Saving Faith - Gordon Clark's Definition vs. Tradition
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I lean towards Clark'ss view because it safe guards one from thinking of faith as a work. Now I believe that regeneration does produce all of the above mentioned Faith, Knowledge, Assent and Trust. But faith as a means of Justification needs to be clearly defined.
VanVos
VanVos
Some definitions:
From Webster's 1828 Dictionary:
In my own mind, I see faith and belief and trust as the same thing. All have to do with resting the mind on a certain person/proposition.
Here's how I see it:
1. To trust a person is to believe what he says is true.
2. To believe what a person says, is trusting that person.
3. Both of these are putting faith in what that particular person says.
Substantially, I do not see the "extra" element that trust provides, that isn't already included in "knowledge and assent" or "belief."
See What is Faith? for a more detailed explanation.
From Webster's 1828 Dictionary:
In my own mind, I see faith and belief and trust as the same thing. All have to do with resting the mind on a certain person/proposition.
Here's how I see it:
1. To trust a person is to believe what he says is true.
2. To believe what a person says, is trusting that person.
3. Both of these are putting faith in what that particular person says.
Substantially, I do not see the "extra" element that trust provides, that isn't already included in "knowledge and assent" or "belief."
See What is Faith? for a more detailed explanation.
C. Matthew McMahon
Christian Preacher
Unless I am missing something, I don't think this formulation is all bad:
Faith=Trust=Knowledge+Assent
The "catch" is the Trust=Knoweldge+Assent.
Maybe - Assent+Knowledge=Trust=Faith is a better was of saying it since Clark seems to simply be putting an "ordo" to how faith comes about. You cannot have Trust without first knowing what you are trusting. But you cannot "truly" trust in God unless you are regenerate, which will ultimately yield faith.
Does anyone see this as problematic?
Faith=Trust=Knowledge+Assent
The "catch" is the Trust=Knoweldge+Assent.
Maybe - Assent+Knowledge=Trust=Faith is a better was of saying it since Clark seems to simply be putting an "ordo" to how faith comes about. You cannot have Trust without first knowing what you are trusting. But you cannot "truly" trust in God unless you are regenerate, which will ultimately yield faith.
Does anyone see this as problematic?
R. Scott Clark
Puritan Board Senior
Matt,
Doesn't this re-definition reduce the number of elements or aspects to two?
What happens to the volitional aspect?
Where is the precedent for re-defining faith thus?
Why did the confessions and Calvin speak about fiducia as they did?
rsc
C. Matthew McMahon
Christian Preacher
If the elements were reduced to two, that would be a problem in my esitamtation. If there were teh case though, it woudl seem redundant for Calrk to say:
Faith=Trust=Knowledge+Assent but this would amount to really saying Faith=(Faith)=Knowledge+Assent
That would be "silly."
If they stand seperately, but in just a different order, I could see that working. But if Faith = Trust, or that means Faith = Faith (?) then that is not helpful at all, but double talk.
Personally, I stick with the calssic definition. I was giving Clark the benefit of the doubt.
Clark thought that the modern church beleived that "œfaith" was "œfaith without reason." This describes most of the Evangelical Church today. This is more specifically defined as mysticism. So he tried countering this.
He is the most obvious choice to make, instead of mysticism, or pure Thomistic Rationalism, is what he called "œFaith and Reason". Faith must have intellectual content to be valid. Faith in Christian philosophy and theology is not blind faith. Faith resides in the heart, mind, soul, etc, which, biblically, refer to the logical intellect that is regenerated by the Holy Spirit. He said, that, for example, the following Scriptures demonstrate that intellect is what is meant: Genesis 6:5, "œThen the LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intent of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." Psalm 4:4, "œ Be angry, and do not sin. Meditate within your heart on your bed, and be still. Selah." Isaiah 33:18, "œYour heart will meditate on terror: "Where is the scribe? Where is he who weighs? Where is he who counts the towers?" The "œheart" in these passages clearly refers to the intellect or mind. These verses would be rather meaningless if the idea of "œemotion" was overlaid on the passages. Thus, faith in God is impossible without a creed, or set of beliefs, to believe. Thus, when one is required to test Scripture by sensation in order to avoid the charge of irrationality, this is itself irrational. Revelation is needed as the basis for a rational worldview.
But, if he made a mistake in making "Faith" = "Faith", that would be a huge blunder. Faith=Trust is saying nothing really.
Scott - when you ask, "Where is the precedent for re-defining faith thus?" I woudl say he has no need or warrant to do so. I think he was being novel.
[Edited on 1-5-2006 by C. Matthew McMahon]
Faith=Trust=Knowledge+Assent but this would amount to really saying Faith=(Faith)=Knowledge+Assent
That would be "silly."
If they stand seperately, but in just a different order, I could see that working. But if Faith = Trust, or that means Faith = Faith (?) then that is not helpful at all, but double talk.
Personally, I stick with the calssic definition. I was giving Clark the benefit of the doubt.
Clark thought that the modern church beleived that "œfaith" was "œfaith without reason." This describes most of the Evangelical Church today. This is more specifically defined as mysticism. So he tried countering this.
