Defining Free Will

[Philip]

In philosophy class this morning, there was a debate over free will and part of the issue came down to two different senses:

Pre-enlightenment: Freedom is the ability to do what is good in the sight of God.

Post-enlightenment: Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.

Can Calvinists agree that depraved man has free will in the second sense? I suggest yes.

 

[PresbyDane]

I would also say yes, but next question Will then be is the Will really free when it only has a limited desire to choose from that being the one bound to sin. Something bound is not free!

 

[Tripel]

I think any definition of free will needs to include mention of ability. In other words, our will is free, but we are only going to will to do that which is within our depraved ability.

 

[Christusregnat]

Post-enlightenment: Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.

Can Calvinists agree that depraved man has free will in the second sense? I suggest yes.

The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.

Cheers,

 

[Skyler]

I think the differentiation between moral and constitutional ability would also come into play here--the limits of one's moral nature vs. one's physical nature. Physically, one can do good things; morally, one cannot(assuming said person is unregenerate).

 

[Philip]

The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.

The second definition leaves what one wants out of the question. The question is whether one could, if so disposed, do good. The second definition was not a concept that anyone before 1700 would have been familiar with. If we define free will as the ability to do what one is disposed to do, I think that we can say yes, this idea is compatible with reformed theology. What is incompatible is libertarianism which says that the will is unconditioned.

I would also say yes, but next question Will then be is the Will really free when it only has a limited desire to choose from that being the one bound to sin. Something bound is not free!

Will we have free will in the New Heavens/New Earth?

 

[Iakobos_1071]

I believe the Bible teaches the absolute Sovereignty of God. (In control of everything) To me this means our will (the elect) and the will of the reprobate as well.. It was not Pharaoh's free will falling on his total depravity that let him to the choice to not let the slaves go, it was the authority of the living God hardening his heart and making him choose not to let His people go that his wrath might be shown. This is in the bible in many other examples.. God is never caught off guard.

 

[Christusregnat]

The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.

The second definition leaves what one wants out of the question. The question is whether one could, if so disposed, do good. The second definition was not a concept that anyone before 1700 would have been familiar with.

That's funny, I think Martin Luther lived before 1700, and he refuted the second view in Bondage of the Will. It's good your in college, so that you can help me get my time line straight.

Cheers,

 

[Confessor]

The Arminian, and common, definition of free will must involve the power of contrary choice, i.e. that an action is free iff one has the ability to do otherwise, all other things being equal. Although, I was discussing this with a friend yesterday, and I realized that the libertarian definition must be a little more than this; it must also include the possibility of performing anything which is within one's natural ability.

For instance, operating on the former definition of libertarian free will, one could say that I have three options in front of me (for the sake of argument): I could type an "a," "b," or "c" on the computer screen. If it is within my natural ability to type in a "c," yet my only conceivable options are "a" and "b," then clearly I don't have libertarian free will with respect to typing "c"; some external force must be restraining me. Therefore the ability to do otherwise, strictly speaking, is not a sufficient definition of free will. It must be the ability to do whatever is within one's natural ability at any given moment.

The Reformed and Biblical viewpoint, on the other hand, is basically the second definition you have above, although saying this convinces me to make a qualifier. I don't think either of the definitions in the OP are false definitions of freedom, but I believe they are true with respect to different aspects of freedom. The second definition properly defines freedom in the sense of possessing moral responsibility, while the first properly defines freedom in the sense of appropriately utilizing our faculties associated with moral responsibility. Just as the imago Dei can be spoken of in two senses, having a rational-moral nature, and properly using that nature, so also freedom can be spoken of in two senses.

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 06:05:57 EST-----

The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.

The second definition leaves what one wants out of the question. The question is whether one could, if so disposed, do good. The second definition was not a concept that anyone before 1700 would have been familiar with.

That's funny, I think Martin Luther lived before 1700, and he refuted the second view in Bondage of the Will. It's good your in college, so that you can help me get my time line straight.

