Van Til's Polemical Context

[Semper Fidelis]

From The Trinitarian Theology of Cornelius Van Til by Lane Tipton:

It is important not only to determine the constructive con text for Van Til’s Trinitarian formulations, but also to grasp some of the polemical context that motivated him to formulate the Trinity as he did. As we have seen, Van Til construes the triune God as one person, an absolute personality, three personal subsistences, and a being with both a unified consciousness and a threefold consciousness. Understanding Van Til’s immediate theological and philosophical context will prove indispensable for grasping his polemical rationale for referring to the triune God as an “absolute person” or “absolute personality.”

Van Til studied idealist philosophy under A. A. Bowman,1 the head of the philosophy department at Princeton University from 1923 to 1929, where he encountered the leading ideas of German, British, and American Absolute Idealism. During that time, he was also exposed to the school of thought known as per- sonalism—a theological and philosophical tradition committed to the notion that ultimate metaphysical reality is personality. This context proves illuminating for understanding Van Til’s theolog- ical and philosophical milieu, especially as it bears on his theol ogy of God as absolute personality. This will help us understand two important points in our exploration of the polemical context of Van Til’s classical Reformed Trinitarianism. First, the Boston Personalist tradition brought the language of God as a person to the foreground, providing an apologetical context to provoke an orthodox Trinitarian response. Second, the Trinitarian doctrine of perichoresis was interpreted by a personalist such as A. C. Knudson in such a way as to deny the orthodox conception of the triper- sonality within the Godhead—a denial that involves a collision course with Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity.

However, we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark. Van Til’s comments on the incomprehensibility of God, especially in An Introduction to Systematic Theology, arise immediately from the context of the Clark–Van Til controversy. As a result, Van Til’s understanding of the Trinity and divine incomprehensibility is designed partly to correct the rationalistic distortions he detected in the formulations of Clark. What will prove instructive for our discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity is the appearance, years after the controversy itself, of a motif in Clark’s theology that denies personality to God’s unity. While definitively dissenting from the personalists, Clark devised formulations that amount to the opposite error of the Boston Per- sonalists in that he can affirm tripersonality only by describing the essence of God as mute or unconscious. The personalists deny personality with respect to God’s diversity, while Clark denies personality with reference to God’s unity.

It is out of this matrix of Trinitarian reflection that Van Til deemed it appropriate to utilize the language that God is “one person” or “absolute personality,” while not allowing that affirmation to subvert the complementary truth that God exists as three persons or a tripersonal being. In Van Til’s mind, the formulations of both the Boston Personalists and Gordon Clark proved inadequate to convey the absolutely personal and incomprehensible character of God’s Trinitarian existence.

1 William White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith: An Authorized Biography, (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 42.

 

[RamistThomist]

I'm glad you said CVT used an idealist context (language, not substance). I've said that before in the past and people seem to think I said he was a Kantian or Hegelian, which I never did.

I don't think the language of "absolute personality" is all that helpful. I'm not saying it is wrong; I'm just not sure what the pay-off is today in a philosophical context that is not Idealist (both Christian and secular philosophers today have largely jettisoned the old Idealist schools).

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I'm glad you said CVT used an idealist context (language, not substance). I've said that before in the past and people seem to think I said he was a Kantian or Hegelian, which I never did.

'Twas not I, but Lane Tipton who wrote the above. I was just trying to provide some information about his background from this book because his language is often misunderstood.

 

[Knight]

However, we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark. Van Til’s comments on the incomprehensibility of God, especially in An Introduction to Systematic Theology, arise immediately from the context of the Clark–Van Til controversy. As a result, Van Til’s understanding of the Trinity and divine incomprehensibility is designed partly to correct the rationalistic distortions he detected in the formulations of Clark. What will prove instructive for our discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity is the appearance, years after the controversy itself, of a motif in Clark’s theology that denies personality to God’s unity. While definitively dissenting from the personalists, Clark devised formulations that amount to the opposite error of the Boston Per- sonalists in that he can affirm tripersonality only by describing the essence of God as mute or unconscious. The personalists deny personality with respect to God’s diversity, while Clark denies personality with reference to God’s unity.

It is out of this matrix of Trinitarian reflection that Van Til deemed it appropriate to utilize the language that God is “one person” or “absolute personality,” while not allowing that affirmation to subvert the complementary truth that God exists as three persons or a tripersonal being. In Van Til’s mind, the formulations of both the Boston Personalists and Gordon Clark proved inadequate to convey the absolutely personal and incomprehensible character of God’s Trinitarian existence.

