The nature, truth-value and co-validity of transcendentals

[Me Died Blue]

Originally posted by Draught Horse
A TAG looks like this:
For x to be the case, y must first be the case because y must be the necessary precondition of x.
X is the case;
Therefore, y is the case.

Let x = logic; y = the existence of God

For logic to be the case, God must exist because logic must have a worldview or a network of assumptions that make it valid.
Logic is possible
God exists

In the nature of the case, no two transcendentals can be equally valid. Even non-Christian philosophers grant this point. For example, it cannot be logically true that the Christian worldview and X worldview both provide the preconditions of intelligibility.

http://puritanboard.com/forum/viewthread.php?tid=16963

Jacob, since you summed this up in such a succint and focused way, I thought I'd take the opportunity to hopefully gain some insight and generate discussion specifically on the portion of your statements above that I put in bold.

This is the (single but key) stepping stone of Van Tillian apologetics and the transcendental argument I have never been able to fully grasp as far as its necessary validity, biblically or logically. I understand and agree with the demonstration of Christianity in providing the preconditions of intelligible reasoning and experience, and for that matter of being able to show that a finite number of other worldviews do not provide that as such.

But in terms of making the jump from making that finite number of demonstrations to making the universal claim that no other worldview can provide the preconditions as such, the explanation I always hear is essentially what you mentioned above regarding the nature of "transcendentals," and how it is logically impossible even in a hypothetical sense for two systems to provide preconditions of that sort. The thing is, I have never been able to get a really good explanation and defense of why (or how) that is logically the case. To that question, I've had people say, "Because that's the definition of a transcendental," which really does nothing but get us where we started, as it doesn't then go on the explain why philosophers would even agree on that definition, and why it's really the case.

[Edited on 2-28-2006 by Me Died Blue]

 

[RamistThomist]

Hmm...wow. Okay, this might take a while (because I am sort of in the same boat, but I trust that Bahnsen's book will lead me to safer shores). I am about to go bible study, but I will get back to you, hopefully later tonight. First, I will try to summarize what I said in the other thread in a different way:

I said that no two transcendentals can co-exist. As I understand it, that is so because there can be no two equally valid claims to ultimacy {brief aside: that is also the reason I reject any dichotomizing of ethical systems where people say that God's word applies in spiritual matters, but some vague, esoteric natural law theory applies in non-spiritual matters}

Of course, your objections probably run deeper and when I settle down, I will post my thoughts. I am glad you brought this up. I feel burdened sometime in life to write a small book on worldview and apologetics. I am now collating all my notes and studies, excluding quotations from Frame, Bahnsen, and Van til for now, into a system.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Me Died Blue
But in terms of making the jump from making that finite number of demonstrations to making the universal claim that no other worldview can provide the preconditions as such, the explanation I always hear is essentially what you mentioned above regarding the nature of "transcendentals," and how it is logically impossible even in a hypothetical sense for two systems to provide preconditions of that sort.

Part of the discussion centers on necessity vs. sufficiency. The unbelievers only out is to claim that Christianity is just sufficient but not necessary. Or put another way, there are more than one foundation for knowledge, as long as you pick a working one, that is all that can be asked.

The problem is that if there are other foundations, then Christianity is false because it claims exclusivity (This is a key point); which would mean that Chrstianity is not sufficient or necessary.

So if Christianity is true, then it is necessary, but if it is false it is neither necessary or sufficient.

The thing is, I have never been able to get a really good explanation and defense of why (or how) that is logically the case. To that question, I've had people say, "Because that's the definition of a transcendental,"

If something is transcendental then it has to be the case, in order for knowledge to be possible. If someone admits that Chrstianity is "a" transcendental then the game is over (unless you want to admit that contradictory things can both be true)

which really does nothing but get us where we started, as it doesn't then go on the explain why philosophers would even agree on that definition, and why it's really the case.

[Edited on 2-28-2006 by Me Died Blue]

I hope I have helped somewhat.

CT

[Edited on 2-28-2006 by ChristianTrader]

 

[JohnV]

I think it comes from Spinoza, Chris. I'll look up the quote. It might help to hear it in his terms.

 

[JohnV]

(The infinite one) ought to be studied first in the order of knowledge and in the order of things.... Hence it has come to pass that there is nothing of which men thought less than the divine nature while they have been studying natural objects, and when they afterwards applied themselves to think about God, there was nothing of which they could think less than those prior fictions upon which they had built their knowledge of natural things, for those fictions could in no way help to the knowledge of the divine nature.

If there were any substance besides God, it would have to be explained by the same attributes of God, and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attribute, which is impossible.

I have them in the order of importance and sense for myself, not necessarily in the order they appear in his work. At the time when I took down these quotes I was collecting ideas, and did not bother to write down the sources, but only the author. So these are from my earlier notes. I'm sorry that I can't find the texts I've taken them from, but I suppose that they are from Ethics, since that is what I have. But I have taken lots of books from the local library too, and I can't remember them all anymore. It is also possible that I took them out of the essays in the Sytopicon of The Great Western Books; and this is the most likely source, since I have been reading them a long time.

But in effect we have here the idea of the originality of attributes, such as goodness, truth, beauty ( the most basic of attributes ) being not in themselves, but derived from an origin higher than themselves. In fact, they represent the character of God. So to find them in anything else as original is to suppose two Gods, which then deflates, or rather annuls, the meaning of God.

This is what the transcendental approach points to, as I believe.

I'm sorry that I cannot do the transcendental approach justice. I don't claim to understand it. As I understand it, as much as I do, it has some enlightenment thrusts in it, and I don't agree with it. Needless to say, I don't sympathize with Van Til's analysis of the history of apologetics, and that accounts for much of the difference, I would suppose. I believe this to be the crucial difference. Therefore it follows that we would differ on the use of terms we have in common too.

But all the same, I try. And this is what I come up with. I hope it helps.

 

[Pergamum]

When I was an atheist at age 18 (not really an atheist but an unbeliever..because there are no true atheists I don't think) I was struck by how many atheists spoke of the evil in the world....which struck me as being internally inconsistent.

Either these things are transcendant truths or they are just labels - and an atheist must always defend the "label" theory. Few people, however,just speak of the Holocaust as being "dreadfully inconvenient" to one segment of the population - it is spoken of in moral terms.

Also, I saw that logic itself rests upon the premise of reason and order and "truth" - in the midst of an illogical and chance world. This could not be!

If I held that "truth" existed - then I concluded that there had to be a God.

I reasoned that if I could truly reason, I could only do so with a God-given reason.

When I see a train coming, I don't question whether it was the result of a chance collocation of atoms - I trust that my perceptions correspond to an external world. When I order my thoughts, I trust that there is such an order to put my thoughts into.

When I find truth, I trust that there is a truth to find...and just where does this Truth come from? If it is true to everybody, it must come from something much higher than everybody!

Therefore, I guess this stuff we are talking about above was one of the pivotal points in my life. It did not, by far, save me...but it removed my defences and left my conscience open and naked before the knowledge of the Coming Wrath of God.

Thus began my period of true seeking which culminated in salvation at age 18.

I heartily assert that the above "stuff" we are trying to chew on it not just mental gymnastics- but is powerful to those who have fortified their doubts within the castles of skepticism and unbelief.

A Christian epistemology is the only one that can stand and not fall by its own weight!!!

