partaij1
Puritan Board Freshman
Thank you. Now I understand where you're coming from and can make sense of your posts. Your rejection of Kant and your connection of Kant with Van Til is significant to the way you view the goings-on at Covenant College. I'm not inclined to argue with you, since I too see a great deal of Kant in Van Til (but I'm not yet sure that's a bad thing).
However, could I ask for just a little bit more clarification on behalf of members who may have been shocked by your posts? Are you saying that Van Tillians are necessarily postmodern/neo-orthodox, or that Van Tillianism leads to (or stems from) postmodernism/neo-orthodoxy, or simply that Van Tillianism is compatible with postmodernism/neo-orthodoxy? (I think those are the only options.) I ask this because there are many Van Tillians on this board, and they probably could not make any sense out of how someone could be labeled all the ways you labeled Dr. McLellan. -- Charliej
Charlie,
These are carefully nuanced and thoughtful questions. How they are answered can, of course, have profound implications for those who are Reformed. I think by the way you pose these questions, you are aware that the stakes are high.
At Westminster Seminary for forty-three years, as you know, Cornelius Van Til had a significant influence on an entire generation of Reformed pastors. As you've noted, a number of people associated with this blog are Van Tillian. It is not surprising that he has had such an impact. He was quite intelligent, spiritually alive and dedicated to Christ, committed to Scripture, and well versed in philosophy.
As you noted, Van Til is, while being critical of Kant, also indebted to Kant. Through Kant, Van Til brought to the church (at least in its Reformed branch) an epistemology that was a synthesis of Reformed theology and Western philosophy (Kant). The result was particularly evident in a new apologetics, altogether unprecedented in the church's history. John Frame recognizes this when he notes a parallel between the importance of Kant in all that follows in Western philosophy and that of Van Til in Reformed circles and thinking.
We might want to pause here for a moment, though, and think through the troubling implications of this (regardless of what one thinks of either Kant or Van Til):
(1) Can we identify another instance in the church's history where an significant overhaul of the presentation and defense of the gospel of Jesus Christ hinged on the teaching of a secular philosopher?
(2) If Van Til had been relying solely on Scripture (Sola Scriptura), which is arguably the most important principle of Reformed thinking, would he have been able to present his influential proposal for apologetics?
(3) Related to the first question, if Van Til was right to incorporate Kant's epistemology into Reformed and biblical theology, does that not mean that the church was in the dark on apologetics for roughly eighteen hundred years prior to Kant? Moreover, does that not mean that the apostles themselves (e.g., Peter in Acts 2 and Paul in Acts 17:2-4), not having Kant's theory of knowing, mistakenly related to people as if there was a common ground of neutrality, shared facts, etc. between themselves and the unregenerate people they were trying to persuade that Jesus is the Messiah?
(4) And does this not all mean that Scripture, as the foundation of the church (Ephesians 2:20) and that which equips the "man of God" for "every good work" (2 Timothy 3:16-17), is actually not sufficient or complete enough for that "good work" which is preaching and defending the gospel of Christ? That the church doesn't have its fullness completely in its head Jesus Christ but needs philosophy for that particular aspect of its work? That the church needed Kant before it was fully enlightened about the true state of the unregenerate in their blindness and with respect to knowing in general and hence, what ought or ought not to be said in bringing the gospel to them -- what ought or ought not to be expected of them as unregenerate?
Just on the face of things, why is it that Reformed people have become so enamoured with a philosopher? Have they read Calvin's Institutes with a view to noting his critical posture toward philosophy, his reasons for opposing any synthesis of Christianity and Western philosophy? Have they really worked through the philosophically learned apostle Paul's clear charge: "See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy" (Colossians 2:8)?
Anyway, it is difficult to talk about Van Til's ideas without considering philosophy, and particularly, what is going on in Kant.
The short answer (oops, too late!) to your question is that Van Tillianism, postmodernism, and neo-orthodoxy all share the epistemological idealism of Kant.