1 William White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith: An Authorized Biography, (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 42.

Van Til's language of "absolute personality" is found in works as early as his The Defense of the Faith (1955). Clark's rhetorical question of whether a person is "to be considered unconscious, mute substance?" comes from The Trinity (1985), 3 months prior to his death. Unless Tipton has in mind any other statements by Clark that were made during the actual controversy (or soon thereafter, i.e. prior to when Van Til wrote The Defense of the Faith), the reference to this question as having anything to do with Van Til's thought process in 1955 is anachronistic. Does Tipton have any other statements in mind?

The disagreement between Clark and Van Til on what divine incomprehensibility entails does not of itself sufficiently justify believing that Van Til's affirmation of the "absolute personality" of the Godhead was in any way a response of sorts to anything Clark said (explicitly or by implication) prior to 1955. On the contrary, take the following statements by Clark written before or in 1955:

1935. Revised edition of Readings in Ethics. Gordon H. Clark and T.V. Smith, eds. New York: F.S. Crofts and Company.

But one must learn that when a philosopher says God, he may not mean God. Both Jew and Christian regard God as an Almighty Personal Being who chose to create the world. Two Christians, Descartes and Leibniz, may have disagreed on the question whether God made this world good by choosing it, or whether God chose this world because it was good. But all agree He chose and created. But for Spinoza, on the contrary, there was neither choice nor creation, for his God is not a personal being.

1949. Authority in Religion. The Witness Jul: 5-6.

The Christian as well as the modernist believes that God has revealed himself in nature. But if this is the only revelation, if this is the most definite revelation there is, men soon begin to see in the marvels of nature, nature and only nature. A real, living, personal God recedes into the dim, unnecessary background.

Pre 1950. Language is Beautiful - and Deceitful. The Home Evangel

The other day a Jewish community house, to raise funds for their unfortunate brothers, invited a philosopher to give a lecture. The philosopher was a Christian, in the original, orthodox, Biblical sense of the word. He chose to speak on the reality of a personal God, and tried to show that only by trusting a personal God could man face the world and solve its problems. A gentleman in the audience said that he did not believe all the stuff this philosopher propounded. “I don’t believe in any personal God,” he insisted, “I am a Unitarian.”

And so it seems that “Unitarian” has come to mean “atheist.” And “Christian” has come to mean one who denies the Bible and rejects the blood atonement of Christ. All this leads a thoughtful person to believe the more in the inherent depravity of man, out of which comes the modem depravity of words. Respectable authors must long for a regeneration of language; but this can only occur by a regeneration of the human heart that is at enmity with God.

The closest I could find to anything relevant was in a letter from Clark to J. Oliver Buswell on April 3, 1937, to which Van Til probably did not have access and which I doubt is the sort of thing Tipton had in mind anyways (since Clark is just attempting to summarize Shedd):

Question: Is the being of the second Person of the Trinity derived from the Father according to Vos?

Answer: I doubt it. On p. 216 of The Self Disclosure, Vos says that the glory of the Son comes from the Father, and on pg. 221 Vos says that Jn. 5:26 and 6:57 teach that the Son's life is derived from the Father. He further seems to accept the doctrine of eternal generation.

The question therefore becomes, what historically is the doctrine of eternal generation, and what does the word 'being' mean?

Hodge, Vol I. on the eternal generation quotes Turretin as opposing the eternal generation of the essence of Christ and as therefore opposing the Nicene fathers. Having read Hodge hurriedly I may be mistaken on the 'therefore' in the last sentence, for I do not think the Nicene father taught what Turretin attacks.

Shaff, Creed of Christendom, Vol I, p.37, says that the Athanasian creed excludes every kind of subordination of essence. It states clearly that absolute unity of the divine being or essence.

Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. I p.316, speaks of the essence as that which is one, the personality three. Thus persons may be generated but not the essence. Shedd also, p. 317, remarks that the eternal generation is necessary but creation depends entirely upon arbitrary will. Apparently this denial ofthe generation of essence is compatible with the expression: the Father communicates the one eternal essence to the Son. By 'communicate' I guess is meant Platonic participation (though there is something queer here) and raises the question whether Gregory of Nyssa was correct in saying that the relation of persons to the Godhead was the same as that of individuals to their Idea.