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Have you guys seen this:

http://www.thirdmill.org/newfiles/joh_frame/Frame.Apologetics2004.TranscendentalArguments.pdf

Transcendental Arguments
An Essay by John Frame

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is responsible for introducing the term
"œtranscendental" to philosophical discussion. Seeking to repel the skepticism of
David Hume, but unable to accept the methods of his rationalist teacher Christian
Wolff, Kant came to advocate transcendental argument as a new means of
grounding the certainty of mathematics, science, and philosophy.
All of us, he argued, must concede that knowledge is possible. Else there is no
point to any discussion or inquiry. Now, given that knowledge is possible, said
Kant, we should ask what the conditions are that make knowledge possible.
What must the world be like, and what must the workings of our minds be like, if
human knowledge is to be possible?
Kant argued that among the conditions of knowledge are the transcendental
aesthetic, in which the mind orders sense experience into a spatio-temporal
sequence, and the transcendental analytic, in which the mind imposes categories
such as substance and cause upon experience. So we know by transcendental
argument that the world (more precisely, the world of appearances, the
phenomena, not the world "˜in itself´) is a collection of substances located in space
and time, with causal relationships to one another. We do not get this knowledge
from sense-experience alone (Hume) or from rational deduction alone (Leibniz,
Wolff), but from an argument assuming the reality of knowledge and showing the
necessary presuppositions of that assumption.
Transcendental argument became a staple of the writings of the idealist school
that followed Kant, and from there it made its way into Christian apologetics.
James Orr (1844-1913) employed it. But the twentieth-century apologist who
placed the most weight on the transcendental argument (which he sometimes
called "œreasoning by presupposition") was Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987), q.v.
Like Kant, Van Til was unhappy with empiricism and rationalism, and with
traditional ways of combining reason and sense experience such as that of
Aquinas. Kant found these approaches to knowledge logically invalid. But for Van
Til they were also wrong in a distinctively theological way. Traditional
methodologies applied to apologetics, said Van Til, assume that human senseexperience
and/or human reason can function adequately without God, that is,
"œautonomously" or "œneutrally." So, at the very outset of an apologetic argument,
they concede the whole game. They adopt a presupposition contrary to the
conclusion they wish to argue. They seek to gain knowledge of God by adopting
a non-theistic epistemology.
2
The only alternative, Van Til argued, is to adopt a theistic epistemology when
arguing for the existence of God. But that approach seems to be viciously
circular: presupposing God in our epistemology and then using that epistemology
to prove his existence.
Van Til answered the charge of circularity in these ways: (1) every system of
thought is circular when arguing its most fundamental presuppositions (e.g. a
rationalist can defend the authority of reason only by using reason). (2) The
Christian circle is the only one that renders reality intelligible on its own terms.
In defense of (2), Van Til developed his own transcendental argument. He
maintained that Christian theism is the presupposition of all meaning, all rational
significance, all intelligible discourse. Even when someone argues against
Christian theism, Van Til said, he presupposes it, for he presupposes that
rational argument is possible and that truth can be conveyed through language.
The non-Christian, then, in Van Til´s famous illustration, is like a child sitting on
her father´s lap, slapping his face. She could not slap him unless he supported
her. Similarly, the non-Christian cannot carry out his rebellion against God unless
God makes that rebellion possible. Contradicting God assumes an intelligible
universe and therefore a theistic one.
But how can we defend the logical move from "œintelligible universe" to "œtheistic
universe?" Van Til rarely articulated his reason for that move; he seemed to think
it was self-evident. But in effect, he reverted at this point to apologetics of a more
traditional type. Apologists have often noted that we could not know the world at
all unless it had been designed for knowledge. If the world were nothing but
matter, motion, time, and chance, we would have no reason to think that the
ideas in our heads told us anything about the real world. Only if a person had
designed the world to be known, and the human mind to know it, could
knowledge be possible. So Van Til at this point reverted to a traditional
teleological argument. He never admitted doing this, and he could not have
admitted it, because he thought the traditional teleological (like the other
traditional arguments) were autonomous and neutral.
If Van Til´s transcendental approach is to succeed, however, it must abandon the
assumption that traditional arguments are necessarily autonomous and welcome
the assistance of such arguments to complete the transcendental argument. The
traditional arguments are in fact necessary to establish the existence of God as a
transcendental conclusion. And there is no reason to assume, as Van Til does,
that anyone who uses an argument from design or causality is presupposing a
nontheistic epistemology. On the contrary, people who use these traditional
arguments show precisely that without God the data of our experience
suggesting order and causality are unintelligible.
What, then, does transcendental argument add to the apologist´s arsenal,
beyond the traditional arguments? First, it presents a goal for apologetics. The
3
goal of the apologist is not only to show that God exists, but also who he is: that
he is the source of all meaning and intelligibility in the universe.
Further, it suggests apologetic strategies somewhat neglected in the tradition.
Traditional apologists have often argued that causality (for example) implies God.
A transcendental argument makes a stronger claim: that causality presupposes
God. The difference between "œimplies" and "œpresupposes," according to Peter
Strawson and Bas Van Fraasen, is that in the latter case God´s existence is
implied either by the assertion or the denial of causality. That is, not only does
the existence of causality imply the existence of God, but even to deny
(intelligibly, if it were possible) the existence of causality would be to invoke a
framework of meaning that presupposes God´s existence. Don Collett argues
that the Strawson-Van Fraasen kind of presupposition is identical with Van Til´s.
So if creation presupposes God, even the denial of creation presupposes him,
and the atheist is like the little girl slapping her father while sitting on his lap.
The Bible does make this kind of radical claim, that creation not only implies, but
presupposes God. For God is the creator of all, and therefore the source of all
meaning, order, and intelligibility. It is in Christ that all things hold together (Col.
1:17). So without him everything falls apart; nothing makes sense. Thus Scripture
teaches that unbelief is foolish (Psm. 14:1, 1 Cor. 1:20). There are many
arguments to be made on the way to that conclusion. Not every individual
apologetic argument needs to go that far. But the apologist´s work is not done
until he reaches that conclusion, until he persuades the objector that God is
everything the Bible says he is. That is to say that a complete argument for
Christian theism, however many sub-arguments it contains, will be
transcendental in character.
Bibliography
Collett, Don, "œVan Til and Transcendental Argument," Westminster Theological
Journal, forthcoming.
Frame, John, Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg, N. J.: 1995).
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, abridged, ed., tr., int. by Norman
Kemp Smith (N. Y.: 1958).
Strawson, Peter, An Introduction to Logical Theory (London: 1952), 174-179.
van Fraassen, Bas C., "œPresupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference," Journal
of Philosophy (1968): 136-152.
Van Til, Cornelius, The Defense of the Faith (Philadelphia: 1963).
J. M. Frame

 

[JohnV]

C.S. Lewis' A Pilgrims Regress is also a good study for this. If you can get the edition with the appendix that explains the book a bit, it would be better still.

 

[Ron]

This is the (single but key) stepping stone of Van Tillian apologetics and the transcendental argument I have never been able to fully grasp as far as its necessary validity, biblically or logically. I understand and agree with the demonstration of Christianity in providing the preconditions of intelligible reasoning and experience, and for that matter of being able to show that a finite number of other worldviews do not provide that as such.

There are only two worldviews. One says that Scripture is the necessary precondition for the justification of intelligible experience and the other says that it´s not. Accordingly, all that needs to be defeated is the one worldview that argues that knowledge, ethics and reality are intelligible apart from revelation.

