convert you in this world. Who can know the mind of the Lord on these matters? God responded to the circumstances surrounding your conversion with the divine volitional act of regenerating you. God responded to your circumstances according to his good pleasure alone, which was according to the time and season he had ordained for his own glory. Under a different time and season, who knows?!

Best wishes,

Ron

-----Added 11/19/2009 at 09:53:15 EST-----

My dear brother Lane,

Thank you so much for your most kind post to me. It is quite an encouragement to me personally. You are more than forgiven. And I can certainly appreciate the circumstances of not having time, etc. to devote to things. Please don’t give that matter another thought.

Regarding the subject at hand, I most certainly agree that Adam was created without a sin nature. He was created upright, in innocence and without any inclination toward sin. Yet he was mutable, which means that had God wanted he could have decreed that Adam fall, which is what God wanted, hence the fall. It is also true as you say that Adam could not do anything other than what God had decreed. I’d like to interpret everything else you said through that one foundational premise, which is Adam (and presumably us after Adam) could not / cannot do anything other than what God had / has decreed. That is to say that Adam could only do what God had decreed, and we can only do what God has decreed.

With respect to the pre-fall nature of Adam, we can also agree that it would have been consistent with Adam’s nature for God to have decreed (had He wanted) that Adam remain upright and innocent longer, or even indefinitely. Just as it would have been consistent with Adam’s nature (being mutable) for God to have decreed that Adam fall from innocence, which in God’s wisdom is the decree we live under. Notwithstanding, in neither scenario could Adam operate contrary to the decree, just like we cannot act contrary to the decree today.

Prelapsarian considerations:

Consistent with Adam’s mutable pre-fall nature was his innocence; yet being mutable, he could fall from that innocence with utter consistency toward his mutable soul. Whereas after the fall, all we do must be tainted with sin and that cannot change outside of glorification. Therefore, it was available for God (had he wanted) to decree that Adam not sin, but given the fall it was not available to God to decree that we not sin since all our actions must be tainted with sin this side of glory. Notwithstanding, those are distinctions without a relevant difference. The pre-fall / post-fall ontology of man is not a relevant distinction with respect to Adam being more free than we to act contrary to God’s decree. Again, with respect to acting contrary to the divine decree, not even God can do that; it’s an impossibility. Consequently, introducing the pre-fall state of Adam only clouds the issue of whether Adam could have chosen contrary to the decree. There is simply no additional freedom that Adam had relevant to us with respect to operating outside God’s decree.

With all those agreements aside, and putting aside the pre-fall distinction:

If Adam in his pre-fall nature could not act contrary to the decree that he would fall, then how can it be logically maintained (without equivocation) that Adam could have not sinned?

My brother, you're a literature guy. I'm not. So, if we’re going to progress in this discussion, I think we’re going to have to leave Shakespeare out of it and speak with very precise terms and phrases that I can understand. I’m not sure I can grasp phrases like “layers of causality”. I would take that to mean secondary causes, but that would not seem to fit well with what you have been suggesting. Also, I don't know what to make of statements like “that does not feel like libertarian free will to me”. Sometimes things don't feel the way they are. I bring these small matters to your attention not to be mean spirited but in an effort to give this matter the precision it will require if we hope to make progress. Also, I am going to do my best not to let this discussion morph into something other than a discussion that challenges this syllogism:

Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree
God decreed that Adam sin
Adam could not act contrary to God’s decree that Adam sin

You have both affirmed and denied the major premise and consequently the conclusion.

If you are too busy to discuss this matter, I'll certainly understand. PLEASE do not feel any pressure to continue with me.

Blessings,

Ron

I honestly do not feel that I would disagree with any of what you've written here. You affirmed what I was desiring to protect, which is the innocence of Adam (I totally agree that it was a mutable innocence). I agree also with the syllogism. I am content to leave it at that. One could profitably go on to talk about the difference between God's perspective and our perspective, but that, I feel is a discussion for another time.

Excellent, Lane!

Warmly,

Ron

-----Added 11/19/2009 at 10:21:52 EST-----

Let’s ratchet up a bit…

God is not a legalist, a reductio:

If Adam intended to act sinfully and was tackled prior to acting upon his intention, wouldn't he have sinned just the same? Moreover, had Eve abstained from eating the forbidden fruit solely because she was concerned for her figure, would she not have sinned just the same in the eyes of God? Certainly God is not a legalist who overlooks the intentions of the heart! Consequently, the sin of eating came from a sinful intention that had occurred prior to the visible act that followed from that intention.