He is the most obvious choice to make, instead of mysticism, or pure Thomistic Rationalism, is what he called "œFaith and Reason". Faith must have intellectual content to be valid. Faith in Christian philosophy and theology is not blind faith. Faith resides in the heart, mind, soul, etc, which, biblically, refer to the logical intellect that is regenerated by the Holy Spirit. He said, that, for example, the following Scriptures demonstrate that intellect is what is meant: Genesis 6:5, "œThen the LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intent of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." Psalm 4:4, "œ Be angry, and do not sin. Meditate within your heart on your bed, and be still. Selah." Isaiah 33:18, "œYour heart will meditate on terror: "Where is the scribe? Where is he who weighs? Where is he who counts the towers?" The "œheart" in these passages clearly refers to the intellect or mind. These verses would be rather meaningless if the idea of "œemotion" was overlaid on the passages. Thus, faith in God is impossible without a creed, or set of beliefs, to believe. Thus, when one is required to test Scripture by sensation in order to avoid the charge of irrationality, this is itself irrational. Revelation is needed as the basis for a rational worldview.
But, if he made a mistake in making "Faith" = "Faith", that would be a huge blunder. Faith=Trust is saying nothing really.
Scott - when you ask, "Where is the precedent for re-defining faith thus?" I woudl say he has no need or warrant to do so. I think he was being novel.
[Edited on 1-5-2006 by C. Matthew McMahon]
If "trust" is a distinct element from "knowledge+assent" then I would like to know what that difference is. If indeed they are different/distinct, we must be very careful to make sure that our faith is not merely "knowledge+assent", for that would not be saving. Only if faith included "knowledge+assent+trust" (where trust is a distinct element that needs definition) could a faith be called "saving."
I have defined trust and faith above and in my own mind share the same definition (at least for all practical purposes).
Please help me with defining trust as it is different from "faith" or "knowledge+assent."
Thanks!
I have defined trust and faith above and in my own mind share the same definition (at least for all practical purposes).
Please help me with defining trust as it is different from "faith" or "knowledge+assent."
Thanks!
R. Scott Clark
Puritan Board Senior
One problem with CG's analysis is that the tri-partite definition is not "popular," it was technical. They meant three distinct things by notitia, assensus, et fiducia.
GC's analysis and criticism assumes that fiducia = "faith" which would be absurd.
Fiducia does not equal "faith." Faith, in this respect, is a composite of three elements or perhaps better, a simple act with three distinct and necessary aspects. To omit one of those aspects, namely fiducia, is to change the nature of faith in act of justification.
GC might be right to make this change, that's another discussion, but we must get right what is at stake.
Trusting that certain things that have been declared to us are actually true is a distinct element from knowing those facts and assenting to their truth.
I'm not sure GC was entirely fair with Manton but I'm not sure that Manton is the best representative of the orthodox definition of faith. Why did he pick on Manton and not a more technical or academic writer?
The question is, which GC doesn't address in this passage, what did the orthodox theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries mean by these three terms? Why did they use three and not two?
rsc
C. Matthew McMahon
Christian Preacher
Scott -
Honestly, I have no idea. Clark actually picks on Manton in more than one of his books. I would have liked to see him deal with Calvin or Turretin.
Right. He doesn't do that in his works either, instead, as you pointed out, he address Manton as a "representative."
Honestly, I have no idea. Clark actually picks on Manton in more than one of his books. I would have liked to see him deal with Calvin or Turretin.
Right. He doesn't do that in his works either, instead, as you pointed out, he address Manton as a "representative."
Two examples:
1)
Knowledge: "Chairs are for sitting."
Assent: "It is true that this chair will seat me, and not collapse into toothpicks."
Trust: sitting in the chair.
2)
Knowledge: "Machines heavier than air can fly, using the principles of lift and thrust."
Assent: "This is an airplane, designed and built for people-moving. It has made over 1000 cross-country trips, and is well within the safety margin for continued flights. Yea, I believe that."
Trust (lack of): "No, if I get on, something bad will happen. The wings will fall off or something. I believe in the principles of flight, and I know Mom just flew in from Cleveland, but I will not fly."
1)
Knowledge: "Chairs are for sitting."
Assent: "It is true that this chair will seat me, and not collapse into toothpicks."
Trust: sitting in the chair.
2)
Knowledge: "Machines heavier than air can fly, using the principles of lift and thrust."
Assent: "This is an airplane, designed and built for people-moving. It has made over 1000 cross-country trips, and is well within the safety margin for continued flights. Yea, I believe that."
Trust (lack of): "No, if I get on, something bad will happen. The wings will fall off or something. I believe in the principles of flight, and I know Mom just flew in from Cleveland, but I will not fly."
What works would you say give the best explanation of the technical differences that trust contributes to saving faith?
Calvin, Institutes 3.2.11 ?
Turretin?
I will try to read these soon and post again.
Again I say that if fiducia makes all of the difference in saving faith, we must carefully define it, and how it is different than "knowledge+assent." All of the defintions of trust I have read can be reduced to assenting to a proposition.
I honestly do not see how.
This is a good question.
I can't pretend to speak for GC, but from what I have gathered, I would guess that he would charge them with making a distinction without a difference.
I will read Calvin and Turretin.
My pastor has given this example before, and to be honest, I have come to despise it.
In the realm of saving faith (realizing that all analogies break down), I think this example is extremely dangerous because it brings in action/works into a completely intellectual matter.
In fact, I would say the act of "œsitting in the chair" is the exact opposite of trust, it is instead testing the proposition that "œchairs are for sitting."
Whatever the elements of saving faith are, we must remember that faith is "œthe substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." This example makes "œfiducia" into something seen, not hoped for"¦tested, not trusted.
Qualification: Indeed sitting in the chair will result from trusting the chair, but it is not the same as trusting it.
I think that this example is actually confusing two different "œobjects" of faith.
The first object (shown in the "œknowledge" and "œassent" portions) is if planes indeed have the ability to fly.
The second object (shown in the "œtrust" portion) is if you believe the plane in front of you will fly. This object is taking into account the probabilities that the plane will or will not fall apart etc.
If this person completely believed this plane would not fall apart, he would be trusting the plane.
