One more question for the Clarkians

[Dan....]

Of course you couldn't *know* that your senses are 100% accurate, because it is not *true* that your senses (or anyone elses for that matter) are always 100% accurate.

Since I can't *know* that my senses are 100% accurate at any point, then I am left to dealing with probabilities (however great the probability, it still isn't 100% certain).

Now you may mean that you can't know anything from your senses because your senses are not always 100% accurate. But if that is what you mean, why assume that knowledge must only come from infallible sources?

knowledge = justified true belief

My problem is that I don't understand how strictly we must define "justified." Is "justified" a matter of probability? Say, 99.5% probable? (Who gets to decide?) Or is "justified" 100% certain? And who can know that anything is 100% certain except for One who is infallible?

That to know something entails having certainty is mainly a Cartesian constraint and has largely been abandoned in modern epistemology.

On what basis is Des Cartes' constraint abandoned?
Is it that Des Cartes constrained justification for knowledge so strictly that skepticism is the only option?

Also, if we are not 100% certain about a matter yet call it "knowledge," then is knowledge a moving target? When we find evidence that goes against what we thought we *knew*, did the truth change?

 

[Arch2k]

I think this debate largely plays on how we define knowledge. I have no problem saying colloquially that I know things that I see, but when using a strict definition, Clarkians will resort to the infallible Holy Writ.

 

[Dan....]

Where does that leave these impressions? You see, the "Holy Spirit" answer does not overcome the problem. Now, I appreciate much of what Clark says, but the problem one runs into with Scripturalism is that if they are consistent in their application of what constitutes justified true belief (knowledge), then they would have to say that there is no knowledge. The very vehicle they say provides knowledge, when closely looked at, fails the Scripturalist test.

I'm not following you. But I guess you are asking how do we know what the Scriptures says if we can only know what the Scripture says. Are you asking what constitutes knowledge (true propositions), or how do we know (acquire true propositions)? These are not the same thing. Knowledge and knowing.

I echo Brian Bosse's question. How can we "know" that it is the Holy Spirit that is revealing truth [scripture] to us?

Earlier you said, "Reading requires a priori equipment - the capacity for language." - How do we *know* that our a priori equipment is working?

 

[Dan....]

Where does that leave these impressions? You see, the "Holy Spirit" answer does not overcome the problem. Now, I appreciate much of what Clark says, but the problem one runs into with Scripturalism is that if they are consistent in their application of what constitutes justified true belief (knowledge), then they would have to say that there is no knowledge. The very vehicle they say provides knowledge, when closely looked at, fails the Scripturalist test.

I'm not following you. But I guess you are asking how do we know what the Scriptures says if we can only know what the Scripture says. Are you asking what constitutes knowledge (true propositions), or how do we know (acquire true propositions)? These are not the same thing. Knowledge and knowing.

I echo Brian Bosse's question. How can we "know" that it is the Holy Spirit that is revealing truth [scripture] to us?

Earlier you said, "Reading requires a priori equipment - the capacity for language." - How do we *know* that our a priori equipment is working?

I just noticed that Brian Bosse started a new thread on this subject. On post #3, located here, he says,

The deductive apparatus itself must be axiomatic. This is one major flaw in Scripturalism.

...this is the jist of what I'm getting at (just stated in a more educated way). If you answer Brian there, then you can bypass answering me here (I won't take it personal), that way you wouldn't need to post the same thing twice.

Thanks for your help.

 

[MW]

Christian since it distinguishes the Creator from his creation and since it explains universal propositions which give meaning to particulars.

Meaning to particulars? What kind of meaning is it giving to a particular which cannot be known? If you can never know A is B, that Socrates is a man, you have no ability to know anything concrete about this world. It is all abstract.

 

[Civbert]

Christian since it distinguishes the Creator from his creation and since it explains universal propositions which give meaning to particulars.

Meaning to particulars? What kind of meaning is it giving to a particular which cannot be known? If you can never know A is B, that Socrates is a man, you have no ability to know anything concrete about this world. It is all abstract.

Do you know Socrates is a man? How do you know?

 

[Civbert]

I echo Brian Bosse's question. How can we "know" that it is the Holy Spirit that is revealing truth [scripture] to us?

Earlier you said, "Reading requires a priori equipment - the capacity for language." - How do we *know* that our a priori equipment is working?

Can we "know" ultimately that we are not simply "a brain in a vat"? At some point we must just assume - it is inescapable.

 

[Civbert]

I think this debate largely plays on how we define knowledge. I have no problem saying colloquially that I know things that I see, but when using a strict definition, Clarkians will resort to the infallible Holy Writ.

That is correct. To answer the Socrates question, 'how do we know Socrates was a man?', either we use a strict definition of knowledge (and we don't know except hypothetically), or we can use a loose definition of knowledge (and what we know might be subjective to individual perception). One definition limits knowledge to "Holy Writ" an what can be deduced therefrom, and the other allows for one to "know what they see with their own eyes", but results in the impossibility of absolute or objective knowledge: one person can know A and another person know not-A (at the same time and sense and place, etc).

 

[MW]

Do you know Socrates is a man? How do you know?

Only a man possesses qualities A, B, and C, and Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C. Ergo, &c.

 

[Civbert]

Do you know Socrates is a man? How do you know?

Only a man possesses qualities A, B, and C, and Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C. Ergo, &c.

How do you know "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C"?

 

[MW]

How do you know "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C"?

The same way you knew that I had written "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C" -- I see them.

 

[Civbert]

How do you know "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C"?

The same way you knew that I had written "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C" -- I see them.

Where? How do you know it's true?

 

[MW]

How do you know "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C"?

The same way you knew that I had written "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C" -- I see them.

Where? How do you know it's true?

Your question assumes I know it's true. How do you know I know it's true? I know it's true in the same way you know I know it's true.

 

[Civbert]

The same way you knew that I had written "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C" -- I see them.

Where? How do you know it's true?

Your question assumes I know it's true. How do you know I know it's true? I know it's true in the same way you know I know it's true.

OK. So you are saying you read that "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C". So from the statement "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C" you conclude Socrates is a man. And your conclusion is hypothetical - that is, only if "Socrates possesses qualities A, B, and C" then Socrates is a man.

Notice how this conclusion is based on words and language, not on sensory information. You did not see the qualities of A, B, and C. You read them and assume they are true. The hypothetical information is conveyed by words and language.

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Anthony,

Notice how this conclusion is based on words and language, not on sensory information.

Knowledge of what the actual words and language are through the act of reading is based on sensory perceptions.

Brian