The argument that was employed earlier in this thread was correct. It was essentially: "For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case." Page 79 of Festschrift

As a formal proof, this argument takes the following form:

Prove A: The Christian God exists.
Step 1 ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
Step 2 (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
Step 3 (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction!)
Step 4 (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
Step 5 (A):= God does exist (Law of negation.)

It would not do to write: "if causality (C), then God (G)"¦," for this only communicates that G is a necessary condition for C (and C is a sufficient condition for G); it does not address the transcendental challenge - that the consequent is a necessary precondition for C, hence the need for a semantic revision of modus ponens. {For instance, if one is regenerate, then he is in Christ; it is also true that if one is in Christ, then he is regenerate. What is the logical order? Does regeneration presuppose being in Christ or is a precondition for being in Christ regeneration? Well of course, regeneration is logically prior to being in Christ, but this is not grasped by a simple "if p then q" proposition. We are in Christ because we are regenerate; we are not regenerate because we are in Christ. Similarly, God's revelation is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience, but we cannot articulate this truth by "if causality, then God," since necessary conditions need not be prior to that which they are a condition, hence the need for a slight semantic variation such as: causality presupposes God's revelation, or God's revelation is the precondition for causality.}

Many Christians might hold to the above argument, which is transcendental in nature. A common debate among certain apologists will be over whether step 2 can be shown to be philosophically certain.

Immediately below is what I believe to be a feeble justification for step 2 of the above proof but I have seen it enough that I believe it is worth interacting with.

Premise 1: Within the worldview of Christianity intelligibility can be justified.
Premise 2: All worldviews that we have been confronted with cannot justify intelligibility.
Conclusion: Since we cannot deny intelligibility, and since only the Christian worldview so far can justify it, then the Christian worldview is true.

Some believe that step-2 of proof can be inductively justified because every worldview that a particular apologist had encountered has been refuted. It is argued by such apologists that the "œrational inference" that God exists is based upon a statistical-confidence one might have from refuting many opposing worldviews. One of the problems I have with this justification is how can an inductive argument justify the God of Christianity when it cannot justify the heart of Christianity, the Resurrection of Christ? In other words, the inductive justification of step-2 presupposes uniformity in nature, yet the existence of the Christian God requires discontinuity, the Resurrection! How does one plan on justifying discontinuity on the basis of induction, apart from presupposing the self-attesting word of God as the foundational truth by which one can even draw rational inference, which can only be done by presupposing the uniformity of nature! Although the unbeliever cannot account for uniformity, he is no less justified in arguing for uniformity than the Christian who argues for it on the basis of an inductive claim. Not to mention, the conclusion of the proof for step 2, which is "œthe Christian worldview is true," exceeds the scope of the premises!

The conclusion that the Christian worldview is more reasonable than the non-Christian worldview remains unjustified because the question of whether one is even philosophically justified in his use of induction has not been established. There are no freebies in Philosophy, as Dr. Bahnsen used to say.

3 Critical points:

1. In step-3 of the proof it is affirmed that there is intelligible experience, which presupposes true a priori categories of thought that can interpret the facts of a mind-independent world according to actual, objective truth.
2. The proof itself presupposes the intelligibility of deductive reasoning.
3. In the justification of step-2 the precondition of intelligible inductive inference is presupposed.

Accordingly, in order to rationally infer that God´s existence is "philosophically uncertain" yet "œmost probable," one must first presuppose that which the conclusion does not afford "“ God´s actual, ontological existence, which is the necessary precondition for inductive inference! This problem is insurmountable. In arguing for the high probability of God´s existence, the apologist, like the unbeliever who argues against God´s existence, presupposes God´s actual existence. The proof, which concludes with minimal philosophical uncertainty that God exists, begins by presupposing the actual certainty of God´s existence in order to employ both deduction (the proof) and induction (the justification for step 2). Accordingly, one´s presupposition of God´s actual existence ends up contradicting his conclusion that God´s existence is not actually certain. Accordingly, one would have to revise his presupposition-hypothesis to one of "œGod might not exist." In doing so, one will not be able to justify actual induction or deduction. In sum, in order to infer that God´s existence is philosophically uncertain, one must first borrow from a worldview that comports with philosophical certainty so that there can be philosophical uncertainty.

The justification for step two of the proof is simply: God's word teaches two worldviews; God's word is true; therefore, it is true that there are two worldviews. Accordingly, the Christian need not evaluate an infinite number of worldviews anymore than he needs to witness an infinite amount of deaths to know that all men are mortal. We have an appeal for such a premise, God´s word. Moreover, induction requires as a necessary precondition something more than a conceptual scheme for God´s existence. Note well that the transcendental proof, which is deductive in nature and can be simply demonstrated through either modus ponens or modus tollens analogues, requires an ontological God who has revealed himself to men.

The problem many people have is that they don't appreciate that when we get to the ultimate truth claims proof must be circular. For the empiricist, observation is the final appeal. For others, logic is ultimate. The problem is that logic does not comport with a mere conceptual necessity for God, let alone a conceptual necessity that is only probable! Logic is only justifiable by presupposing Scripture.

We must begin our reasoning with the ontological Trinity who has revealed himself in Scripture. My proof is sound in that the form is valid and the premises true. NOTE: The truth of any deductive conclusion is not predicated upon anyone's agreement of the truth of the premises. Accordingly, since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, step 2 of the proof, the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors. In doing so we don´t gain more philosophical confidence that God exists. We merely demonstrate the veracity of TAG to a watching world. Finally, we do not arrive at premise-2 by borrowing from another worldview in order that we might reason inductively. We know our premises by our first principle, God's clear revelation of himself to us in Scripture.

Finally, some might say that since men are fallible men cannot be certain about anything, let alone their proof for God´s existence. I would like to see one put this assertion into a formal argument. Can the skeptic be certain of that claim? Do foibles logically necessitate uncertainty about all things? If so, then the Bible is wrong when it states that we can know we have eternal life? Doesn´t the Christian know that his redeemer lives? Doesn't the fallible Christian know that fallible men chose the correct books for the canon under God´s sovereign guidance?

I´ve probably said enough, especially for my first post on this site. However, there should be much to launch from into further discussion.

Ron

[Edited on 3-1-2006 by Ron]

 

[Don]

Ron said,

The justification for step two of the proof is simply: God's word teaches two worldviews; God's word is true; therefore, it is true that there are two worldviews. Accordingly, the Christian need not evaluate an infinite number of worldviews anymore than he needs to witness an infinite amount of deaths to know that all men are mortal. We have an appeal for such a premise, God´s word. Moreover, induction requires as a necessary precondition something more than a conceptual scheme for God´s existence. Note well that the transcendental proof, which is deductive in nature and can be simply demonstrated through either modus ponens or modus tollens analogues, requires an ontological God who has revealed himself to men.

So your 'justification' (I'm still unsure what some VT's mean by justification) for there being two worldviews is an appeal to Scripture?

This clearly begs the question against the unbeliever, as he will not accept the Scripture in the first place, so appealing to it to prove a major point in the Bahnsenian TA will do no good (maybe I'm missing something in your post).