The generation therefore is of a Person by a Person. As Calvin I xiii 19 says: “we justly represent him as originating from the Father.”

Shedd, op. cit. p. 323: “Hence the Nicene theologians harmonized the doctrine of eternal generation with that of unity of essence by teaching the necessity of this generation.”

CONCLUSION. Since the Nicene fathers maintained eternal generation in their repudiation of Arianism, it seems to me first that there is no ground for saying that Vos implies the generation of essence, being, reality (ousia); and second that the doctrine instead of being dangerous is an excellent method of defending trinitarianism against Arianism.

May I also add that Vos may not have the “unified perspective” of Machen and Warfield because he approaches his problems exegetically rather than systematically.

Finally, this is the context of Clark's rhetorical question cited by Tipton:

Several romantically inclined students, and a few professors as well, have complained that “this makes your wife merely a set of propositions.” Well, so it does. This suits me, for I am a set of propositions too. And those who complain are as they think. Is a person to be considered unconscious, mute substance? Why is he not conscious thoughts? Of course, one may just say “thoughts,” for thoughts cannot be unconscious.

Naturally, human beings are mutable: Their thoughts or minds change. The three Persons of the Godhead are immutable because their thoughts never change. They never forget what they now know, they never learn something new, in fact they have never learned anything. Their thought is eternal. Since also the three Persons do not have precisely the same set of thoughts, they are not one Person, but three. If substance were the principle of individuation – for we have seen that space-time cannot be – then there could not be three Persons. Identity of substance would mean identity of person. If then substance, for this and other reasons, is not the principle of individuation, the theologians referred to should explain what their principle is.

One may disagree with Clark's metaphysical reductionism of persons to sets of propositions (as I do and have argued against). A few points, though:

The immediate context of the quote is in reference to human persons and substances. Clark affirmed there are "three Persons of the Godhead," as seen in the larger context.

The point of the bold is obviously meant by Clark to be a denial that persons are unconscious, mute substances... but one would think Tipton and Van Til would agree with this? If so, then what is the issue? Is Tipton inferring something more, e.g. that Clark thinks all substances actually are unconscious and mute? If so, his inference is by no means obvious to me, and I think he would need to give more evidence of this.

In fact, in the same book on The Trinity, Clark says:

In VII, ii, 3 Augustine makes substance and essence synonyms, and in VII, iv, 7 he twice, and maybe a third time, includes nature. This may help some readers to escape from Aristotelian matter and Locke’s two substances, but the term essence today is also vague. If, however, these terms were replaced by the word definition, several difficulties could be avoided. The definition of the Triune God is not the definition of the Son.

Obviously, Clark thinks the Son is a person who is neither mute nor unconscious. If the Son is a definition (= substance), then Clark thinks that at least one substance is neither mute nor unconscious. Of course, there are numerous problems with this construction, but the point is that Tipton seems to be reading into Clark's rhetorical question things that are not entailed.

In any case, I would be more interested in what pre-1955 statements by Clark Tipton thinks framed a context for Van Til's distinctive views on the Trinity.

 

[ZackF]

Would any of you find parallels between Van Til's context and influences and that of 20th century Roman Catholics. I am thinking Von Balthazar, Yves Congar and of course Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla). I looked into this stuff back in the 90s. Personalism was a kissing cousin to Phenomenology, right?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Van Til's language of "absolute personality" is found in works as early as his The Defense of the Faith (1955). Clark's rhetorical question of whether a person is "to be considered unconscious, mute substance?" comes from The Trinity (1985), 3 months prior to his death. Unless Tipton has in mind any other statements by Clark that were made during the actual controversy (or soon thereafter, i.e. prior to when Van Til wrote The Defense of the Faith), the reference to this question as having anything to do with Van Til's thought process in 1955 is anachronistic. Does Tipton have any other statements in mind?

I'm not sure how you quote half a passage and then ask how he could be referring to something that predates his use of the term. I'm not defending Lane uncritically but he did not write that his use of certain terms owed exclusively to his interactions with Clark. His presentation of Van Til's context includes three things and not one. Did you read past them or did you think of them when you posed this question?

In other words, prior to interactions with Clark, there was a philosophical and theological milieu that would explain his use of the terms.

As for your other questions challenging Lane's grasp of the facts, you can pick up his book to read what he writes about Clark and pose the question on the Reformed Forum community page. Maybe he'll address your concerns. I am only quoting what he wrote in this particular section.