Moreover, the approach that Van Til took with synthesizing modern philosophy (Kant) and Reformed Christianity has a logical and historical continuum -- i.e., the insight Van Til took from modern philosophy in its historical development calls for an update: modernism has aged into postmodernism.
I will say more about this later, but Van Til naively and inconsistently assumed a direct realistic access to Scriptural meaning, although, this was what saved him from the implications of epistemological idealism which in its latter form as postmodernism denied that there was any directly or immediately accessible meaning in the text (the Bible included).
But I've gotten ahead of myself. I've already used a term which may not be clear. So if I may, I need to do some preliminary work first before I respond further to your questions. Though you may be familiar with my terminology, for the sake of clarity and for readers who may be following this discussion who may not be familiar with philosophy, I will provide a couple of definitions that will need to be learned, or it will be difficult (if it isn't difficult already) to follow me.
I. I define "epistemological realism" as the belief that reality or truth exists and is directly or immediately knowable.
For my purposes, "epistemological realism" is the same as "common sense realism," "naive realism," and "direct realism."
"Epistemological realism" is associated with the "correspondence theory" of truth which states that "truth is what accords with (or corresponds to) reality."
The implication here is that there is a reliable correlation between the way the mind processes reality and the way reality itself is. There can, therefore, be a match between the way the mind knows things and the way things actually are.
I see a pencil on my desk right now.
"Epistemological realism" takes that statement not as a claim or "belief" that needs to be justified somehow before it can become knowledge (the way philosophers may feel is necessary) but as "knowledge" already and in itself.
It is called "simple seeing" or "knowledge by acquaintance." It stands for knowing in its "is-structure" -- i.e. and in my above example, The pencil is the object I see and its actual structure or form accords with what I see.
This is just plain ordinary or everyday knowing as all of us know and depend on it.
One more definition.
II. I define "epistemological idealism" as the belief that reality or truth exists but is indirectly or mediately knowable. Reality is known through or by ideas, by conditions and structures internal to the mind.
Using the pencil illustration, epistemological idealism speaks this way: "I am being appeared to in the manner of a pencil on my desk. I see a particular object (x) as a pencil. It has the "as-structure" of a pencil. I don't know what it really looks like (its "is-structure"); I only know how it appears to me given the way my mind conditions it."
There is a family of different theories of truth which may all be associated with "epistemological idealism." I will mention the primary one: "the coherence theory of truth." Here's the definition: "truth is what coheres with everything else we believe."
There are other theories in the same family belonging to epistemological idealism (such as the "pragmatic theory of truth") but what this family does not accept, of course, is the "correspondence theory of truth."
Often in philosophy, "idealism" is regarded as a metaphysical (what pertains to the ultimate nature of things) description merely -- i.e., as the belief that reality is entirely mental or the product of the mind. Bishop Berkeley is most generally associated with this extreme form of "idealism."
But Western philosophy presents other forms of idealism than the Berkeleyan variety.
First, Plato's doctrine of the Ideas or Forms states that reality exists in an immaterial realm only encountered directly or immediately when the soul is disembodied after death. In that state, the soul sees directly or immediately the Ideas or Forms. Then when the soul is reincarnated it learns by recalling through questions what it knew perfectly, directly, and immediately when it saw the Ideas or Forms in its disembodied state. The material realm is a shadow (less real) of the immaterial realm. According to Plato, "the body is the prison house of the soul." Matter/body gets in the way of mind, distorts knowledge, makes knowing imperfect. The more purely rational one is while in an embodied state in the material realm is the more one makes progress in knowing reality as it actually is (that is the Forms or Ideas themselves).
Second, fast forward to Descartes, the father of modern philosophy. Descartes holds to a radical dualism between mind and body/matter -- that these are two different substances which cannot relate to each other. In his quest for indubitable knowledge, he believes all he can know, is known by a subjective turn within: his own ideas or thoughts as a thinking being. Plato's Ideas or Forms are now in the human mind itself. The mind has become its own prison. And that's where I'll have to leave it for now.