Cheers,

Adam,

The second view in the OP is the Biblical view. Arminians appeal to the power of contrary choice (in good Romans 9:19 fashion) as essential to freedom, while Reformed Christians stress that freedom is the ability to act in accord with one's inclinations/"heart."

And, as I said above, freedom with respect to properly utilizing our faculties is correctly defined in the first definition. But this does not imply that freedom with respect to the sheer possession of moral responsibility for actions is incorrectly defined in the second definition.

Ben

 

[Philip]

The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.

The second definition leaves what one wants out of the question. The question is whether one could, if so disposed, do good. The second definition was not a concept that anyone before 1700 would have been familiar with.

That's funny, I think Martin Luther lived before 1700, and he refuted the second view in Bondage of the Will. It's good your in college, so that you can help me get my time line straight.

Cheers,

No, that wasn't it at all. What he was refuting is the idea that man, in his natural state, can do good in the sense that he is willing. That is, though man has the natural ability to do good, he does not have the actual or volitional ability to do good.

Free will is the ability to choose the contrary, if one were so disposed. I chose to eat pizza rather than wings tonight because I felt like pizza. Could I have chosen have chosen wings? Yes, if I was so disposed--but I wasn't, so the choice of pizza was inevitable.

 

[Christusregnat]

Adam,

The second view in the OP is the Biblical view. Arminians appeal to the power of contrary choice (in good Romans 9:19 fashion) as essential to freedom, while Reformed Christians stress that freedom is the ability to act in accord with one's inclinations/"heart."

The second view states that man has the natural ability to choose good or evil. That may be your view, but it is not the Scripture's, nor the confessional view.

Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.

Man does not have the natural ability to choose anything but evil.

I. God has endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor, by any absolute necessity of nature, determined good, or evil.[1]

II. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom, and power to will and to do that which was good and well pleasing to God;[2] but yet, mutably, so that he might fall from it.[3]

III. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, has wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation:[4] so as, a natural man, being altogether averse from that good,[5] and dead in sin,[6] is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.[7]

IV. When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He frees him from his natural bondage under sin;[8] and, by His grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good;[9] yet so, as that by reason of his remaining corruption, he does not perfectly, or only, will that which is good, but does also will that which is evil.[10]

Human nature, as fallen, cannot choose anything spiritually good.

Cheers,

 

[Confessor]

The second view states that man has the natural ability to choose good or evil. That may be your view, but it is not the Scripture's, nor the confessional view.

No, it states that if man pleases, he may choose good or evil. TD men may not please to do good; therefore they choose only evil.

Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.

Man does not have the natural ability to choose anything but evil.

I should have defined this term from the outset. Natural ability by definition refers to one's capability to perform an action if he desires to do that action. To get this across with an extreme example, God has the natural ability to sin, but He does not have the moral ability to sin. He is not too weak to sin, but too good to sin. He would never desire to sin, but if He did (God forbid), then He would be powerful enough to carry it out.

Human nature, as fallen, cannot choose anything spiritually good.

Agreed. But this is a moral inability, not a natural inability. The distinction has to be made, for there are clearly things we are unable to carry out for which we have moral responsibility (e.g. repentance and faith), and there are clearly things we are unable to carry out for which we don't (e.g. flying without technological assistance).

 

[steven-nemes]

Free will is the power or ability to do otherwise than we do in some circumstances. Peter van Inwagen defines it as such in his essay How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.

Compatibilism is the view that this ability is compatible with determinism being true; incompatibilism is the view that this ability is not compatible with determinism being true.

Hard determinists are incompatibilists who believe in determinism. Libertarians are incompatibilists who believe we do have free will and determinism is false. Pessimism about free will is the view that whether or not determinism is true, free will is not possible.

Some people interpret "ability or power to do otherwise than we do" in a counter-factual sense: S could have done otherwise if the conditions prior to his committing that act had been different, for instance. A compatibilist might hold to that kind of power of contrary choice.