Real faith goes beyond the basics of knowledge and assent to include trust, and that trust is verified when put to the test, not merely the assent or knowledge is verified. Something vital is missing when we are simply satisfied with bare knowledge or consent to truth. Its that "for me" part. Leaving out fiducia would be as if you had 1) a "justified, true belief," 2) no willingness to deny something obviously true, but refused to commit yourself, for some or any reason.
As for breaking down concerning saving faith, I disagree. YOU see (believe) with the eyes of faith, yes? Just because that is "natural" (in the new man) doesn't make it less real or less intentional. And just because it is Spirit-engendered, doesn't make it less your own act.
[Edited on 1-5-2006 by Contra_Mundum]
As for breaking down concerning saving faith, I disagree. YOU see (believe) with the eyes of faith, yes? Just because that is "natural" (in the new man) doesn't make it less real or less intentional. And just because it is Spirit-engendered, doesn't make it less your own act.
[Edited on 1-5-2006 by Contra_Mundum]
"Testing the proposition" regarding the chair? How many people do that? Do you? When you rolled out of bed this morning and walked to the bathroom, did you expect the floor to not give way beneath you because you had knowledge and assent (a resonable expectation that the future was going to be like the past, and the sensory inputs of your eyes and feet that you assented to), but you also inspected the joists, and fibrous/calcified/etc. integrity of the materials, and you used the walk as a "test" of your faith?
Sitting in the chair is not the same as "testing" your faith. I sit in chairs all the time, and that purely, it seems, on trust. If it breaks apart on me, its usually a horrible surprise. Nor am I putting them to the test when I sit down in them (as if I gingerly sat down waiting to put all my weight on it, or prepared for the possibility of going crashing through). I simply exercise trust. I'm not "testing" anything. If it "functions" as a test, I concur with the judgment, but don't we do that with the promises, and answered prayers from God too? Or are we "putting him to the test" in an illegitimate way?
[Edited on 1-5-2006 by Contra_Mundum]
Sitting in the chair is not the same as "testing" your faith. I sit in chairs all the time, and that purely, it seems, on trust. If it breaks apart on me, its usually a horrible surprise. Nor am I putting them to the test when I sit down in them (as if I gingerly sat down waiting to put all my weight on it, or prepared for the possibility of going crashing through). I simply exercise trust. I'm not "testing" anything. If it "functions" as a test, I concur with the judgment, but don't we do that with the promises, and answered prayers from God too? Or are we "putting him to the test" in an illegitimate way?
[Edited on 1-5-2006 by Contra_Mundum]
My point is he has no reason not to trust, he's being irrational. I could have stated, "he thinks the plane will not survive a possible lightning strike." But if you assuage that fear, he has 10,000 more excuses. It is the trust that would be rational, given the knowledge and assent. But yet he doesn't trust.
How do you explain the fellow who hears about creation, sin, judgment, Jesus, salvation, and faith alone; who agrees that this seems most true to him, has no reason to doubt it, and in fact affirms it and fears the judgment mightily, but for whatever reason (or lack thereof) will not "receive and rest" in Jesus for salvation? Or wants to add his works to Christ's. Or any objection? Isn't his faith defective? Surely it is not simply a matter of "lack of enough information" !
A time will come when Joe will have to fish or cut bait. He has the knowledge; he assents to it. He still doesn't "feel like" he has a "critica-mass" of info. So what is he going to do? Trust Jesus, or not? Many have been saved with far less "info" than he has demanded, and in his case received.
God saves Jane with "ye must be born again." That's it. God saves Bob with a whole mountain of truth that Bob finally couldn't resist (the means chosen by the "irresistible Spirit" who intended to save him at that price). This difference alone is enough to establish the legitimacy of distinguishing between the three parts. Joe doesn't believe with either the least or the greatest. He never denies any of it, he just claims it's insufficient to "get him on the plane." Reality: the Spirit didn't grant him saving faith.
[Edited on 1-5-2006 by Contra_Mundum]
Something vital is missing when we are simply satisfied with bare knowledge or consent to truth. Its that "for me" part. [/quote]
The "œfor me" part is just as much assent as the rest. You assent to the fact the promises of the gospel Act 2:39 "For the promise is to you and to your children"
As the WLC states it:
Some people try to use the catechism to say that assenting to truths of scripture is not enough. John Robbins replies:
I think we may be mis-understanding each other. I (nor Clark) is "œleaving out fiducia." Clark is arguing that ficucia IS faith. They are the same thing.
Yes. The "œeyes of faith" is poetic terminology In my humble opinion for believing the truth. "œI once was blind, but now I see."
I agree with this statement.
Absolutely! But the problem is not that he has "œknowledge" and has "œassent" but lacks "œtrust." His problem is that he lacks assent AND trust!
This is the how I perceive most who like to define faith as knowledge, assent, and trust.
They define:
1-Knowledge: Understanding the subject at hand
2-Assent: Profession
3-Trust: True belief
I think that these are faulty definitions (please correct me if I am mis-labeling you).
Whereas I would define:
1-Knowledge: Understanding the subject at hand
2-Assent: True belief
3-Trust: True belief
"œBelief" being "œresting, relying, receiving" etc. etc. etc.
I have posted Webster´s definition of "œtrust" and "œfaith" above. Both include the concept of resting and relying.
Amen, it is a lack of belief.
Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and you will be saved.
Jeff,
I hope this exchange is profitable, if not for you vs. me, at least for others. My purpose is certainly not to attack, but to air the subject out. So, brother, hopefully in the proper spirit...
