Does Voluntarism entail Capricioiusness?

[Justified]

Do voluntarist models of God entail moral capriciousness? Could God have willed that murder is good? Could he have willed that stealing is good?

I ask because I am sympathetic to voluntarist views of God, since necessitarian views of God tend to make two Gods-- his nature and "God." Necessitarian views of God also ignore the voluntarist nature of many passages of Scripture. Nevertheless, I am having difficulty thinking through this issue.

 

[rickclayfan]

I think this issue is too complex to think that the necessitarian position strips God of His free agency. God is incomprehensible. It would seem as if God's inability to sin demonstrates weakness and limitation on God's part; however, it is evident that His inability to do so is not weakness, but the height of perfection and strength. In the same way, in regard to atonement, He is not limited.

We cannot divorce God from His nature. His essence is of the utmost simplicity and indivisibility. His attributes work in concert. To use us as an example, we tend to view sin as being an independent entity from us, when in fact it possesses no existence of its own. Sin is not a substance or a thing, but a personal lack of conformity to the law of God. Just as sin cannot be divorced from the sinner, in the same way (to use this crude example) God's nature is inseparable from God. God remains a most free being when He acts according to His nature, since His nature is who He is.

 

[MW]

Do voluntarist models of God entail moral capriciousness? Could God have willed that murder is good? Could he have willed that stealing is good?

In the history of the debate this is one of those questions which have been designed to shock the moral sensibilities of men so as to turn them away from a divine command theory of ethics. The question itself, though, is irrelevant because "morality" supposes existing relations which God Himself has created and creation is one of those things which God has "freely" willed. From our perspective we cannot think of another moral order without making void the relations which actually exist under the present created order, and we cannot assume another created order without substantiating the freedom of the divine will to create it. Raising the question of "possible worlds" only establishes voluntarism.

 

[Justified]

Do voluntarist models of God entail moral capriciousness? Could God have willed that murder is good? Could he have willed that stealing is good?

In the history of the debate this is one of those questions which have been designed to shock the moral sensibilities of men so as to turn them away from a divine command theory of ethics. The question itself, though, is irrelevant because "morality" supposes existing relations which God Himself has created and creation is one of those things which God has "freely" willed. From our perspective we cannot think of another moral order without making void the relations which actually exist under the present created order, and we cannot assume another created order without substantiating the freedom of the divine will to create it. Raising the question of "possible worlds" only establishes voluntarism.

Thanks a lot, Rev. Winzer. Your argument seems to be that our moral sensibilities, as rational creatures created by God, are conditioned by the natural law which God has willed to be so. Therefore, when we talk about worlds in which God wills the moral law to be otherwise, we are naturally appalled because it is contrary to the law which God himself has established. Am I right?

Also, would you concur with my concern of necessitarian views of God, that they create, in a sense, "two Gods:" e.g., God couldn't will such and such because of his nature?

 

[MW]

Your argument seems to be that our moral sensibilities, as rational creatures created by God, are conditioned by the natural law which God has willed to be so. Therefore, when we talk about worlds in which God wills the moral law to be otherwise, we are naturally appalled because it is contrary to the law which God himself has established. Am I right?

Yes; but also the very notion of a "possible world" requires an acceptance that the real world is voluntaristic. If there are possible worlds then this world has been freely willed by God. That determines in favour of voluntarism. So the opening question presupposes that which it attempts to undermine.

Also, would you concur with my concern of necessitarian views of God, that they create, in a sense, "two Gods:" e.g., God couldn't will such and such because of his nature?

Absolutely. But then we can understand certain necessarian dynamics in terms of covenant condescension without creating two Gods. God has bound Himself to act according to the limitations He imposes in covenant faithfulness. This means, though, that the necesssity is ad extra, in the voluntary condescension of God, not in God Himself.

 

[Justified]

Yes; but also the very notion of a "possible world" requires an acceptance that the real world is voluntaristic. If there are possible worlds then this world has been freely willed by God. That determines in favour of voluntarism. So the opening question presupposes that which it attempts to undermine.

Could not one respond that God's nature constrains the freedom of possibilities, while maintaining that God freely chooses between the possibilities?

Absolutely. But then we can understand certain necessarian dynamics in terms of covenant condescension without creating two Gods. God has bound Himself to act according to the limitations He imposes in covenant faithfulness. This means, though, that the necesssity is ad extra, in the voluntary condescension of God, not in God Himself.