Remember, however, what Lane is focusing upon is why Van Til used the term and what he meant by it. You wouldn't be the first to claim that Van Til got Clark all wrong (or others talking about him) but, even if Van Til misapprehended Clark's points, it still might shape why he might want to use some terms if he perceived someone to be saying something. The perception may have been inaccurate, but it could still provide the basis for a thinker to employ language to deal with what he perceives as an error. In writing this, I'm not defending Van Til's use of the language. It's not my point to write any of this to make Van Ti's use proper. I'm only attempting to offer what Tipton believed drove Van Til to use language in a certain way.

 

[jwright82]

Would any of you find parallels between Van Til's context and influences and that of 20th century Roman Catholics. I am thinking Von Balthazar, Yves Congar and of course Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla). I looked into this stuff back in the 90s. Personalism was a kissing cousin to Phenomenology, right?

As far as I know it was Descartes that was more of an impetus. See the first section of "Being And Time" by Heiddeger, who was heavily influenced by Husseral, where he pretty much starts with Renee. Some of of the language is Idealist.
Phenomenology/Existentialism and American Pragmatism were both reactions too and birthed out of Idealism. I actually have a book somewhere that shows how much the American Pragmatist William James and Existentialism have in common.

 

[jwright82]

Oh also the first section of Sarte's "Being And Nothingness" starts with old Renee as well.

 

[Knight]

I'm not sure how you quote half a passage and then ask how he could be referring to something that predates his use of the term.

Can you explain what this means? I don't understand what you are getting at, sorry.

I'm not defending Lane uncritically but he did not write that his use of certain terms owed exclusively to his interactions with Clark. His presentation of Van Til's context includes three things and not one. Did you read past them or did you think of them when you posed this question?

I'm not saying that he did. I'm questioning the following:

What will prove instructive for our discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity is the appearance, years after the controversy itself, of a motif in Clark’s theology that denies personality to God’s unity. While definitively dissenting from the personalists, Clark devised formulations that amount to the opposite error of the Boston Per- sonalists in that he can affirm tripersonality only by describing the essence of God as mute or unconscious. The personalists deny personality with respect to God’s diversity, while Clark denies personality with reference to God’s unity.

I am questioning 1) that Tipton has any evidence for this beyond a quote from 1985 as well as 2) whether the quote itself even entails what Tipton thinks it does. That is all.

Since you asked, I am not interested in what else "Van Til's context" included.

Remember, however, what Lane is focusing upon is why Van Til used the term and what he meant by it. You wouldn't be the first to claim that Van Til got Clark all wrong (or others talking about him) but, even if Van Til misapprehended Clark's points, it still might shape why he might want to use some terms if he perceived someone to be saying something. The perception may have been inaccurate, but it could still provide the basis for a thinker to employ language to deal with what he perceives as an error. In writing this, I'm not defending Van Til's use of the language. It's not my point to write any of this to make Van Ti's use proper. I'm only attempting to offer what Tipton believed drove Van Til to use language in a certain way.

Sure. As I said, then, if you or Tipton know of any, I would be interested in what statements Clark made prior to 1955 (even if Van Til's interpretation of said statements were incorrect) could have conceivably (though not exclusively) contributed to Van Til's distinctive affirmation of the language of "absolute personality." This is not a "gotcha" question - I'm genuinely curious in an answer to this, because I myself can't think of any.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

an you explain what this means? I don't understand what you are getting at, sorry.

Sure, the first thing you wrote was this:

Van Til's language of "absolute personality" is found in works as early as his The Defense of the Faith (1955). Clark's rhetorical question of whether a person is "to be considered unconscious, mute substance?" comes from The Trinity (1985), 3 months prior to his death. Unless Tipton has in mind any other statements by Clark that were made during the actual controversy (or soon thereafter, i.e. prior to when Van Til wrote The Defense of the Faith), the reference to this question as having anything to do with Van Til's thought process in 1955 is anachronistic. Does Tipton have any other statements in mind?

The point I was making is that Tipton never claimed that Van Til started referring to "absolute personality" in reaction to Clark. Read the full quote again. It's a factor in Van Til's overall project that he was dealing with Clar, but Lan never claims that "absolute personality" began after he interacted with Clark.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Sure. As I said, then, if you or Tipton know of any, I would be interested in what statements Clark made prior to 1955 (even if Van Til's interpretation of said statements were incorrect) could have conceivably (though not exclusively) contributed to Van Til's distinctive affirmation of the language of "absolute personality." This is not a "gotcha" question - I'm genuinely curious in an answer to this, because I myself can't think of any.