First,
I do want to emmend one thing I said. I don't think that "knowledge", as a component of faith here, should be defined by the philosophical/epistemological definition "justified true belief," at least not without further explanation. The terminology "knowledge" with respect to saving faith is specifically related to objective truth, and in particular that truth expressed in the pasges of Scripture. In that capacity, it is identical to the truth as it is faithful presented--either by reading it, or by a faithful expositor. Simply put, this is knowledge in a raw, objective form. It's knowledge whether or not it is subjectively accepted by a given individual.
(It is worth adding here that false knowledge, is still a form of knowledge, albeit worthless. It functions in the mind of the ignorant like the real thing. It may be partial, that is formally false, but still containing elements of truth. And faith exercised on the basis of it is partly useful in spite of the falsehoods, but proves ultimately in all cases useless or positively deathly.)
Faith (however it is defined) is not posible without knowledge ("...but come to the knowledge of the truth"). That comes not apart from hearing ("Faith cometh by hearing..."). And whether or not this passes (as it were) in one ear and out the other, the knowledge has come. In fact, to whomever it comes and is rejected, that hearing, that the "birds came and ate" from the pathway, will still form part of the basis of judgment against that man. That "hard soil" does not represent a person who did not have knowledge. The knowledge came to him. This is the raw material. The data about salvation is absolutely necessary to full, saving faith.
"Assent" is that agreement to the truth of something. "Even the demons believe, and tramble." They know the truth, and assent to it, yet it is not saving faith to them. A reprobate may do the same. An elect man, as yet unsaved, may also be assenting to what he knows, and yet not be fully invested. Even if you say the "for you" part belongs to "assent" because it is an element of promise found in Scripture, you cannot deny there is something unique about that statement, something highly subjective. That "for you" is tramsmuted, yes? by faith into "for me." "For you" is still an element of truth, something that can be assented to, though what it implies be not fully grasped. There is something left to be gained when all instances of the foregoing have been gathered into one grouping, in order to distinguish between that which is FAITH, and that which is not.
By distinguishing these things from one another and from Trust, but incorporating all three of them under the concept of faith, we are simply acknowledging facts that we can see. You can have 1 only, or 1+2 only; or 1+2+3, or but not 3. And there is no amount of 1 or 2 that will constitute "enough" of it to equal "Faith". "Trust"--you can call it the final act of assent, if that will satisfy you. But it is special. And to say that that which is final equals the whole (trust = faith) is just not proper.
There is also the separate matter of what one believes in, or the object of faith. Someone can have strong faith, in a worthless object--like a unservicable aircraft, or a false Messiah. You can class that under "deficient knowledge" if you will, but considered in itself it is knowledge of a sort, accompanied by assent and wholesale reliance--in some cases for eternal destiny. Are we justified in speaking of this person as not having faith? I say, of course not. His problem is best described as having all too much faith in the wrong object.
I'm not going to engage the Robbins quote. Suffice to say I am convinced he reads things through his own grid, including history's persons and documents, which has been shown time and again not to do them justice. He offers no documentation or support for his suggestion that the WCF authors meant the cast he places on the language, and not the interpretation that has come down to us with fair consistency from that time. As for the claim that no confessional documents speak differently, I would ask him to engage Dr. Clark's use of the BC/HC above, where he points out that faith (as defined) engages all the faculties of the soul--intellect, affection, and intention.
I hope this exchange is profitable, if not for you vs. me, at least for others. My purpose is certainly not to attack, but to air the subject out. So, brother, hopefully in the proper spirit...
First,
I do want to emmend one thing I said. I don't think that "knowledge", as a component of faith here, should be defined by the philosophical/epistemological definition "justified true belief," at least not without further explanation. The terminology "knowledge" with respect to saving faith is specifically related to objective truth, and in particular that truth expressed in the pasges of Scripture. In that capacity, it is identical to the truth as it is faithful presented--either by reading it, or by a faithful expositor. Simply put, this is knowledge in a raw, objective form. It's knowledge whether or not it is subjectively accepted by a given individual.
(It is worth adding here that false knowledge, is still a form of knowledge, albeit worthless. It functions in the mind of the ignorant like the real thing. It may be partial, that is formally false, but still containing elements of truth. And faith exercised on the basis of it is partly useful in spite of the falsehoods, but proves ultimately in all cases useless or positively deathly.)
Faith (however it is defined) is not posible without knowledge ("...but come to the knowledge of the truth"). That comes not apart from hearing ("Faith cometh by hearing..."). And whether or not this passes (as it were) in one ear and out the other, the knowledge has come. In fact, to whomever it comes and is rejected, that hearing, that the "birds came and ate" from the pathway, will still form part of the basis of judgment against that man. That "hard soil" does not represent a person who did not have knowledge. The knowledge came to him. This is the raw material. The data about salvation is absolutely necessary to full, saving faith.
"Assent" is that agreement to the truth of something. "Even the demons believe, and tramble." They know the truth, and assent to it, yet it is not saving faith to them. A reprobate may do the same. An elect man, as yet unsaved, may also be assenting to what he knows, and yet not be fully invested. Even if you say the "for you" part belongs to "assent" because it is an element of promise found in Scripture, you cannot deny there is something unique about that statement, something highly subjective. That "for you" is tramsmuted, yes? by faith into "for me." "For you" is still an element of truth, something that can be assented to, though what it implies be not fully grasped. There is something left to be gained when all instances of the foregoing have been gathered into one grouping, in order to distinguish between that which is FAITH, and that which is not.
By distinguishing these things from one another and from Trust, but incorporating all three of them under the concept of faith, we are simply acknowledging facts that we can see. You can have 1 only, or 1+2 only; or 1+2+3, or but not 3. And there is no amount of 1 or 2 that will constitute "enough" of it to equal "Faith". "Trust"--you can call it the final act of assent, if that will satisfy you. But it is special. And to say that that which is final equals the whole (trust = faith) is just not proper.