Finally, some might say that since men are fallible men cannot be certain about anything, let alone their proof for God´s existence. I would like to see one put this assertion into a formal argument. Can the skeptic be certain of that claim? Do foibles logically necessitate uncertainty about all things? If so, then the Bible is wrong when it states that we can know we have eternal life? Doesn´t the Christian know that his redeemer lives? Doesn't the fallible Christian know that fallible men chose the correct books for the canon under God´s sovereign guidance?

There's a world of difference between being certain and being able to *show* or prove something with certainty.

[Edited on 3-1-2006 by Don]

 

[Ron]

So your 'justification' (I'm still unsure what some VT's mean by justification) for there being two worldviews is an appeal to Scripture?

This clearly begs the question against the unbeliever, as he will not accept the Scripture in the first place, so appealing to it to prove a major point in the Bahnsenian TA will do no good (maybe I'm missing something in your post).

Hi Don,

Proof is not pesuasion. There are many proofs for God's existence: E.g., God exists or nothing exists; not nothing exists; therefore God exists. The form is valid and the premises true so the proof is sound. If I were to show a skeptic that the sky is cloudy yet he denies the reliability of his senses, have I therefore begged the question because he denies believing what he actually believes or should believe? A sound argument is not predicated upon what people will accept as reasonable. Rather, a sound argument is based upon truth propositions that are properly organized. Again, proof does not always entail persuasion.

There's a world of difference between being certain and being able to *show* or prove something with certainty.

True but I don't see how that pertains to my post. A man who never heard the Scriptures is certain of God's existence yet he cannot begin to articulate his warrant for his true belief since all he can appeal to is a conceptual necessity of God, which need not entail ontological necessity. Notwithstanding, all men are certain that God exists because they have warrant for believing what is true by nature (Romans 1).

Blessings,

Ron

 

[Don]

Ron,

Hi Don,

Proof is not pesuasion. There are many proofs for God's existence: E.g., God exists or nothing exists; not nothing exists; therefore God exists. The form is valid and the premises true so the proof is sound. If I were to show a skeptic that the sky is cloudy yet he denies the reliability of his senses, have I therefore begged the question because he denies believing what he actually believes or should believe? A sound argument is not predicated upon what people will accept as reasonable. Rather, a sound argument is based upon truth propositions that are properly organized. Again, proof does not always entail persuasion.

I never said that proof was persuasion. The problem is that the certainty of a Bahnsenian TA rests on the 2 worldview approach; however, that is only justified by an appeal to Scripture. You have an unargued assumption within your premise (actually a hidden premise) and appealing to the truth of Scripture for the 2 worldview approach before you prove the truth of Scripture (or the Christian God) through the Bahnsenian TA and would therefore beg the question. You first need to prove the 2 worldview approach apart from Scripture then argue to Scripture. That's why the TA usually employs logic in the premise, since no one really denies that and to do so is foolish.

Don't get me wrong, I hold to the 2 worldview approach. I am just not sure if there is a plausible argument for it. If there is not a plausible argument for it, it would seem that the Bahnsenian TA is reduced to an inductive proof.

True but I don't see how that pertains to my post. A man who never heard the Scriptures is certain of God's existence yet he cannot begin to articulate his warrant for his true belief since all he can appeal to is a conceptual necessity of God, which need not entail ontological necessity. Notwithstanding, all men are certain that God exists because they have warrant for believing what is true by nature (Romans 1).

It certainly seemed so because in your last paragraph you said, "Finally, some might say that since men are fallible men *cannot be certain* about anything, let *alone their proof for God´s existence*". Then you go further and talk about whether one knows if he has eternal life. These are two different issues.

 

[Ron]

I never said that proof was persuasion.

Hi Don,

You said, "œThis [appealing to Scripture] clearly begs the question against the unbeliever, as he will not accept the Scripture in the first place, so appealing to it to prove a major point in the Bahnsenian TA will do no good (maybe I'm missing something in your post)."

The proof is sound because it has a valid form and employs true premises. Accordingly, I´ve proven what I set out to prove. You said that I "œbegged the question" because "œ[the unbeliever] will not accept Scripture in the first place." So what? That a man denies the plain truth of Scripture does not make the use of Scripture somehow invalid, does it? In the like manner, if a man denies that his senses are reliable, does this mean that I cannot prove to him that there´s a dog in the living room by showing him the dog? Again, an unwillingness to accept the truth of premises does not constrain the apologist to appeal to "œfacts" that the opponent will accept, does it? Accordingly, it would seem that you are requiring an argument that will persuade the atheist, or at least requiring one that he will accept the premises as true. It all comes down to ultimate authorities, doesn't it? If one will not submit to reason, I may not abandon logic. Likewise, if one does not submit to Scripture, I may not abandon my moral commitment to the epistemic Lordship of Christ and his Word. Proof is not persuasion and it would seem that you´re looking for the latter and not the former. I´m prepared to offer the former and leave the latter to the Holy Spirit. :bigsmile:

Don't get me wrong, I hold to the 2 worldview approach. I am just not sure if there is a plausible argument for it. If there is not a plausible argument for it, it would seem that the Bahnsenian TA is reduced to an inductive proof.

I showed the inchorence of trying to argue for step-2 on inductive grounds, which would be that induction presupposes uniformity and uniformity is unintelliglbe without presupposing God's actual existence and revelation, which denies that God needs to be justified on inductive grounds or even can be. Inductive arguments, whether they are aimed at justifying step two or that salt will dissolve in water tomorrow, can only be advanced and defended if Scripture is already true, which is to presuppose that Scripture is certain and not merely conceptual or possible. Accordingly, Scripture becomes your unspoken true transcendental, which is being presupposed by you as certain so you can reason inductively.

This simple solution is that in deductive argumentation the conclusion is implied in the premise. At the end of the day, you either need to deny circular reasoning with respect to ultimate truth claims or consign yourself to skepticism, admitting that you cannot justify having any knowledge whatsoever. If you care to reply to any of this, I would ask that you first justify something with certainty. If you say you can't, then I'll ask you whether you can justify your skepticism. If you say can't justify your skepticism, then you will have opposed yourself again by saying with certainty that you cannot be certain about anything, even the certainty of your skepticism! If you take the other route and try to prove something, I will ask you to justify your use of the law of non-contradiction apart from appealing to Scripture as your ultimate authority.

It certainly seemed so because in your last paragraph you said, "Finally, some might say that since men are fallible men *cannot be certain* about anything, let *alone their proof for God´s existence*". Then you go further and talk about whether one knows if he has eternal life. These are two different issues.

They're not different at all. One cannot know that he has eternal life apart from Scripture saying that one can have eternal life.

All who believe on the name of Christ will enter into glory.
I believe on the name of Christ.
I will enter into glory.

Tell me how one can know he is saved without reasoning as I have just done from Scripture. The Spirit bears witness to our spirt that we are sons of God but this is not done in a vacuum but in accordance with the Word of promise.

Please don´t get me wrong. One can know he is saved without being able to articulate his reason for knowing. Notwithstanding, all who have cognizant assurance have reasoned on some level to that end. Our basis for assurance is God´s promise to men in general and our subjective acceptance of the promise coupled with the confirmation from the Holy Spirit Himself.