The difference between necessitas consequentiis et necessitas consequentiae, correct?

 

[MW]

Could not one respond that God's nature constrains the freedom of possibilities, while maintaining that God freely chooses between the possibilities?

If God's "nature" exercises constraint on possibilities then it is bound to constrain possibilities to the one which most accords with God's nature, which is as much as to say that there would be no other possibilities and no freedom to choose. The world itself would then be necessary and God Himself would have to give an account as to why He permits murder and theft contrary to His "nature" or how He could use such actions as punishments.

The difference between necessitas consequentiis et necessitas consequentiae, correct?

Possibly. I'm not sure how these terms are being used in this context.

 

[Justified]

If God's "nature" exercises constraint on possibilities then it is bound to constrain possibilities to the one which most accords with God's nature, which is as much as to say that there would be no other possibilities and no freedom to choose. The world itself would then be necessary and God Himself would have to give an account as to why He permits murder and theft contrary to His "nature" or how He could use such actions as punishments.

I am not necessarily disagreeing. I am just trying to think this through. Why can there not be multiple possible worlds that accord with nature? Why only one?

Also, you mentioned in the previous post that God constrains himself, albeit willingly. However, if there are not certain things which are fixed in God, say, his truthfulness, how can we be assured that God is not lying to us in his Word? If truthfulness is intrinsic to the nature of God, this problem disappears.

Thank you, Rev. Winzer, for your patience with me and your help.

 

[MW]

These are questions worth exploring, but let's not forget what the necessarian is asking us to believe -- that God is bound by His nature. Now, from a voluntarist point of view, we accept there are numerous possibilities, but can you have these possibilities on a necessarian scheme? If God is bound to will according to His nature then everything must always be according to His nature in order to be governed by His will. The whole idea of the felix culpa and of permitting lesser states for higher purposes would be ruled out. At the very least God "permits" sin. That in itself basically dismantles the necessarian system. One can say that God has a higher purpose in it, but the very fact that something lower can serve an higher purpose shows that God has complete voluntarism with regard to external things.

Truthfulness is intrinsic to the "nature" of God, but we only know this because God has condescended to our low estate. We cannot know the essence of God as it is in itself; we only know God as He reveals Himself to us. It seems to me, that by seeking an epistemic guarantee of truthfulness in the essence of God the creature is undermining the possibility of trust because the creature must be able to know the mind of the Lord in order to be his counsellor as a precondition of putting trust in Him. On the voluntarist view, we accept our place as lower, and can thereby be certain of the truth of God by recognising His supremacy and authority over us. We can take the place of the blind who are being led by a path they know not because God's nature voluntarily revealed to us is entirely worthy of implicit trust and obedience.

 

[Justified]

Thanks. I see now that some of my questions were motivated by a desire to know God in his essence, while I should rather humble myself and accept the ectype of what he has been pleased to reveal to us.

 

[Justified]

Truthfulness is intrinsic to the "nature" of God, but we only know this because God has condescended to our low estate. We cannot know the essence of God as it is in itself; we only know God as He reveals Himself to us. It seems to me, that by seeking an epistemic guarantee of truthfulness in the essence of God the creature is undermining the possibility of trust because the creature must be able to know the mind of the Lord in order to be his counsellor as a precondition of putting trust in Him. On the voluntarist view, we accept our place as lower, and can thereby be certain of the truth of God by recognising His supremacy and authority over us. We can take the place of the blind who are being led by a path they know not because God's nature voluntarily revealed to us is entirely worthy of implicit trust and obedience.

One last question, if I may. Are you saying that there might be things intrinsic to the nature of God (e.g., truthfulness), but we only know them insofar as God condescends to us?

 

[MW]

Are you saying that there might be things intrinsic to the nature of God (e.g., truthfulness), but we only know them insofar as God condescends to us?

We would say God is His attributes (including truth), which is a negation that He has parts. We don't have any creaturely analogy which conveys what it means to be without parts. We only know Him compartmentalised according to our way of knowing anything. In that compartmentalised sense we speak of the nature and attributes of God the way we speak of the nature and attributes of any object of knowledge. But in Himself God does not have these parts as we conceive Him.