Is Hume right that if you act without external constraint imposed on your action by anyone else you act freely? If not, why not? If so, and if everything that happens is caused by other things that happened earlier, does that mean that you act freely even though your action was caused by other things that happened earlier (perhaps even before you were born)?
Hume on free action
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Wouldn't we define "liberty" or "freedom" as more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action?" It seems to me that when we say someone has "free will" we mean more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action." Does anybody have a good objection to Hume's notion of liberty?
Reformed Thomist
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Hume is trying to reconcile freedom -- enough, at least for moral responsibility -- and causal determinism. His is a 'compatibilist' position. This position, by definition, negates 'libertarian' free will (what most people think they have, or what most mean by 'free will'), but preserves what we really care about in talk of freedom: moral responsibility for our behaviours.
Basically, causal determinism is true; there is no such thing as an action which is not caused. But there are two main 'kinds' of causation for the human being: One compatible with freedom/moral responsibility, and the other not. We are free and morally responsible for our (caused) actions insofar that our action is in line with our will (doing what we want to do) -- which is normally the case with human action. Here we, via our wills, are directly involved in the causation; we thereby own the action. If, on the other hand, we are caused to do something mainly by external agents (violating our will; doing what we do not want to do; in effect, forcing our action), this is an unfree act and we are not morally responsible for it. We are only indirectly involved in the causation; we do not own the action, but someone else does, using us as an unwilling 'instrument'. But, again, this is a relatively rare occurance in human action.
Basically, causal determinism is true; there is no such thing as an action which is not caused. But there are two main 'kinds' of causation for the human being: One compatible with freedom/moral responsibility, and the other not. We are free and morally responsible for our (caused) actions insofar that our action is in line with our will (doing what we want to do) -- which is normally the case with human action. Here we, via our wills, are directly involved in the causation; we thereby own the action. If, on the other hand, we are caused to do something mainly by external agents (violating our will; doing what we do not want to do; in effect, forcing our action), this is an unfree act and we are not morally responsible for it. We are only indirectly involved in the causation; we do not own the action, but someone else does, using us as an unwilling 'instrument'. But, again, this is a relatively rare occurance in human action.
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Moral freedom is more than acting without external constraint. Moral freedom has to do with acting according to one's desires. Moreover, those desires would need to be generated in an appropriate way (e.g. not being brainwashed).
Moral freedom does not necessarily entail the ability to do evil. God has moral freedom, but He does not have the ability to do evil.
What if the desire one has is impossible to act on (i.e. a human desiring to fly). So would we have to say that the desire has to be possible (i.e. a healthy human desiring to walk from point A to point B - a distance of say 10 feet). [I think post #3 in this thread touches on this topic].
Also, would this be in line with what you were thinking about desire in an appropriate way: [-]a case of manipulation that is not constraint (e.g., your action being internally caused by neuroscientists using sophisticated machinery implanted in your brain) would be an example of an unfree act without external constraint[/-]? [I think this covered it].
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There is a psychological determinism which undermines human agency and responsibility built on that definition.
I would include "inclination to good" as basic to any definition of freedom. One must then account for the reason why humans choose what is evil. I think this is more natural than the alternative, which must reckon with the inexcusability of man for doing evil and the reason why humans do relatively good actions. The "inclination to good" position can explain the choice of evil under the concept of "deception," which is also the biblical way of explaining the problem.
Sometimes "freedom," or "free will" is defined as "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise" (The Principle of Alternate Possibilities) or "to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances." What's wrong with these again? I've read somewhere in the past that these two definitions are wrong, but I forgot the reasons why.
I have heard that this conception of freedom has two implications. One implication is that some people will make decisions at random or for no reason. From God's perspective, no decision is truly random because God ordains what we will choose. From man's perspective, some of our decisions appear to be random.
Another implication is that the reason a person chooses X is the same reason he has for not choosing X. Suppose person A murders person B and he had a reason for doing that. If history were rolled back to when person B was alive and person A chose otherwise, then the reason that person A had for murdering person B is the same reason he had for not choosing to murder person B.
Psychological determinism is the usual route of most reformed thinkers, actually (including Jonathan Edwards).