In his grace,

Ron

 

[Don]

Ron,

The proof is sound because it has a valid form and employs true premises. Accordingly, I´ve proven what I set out to prove. You said that I "œbegged the question" because "œ[the unbeliever] will not accept Scripture in the first place." So what? That a man denies the plain truth of Scripture does not make the use of Scripture somehow invalid, does it? In the like manner, if a man denies that his senses are reliable, does this mean that I cannot prove to him that there´s a dog in the living room by showing him the dog? Again, an unwillingness to accept the truth of premises does not constrain the apologist to appeal to "œfacts" that the opponent will accept, does it? Accordingly, it would seem that you are requiring an argument that will persuade the atheist, or at least requiring one that he will accept the premises as true. It all comes down to ultimate authorities, doesn't it? If one will not submit to reason, I may not abandon logic. Likewise, if one does not submit to Scripture, I may not abandon my moral commitment to the epistemic Lordship of Christ and his Word. Proof is not persuasion and it would seem that you´re looking for the latter and not the former. I´m prepared to offer the former and leave the latter to the Holy Spirit.

The form may be valid but a TA depends on the subarguments that can be given for it. According to Copi & Cohen (logic), 'an argument is valid when its premisses, *if true*, do provide conclusive grounds for the truth of its conclusion", p. 57. The premisses must succeed in providing conclusive grounds for the truth of conclusion. Just saying that you know they are true and just because the unbeliever doesn't accept them means nothing when it comes to actually giving a philosophical argument.

In order for this argument to be sound, you are going to need to actually show that the premisses are true, and your justification so far has been nothing but question begging. Your *proof* needs to include the 2 worldview approach since Bahnsen's certainty depends on it. All you have done is say, "Christianity is true, therefore Christianity is true", which is not exactly a proof. Other people have at least tried to give a proof for this.

You say, "so what"? If you are going to give a *proof* to the unbeliever then this is what you need to do. As Bahnsen would say, "If you don't want to play the reasoning game, then get off the court." (or something like that)

Again, I know the difference between persuasion and proof. But do you not give proofs in order to persuade? I don't know why this is repeated by different people, b/c this is nothing more than a diversionary tactic when arguments are lacking. All the unbeliever is going to say is that your post is persuasion not proof.

I showed the inchorence of trying to argue for step-2 on inductive grounds, which would be that induction presupposes uniformity and uniformity is unintelliglbe without presupposing God's actual existence and revelation, which denies that God needs to be justified on inductive grounds or even can be. Inductive arguments, whether they are aimed at justifying step two or that salt will dissolve in water tomorrow, can only be advanced and defended if Scripture is already true, which is to presuppose that Scripture is certain and not merely conceptual or possible. Accordingly, Scripture becomes your unspoken true transcendental, which is being presupposed by you as certain so you can reason inductively.

I'm not sure if you showed it 'incoherent'. But again here you are just assuming the "impossibility of the contrary" without arguing for it. All you have done here is to restate your assumption that was based on the 2 worldview approach and that if someone can't do this, then it automatically proves *Christian Theim*. This is similar to what Bahnsen did in his Van Til: Readings and Analysis. This misses the point of my objection, though. You end up critiquing a few worldviews and then conclude that all worldviews fail, which is inductive.

This simple solution is that in deductive argumentation the conclusion is implied in the premise. At the end of the day, you either need to deny circular reasoning with respect to ultimate truth claims or consign yourself to skepticism, admitting that you cannot justify having any knowledge whatsoever. If you care to reply to any of this, I would ask that you first justify something with certainty. If you say you can't, then I'll ask you whether you can justify your skepticism. If you say can't justify your skepticism, then you will have opposed yourself again by saying with certainty that you cannot be certain about anything, even the certainty of your skepticism! If you take the other route and try to prove something, I will ask you to justify your use of the law of non-contradiction apart from appealing to Scripture as your ultimate authority.

I'm not exactly sure how epistemic circularity would prove your point. If you want to question me in this manner, then I will ask you what you mean by "justify" and give me arguments as to why I should accept your theory of justification whatever that may be. I know of several different types of justification so you are being extremely vague. But again, if you take this approach, it is inductive. You need to prove to me why there are two worldviews and how refuting one 'worldview' refutes them all.

Until you either refute all worldviews or actually give arguments for the whole 2 worldview approach, then you have not given the *certainty* that Bahnsen wanted (as in philosophical proof). And then I'm sure you'll say, as did Bahnsen, that I need to give reasons for why I can even reason in the first place, but you would then need to give arguments for him needing to do so and I see no reason why the atheist couldn't remain agnostic as to his "justification".

They're not different at all. One cannot know that he has eternal life apart from Scripture saying that one can have eternal life.

This misses my objection. You are equivocating between a philosophical proof and knowing through intuition, revelation, etc. I never said that one couldn't give a reason from Scripture as to why he's saved so this has no relevance.

I'm speaking along the lines of an externalist type of justification, such as warrant. I was referring to knowing that God exists without being able to provide *certainty* through philosophical proof. This is the sense in which I was talking about knowing without knowing how you know or being able to spell it out. This is seen in Plantinga's book "God and Other Minds" and "Warranted Christian Belief".

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Ron

There's a world of difference between being certain and being able to *show* or prove something with certainty.

True but I don't see how that pertains to my post. A man who never heard the Scriptures is certain of God's existence yet he cannot begin to articulate his warrant for his true belief since all he can appeal to is a conceptual necessity of God, which need not entail ontological necessity. Notwithstanding, all men are certain that God exists because they have warrant for believing what is true by nature (Romans 1).

Blessings,

Ron

So there is no demonstration, but there is just assertion? (I agree with the assertion but not asserting something and demonstrating something are two different things.) The issue of knowing vs. proving seems to be playing a huge role. No one here is saying that we know that the Bible is true based on induction. The issue is that the defense will look exactly like induction.

CT

 

[Monergism]

Originally posted by Don

In order for this argument to be sound, you are going to need to actually show that the premisses are true, and your justification so far has been nothing but question begging.

Don,

What do you mean by "show?" It seems to me that by show you mean persuade. If so, you're confusing proof and persuasion (which, as you yourself said earlier, is very bad form). If not, you must mean prove. If so, then your statement would be as follows:

"In order for this argument to be sound (proven), you are going to need to actually show (prove) that the premises are true."


Aside from the fact that circularity in arguing for an ultimate authority is not the logical fallacy "begging the question" as you suggest, your rejection of an appeal to an ultimate authority leaves you without a starting point. In order to prove the premises are true, you´re suggesting we appeal to other [sound] sub arguments. Those sub arguments will in turn have premises that will need to be proven, which will require more sub arguments, and so on ad infinitum.

Without appealing to a self-authenticating authority as Ron has in assuming the truth claims of Scripture, I have to ask, how is a sound argument possible? It seems you´re left with one argument justifying another, justifying another, and so on. Ron has already asked, but I didn't see where you answered. Since Ron asked it so much better than I have, I'll repost Ron's questions for you:

Originally posted by Ron
If you care to reply to any of this, I would ask that you first justify something with certainty. If you say you can't, then I'll ask you whether you can justify your skepticism. If you say can't justify your skepticism, then you will have opposed yourself again by saying with certainty that you cannot be certain about anything, even the certainty of your skepticism! If you take the other route and try to prove something, I will ask you to justify your use of the law of non-contradiction apart from appealing to Scripture as your ultimate authority.

Grace,
Brett

 

[Don]

This will be my last post, as I think this takes up way too much time - time that could be better spent in my opinion. But for further information, there are many critiques of Bahnsen's position on the VT Lists.