Blessings,
Joseph
__________________
However, could I ask for just a little bit more clarification on behalf of members who may have been shocked by your posts? Are you saying that Van Tillians are necessarily postmodern/neo-orthodox, or that Van Tillianism leads to (or stems from) postmodernism/neo-orthodoxy, or simply that Van Tillianism is compatible with postmodernism/neo-orthodoxy? (I think those are the only options.) I ask this because there are many Van Tillians on this board, and they probably could not make any sense out of how someone could be labeled all the ways you labeled Dr. McLellan. -- Charliej
Charlie,
These are carefully nuanced and thoughtful questions. How they are answered can, of course, have profound implications for those who are Reformed. I think by the way you pose these questions, you are aware that the stakes are high.
At Westminster Seminary for forty-three years, as you know, Cornelius Van Til had a significant influence on an entire generation of Reformed pastors. As you've noted, a number of people associated with this blog are Van Tillian. It is not surprising that he has had such an impact. He was quite intelligent, spiritually alive and dedicated to Christ, committed to Scripture, and well versed in philosophy.
As you noted, Van Til is, while being critical of Kant, also indebted to Kant. Through Kant, Van Til brought to the church (at least in its Reformed branch) an epistemology that was a synthesis of Reformed theology and Western philosophy (Kant). The result was particularly evident in a new apologetics, altogether unprecedented in the church's history. John Frame recognizes this when he notes a parallel between the importance of Kant in all that follows in Western philosophy and that of Van Til in Reformed circles and thinking.
We might want to pause here for a moment, though, and think through the troubling implications of this (regardless of what one thinks of either Kant or Van Til):
(1) Can we identify another instance in the church's history where an significant overhaul of the presentation and defense of the gospel of Jesus Christ hinged on the teaching of a secular philosopher?
(2) If Van Til had been relying solely on Scripture (Sola Scriptura), which is arguably the most important principle of Reformed thinking, would he have been able to present his influential proposal for apologetics?
(3) Related to the first question, if Van Til was right to incorporate Kant's epistemology into Reformed and biblical theology, does that not mean that the church was in the dark on apologetics for roughly eighteen hundred years prior to Kant? Moreover, does that not mean that the apostles themselves (e.g., Peter in Acts 2 and Paul in Acts 17:2-4), not having Kant's theory of knowing, mistakenly related to people as if there was a common ground of neutrality, shared facts, etc. between themselves and the unregenerate people they were trying to persuade that Jesus is the Messiah?
(4) And does this not all mean that Scripture, as the foundation of the church (Ephesians 2:20) and that which equips the "man of God" for "every good work" (2 Timothy 3:16-17), is actually not sufficient or complete enough for that "good work" which is preaching and defending the gospel of Christ? That the church doesn't have its fullness completely in its head Jesus Christ but needs philosophy for that particular aspect of its work? That the church needed Kant before it was fully enlightened about the true state of the unregenerate in their blindness and with respect to knowing in general and hence, what ought or ought not to be said in bringing the gospel to them -- what ought or ought not to be expected of them as unregenerate?
Just on the face of things, why is it that Reformed people have become so enamoured with a philosopher? Have they read Calvin's Institutes with a view to noting his critical posture toward philosophy, his reasons for opposing any synthesis of Christianity and Western philosophy? Have they really worked through the philosophically learned apostle Paul's clear charge: "See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy" (Colossians 2:8)?
Anyway, it is difficult to talk about Van Til's ideas without considering philosophy, and particularly, what is going on in Kant.
The short answer (oops, too late!) to your question is that Van Tillianism, postmodernism, and neo-orthodoxy all share the epistemological idealism of Kant.
Moreover, the approach that Van Til took with synthesizing modern philosophy (Kant) and Reformed Christianity has a logical and historical continuum -- i.e., the insight Van Til took from modern philosophy in its historical development calls for an update: modernism has aged into postmodernism.