In this case, you are talking past the issue. You are talking about moral ability whereas this discussion is about what Edwards called "natural ability."
Could you provide an example to illustrate your point?
No, the terms are specifically aimed at what is natural to the will as will. Natural freedom includes the inclination to good. On the basis of the Christian doctrine of the fall a question arises as to whether this inclination to good was destroyed by man's voluntary choice to sin. At that point moral ability becomes an issue. But the fact remains that for reformed theologians the inclination to good is basic to the natural freedom of the will.
Edwards was a reformed thinker, not the reformed thinker. Calvin says, "his choice of good and evil was free, and not that alone, but the highest rectitude was in his mind and will, and all the organic parts were rightly composed to obedience, until in destroying himself he corrupted his own blessings" (Institutes 1.15.8).
Calvin's complaint of the philosophers is to the point -- "they were seeking in a ruin for a building."
Peairtach
Puritan Board Doctor
It's the fact that God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent and that Man has a soul that makes human "natural"/metaphysical freedom and responsibility possible. Obviously fallen Man is ethically bound by his own sin. See e.g. Luther's "Bondage of the Will" for a treatise on that.
The more consistent atheists and materialists, e.g. the Marxists, are determinists when it comes to Man's will and all else.
Here's a suggestive article by Douglas Wilson on the subject, possibly before his Federal Vision heresy carried him away:
Antithesis at Reformed.org
Here's a couple of threads on the subject from the PB, which may or may not be enlightening:
http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/sovereignty-establishing-free-will-62841/
http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/causal-determinism-human-responsibility-63037/
The more consistent atheists and materialists, e.g. the Marxists, are determinists when it comes to Man's will and all else.
Here's a suggestive article by Douglas Wilson on the subject, possibly before his Federal Vision heresy carried him away:
Antithesis at Reformed.org
Here's a couple of threads on the subject from the PB, which may or may not be enlightening:
http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/sovereignty-establishing-free-will-62841/
http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/causal-determinism-human-responsibility-63037/
Again, this is the old pre-enlightenment framing of the issue (cf. Anselm's definition). The question was reframed in philosophy during the 17th century and has become a question about how choices are determined. Again, this is the difference: moral freedom, Edwards would agree, includes the inclination toward morally right actions. The question that Hume is asking, though, is about the functioning of choice, regardless of its moral components. Both ways of framing the question have been engaged and dealt with in our tradition, so let's not write off the reframing.
In some ways we have to remember that Hume is really playing with a lot of things. Yes, he claims that the idea of cause and effect that we have is custom rather than reason, but he later assumes it in the Dialogues Concerning Natural and Revealed Religion. The other thing to remember about Hume is that, like Locke, he is not terribly concerned about the practical implications of his thought, which is why he's considered part of the Scottish Enlightenment, but not part of the Scottish School of Common Sense.
I think you're missing Matthew's point. You stated that we was talking "...past the issue...." but Matthew was responding to the question:
He's not asking how Hume or post-Enlightenment thinking would frame the issue but how we would define freedom. Matthew is providing the classically Reformed answer to the question.
Thanks Rich. That is the point. There is an answer here which the traditional reformed have expounded from Scripture. The philosophers, as Calvin notes, basically do not account for man as fallen and look at the human constitution as if it functioned with complete integrity.
Again, that depends on how the question is framed? Are we talking about freedom as a moral quality or ability (cf. Anselm, defines freedom as the ability to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake) or a metaphysical one?
I think Anselm and Edwards might be exceptions here. Perhaps (when I have my flash drive with me and am not sitting in a cafe) I should post some portions of my essay on the subject, where I compare Anselm, Edwards, Luther, and (more for fun than anything else) Chesterton on free will---all of them, I think, are operating with very similar notions of freedom and responsibility.
That would be great.
And, again, you accused Matthew of talking past the issue. He was not. When asked how we would respond, he answered how Reformed dogmatists have handled it historically. This field is not co-extensive with the history of philosophy and gives different answers to the problems than you'll find in a history of philosophy. Unless you have spent a lot of time researching Reformed dogmatics, you should not presume to lecture another who has on whether he is talking past an issue he is giving an answer to. Simply because he is not framing the answer in the realm you are familiar with does not mean he is talking past the issue.