Don,

What do you mean by "show?" It seems to me that by show you mean persuade. If so, you're confusing proof and persuasion (which, as you yourself said earlier, is very bad form). If not, you must mean prove. If so, then your statement would be as follows:

"In order for this argument to be sound (proven), you are going to need to actually show (prove) that the premises are true."

To prove that the premise is true. Paul Manata tried this in another thread through the use of a disjunctive syllogism. But why even engage an unbeliever if this is the common reply? Do you engage him just to say something like, "well though I may not persuade you, it's proof to me" and then just leave it that?

Aside from the fact that circularity in arguing for an ultimate authority is not the logical fallacy "begging the question" as you suggest, your rejection of an appeal to an ultimate authority leaves you without a starting point. In order to prove the premises are true, you´re suggesting we appeal to other [sound] sub arguments. Those sub arguments will in turn have premises that will need to be proven, which will require more sub arguments, and so on ad infinitum.

I never said that arguing in an epistemically circular fashion was a logical fallacy. Why do you think that one premise of a TA is logic, or morality? I hold to a type of local TA, just not a global TA. I don't think that any argument for the existence of God escapes epistemic circularity, or even sense perception for that matter (a good book is William Alston's The Reliability of Sense Perception). I said that a *TA* (that is, a transcendental argument) depends on subarguments to support it. This is usually accomplished through retortion or reductio. But in a debate, you are usually asked to prove the premisses of your arguments, so I really see nothing wrong with my request.

Without appealing to a self-authenticating authority as Ron has in assuming the truth claims of Scripture, I have to ask, how is a sound argument possible? It seems you´re left with one argument justifying another, justifying another, and so on. Ron has already asked, but I didn't see where you answered. Since Ron asked it so much better than I have, I'll repost Ron's questions for you:

You must not have read all of my response. I asked what he means by "justify" among other things. There is also a certain response that Thomas Reid gave David Hume that, I think, effectively rebutted his skepticism.


Peace out,
Don

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]

 

[Ron]

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Ron

There's a world of difference between being certain and being able to *show* or prove something with certainty.

True but I don't see how that pertains to my post. A man who never heard the Scriptures is certain of God's existence yet he cannot begin to articulate his warrant for his true belief since all he can appeal to is a conceptual necessity of God, which need not entail ontological necessity. Notwithstanding, all men are certain that God exists because they have warrant for believing what is true by nature (Romans 1).

Blessings,

Ron

So there is no demonstration, but there is just assertion? (I agree with the assertion but not asserting something and demonstrating something are two different things.) The issue of knowing vs. proving seems to be playing a huge role. No one here is saying that we know that the Bible is true based on induction. The issue is that the defense will look exactly like induction.

CT

CT,

The problem you might be having is that you don't appreciate what a sound argument entails. A sound argument that all men are mortal is:

Whatever Scripture teaches is true
Scripture teaches that all men are mortal
Therefore, it is true that all men are mortal

The "demonstration," as you called it, that all men are mortal is not to be found in the proof. Demonstration, which is most appropriate, is accomplished through witnessing one death after another, which supports but does not establish the argument for all men being mortal.

In the like manner, step-2 of my TAG argument can be demonstrated by refuting all would-be competitors to the Christian worldview but the demonstration is not the proof. If one thinks that the demonstration is the proof then he has made a philosphical blunder, for how can the truth value of a premise for a deductive argument be justified on inductive grounds? One should not just ignore this problem but rather wrestle with it. If we are left to establish step-2 by induction, then we don't have a deduced or revealed truth value for the premise in question, which means that the conclusion that it is true that God exists goes beyond the scope of the premises. Moreover, we know that induction is only possible given God's existence. Therefore, the inductive principle used to establish step-2 would be unjustified! Finally, the whole deductive-TAG, in which step-2 is nested, would be unjustified since there would be no justification for deduction if the truth of God is an inference based upon induction!

To deny an appeal to Scripture is to leave one with no defense of the faith. This is the problem that comes from beginning our reasoning on autonmous grounds, which is to deny the epistemic Lordship of Christ. The proof for God's existence becomes an unjustified wish based upon no justification for deduction or rational inference. This is not to say that the one employing an unjustified argument for God's existence does not know, and even know that he knows, that God exists.

In his grace,

Ron

[Edited on 3-3-2006 by Ron]

 

[Ron]

Bret,

Nicely done.

In his grace,

Ron

 

[Ron]

But why even engage an unbeliever if this is the common reply? Do you engage him just to say something like, "well though I may not persuade you, it's proof to me" and then just leave it that?

This seems rather Arminian, Don. The success of one's argument is not dependent upon the results, is it? Rather, we bear witness with sound arguments for God's glory first and foremost. In any case, how would you persuade a skeptic that there is absolute truth? You can't if he is truly committed to his presupposition that skepticism is true. All you can do is strip his mask away by reducing his position to absurdity and arguing (then demonstrating) that God is the precondition for even predicating falsely. Moreover, the unbeliever doesn't need to be "persuaded" that God exists, for he already knows this by nature. Accordingly, we are to argue that his position opposes itself, which is effectively done through reductios (i.e. modus tollens). Yet, reducing the opposing worldview is only the half the job. We must then put forth an argument of philosophical certainty that God is the precondition of even wrong thinking. After we have framed the argument, then all we can do is refute the one single competitor to the Christian worldview in all its different forms.

1. Reduce the opposing worldview to absurdity
2. Set-up the argument for the Christian worldview
3. Demonstrate the veracity of the argument by induction

Grace and peace,

Ron

 

[Don]

This seems rather Arminian, Don. The success of one's argument is not dependent upon the results, is it? Rather, we bear witness with sound arguments for God's glory first and foremost. In any case, how would you persuade a skeptic that there is absolute truth? You can't if he is truly committed to his presupposition that skepticism is true. All you can do is strip his mask away by reducing his position to absurdity and arguing (then demonstrating) that God is the precondition for even predicating falsely. Moreover, the unbeliever doesn't need to be "persuaded" that God exists, for he already knows this by nature. Accordingly, we are to argue that his position opposes itself, which is effectively done through reductios (i.e. modus tollens). Yet, reducing the opposing worldview is only the half the job. We must then put forth an argument of philosophical certainty that God is the precondition of even wrong thinking. After we have framed the argument, then all we can do is refute the one single competitor to the Christian worldview in all its different forms.

1. Reduce the opposing worldview to absurdity
2. Set-up the argument for the Christian worldview
3. Demonstrate the veracity of the argument by induction

Grace and peace,

Ron

I think you should take the whole thread into account before you label something or someone as "Arminian", Ron. This seems to be a common tactic among some Van Tillians and Clarkians. Asking for an actual argument that provides philosophical certainty, as some Van Tillians claim, is not arminian in the least. Nor do I grant any autonomy (such as reasoning) to the unbeliever by denying this philosophical certainty through Bahnsen's argument.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Ron

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Ron

There's a world of difference between being certain and being able to *show* or prove something with certainty.

True but I don't see how that pertains to my post. A man who never heard the Scriptures is certain of God's existence yet he cannot begin to articulate his warrant for his true belief since all he can appeal to is a conceptual necessity of God, which need not entail ontological necessity. Notwithstanding, all men are certain that God exists because they have warrant for believing what is true by nature (Romans 1).