There is also the separate matter of what one believes in, or the object of faith. Someone can have strong faith, in a worthless object--like a unservicable aircraft, or a false Messiah. You can class that under "deficient knowledge" if you will, but considered in itself it is knowledge of a sort, accompanied by assent and wholesale reliance--in some cases for eternal destiny. Are we justified in speaking of this person as not having faith? I say, of course not. His problem is best described as having all too much faith in the wrong object.
I'm not going to engage the Robbins quote. Suffice to say I am convinced he reads things through his own grid, including history's persons and documents, which has been shown time and again not to do them justice. He offers no documentation or support for his suggestion that the WCF authors meant the cast he places on the language, and not the interpretation that has come down to us with fair consistency from that time. As for the claim that no confessional documents speak differently, I would ask him to engage Dr. Clark's use of the BC/HC above, where he points out that faith (as defined) engages all the faculties of the soul--intellect, affection, and intention.
R. Scott Clark
Puritan Board Senior
Jeff,
Using a modern English dictionary to decide what terms meant historically is not very reliable. Webster's et al are records of current usage.
Let's establish what was meant by those three terms first, then decide whether we should keep that usage. A modern English dictionary might be useful to decide proper contemporary usage, but not to settle a theological point.
As to Robbin's claim about the Standards, I don't find his arguments compelling.
It seems to me that Clark was more honest about wanting to revise the traditional definition.
Whatever weaknesses Manton's explanation has, his affirmation of the tri-partite definition is closer to the meaning of the divines than Robbins' explanation.
In defense of my claim I appeal to WCF 10.1 where, under effectual calling, the Confession says "enlightening their minds, spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills...".
This article clearly thinks of three distinct faculties of the soul. These three faculties correspond to notitia, assensus et fiducia.
We must understand Q. 72 of the WLC in the light of this threefold distinction. It clear distinguishes assent from receiving and resting. The grace of justifying faith is "wrought in the heart of a sinner."
There are at least two, to use the older language, movements of the soul here. An intellectual act, assent (which assumes notitia) and "resting and receiving" (the language of WCF 11.1). The latter two are more volitional and affective.
An attempt to render the definition of faith as only an intellective act then, seems to have more to do with GC's intellectualism (meaning his view that, at some point, the human and divine intellect's intersect) than it does with the Standards.
Further, as I argue in the Strimple festschrift, if we begin with the traditional Reformed distinction between theology as God knows it and theology as it is revealed to us, this threefold distinction is more compelling. I can see why GC would want to revise the definition of faith, given his definition of theology.
rsc
Using a modern English dictionary to decide what terms meant historically is not very reliable. Webster's et al are records of current usage.
Let's establish what was meant by those three terms first, then decide whether we should keep that usage. A modern English dictionary might be useful to decide proper contemporary usage, but not to settle a theological point.
As to Robbin's claim about the Standards, I don't find his arguments compelling.
It seems to me that Clark was more honest about wanting to revise the traditional definition.
Whatever weaknesses Manton's explanation has, his affirmation of the tri-partite definition is closer to the meaning of the divines than Robbins' explanation.
In defense of my claim I appeal to WCF 10.1 where, under effectual calling, the Confession says "enlightening their minds, spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills...".
This article clearly thinks of three distinct faculties of the soul. These three faculties correspond to notitia, assensus et fiducia.
We must understand Q. 72 of the WLC in the light of this threefold distinction. It clear distinguishes assent from receiving and resting. The grace of justifying faith is "wrought in the heart of a sinner."
There are at least two, to use the older language, movements of the soul here. An intellectual act, assent (which assumes notitia) and "resting and receiving" (the language of WCF 11.1). The latter two are more volitional and affective.
An attempt to render the definition of faith as only an intellective act then, seems to have more to do with GC's intellectualism (meaning his view that, at some point, the human and divine intellect's intersect) than it does with the Standards.
Further, as I argue in the Strimple festschrift, if we begin with the traditional Reformed distinction between theology as God knows it and theology as it is revealed to us, this threefold distinction is more compelling. I can see why GC would want to revise the definition of faith, given his definition of theology.
rsc
I want to thank you both for your interaction on this subject. I assure you that on my part, this discussion is profitable, and I hope that Christian charity has been shown on my part, for it was at least intended.
I have some material to read, and of course have intial thoughts regarding both of your posts. But rather than posting rashly, I wish to consult Calvin, Turretin, and some commentaries on WLC #72.
Hopefully then, I can comment on your posts, and it will be edifying.
Thanks again.
Regards,
I have some material to read, and of course have intial thoughts regarding both of your posts. But rather than posting rashly, I wish to consult Calvin, Turretin, and some commentaries on WLC #72.
Hopefully then, I can comment on your posts, and it will be edifying.
Thanks again.
Regards,
This is a good thread and I need to spend more time with it, but I wanted to test the test of faith here.
I agree that true faith entails trust, but that only means that trust follows from true faith. But should we not distinguish between what faith entails, and the definition (meaning) of faith. For saving faith also entails good works, that is, according to James, faith without works is dead. But if works define faith, then we are saved by faith and works, and and not by faith alone.
The statements:
- we are saved by faith alone
- faith without works is dead
[/list=1]must not lead to a conflation of faith and works. Works are a necessary consequence of saving faith.
Saving faith is a work of the Spirit of Christ (WCF 14:1), and trust and obedience are man's response to saving faith (WCF 14:2). But trust and obedience are not the "meaning" or definition of faith.