Let me just reiterate what I just wrote. Tipton doesn't claim that the use of "absolute personality" owes to Clark's interactions. He references both Van Til's philosophical training as well as the Boston School he was dealing with that predates Clark. Again, read the extract again. He may have redeployed the same term to deal with what he perceived as a different kind of problem in Clark but Tipton never says that it took all three influences for Van Til to use the language.

 

[Knight]

Let me just reiterate what I just wrote. Tipton doesn't claim that the use of "absolute personality" owes to Clark's interactions.

At all? What of this: "we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark."

A straightforward reading of that seems to suggest that Van Til's "concerns" - where his concerns were those factors "that motivated him to formulate the Trinity as he did... the triune God as one person, an absolute personality, three personal subsistences, and a being with both a unified consciousness and a threefold consciousness" - involved Gordon Clark as one factor (among others).

If I'm misunderstanding Tipton, I doubt I'm the only one. I'm still not getting what Clark has to do with Van Til's distinctive Trinitarian formulations. In what way would leaving Clark out of the discussion "fail to do justice"?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

At all? What of this: "we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark."

I didn't say that Clark did not represent part of the milieu of Van Til's entire life. You started by poking holes in the presentation because "absolute personality" appears in Van Til's writing prior to Clark.

A natural reading of Tipton's presentation introduces the fact that "absolute personality" is in the paragraph preceding the discussion about Clark himself.

Van Til studied idealist philosophy under A. A. Bowman,1 the head of the philosophy department at Princeton University from 1923 to 1929, where he encountered the leading ideas of German, British, and American Absolute Idealism. During that time, he was also exposed to the school of thought known as per- sonalism—a theological and philosophical tradition committed to the notion that ultimate metaphysical reality is personality. This context proves illuminating for understanding Van Til’s theolog- ical and philosophical milieu, especially as it bears on his theol ogy of God as absolute personality. This will help us understand two important points in our exploration of the polemical context of Van Til’s classical Reformed Trinitarianism. First, the Boston Personalist tradition brought the language of God as a person to the foreground, providing an apologetical context to provoke an orthodox Trinitarian response. Second, the Trinitarian doctrine of perichoresis was interpreted by a personalist such as A. C. Knudson in such a way as to deny the orthodox conception of the triper- sonality within the Godhead—a denial that involves a collision course with Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity.

How can you read that paragraph and conclude that Tipton claims that "absolute personality" in Van Til's language appears only after dealing with Clark?

 

[Knight]

I didn't say that Clark did not represent part of the milieu of Van Til's entire life. You started by poking holes in the presentation because "absolute personality" appears in Van Til's writing prior to Clark.

A natural reading of Tipton's presentation introduces the fact that "absolute personality" is in the paragraph preceding the discussion about Clark himself.

How can you read that paragraph and conclude that Tipton claims that "absolute personality" in Van Til's language appears only after dealing with Clark?

To me, Tipton seems to be saying that while that context is illuminating to Van Til's language of absolute personality et al., it is not exclusively illuminating.

Hence, Tipton begins the next paragraph by saying "we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark."

 

[Semper Fidelis]

To me, Tipton seems to be saying that while that context is illuminating to Van Til's language of absolute personality et al., it is not exclusively illuminating.

Hence, Tipton begins the next paragraph by saying "we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark."

And notice, in that paragraph, he doesn't even mention the term "absolute personality" but another concern.

One might cavil about the presentation, but Tipton is trying to represent decades of Van Til's milieu from his training to personalist backgrounds and then factors in another concern.

You'd also have to read what precedes this chapter where Tipton develops his theology. He didn't develop his Trinitarian theology in reaction to other theologies. He certainly seems to have deployed language (perhaps unguardedly) in response to what he perceived as needful corrections.

The overall point is that Tipton is providing a "flyover" of a long period. He stops at one point to consider how "absolute personality" appears in reference to a theological school and, flies over another period where he's dealing with Clark, and then concludes in order to represent the whole. The point he might have made more explicit is that you cannot consider the entire milieu of Van Til without factoring in Clark, but it's grammatically erroneous to charge him with the idea that "absolute personality" is used by Van Til only after everything is factored in.

If you want to email Tipton and tell him that he's the one who is confusing then be my guest, but I imagine he'll find the objection to be a cavil.