Others interpret "ability or power to do otherwise than we do" in a stronger sense: S could have done otherwise than he did, all prior conditions being the same. A libertarian might hold to that kind of power of contrary choice.

I lean towards hard determinism or pessimism about free will.

 

[Confessor]

I lean towards hard determinism or pessimism about free will.

Doesn't hard determinism ipso facto preclude moral responsibility?

 

[steven-nemes]

Only if you assume free will is necessary for moral responsibility.

Which I don't.

Remember, I was speaking of free will, which is a separate issue from moral responsibility, though the two are closely related.

Really, I could've added the semi-compatibilist position to the list, which is the view that whether or not free will is compatible with determinism, moral responsibility is.

I could be a pessimist about free will and still believe in moral responsibility, though this view is probably very rare.

 

[Confessor]

I thought compatibilism referred to the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, not of LFW and determinism -- for the latter two are excluded by definition.

 

[Christusregnat]

Agreed. But this is a moral inability, not a natural inability.

I think you are equivocating with the word natural. Please tell me what do you mean by natural, and then perhaps we can discuss this. God does not have a natural ability to sin, nor a moral ability to sin; He is impeccable.

When we talk about man's nature, we have to talk about it under the fourfold state. Which one do you want to talk about? To blur the four states is to create confusion.

Cheers,

 

[CharlieJ]

Neither?

I thought compatibilism referred to the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, not of LFW and determinism -- for the latter two are excluded by definition.

You are surely correct in your second assertion - LFW and determinism are mutually exclusive concepts. However, I'm not sure you're correct in your first assertion, that compatibilism refers to moral responsibility and determinism. I believe that compatibilism refers to the belief that determinism is compatible with a reasonable definition of free will (although not LFW). Most Reformed, for example, would argue both for determinism and for a concept of free will focusing on freedom from external compulsion.

As you can tell from Steven's post, the discussion has advanced along a number of different lines, not all of which can be placed on a two-dimensional spectrum.

 

[steven-nemes]

Free will is what I defined it to be at the top of my post. That's the definition van Inwagen gives.

Compatibilism is the view that that is compatible with determinism. Semi-compatibilism is the view that whether or not that is compatible with determinism, moral responsibility nonetheless is.

 

[Confessor]

Agreed. But this is a moral inability, not a natural inability.

I think you are equivocating with the word natural. Please tell me what do you mean by natural, and then perhaps we can discuss this. God does not have a natural ability to sin, nor a moral ability to sin; He is impeccable.

When we talk about man's nature, we have to talk about it under the fourfold state. Which one do you want to talk about? To blur the four states is to create confusion.

If one has the capability of performing an action when he wants, then he has a natural ability to carry out that action. That God cannot sin is not a want of power, but a want of evil in Him. If He desired, He could sin, but since He is perfect He will never desire to sin -- thus He has a moral inability to sin.

I am not talking about any particular one of the four states, but if I were to categorize them, I would say that in all four states man has the natural ability to sin: in the first he has the moral ability to sin and not to sin (at various points in time); in the second he has the moral ability to sin, but not to do good; in the third he has the moral ability to sin and not to sin (again, at various points); and in the fourth he has the moral ability to do good, but not to sin.

And, again, among various actions that humans are incapable of performing, there are some for which our inability is punishable, and some for which it is not. Therefore there must be some non-arbitrary distinction between the two. Hence, natural ability and moral ability.

I'm basically just rehashing Jonathan Edwards here, by the way.

 

[Skyler]

I'm pretty sure the definition I gave was the simplest, most succinct, and best answer. I would know, I have a Bachelor's Degree.

You're absolutely right, Joshua. What was I thinking to doubt you?