By saying faith is "mental assent" to propositions, Clark avoids confusing the meaning of faith with the consequences of faith - thereby keeping the harmony between Paul and James. And he does justice to the view of the divines.
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
Hi there, everyone. This is my first post here. I was referred by a friend to the original topic (regarding Dr. John W. Robbins) and found this topic as a result. In fact, I found it so compelling, and the rest of the board so brotherly and edifying, that I decided to join.
Throughout this thread I noticed some great posts, first of which belongs to Dr. R. Scott Clark:
Jeff Bartel made these comments:
Rev. Buchanan and Dr. R. Scott Clark both made insightful comments on the equivocal nature of the discussion.
I had actually been thinking about this thread for a couple of days before I thought I should post. At this point, I think I would like to propose what I consider faith to be and how it would fit into the traditional tripartite view of faith. Please feel free to comment on or correct any content herein.
Dr. Clark's definition of knowledge, as I asserted before, appears to be traditional. But he also uses the term loosely, that is, colloquially, attributing knowledge to propositions that his epistmology could in nowise justify as being true. He must have either been inconsistent, or acknowledged that knowledge can have more than one meaning. This latter assumption seems most plausible, as he frequently commented that many English words have four or five meanings, and that one should read "Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary" (verbatum) if he desires to "know" them. Thus, I do not think Dr. Clark would object if I were to attribute a less technical usage of knowledge to the Reformers, as they do not seem to have always (if not rarely) meant justified true belief.
Well, if the Reformers did not mean Platonic knowledge when they discussed notitia, what did they mean? I have come to believe (certainly not "know"
) that the Reformers spoke of what we would call the "justification" of an object of knowledge. That is, the Reformers spoke of the proposition itself. For example, the proposition, "Socrates is mortal." This is the conclusion of an argument. In this case, the conclusion of a syllogism, which contains the major premise, all men are mortal, and the minor premise, Socrates is a man. Thus, I agree with Rev. Buchanan that notitia is the "raw objective" truth, i.e. true propositions, without concern for the other two elements of faith (i.e., assensus and fiducia).
Now, this argument itself is purely logical and intellectual. But unless one believes the premises are true, one cannot believe the conclusion. For instance, if I denied the minor premise (Socrates is a man), the conclusion does not possibly follow. I am left with a bare major premise: all men are mortal. In denying the particular, I have eliminated the possibility of the conclusion following. That is, I do not assent to the minor premise. I do not agree that they are correct. Since I do not assent to the truth of the premises, I cannot possibly trust that the conclusion is correct.
At this point, I think you might know what I am going to propose next, viz. that fiducia is trust in the conclusion. I am also sure that the more astute readers will immediately object that assent and trust here are identical in meaning, for the major and minor premises are themselves conclusions of previous arguments, the whole of knowledge regressing to a beginning. That is quite true and I applaud those who come to this conclusion unaided. I would like to give what I believe is a genuine distinction, though.
Earlier, I suggested that assensus is assent to the premises. Now, for those salvific propositions, this assent is directed at the Scriptures. That is, the object of belief (assent) is the inspired word of God. But it is one thing to assent to the fact that the Bible says one thing or another. It is quite something else to believe the proposition is true. I would therefore submit that saving faith is indeed tripartite and has these three characteristics.
1) Assensus - Believing the Bible teaches proposition p.
2) Notitia - Cognition of the proposition (understanding it).
3) Fiducia - Trusting (believing) the proposition is true.
Thus, in this formulation, assensus and fiducia have not only different objects or different propositions in view, but they have two different forms in view. That is, assensus is trust in the axiom (Scripture), whereas fiducia is trust in the conclusion (the salvific proposition). A demonstration seems in order.
It is written: For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved (Rom. 10:13). By declaring "it is written," I assent that this proposition is biblical. Secondly, I understand it. If it were written in another language besides English (and if I did not already have Romans 10:13 memorized), I would not understand the proposition. Thirdly, I trust the proposition is true. More definitely, I believe it applies to me. With these three elements, I can construct a valid syllogism, which is a particularized salvific proposition:
1) All who call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.
2) I call upon the name of the Lord.
C) Therefore, I shall be saved.
I believe that in this syllogism all three characteristics of the traditional tripartite definition of faith are embodied.
To give some further illustrations"”
For many so-called "agnostics," #1 and #2 apply. They believe the Bible teaches that all who call upon the name of the Lord shall be save and they understand the proposition (narrowly speaking) perfectly. But they do not necessarily believe it is true; at least, not for them. For cults and heresies, they may certainly have #2, but deny that it is #1, thus, logically negating #3. For certain irrational definitions of faith (especially Kierkegaard), #2 and #3 are true, but #1 is false. That is, Kierkegaard believed we must understand and believe the Bible teaches contradiction. Thus, they deny assent to the premises of the Bible (#1). An irrational faith would deny the Bible teaches justification by faith alone because James says we are not justified by faith alone. The irrationalist asserts this is a contradiction that must be believed, even more that it must be believed to be a contradiction. Kierkegaard wrote explicitly that if it were not contradictory then no faith would be required.
Now, in any of the former examples it might be said that I have equivocated. That might be the case. That is the danger of examples. I hope my gracious readers (and you must be gracious for having read this far!) will understand the attempt to illustrate the argument, even if it was not done so well. I would be delighted if one or more persons would like to provide feedback on this, however.
Interestingly enough, this three-part formulation appears to me to be nearly identical with the Platonic definition of knowledge as justified (notitia) true (assensus) belief (fiducia). There are probably many different aspects of the issue we could discuss, especially the validity of attributing "bare knowledge" to salvific propositions. I am convinced that saving faith is entirely intellectual, any other sort of extra-propositional volition being extraneous to the sole instrument of justification (faith), thus adding to the transaction something that cannot possibly be justifiable.