I will say more about this later, but Van Til naively and inconsistently assumed a direct realistic access to Scriptural meaning, although, this was what saved him from the implications of epistemological idealism which in its latter form as postmodernism denied that there was any directly or immediately accessible meaning in the text (the Bible included).
But I've gotten ahead of myself. I've already used a term which may not be clear. So if I may, I need to do some preliminary work first before I respond further to your questions. Though you may be familiar with my terminology, for the sake of clarity and for readers who may be following this discussion who may not be familiar with philosophy, I will provide a couple of definitions that will need to be learned, or it will be difficult (if it isn't difficult already) to follow me.
I. I define "epistemological realism" as the belief that reality or truth exists and is directly or immediately knowable.
For my purposes, "epistemological realism" is the same as "common sense realism," "naive realism," and "direct realism."
"Epistemological realism" is associated with the "correspondence theory" of truth which states that "truth is what accords with (or corresponds to) reality."
The implication here is that there is a reliable correlation between the way the mind processes reality and the way reality itself is. There can, therefore, be a match between the way the mind knows things and the way things actually are.
I see a pencil on my desk right now.
"Epistemological realism" takes that statement not as a claim or "belief" that needs to be justified somehow before it can become knowledge (the way philosophers may feel is necessary) but as "knowledge" already and in itself.
It is called "simple seeing" or "knowledge by acquaintance." It stands for knowing in its "is-structure" -- i.e. and in my above example, The pencil is the object I see and its actual structure or form accords with what I see.
This is just plain ordinary or everyday knowing as all of us know and depend on it.
One more definition.
II. I define "epistemological idealism" as the belief that reality or truth exists but is indirectly or mediately knowable. Reality is known through or by ideas, by conditions and structures internal to the mind.
Using the pencil illustration, epistemological idealism speaks this way: "I am being appeared to in the manner of a pencil on my desk. I see a particular object (x) as a pencil. It has the "as-structure" of a pencil. I don't know what it really looks like (its "is-structure"); I only know how it appears to me given the way my mind conditions it."
There is a family of different theories of truth which may all be associated with "epistemological idealism." I will mention the primary one: "the coherence theory of truth." Here's the definition: "truth is what coheres with everything else we believe."
There are other theories in the same family belonging to epistemological idealism (such as the "pragmatic theory of truth") but what this family does not accept, of course, is the "correspondence theory of truth."
Often in philosophy, "idealism" is regarded as a metaphysical (what pertains to the ultimate nature of things) description merely -- i.e., as the belief that reality is entirely mental or the product of the mind. Bishop Berkeley is most generally associated with this extreme form of "idealism."
But Western philosophy presents other forms of idealism than the Berkeleyan variety.
First, Plato's doctrine of the Ideas or Forms states that reality exists in an immaterial realm only encountered directly or immediately when the soul is disembodied after death. In that state, the soul sees directly or immediately the Ideas or Forms. Then when the soul is reincarnated it learns by recalling through questions what it knew perfectly, directly, and immediately when it saw the Ideas or Forms in its disembodied state. The material realm is a shadow (less real) of the immaterial realm. According to Plato, "the body is the prison house of the soul." Matter/body gets in the way of mind, distorts knowledge, makes knowing imperfect. The more purely rational one is while in an embodied state in the material realm is the more one makes progress in knowing reality as it actually is (that is the Forms or Ideas themselves).
Second, fast forward to Descartes, the father of modern philosophy. Descartes holds to a radical dualism between mind and body/matter -- that these are two different substances which cannot relate to each other. In his quest for indubitable knowledge, he believes all he can know, is known by a subjective turn within: his own ideas or thoughts as a thinking being. Plato's Ideas or Forms are now in the human mind itself. The mind has become its own prison. And that's where I'll have to leave it for now.
Blessings,
Joseph
__________________