The issue he is addressing is not the issue that Hume is addressing.
Philip,
Pay attention because this is the last time I'm going to explain this to you and then I'm going to start moderating you if you will not pay closer attention.
Claudiu asked:
This is a question about how we would define liberty or freedom.
Matthew didn't have to answer the question to the definition of liberty or freedom to Hume's satisfaction or even to your satisfaction in order to provide a definition.
Are you at all studied in Reformed dogmatics on this issue?
But for what purpose? In Reformed dogmatics, freedom is what we have in Christ---freedom from sin and unto righteousness. In philosophy, freedom is that set of conditions that is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility. That's where I see reformed dogmatics talking past the issue (and yes, I'm familiar with it) and it's where I see Edwards' work on the will extremely helpful in distinguishing between the two.
To put it another way, would we apply the definition of freedom given by reformed dogmatics in the realm of politics?
Is it seriously your contention that the Reformed dogmatists have said no more than freedom from sin and unto righteousness and have not written on the nature of the will prior to Edwards? On the one hand you state you have read on this and on the other this summation belies that assertion.
You might find Shedd's discussion of human will to be profitable, as found in his Dogmatics, 2:115ff. His discussion exposes a genuine difference between the elder and younger psychology -- the elder providing for true freedom as defined by the Bible and precluding necessitating theories. It also becomes clear from Shedd's discussion that Edwards' explanation of the will assumed the definition of his Arminian opponents and at times failed to distinguish between volition and inclination.
Ok, it seems my post was lost (bad connections last night).
I'm requoting your explanation here so that I can explain how this works: this definition is very similar to Anselm's definition of freedom as an ability (implying inclination) to preserve rectitude of will. Thus, we get the posse peccare, non posse non peccare, etc. I have no quarrel with this conception of freedom.
But we must recognize its limitations: it is dealing primarily with inclinations as they are. What it does not deal with, though, is the issue of human responsibility, which is what Hume's definition is dealing with. In this vein, there have been three answers, historically: hard determinism (hyper-Calvinism, materialism, behaviorism), compatibilism (reformed theology, classic Thomism), and libertarianism (Arminianism, Molinism). The first is the idea that determination of decisions means that ultimately humans are not responsible for their actions, the second holds that some sort of determination is compatible with responsibility, and the third holds that ultimately responsibility depends on the decision not being determined by anything (including Divine Decree). Hard determinism, as we have said, is to be rejected. Libertarianism, on the other hand, ends in the logical conclusion of openness theology, which we would all agree is unbiblical. This is why Reformed theology has been historically compatibilist when it comes to philosophical freedom.
I'm requoting your explanation here so that I can explain how this works: this definition is very similar to Anselm's definition of freedom as an ability (implying inclination) to preserve rectitude of will. Thus, we get the posse peccare, non posse non peccare, etc. I have no quarrel with this conception of freedom.
But we must recognize its limitations: it is dealing primarily with inclinations as they are. What it does not deal with, though, is the issue of human responsibility, which is what Hume's definition is dealing with. In this vein, there have been three answers, historically: hard determinism (hyper-Calvinism, materialism, behaviorism), compatibilism (reformed theology, classic Thomism), and libertarianism (Arminianism, Molinism). The first is the idea that determination of decisions means that ultimately humans are not responsible for their actions, the second holds that some sort of determination is compatible with responsibility, and the third holds that ultimately responsibility depends on the decision not being determined by anything (including Divine Decree). Hard determinism, as we have said, is to be rejected. Libertarianism, on the other hand, ends in the logical conclusion of openness theology, which we would all agree is unbiblical. This is why Reformed theology has been historically compatibilist when it comes to philosophical freedom.
The categories which you have described are the result of the "younger psychology." I think you will come to see the subject in a different light after you have read Shedd.
Are his works available online at all? Does he deal with Divine Sovereignty/theological determinism as it relates to human freedom and responsibility?
But my question remains the same here: is this framing of the issue somehow invalid? If so, why? What presuppositions are there to this framing that make thinking of freedom in terms of moral responsibility and accountability unhelpful or unreformed?
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