Well, I supposed that was verbose enough for my my first post. I shall try not to bore you all so much in the future.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Throughout this thread I noticed some great posts, first of which belongs to Dr. R. Scott Clark:
I am inclined to agree that Dr. Gordon H. Clark's appeal to the etymology of fiducia does not fit into the argument. Words can and do change in meaning, and one should consult the various instances of the term to find its intended definition. On that count, I do agree with Dr. Gordon H. Clark that the usage seems to be in many cases confused; or perhaps it is simply I that am confused. In any case, I admit to having trouble understanding what the Reformers meant when they used the term fiducia. Any help in that regard would be much appreciated.
Jeff Bartel made these comments:
I must agree with the objections here. Requiring that faith be verified through the testing of trust smuggles an elements of works into faith. I believe it upsets the doctrine of sola fide. In the second objection (not quoted here), the poster also aptly noted that two separate objects are being considered the same object of faith, thus making the argument equivocal. It is certainly true that we are justified by faith alone, but that justifying faith is never alone. I frequently find myself having to be careful about the relationship between works and faith, however, especially in light of recent controversies. We are justified by faith, a faith that produces works, but works play no part in our justification; thus, trust, i.e., fiducia, cannot be "testing" of faith, but must be something else. If I understand the Scriptures properly, that is.
Rev. Buchanan and Dr. R. Scott Clark both made insightful comments on the equivocal nature of the discussion.
Dr. Gordon H. Clark (hereafter, Dr. Clark) most certainly took a more technical approach to his formulation, I think. Moreover, he reads knowledge to be the traditional Platonic formulation of justified true belief, which meaning it does not always carry, neither in colloquial use, or in the writings of the Reformers. As a result, some of Dr. Clark's objections appear to be objections in definition, not necessarily in content.
I had actually been thinking about this thread for a couple of days before I thought I should post. At this point, I think I would like to propose what I consider faith to be and how it would fit into the traditional tripartite view of faith. Please feel free to comment on or correct any content herein.
Dr. Clark's definition of knowledge, as I asserted before, appears to be traditional. But he also uses the term loosely, that is, colloquially, attributing knowledge to propositions that his epistmology could in nowise justify as being true. He must have either been inconsistent, or acknowledged that knowledge can have more than one meaning. This latter assumption seems most plausible, as he frequently commented that many English words have four or five meanings, and that one should read "Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary" (verbatum) if he desires to "know" them. Thus, I do not think Dr. Clark would object if I were to attribute a less technical usage of knowledge to the Reformers, as they do not seem to have always (if not rarely) meant justified true belief.
Well, if the Reformers did not mean Platonic knowledge when they discussed notitia, what did they mean? I have come to believe (certainly not "know"
) that the Reformers spoke of what we would call the "justification" of an object of knowledge. That is, the Reformers spoke of the proposition itself. For example, the proposition, "Socrates is mortal." This is the conclusion of an argument. In this case, the conclusion of a syllogism, which contains the major premise, all men are mortal, and the minor premise, Socrates is a man. Thus, I agree with Rev. Buchanan that notitia is the "raw objective" truth, i.e. true propositions, without concern for the other two elements of faith (i.e., assensus and fiducia).Now, this argument itself is purely logical and intellectual. But unless one believes the premises are true, one cannot believe the conclusion. For instance, if I denied the minor premise (Socrates is a man), the conclusion does not possibly follow. I am left with a bare major premise: all men are mortal. In denying the particular, I have eliminated the possibility of the conclusion following. That is, I do not assent to the minor premise. I do not agree that they are correct. Since I do not assent to the truth of the premises, I cannot possibly trust that the conclusion is correct.
At this point, I think you might know what I am going to propose next, viz. that fiducia is trust in the conclusion. I am also sure that the more astute readers will immediately object that assent and trust here are identical in meaning, for the major and minor premises are themselves conclusions of previous arguments, the whole of knowledge regressing to a beginning. That is quite true and I applaud those who come to this conclusion unaided. I would like to give what I believe is a genuine distinction, though.
Earlier, I suggested that assensus is assent to the premises. Now, for those salvific propositions, this assent is directed at the Scriptures. That is, the object of belief (assent) is the inspired word of God. But it is one thing to assent to the fact that the Bible says one thing or another. It is quite something else to believe the proposition is true. I would therefore submit that saving faith is indeed tripartite and has these three characteristics.
1) Assensus - Believing the Bible teaches proposition p.
2) Notitia - Cognition of the proposition (understanding it).
3) Fiducia - Trusting (believing) the proposition is true.
Thus, in this formulation, assensus and fiducia have not only different objects or different propositions in view, but they have two different forms in view. That is, assensus is trust in the axiom (Scripture), whereas fiducia is trust in the conclusion (the salvific proposition). A demonstration seems in order.
It is written: For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved (Rom. 10:13). By declaring "it is written," I assent that this proposition is biblical. Secondly, I understand it. If it were written in another language besides English (and if I did not already have Romans 10:13 memorized), I would not understand the proposition. Thirdly, I trust the proposition is true. More definitely, I believe it applies to me. With these three elements, I can construct a valid syllogism, which is a particularized salvific proposition:
1) All who call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.
2) I call upon the name of the Lord.
C) Therefore, I shall be saved.
I believe that in this syllogism all three characteristics of the traditional tripartite definition of faith are embodied.