Blessings,

Ron

So there is no demonstration, but there is just assertion? (I agree with the assertion but not asserting something and demonstrating something are two different things.) The issue of knowing vs. proving seems to be playing a huge role. No one here is saying that we know that the Bible is true based on induction. The issue is that the defense will look exactly like induction.

CT

CT,

The problem you might be having is that you don't appreciate what a sound argument entails. A sound argument that all men are mortal is:

Whatever Scripture teaches is true
Scripture teaches that all men are mortal
Therefore, it is true that all men are mortal

The "demonstration," as you called it, that all men are mortal is not to be fond in the proof. Demonstration, which is most appropriate, is accomplished through witnessing one death after another, which supports but does not establish the argument for all men being mortal.

The issue that I am wrestling with is the philosophical certainty that can be gained by any argument. It seems that the TAG advertises something that cannot be delivered by argumentation of any kind. The certainty advertised can only be delivered by the intersection of scripture, the Holy Spirit and our spirit. As finite beings we can only argue and demonstrate so much, as I think you agree.

In the like manner, step-2 of my TAG argument can be demonstrated by refuting all would-be competitors to the Christian worldview but the demonstration is not the proof.

Very true.

If one thinks that the demonstration is the proof then he has made a philosphical blunder, for how can the truth value of a premise for a deductive argument be justified on inductive grounds?

It cannot be.

One should not just ignore this problem but rather wrestle with it. If we are left to establish step-2 by induction, then we don't have a deduced or revealed truth value for the premise in question, which means that the conclusion that it is true that God exists goes beyond the scope of the premises.

I agree.

Moreover, we know that induction is only possible given God's existence. Therefore, the inductive principle used to establish step-2 would be unjustified! Finally, the whole deductive-TAG, in which step-2 is nested, would be unjustified since there would be no justification for deduction if the truth of God is an inference based upon induction!

Alright.

To deny an appeal to Scripture is to leave one with no defense of the faith. This is the problem that comes from beginning our reasoning on autonmous grounds, which is to deny the epistemic Lordship of Christ. The proof for God's existence becomes an unjustified wish based upon no justification for deduction or rational inference. This is not to say that the one employing an unjustified argument for God's existence does not know, and even know that he knows, that God exists.

In his grace,

Ron

No one said anything about autonomous grounds. The issue is a seeming slight of hand between offering arguments and knowing infallibly that we are correct about God. We talk about offering arguments then when someone balks, we talk about not having to offer arguments because the unbelievers suppress the truth in the first place and therefore know the truth. It feels that a heads we win, tails they lose type of deal. While I agree that we are correct in our conclusions, it seems that we want to get into the argument game, then change the game in the middle.

I am rambling so you can take or reject whatever you wish

CT

 

[Ron]

I think you should take the whole thread into account before you label something or someone as "Arminian", Ron.

Don,

I thought you said: "œBut why even engage an unbeliever if this is the common reply? Do you engage him just to say something like, "well though I may not persuade you, it's proof to me" and then just leave it that?" This statement is indeed Arminian (and the context of the thread bears this out) because it presupposes that the opponent to the Christian worldview has the ability to take off his own blinders and submit to what he already knows to be true as long as he is provided with more evidence that will satisfy his carnal tendencies and spiritual condition. This underlies your charge simply because you believe that giving a cogent defense of the faith is not enough. You seem to want more, such as to engage the unbeliever in inductive inference, as if induction comports with the unbeliever´s worldview and it doesn´t necessarily presuppose God´s actual existence, the issue of debate! Moreover, the apologetic that you think you disagree with is not idiosyncratic. It is not simply "œproof to me" as you said but rather it is sound argumentation, which you seem to disdain. Again, the problem might be that you don´t understand what a sound syllogism entails, which I´ve taken the time to address below under your reference to Copi.

You, also, stated: "œI never said that proof was persuasion." Yet you deny this assertion with your rhetoric. When I put forth a sound proof, you argued that it is not enough. In fact, your objection to my proof was that it "œmay not persuade" the atheist! This, Don, is to confuse proof with persuasion; it is to measure our obedience to God by the results we get; it is to engage the fool according to his folly; it is to act like an Arminian.

Now for more substantial matters:

Asking for an actual argument that provides philosophical certainty, as some Van Tillians claim, is not arminian in the least.

I'm afraid that you have now confused philosophical certainty with persuasion. If someone in sin and stubbornness refuses to affirm the laws of logic, do you abandon the law of non-contradiction in order to persuade him of something else? No, you will appeal to the "authoritative" nature of logic as you continue to reason logically. In the like manner, my argument is philosphically sound. You want more in order to try to satisfy those who refuse to listen to the self-attesting Christ of Scripture and sound argumentation. What you don't seem to grasp is that those who would reject such an argument are more stubborn than someone would look straight at you while denying they saw you were there. These people arleady know what they refuse to admit, Don.

What are the necessary preconditions of logic and induction, if not God? If intelligible induction, then God is being presupposed; or do you deny this? What you don´t seem to grasp at this time is that there are no freebies in philosophy. If you want to prove step 2 by induction, then I´m going to demand a justification for induction prior to our having a rational exchange of ideas. This justification must comport with the worldview that wishes to employ rational inference. We are not going to begin with induction and logic as if those are neutral tools of debate. That ground belongs the Jehovah too!

According to Copi & Cohen (logic), 'an argument is valid when its premisses, *if true*, do provide conclusive grounds for the truth of its conclusion", p. 57.

First off, an argument can be valid without true premises! True premises pumped into a valid argument make a valid argument sound. Aside from these basic tenets of philosophy, the premises of my argument are all true and you agree with them! Accordingly, because the premises are true and the form is valid the argument is sound. It´s rather clear to me why you reject my argument, even though you agree with its form and premises (i.e. its soundness). It´s not because it´s fallacious but rather it´s because you want more than a sound argument, yet you wish to deny this. You want an argument that the atheist will accept, hence your insistence for a better argument and your denial that you are confusing proof with persuasion. Brother Don, your problems, as I see it, seem to begin with a misunderstanding of what a sound argument entails and they would seem to end with a view that the atheist need not first square reality, knowledge and ethics with his pre-commitment to the stripe of unbelief he subscribes to.

The premisses must succeed in providing conclusive grounds for the truth of conclusion.

This criterion I have met. The conclusion of any sound argument is reliable. What you are asking for is an argument that is more palatable for the atheist.

Just saying that you know they are true and just because the unbeliever doesn't accept them means nothing when it comes to actually giving a philosophical argument.

As Bret alluded to, you are reduced to subjectivism and ultimately skepticism I'm afraid. The reason being, for you what is permissible in sound argumentation is contingent upon your opponent accepting your appeals to authority. What´s ironic is that you don´t live this way. If your child did not accept your appeal to your observation that he struck another child, would you then abandon the premise that there exists a fruitful connection between your mind and the external world? Of course you wouldn´t. Accordingly, it would seem that you have a double standard when it comes to my argument. I suspect that this double standard stems from a pre-commitment to autonomous reason that need not begin with God´s revelation found in Scripture. Again, Arminianism I'm afraid.