 

[Knight]

And notice, in that paragraph, he doesn't even mention the term "absolute personality" but another concern.

One might cavil about the presentation, but Tipton is trying to represent decades of Van Til's milieu from his training to personalist backgrounds and then factors in another concern.

You'd also have to read what precedes this chapter where Tipton develops his theology. He didn't develop his Trinitarian theology in reaction to other theologies. He certainly seems to have deployed language (perhaps unguardedly) in response to what he perceived as needful corrections.

The overall point is that Tipton is providing a "flyover" of a long period. He stops at one point to consider how "absolute personality" appears in reference to a theological school and, flies over another period where he's dealing with Clark, and then concludes in order to represent the whole. The point he might have made more explicit is that you cannot consider the entire milieu of Van Til without factoring in Clark, but it's grammatically erroneous to charge him with the idea that "absolute personality" is used by Van Til only after everything is factored in.

If you want to email Tipton and tell him that he's the one who is confusing then be my guest, but I imagine he'll find the objection to be a cavil.

I don't own the book you are referring to, so I'll leave it to readers to decide who has more properly interpreted Tipton there.

But it's pretty clear that Tipton thinks what I am saying he thinks. For further support for what I am saying - that he takes Clark's words in 1985 and anachronistically sets them as part of the polemical context out of which Van Til's distinctive Trinitarian theology was formed - take Tipton's own words in this lecture on "Gordon Clark: Theological Rationalism and Trinitarianism." Starting at 21:52, which is a summary of Clark:

To clarify a bit the relationship of the hypotheses to the essence of God - the relationship of the persons to the essence - what distinguishes the persons from the godhead or the essence is self-consciousness. Mute substance is not what characterizes the persons - that is collections of thought collections of thoughts. Personhood is not what characterizes the substance - it's unconscious and mute.

And so look at what you start to find in the polemical context that Van Til faced: whether it's the personalists at the early turn of the 20th century moving into the 20s and 30s or whether it's the developing neo-evangelical trinitarianism of Gordon Clark in the 30s, 40s, and into the 50s, what do you find?

You find an affirmation of unipersonality that calls into question the integrity and personality of the individual hypotheses in personalism, or you find an affirmation of personhood as bundles of thoughts - a novelty in the history of the reformed tradition, but that's how personhood is defined - but in a way that makes the essence of God unconscious, mute substance.

And so there's an affirmation of one Consciousness (a denial of three Consciousness) in the personalists there's an affirmation of three Consciousness and a denial of one Consciousness in the neo-evangelical rationalists.

I see zero evidence that Clark said anything in "the 30s, 40s, and into the 50s" (note: right before Van Til's The Defense of the Faith) which could be labeled "neo-evangelical trinitarianism." A 1985 quote which may not even be correctly interpreted is insufficient evidence for the idea that Van Til owed his distinctive Trinitarian language or views to anything Clark wrote.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

But it's pretty clear that Tipton thinks what I am saying he thinks. For further support for what I am saying - that he takes Clark's words in 1985 and anachronistically sets them as part of the polemical context out of which Van Til's distinctive Trinitarian theology was formed - take Tipton's own words in this lecture on "Gordon Clark: Theological Rationalism and Trinitarianism." Starting at 21:52, which is a summary of Clark:

The video you provided demonstrates how silly your contention is that Lan Tipton claims that van Til only used the term absolute personality after dealing with Gordon Clark.

I have zero interest in the second question about whether he anachronistically charges Clark with something. The only thing I've been dealing with is the ridiculous contention that Tipton claims that "absolute personality" came into the picture after he dealt with Clark.

Watch the first three minutes of the video. This is BEFORE he pivots to the discussion of Clark and he explains where the term comes from (Bavinck) and why he uses it (Boston personalism).

One would have to be completely obtuse to conclude that Lane concludes that Van Til only starts using "absolute personality" after he deals with Clark.

You may persist in assuming that Tipton claims this but the video evidence only underlines how wrong this contention is.

 

[Knight]

The video you provided demonstrates how silly your contention is that Lan Tipton claims that van Til only used the term absolute personality after dealing with Gordon Clark.

I have zero interest in the second question about whether he anachronistically charges Clark with something. The only thing I've been dealing with is the ridiculous contention that Tipton claims that "absolute personality" came into the picture after he dealt with Clark.