To give some further illustrations"”
For many so-called "agnostics," #1 and #2 apply. They believe the Bible teaches that all who call upon the name of the Lord shall be save and they understand the proposition (narrowly speaking) perfectly. But they do not necessarily believe it is true; at least, not for them. For cults and heresies, they may certainly have #2, but deny that it is #1, thus, logically negating #3. For certain irrational definitions of faith (especially Kierkegaard), #2 and #3 are true, but #1 is false. That is, Kierkegaard believed we must understand and believe the Bible teaches contradiction. Thus, they deny assent to the premises of the Bible (#1). An irrational faith would deny the Bible teaches justification by faith alone because James says we are not justified by faith alone. The irrationalist asserts this is a contradiction that must be believed, even more that it must be believed to be a contradiction. Kierkegaard wrote explicitly that if it were not contradictory then no faith would be required.
Now, in any of the former examples it might be said that I have equivocated. That might be the case. That is the danger of examples. I hope my gracious readers (and you must be gracious for having read this far!) will understand the attempt to illustrate the argument, even if it was not done so well. I would be delighted if one or more persons would like to provide feedback on this, however.
Interestingly enough, this three-part formulation appears to me to be nearly identical with the Platonic definition of knowledge as justified (notitia) true (assensus) belief (fiducia). There are probably many different aspects of the issue we could discuss, especially the validity of attributing "bare knowledge" to salvific propositions. I am convinced that saving faith is entirely intellectual, any other sort of extra-propositional volition being extraneous to the sole instrument of justification (faith), thus adding to the transaction something that cannot possibly be justifiable.
Well, I supposed that was verbose enough for my my first post. I shall try not to bore you all so much in the future.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
Great question. This distinction has come into focus in many circles lately. I am eager to understand the arguments in favor of such a dichotomy, but I either do not understand the explanations given, or the explanations overlap, thus invalidating the assertion that head and heart are distinct. To me, it seems to be an a priori supposition that the head and heart are distinct, for Scripture uses the two interchangably. I readily admit my own presupposition, which is the unitary nature of man. I believe man is a living soul, which possesses a body; but this body is not itself the image of God, who has no body. The soul is the image, and man, being the image, is the soul. The soul itself is one, man not being one in many persons as the Godhead is, but a creaturely individual.
Most importantly, I find this to be the teaching of Scripture. I have difficulty finding a biblical basis for the distinctions drawn in the nature of man, as if he were a head and a heart, a mind, will, and passions, or a body, soul, and spirit. The heart is said to think, to will, and to emote. Likewise, the mind is said to think, will, and emote. The soul is said to do these, as is the spirit. How can we tell them apart? It seems hard to say that any one thing is a separate faculty when there is such overlap among them. It is certainly true the Bible speaks of the different terms in the same context (Matt. 22:37, 1 Thess. 5:23), but this sort of literary redundancy is frequent in the Bible and exists in religious and secular writings as well.
There is definitely validity in the difference between our earthy body and future heavenly body, though (1 Cor. 15:44). Our earthy bodies are corruptable, our heavenly bodies will be incorruptable. But not much is said about the nature of these future bodies.
Coincidentally, Dr. Gordon H. Clark wrote a little book on this very issue as well, The Biblical Doctrine of Man. In it, he gives some apparently good exegesis of relavent biblical passages. He especially addresses the distinction between head and heart, although does not devote as much time to body, soul, and spirit.
The best argument I have seen for body, soul, and spirit is one that said the body is the flesh, the spirit is what we refer to in English as the soul, i.e. the supernatural portion of man, and the soul is the body and the spirit together (living soul). The problem with this is that Christ says in Matt. 10:28 to fear him who can destroy body and soul, which does not make sense in the case given above.
Ah, but now we are getting into dimensions that beg real exegesis and not just select quotations and generalizations. And if I recall correctly, this particular thread is about Dr. Gordon H. Clark's definition of faith and its relation to the traditional Reformed definition.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Magma2
Puritan Board Sophomore
Just my 
Rev. Buchanan provides the following illustration of the supposed necessity of trust as the imagined third ingredient which makes belief saving.
I thought these examples, which I´m sure most are very familiar with in some form or another, are very illustrative of the inherent problem with the tradition formulation and which Clark specifically addresses in What is Saving Faith (pgs 157,158). Clark uses the illustration of a bank in which a person is said to believe the bank is sound, but cannot be said to trust it until he actually puts his money in. After listing a couple of arguments demonstrating inherent and somewhat deceptive problems with such illustrations, Clark adds:
C. Matthew McMahon writes
I´m just a little bit perplexed by this, but my guess it stems from the selection offered in Trinity Review as opposed to Clark´s book What is Saving Faith where he deals with Calvin, Owen, C. Hodge, Warfield at some length in addition to a number of minor men like Bavinck, Anderson and Mueller. As far as I know, Clark was never accused of picking off cripples
Rev. Buchanan provides the following illustration of the supposed necessity of trust as the imagined third ingredient which makes belief saving.
I thought these examples, which I´m sure most are very familiar with in some form or another, are very illustrative of the inherent problem with the tradition formulation and which Clark specifically addresses in What is Saving Faith (pgs 157,158). Clark uses the illustration of a bank in which a person is said to believe the bank is sound, but cannot be said to trust it until he actually puts his money in. After listing a couple of arguments demonstrating inherent and somewhat deceptive problems with such illustrations, Clark adds:
C. Matthew McMahon writes
I´m just a little bit perplexed by this, but my guess it stems from the selection offered in Trinity Review as opposed to Clark´s book What is Saving Faith where he deals with Calvin, Owen, C. Hodge, Warfield at some length in addition to a number of minor men like Bavinck, Anderson and Mueller. As far as I know, Clark was never accused of picking off cripples
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