At the end of the day, if you wish to try to "œprove" step two on inductive grounds, then your entire argument unravels into subjectivism, skepticism and knowledge falsely called. Don´t get me wrong, as I said to CT the demonstration of the veracity of step-2 can be inductive in nature, however, the very intelligibility of induction presupposes the actual existence of God, the very conclusion of the proof and the debate! (I trust you appreciate that induction is based upon asserting the consequent and, therefore, cannot bring forth certainty of truth but only rational inference and veracity to a deductive claim. Having said that, there are no free rides in philosophy; if you want to use induction, then I will ask you for the necessary preconditions for the uniformity of nature)

As I believe I showed, the incoherence of trying to argue for step-2 on inductive ground stems from something you affirm as a Christian, that induction presupposes uniformity and uniformity is only unintelligible because of God's revelation. Inductive arguments can only be justified if Scripture is already true and not merely conceptual, which I would think you believe. Accordingly, either you must employ induction without warrant, which is to beg the question, or you must employ induction with warrant, which is to presuppose God's existence transcendentally! Accordingly, Scripture is in fact your unspoken transcendental, which is being presupposed by you as true so that you can justify your reasoning to yourself. I would suggest that you have the cart ahead of the horse. You are willing to use induction in order to justify a claim for God´s existence when the very use of induction already presupposes God's actual, ontological existence - not his inductively demonstrated existence!

In many ways you are like the humanist my brother. In order to argue against what I am saying, you must first presuppose that argumentation is possible, which presupposes God. Therefore, if argumentation, then God (is being presupposed); argumentation, therefore, God.

Maybe we should give this a rest so that we might better internalize what the other has said.

Unworthy but his,

Ron

 

[Don]

Ron,

This statement is indeed Arminian (and the context of the thread bears this out) because it presupposes that the opponent to the Christian worldview has the ability to take off his own blinders and submit to what he already knows to be true as long as he is provided with more evidence that will satisfy his carnal tendencies and spiritual condition.

I never intended to relay the idea that an unbeliever could "take off his own blinders". So I'm not sure where this comes from. As a matter of fact, I have said that I would NOT grant autonomy to the unbeliever. I never implied that if he is 'provided with more evidence that will satisfy his carnal tendencies and spiritual condition", so again whatever. What I am saying is that if you want to debate with the unbeliever, then debate. I see no problem with actually granting the unbeliever logic, induction, et al., so long as it is not autonomous logic, induction, et al.

This underlies your charge simply because you believe that giving a cogent defense of the faith is not enough. You seem to want more, such as to engage the unbeliever in inductive inference, as if induction comports with the unbeliever´s worldview and it doesn´t necessarily presuppose God´s actual existence, the issue of debate!

No it does not underly my charge, Ron. What I said was that *Bahnsen's argument reduces to inductive proof*. I never said that induction comports with an unbeliever's worldview either. As a matter of fact, I believe and have said just the opposite! But this isn't special to Bahnsen or Van Til, others have said the exact same thing.

Moreover, the apologetic that you think you disagree with is not idiosyncratic. It is not simply "œproof to me" as you said but rather it is sound argumentation, which you seem to disdain. Again, the problem might be that you don´t understand what a sound syllogism entails, which I´ve taken the time to address below under your reference to Copi.

I meant that you seem to reduce it to a type of "proof to me". Since I disagree with you then I "disdain" sound argumentation and there's really no point of continuing. I guess everyone in the world besides Bahnsenites "disdain" sound argumentation as well, including Van Tillian professional philosophers.

As Bret alluded to, you are reduced to subjectivism and ultimately skepticism I'm afraid. The reason being, for you what is permissible in sound argumentation is contingent upon your opponent accepting your appeals to authority. What´s ironic is that you don´t live this way. If your child did not accept your appeal to your observation that he struck another child, would you then abandon the premise that there exists a fruitful connection between your mind and the external world? Of course you wouldn´t. Accordingly, it would seem that you have a double standard when it comes to my argument. I suspect that this double standard stems from a pre-commitment to autonomous reason that need not begin with God´s revelation found in Scripture. Again, Arminianism I'm afraid.

Again, Ron, this is unfounded. I am not reduced to skepticism as I mostly agree with you. Nevertheless, you are extremely vague in your terms such as justification et al, which is not my fault. I have no idea what you are saying when you talk of justification... for the 3rd time... However, I think you'd be better off just saying that Scripture is true therefore, Scripture is true (in a debate setting) and skip the whole logic as a premise.

What you don´t seem to grasp at this time is that there are no freebies in philosophy.

EXACTLY RON!



Anyway, Since I am now like the "humanist", I really have no desire to continue this with you, Ron or even read the rest of what you may have to say. I don't think there is knowledge outside of presupposing God for the 3rd time. First it was that I didn't know whether I could be saved, then I'm an arminian, now I'm a humanist! But yet I'm a Van Tillian/RE who happens to disagree with Bahnsen and Butler!

[Edited on 3-3-2006 by Don]

 

[Don]

I did mean to address this though but forgot...

According to Copi & Cohen (logic), 'an argument is valid when its premisses, *if true*, do provide conclusive grounds for the truth of its conclusion", p. 57.

In my haste, I actually quoted validity instead of soundness here and didn't read back over it. My fault. This was right after the whole 'assurance' spill of yours.

[Edited on 3-3-2006 by Don]

 

[Ron]

I see no problem with actually granting the unbeliever logic, induction, et al., so long as it is not autonomous logic, induction, et al.

Don,

If you're not granting autonomous logic, et al., then what type of logic are your granting? If you're willing to grant only logic that finds its justification in God's word, then you are justifying step-2 of my original proof by the use of Scripture not induction! Please make up your mind.

What I said was that *Bahnsen's argument reduces to inductive proof*.

I'm not concerned with Bahnsen nor you interpretation of Bahnsen. I'm concerned with what you have said.

I never said that induction comports with an unbeliever's worldview either.

Don, what you have done is appealed to induction without an appeal to God's word, which begs the question concerning the justification for induction. Go back and review the bidding please.

I have no idea what you are saying when you talk of justification.

Then you don't understand the position you think you disagree with.

However, I think you'd be better off just saying that Scripture is true therefore, Scripture is true (in a debate setting) and skip the whole logic as a premise.

Then Socrates was a mortal because Socrates was a mortal. Don, it is clear that you do not understand the limits and extent of even first order predicate logic.

In my haste, I actually quoted [Copi} validity instead of soundness here and didn't read back over it. My fault. This was right after the whole 'assurance' spill of yours.

That you even had to refer back to Copi on such discussion is telling; telling indeed.

I'm a Van Tillian/RE who happens to disagree with Bahnsen and Butler!

You've communicated to me that you understand none of these men.

Thanks for the exchange.

Ron

 

[Don]

[Edited on 3-3-2006 by Don]

 

[Ron]

I am rambling so you can take or reject whatever you wish

CT,

I'm not sure there's a whole lot in your post I can interact with. Maybe you're thinking out loud?

Ron

 

[Don]

Ron,

When I said what type of justification you were referring to, I meant whether it was internal, deontological, or proper function (or something along the lines of Wolterstorff)? That's all. I'm not sure of any Van Tillians who have addressed this.

Here is one article from the Van Til lists that may be of some interest.

Don

 

[Ron]

Originally posted by Don
Ron,

When I said what type of justification you were referring to, I meant whether it was internal, deontological, or proper function (or something along the lines of Wolterstorff)? That's all. I'm not sure of any Van Tillians who have addressed this.

Here is one article from the Van Til lists that may be of some interest.

Don

Don,

Are you really after an answer to your question? I don't see how it is germane to this discussion.

Grace and peace Christian,

Ron

[Edited on 3-3-2006 by Ron]