Mystery, mystery when there is no mystery:

The reason people call the first sin a mystery is because they begin their reasoning with the false premise that the act of taking and eating the forbidden fruit was the first sin. If we get back to first principles and focus on what precedes any volitional act, whether sinful or not, we can begin to recognize that the first sin was the desire to be like God and not the act that proceeded from that desire. Accordingly, the first sin was Adam’s nature upon becoming fallen, which correlates with his desire to be like God. Adam, in other words, had concupiscence prior to acting sinfully. To deny that Adam's first sinful act came from a nature that had already fallen is to affirm that a sinful act came from a non-sinful nature, a monstrosity indeed.

The question that we should be concerned with is not how did an unrighteous act spring from an upright being (which is a question that proceeds from a false premise), but rather how did an upright being acquire a sinful intention to act sinfully? The answer is no different than the answer to the question of how does any intention and subsequent act come into existence. Doesn’t God providentially orchestrate circumstances that come before the souls of men thereby moving them by secondary causes to act in accordance with new inclinations that are brought into existence according to God’s providence that He decrees? By God's pre-interpretation of the otherwise brute particulars of providence, the intentions of men and their subsequent acts fall out as God so determines.

For Calvinists to argue that an act of sin proceeded from an upright nature is to assert a contradiction – and no amount of mystery can save a contradiction! The only thing I find mysterious is that so many Calvinists find the entrance of sin into humanity so mysterious. Note well that I am not pretending to know how God pre-interprets particulars or how the mind of man relates to the movement of the body. That’s not in view at all. My simple point is that Calvinists do not generally find it mysterious that volitional acts necessarily follow from intentions and that God’s orchestrating of circumstances are an ordained means by which intentions that never existed before come into being. Why, therefore, should we not apply the same theological reasoning to the first sin as we do to God’s sovereignty over the intentions of fallen men? The mystery is the same. We don't know the details of how God brings to pass the intentions of the heart, but that is not peculiar to the first sin. It pertains to all intentions.

Again, had Adam been tackled prior to eating the fruit, wouldn't his intention to eat have been sin? And wouldn't that intention have come from a fallen nature? Now did his intention to eat somehow not become sin because he was not tackled and actually did act according to his intention? Of course not. His sin was the intention of his heart (which could have only come from a nature that could produce such an intention), and he also sinned by acting on that intention. So the first sin was the fallen nature and the desire to be like God, then the intention to act and then the subsequent actions. Now is any good Calvinist going to say that we choose our intentions or our nature? No, but we are certainly responsible for them, for they are ours!

Ron

 

[MW]

Doesn’t God providentially orchestrate circumstances that come before the souls of men thereby moving them by secondary causes to act in accordance with new inclinations that are brought into existence according to God’s providence that He decrees?

The word "moving" is quite unecessary, and can only be interpreted so as to make God the author of the act of sin. God moves no man to sin.

As for your reference to mystery, Calvinists require no mystery to explain how an upright man became a sinner. It lies in the fact that the upright man was yet to be confirmed in his uprightness. The probation was set before him on the understanding that man was mutable and could sin. His nature therefore possessed the possibility of sinning. There is no mystery in this. The first man is of the earth, earthy. He already had an earthy nature. Eating the forbidden fruit involved choosing earthly happiness at the expense of heavenly fellowship with God, something which his mutably upright yet earthly nature was quite capable of doing by itself without any secondary influence from God.

 

[Knight]

An often under-emphasized point when considering from whence Adam's desire to sin sprung is the fact that if Adam's desire - in fact, if any desire - is the result of autonomy, this would contradict the eternal omniscience of God. Ron has already made this point, it seems, but I think it is useful to make it again: for God's knowledge to be contingent on a contingent creature necessarily implies God is not eternally omniscient (given that we not eternal).

The question becomes, then, in what way one can be morally responsible in a deterministic setting. What is or are the precondition(s) of moral responsibility if not autonomy? The answer is given by Paul in Romans 9:18-21. God's sovereignty is the precondition of our moral responsibility to Him. Responsibility implies an authority: that authority is God. That God must have hardened Adam such that rebelliousness was effected does not imply Adam was not morally responsible for his rebellion; it implies God is sovereign and confirms God has a right to do with his creatures as He pleases.