 

[Marrow Man]

Alister McGrath writes the following paragraph in his book Studies in Doctrine concerning the historical meaning of the term (see my blog post here):

The term “free will” (which is a translation of the Latin liberum arbitrium) is not a biblical term but derives from Stoicism. It was introduced into Western Christianity by the second-century theologian Tertullian, who borrowed this Latin term to translate the Greek word autexousia, which meant something rather different: “responsibility for one’s own actions” is probably the most helpful translation. What Augustine had to do, therefore, was to keep the term “free will” (which during the two centuries since Tertullian had become so well established that its elimination was impossible) but to try and bring its meaning back into line with the teaching of the New Testament, especially that of Paul.

 

[Philip]

I should have mentioned that Edwards makes the distinction I just made.

Natural here is not the theological natural. It means--within one's power. I have a natural ability to walk around my room even if I don't want to do so. I do not have a natural ability to fly around the room even if I want to do so.

 

[MW]

There are some odd statements flying around this thread.

First, God cannot sin. He cannot even be tempted to sin, naturally, morally, or otherwise. He hates sin and is of purer eyes than to behold evil. Perish the thought, whoever suggested the contrary.

Secondly, the discussion is woefully confused between action and the morality of an action. Of course an unregernerate person can choose to do good and abstain from evil so far as actions commanded or forbidden are concerned. Read Paul's account in Philippians 3. But those actions can never be pleasing to God because they are not done for the glory of God or by faith in the righteousness of Jesus Christ.

 

[Confessor]

First, God cannot sin. He cannot even be tempted to sin, naturally, morally, or otherwise. He hates sin and is of purer eyes than to behold evil. Perish the thought, whoever suggested the contrary.

Would you say that this proposition is true? If God desired to sin, He would be powerful enough to carry it out.

I am not advocating for the truthfulness of the antecedent, or even the remote possibility of its truthfulness.

 

[MW]

Would you say that this proposition is true? If God desired to sin, He would be powerful enough to carry it out.

No; it falls into the same category as the "rock too heavy to lift." It is an absurdity. Sin is weakness, not strength.

 

[Confessor]

No; it falls into the same category as the "rock too heavy to lift." It is an absurdity. Sin is weakness, not strength.

Right, but a morally perfect being's capability of sinning is an objective impossibility only because of its moral aspect. Sin is moral weakness, not natural weakness.

 

[JTB]

First, God cannot sin. He cannot even be tempted to sin, naturally, morally, or otherwise. He hates sin and is of purer eyes than to behold evil. Perish the thought, whoever suggested the contrary.

Would you say that this proposition is true? If God desired to sin, He would be powerful enough to carry it out.

I am not advocating for the truthfulness of the antecedent, or even the remote possibility of its truthfulness.

What moral law could God be bound to so as to desire Himself to break it? It seems like the proposition is meaningless because the terms are self-contradictory.

 

[MW]

Right, but a morally perfect being's capability of sinning is an objective impossibility only because of its moral aspect. Sin is moral weakness, not natural weakness.

No; it is natural weakness, if by natural you mean what is ordinarily conveyed by the moral-natural distinction. Just look at the political spectrum. Sin is the easy choice; there is a temporary pleasure in it, even if it is but for a season.

 

[Confessor]

What moral law could God be bound to so as to desire Himself to break it? It seems like the proposition is meaningless because the terms are self-contradictory.

Are you saying that since God is the standard for moral goodness, it would be meaningless to speak of the possibility of His acting apart from that standard?

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 07:59:13 EST-----

Right, but a morally perfect being's capability of sinning is an objective impossibility only because of its moral aspect. Sin is moral weakness, not natural weakness.

No; it is natural weakness, if by natural you mean what is ordinarily conveyed by the moral-natural distinction. Just look at the political spectrum. Sin is the easy choice; there is a temporary pleasure in it, even if it is but for a season.

Well, some sins can be physically grueling to carry out, e.g. a mass murder. It would be physically easier, at least in one case, not to carry that out.

But at any rate, by "natural ability" I mean this: one has the natural ability to carry out an action if he can carry it out when he so desires. Moral ability refers to the actual possession of that desire. (God can never possess a desire to sin; therefore He is morally unable to sin.)