Watch the first three minutes of the video. This is BEFORE he pivots to the discussion of Clark and he explains where the term comes from (Bavinck) and why he uses it (Boston personalism).

One would have to be completely obtuse to conclude that Lane concludes that Van Til only starts using "absolute personality" after he deals with Clark.

You may persist in assuming that Tipton claims this but the video evidence only underlines how wrong this contention is.

When did Van Til first use the language of "absolute personality"? The first 3 minutes of the video say nothing about that. Did he use it in any publication, lecture, or recordings prior to 1955? I may be obtuse - in that case, please try to enlighten me rather than provoke me.

I would encourage you and others to watch the whole video. Starting at 24:23:

Did Bavinck confirm absolute personality as an entailment of numerical unity and divine simplicity? Yes. Did Hodge affirm that there is one will, one mind, one consciousness in a way that peacefully and sweetly complies in mystery with tri-personality? Yes. Did Van Til follow both? Yes.

But according to Clark, personality requires only those things not common to the three and he draws the implication from that that the essence of God is unconscious, mute substance that is antithetically related to personality. See, a necessary condition for Clark for the possibility of personality is the presence of propositions not common to the three. So what Clark lacks is a theological principle that can account for the absolute personality of God.

At this point, if you still don't believe that Tipton (wrongly) thinks that what he quotes by Clark and posts on his whiteboard exhibits a so-called "neo-evangelical trinitarianism of Gordon Clark in the 30s, 40s, and into the 50s" which also was involved in the polemical context which framed Van Til's Trinitarian distinctives (in addition to the material in first several minutes of the video - no one has said Van Til's Trinitarian musings were entirely a response to Clark), maybe you'll listen to Christopher Smith's review of Tipton's book, who says the same thing I do (link):

This absolute personality means, contra Gordon Clark (1902–85), that self-consciousness can be found in the Triune God even while there is a self-differentiated existence as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, thus guarding against the tritheistic notion of three centers of self-consciousness.19 Van Til was reacting to Clark’s notion that in God there are three “distinct bundles of thoughts,” i.e. self-consciousness.20 Van Til’s opponents were broader than merely Gordon Clark, however. Indeed, his primary opponent was a school of thought Tipton identifies as “theistic personalism,”21 and Van Til’s thought was, in large part, a reaction to these views.

It is impossible for Van Til to have been reacting to a thought by Clark in 1985.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

When did Van Til first use the language of "absolute personality"? The first 3 minutes of the video say nothing about that. Did he use it in any publication, lecture, or recordings prior to 1955? I may be obtuse - in that case, please try to enlighten me rather than provoke me.

You are being obtuse.

I've stated plainly what Lane presents. Your Procrustean bed doesn't fit either the Chapter or the Video but don't let that stop you from forcing him to fit into your conception.

 

[Knight]

You are being obtuse.

I've stated plainly what Lane presents. Your Procrustean bed doesn't fit either the Chapter or the Video but don't let that stop you from forcing him to fit into your conception.

I am asking sincere questions and trying to make relevant points. If I am being obtuse, I am not opposed to correction - I just don't think I am forcing an interpretation of anything, and several people seem to agree with my understanding of Tipton. But I digress.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

and several people seem to agree with my understanding of Tipton. But I digress.

Congratulations.

I'll let you take up your concern with Dr. Tipton as to whether he thinks (or has written) that "absolute personality" was in the thinking of Van Til prior to or dependent upon his concerns with Clark.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I am asking sincere questions and trying to make relevant points. If I am being obtuse, I am not opposed to correction - I just don't think I am forcing an interpretation of anything, and several people seem to agree with my understanding of Tipton. But I digress.

Please forgive me for being harsh with you yesterday. It was inappropriate. I think the research you've done to figure out whether Clark really wrote what Lane is accusing him of is interesting. I simply very clearly hear him indicate that Van Til's ideas were shaped much prior to that.

I don't have time right now to quote excerpts from the book itself, but Tipton is aware that Clark only takes up issues about the Persons in the Trinity Many yers later.

When speaking of Van Til's concerns with Clark, he focuses on Clark's rationalism and denials of incomprehensibility.

I can see how concluding thoughts would lead one to assume that what Tipton has said all along is that Van Til either knew or foresaw what Clark might write about the Trinity years in the future, but the overall presentation makes it clear that he understands where Clark fit in the story and that "absolute personality" is not pinned to some later reading of Clark.

As to whether Tipton misinterprets what Calrk wrote or meant, that's another topic.