 

[MW]

Responsibility implies an authority: that authority is God.

God is sovereign over plants and animals; sure I am that plants and animals do not have moral responsibility.

As noted in an earlier post, moral responsibility requires moral quality, moral ability, and moral liberty. The Sovereign must have endowed man with such moral capacity in order to make him culpable for his actions.

 

[Knight]

Responsibility implies an authority: that authority is God.

God is sovereign over plants and animals; sure I am that plants and animals do not have moral responsibility.

My allusion to "authority" presupposes agency:

Authority: the power of him whose will and commands must be submitted to by others and obeyed

In any case, if you wished to clarify my statement, you have.

 

[Ron]

The word "moving" is quite unecessary, and can only be interpreted so as to make God the author of the act of sin. God moves no man to sin.

Matthew,

I find the word "moving" most approprite because nothing changes apart from God upholding, sustaining and directing the occurrence. If God is not the ultimate cause of all movement, then I don't know what is. He is, after all, the First Mover. I qualified "moving" by the use of the phrase secondary causes, which I would think clearly takes God out of the realm of being a sinner.

As for your reference to mystery, Calvinists require no mystery to explain how an upright man became a sinner. It lies in the fact that the upright man was yet to be confirmed in his uprightness. The probation was set before him on the understanding that man was mutable and could sin. His nature therefore possessed the possibility of sinning. There is no mystery in this.

You begin by saying that there is no mystery in how an upright man became a sinner and you close with telling us that he possessed the possibility of sinning due to his nature. That much is true. However, I do not see how you address what so many have found so mysterious, which his how sin came from a non-sinful person. My previous post makes an attempt at that, whereas your post would only seem to set up the question by stating the facts which both Arminians and Calvinist agree upon.

The first man is of the earth, earthy. He already had an earthy nature. Eating the forbidden fruit involved choosing earthly happiness at the expense of heavenly fellowship with God, something which his mutably upright yet earthly nature was quite capable of doing by itself without any secondary influence from God.

Matthew, Adam was certainly influenced - that is without dispute lest choices occur without influence. Moreover God decreed that Adam would be influenced in the manner that he was. The totality of that influence, which God determined, was in some proportion the flesh, the devil and the world. Those are secondary causes. Can you not agree with this simple statement: Adam's choice was influenced by secondary causes, which God was pleased to direct according to his purposes.

something which his mutably upright yet earthly nature was quite capable of doing by itself without any secondary influence from God.

If nobody makes choices without influence, then Adam made a choice under influence. Influences are causes because without influence the effect is gone. Therefore, the only question is whether there are any causes that cannot be traced back to God. If not, then secondary causes are God's secondary causes.

Best,

Ron

-----Added 11/20/2009 at 07:55:47 EST-----

Responsibility implies an authority: that authority is God.

God is sovereign over plants and animals; sure I am that plants and animals do not have moral responsibility.

My allusion to "authority" presupposes agency:

Of course it did. It was quite clear.

Ron

 

[Confessor]

God is sovereign over plants and animals; sure I am that plants and animals do not have moral responsibility.

My allusion to "authority" presupposes agency:

Of course it did. It was quite clear.

Ron

And if I can chime in, Ryan said that responsibility implies authority and sovereignty, not necessarily that sovereignty implies responsibility.

 

[Knight]

And if I can chime in, Ryan said that responsibility implies authority and sovereignty, not necessarily that sovereignty implies responsibility.

Exactly.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent

 

[Ron]

God's sovereignty is the precondition of our moral responsibility to Him. Responsibility implies an authority: that authority is God.

The first sentence means that God is the necessary condition for moral responsibility.

The second sentence (even lifted out of context, which is what was done) means that responsibility is a sufficient condition the authority of God.

Both sentences, therefore, logically imply the same thing.

They can be written thusly:

If X is responsible, then God has the authority over X
X is responsible
Therefore, God has the authority over X

Ryan’s sentences do not mean:

If God has the authority over X, then X is responsible
God has the authority over X
Therefore, X is responsible

Accordingly, Ryan was indeed clear, even redundantly so. He never came close to suggesting that God’s authority over X is a sufficient condition for X to be responsible. Therefore, he made no allusion to plants and animals.

That he linked us to affirming the consequent was too clever!

Ron