Is classical apologetics Pelagian at root?

[Prufrock]

Ben, I realize I'm jumping unto this dog-pile a little late; and also, I've never participated in an apologetics thread before, so sorry if I'm rehashing something that's been covered ad nauseum: but I think the answer to your question is not a simple yes or no. The best answer I can think of is: It depends on what you're trying to do with it. Questions like this demonstrate the importance of not divorcing apologetics from its larger systematic theological framework. Our faith, while being most reasonable, is not based upon reasonable proofs; the claims regarding God are accepted by faith, and the applicable claims are then confirmed, ratified and supported by reason. Natural theology is important for us, but not as the foundation upon which our faith or belief of God rests. So, if you're using "classical arguments" to either 1.) Affirm one's faith; or, 2.) Demonstrate the reasonability of the faith (within a properly established presuppositional framework, of course) to those outside in defense of the faith, then "classical apologetics" is great. If it is being used in an autonomous manner, such that the conclusion of natural theology is a necessary a priori for faith, then it is being used most improperly, and in some sense could be linked with a form of a Pelagian-style religion.

 

[Confessor]

Why must the apologists goal be to have the atheist repent of his sins? I have always thought that an apologist is defined as someone who defends the faith; but since when should an apologist likewise be an evangelist? Especially when the question of whether or not Christianity is true (like, let's say during a debate on whether abortion is wrong, or God exists, etc.) is irrelevant.

The goal of all Christian apologists is to argue for the truth of Christianity. (We're not talking about mere abortion debates.) Therefore, if one's method of debate were to arrive at a dead end (e.g. when an atheist shrugs his shoulders at the cosmological or moral arguments), or if one's method of debate were to give an unbeliever more fuel for his unbelief (e.g. when he interprets the conclusions of the cosmological and moral arguments in his naturalistic worldview), then that method is clearly wrong. Yet that method is natural theology.

The unbeliever can in fact do either of those, i.e., shrug off the conclusions or interpret them in the context of his worldview. I know of one atheist on an apologetics group who was very intelligent, and he simply said something along the lines of, "It seems extremely unlikely that an infinite being who we can never see and who is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. exists solely because of a couple of phrasings of a few arguments." And he said that in the context of WLC's cosmological and moral arguments. Even if he weren't to brush it aside as sophistry, unbelievers can very easily interpret them in a naturalistic context, saying that a First Cause can easily be the universe itself (after all, we know nothing about what occurred "before" the Big Bang; causality goes haywire at that point) and that man himself can be the Lawgiver -- as is rampant among humanism.

The worst part about natural theology is that it assumes the unbeliever is generally correct in how he interprets the world. Rather than saying that at every juncture of his worldview he is wrong, it reserves the God-arguments for a few parts -- namely, causality and morality -- such that the unbeliever has much less he must ignore in order to remain in his unbelief. By telling the unbeliever that there are only two or so things in his worldview which would make him believe in God, one can make his truth-suppression that much easier.

Of course, classical apologists will always claim that with natural theology they're not proving Christianity, but rather some generic theism; they then proceed to prove Christianity evidentially. But this has manifold problems in itself, as there are an unbelievable amount of historical standards unbelievers will impose on someone if he attempts to prove the resurrection. Seriously, once one allows autonomy, he must submit to autonomous standards. And at that point a resurrection will very rarely be proven. I have encountered this firsthand, when I used to boast how my faith was stilted on historical evidence for the resurrection.

Some facts could be incredibly difficult to interpret through his worldview-filter, like perhaps an overwhelmingly complex and convincing argument for the existence of a necessary being external to the universe, or a very good case for the resurrection and a refutation of all other alternatives. In a situation like that, it could lead him to abandon his naturalistic worldview, like in Antony Flew's case.

This is absolutely true. Van Til often said how unbelievers would go so far as to write the resurrection off to natural causes, but that is simply unlikely. Many unbelievers gladly concede that were the resurrection proved, then Christianity is true.

However, that doesn't stop their Total Depravity from setting in on the entire process to prove the resurrection. As I said above, autonomously imposed standards on a resurrection-evidentialism are seriously impossible to overcome. I can give an example of this if you'd like (I'd just have to find the thread on Facebook).

Blessings.

 

[steven-nemes]

I'm leaving to go camping at the lake soon, but I will respond Ben!

 

[Whitefield]

I do think that classical apologetics has to down-play, if not ignore, total depravity and the noetic effects of sin.

 

[Confessor]

I'm leaving to go camping at the lake soon, but I will respond Ben!

Have fun!

-----Added 5/23/2009 at 02:56:49 EST-----

So, if you're using "classical arguments" to either 1.) Affirm one's faith; or, 2.) Demonstrate the reasonability of the faith (within a properly established presuppositional framework, of course) to those outside in defense of the faith, then "classical apologetics" is great. If it is being used in an autonomous manner, such that the conclusion of natural theology is a necessary a priori for faith, then it is being used most improperly, and in some sense could be linked with a form of a Pelagian-style religion.

Indeed, I would say this is a presuppositional use of the theistic proofs. As long as it is understood that Christians are still rationally justified in accepting Scripture as authoritative (which is the root and foundation of all presuppositionalism), then I don't care. But almost all classical apologists, while indeed recognizing the importance of faith, and that the internal witness of the Spirit is the true foundation of our accepting Scripture; they fail to recognize that the Spirit gives rational support for belief in the Scriptures, instead saying that the theistic proofs or historical evidence are the rational supports.

Therefore, insofar as classical apologetics is not presuppositional -- i.e., insofar as it does not recognize the Christian's rational justification of accepting Scriptural authority -- I would contend that it is Pelagian.

I hope that clarifies things.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation.

And, just as they are culpable for their bad interpretations of special revelation, so others can be culpable for their bad interpretations of general revelation. Nonetheless, special revelation provides the necessary basis for a correct interpretation.

I disagree, natural revelation can be correctly interpreted. It actually has to be correctly interpreted in order to believe the Bible. We do not see our need for redemption because we read it in the Bible. The Bible is not the bad and the good news. It is the good news for the bad news that we already know though general revelation/natural theology.

Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.

Well, I think you might be equivocating on "standard." Logic/coherence/internal consistency/etc. cannot be seen as some type of foundation or basis, but rather as a tool.

I do not have a problem calling it both.

And yes, people would be allowed to test the foundations when I assert the veracity of Christianity. But this does not mean that they should not accept the Gospel message immediately.

Okay.

CT

-----Added 5/23/2009 at 03:59:54 EST-----

Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.

Quite right. Would I be correct in assuming, then, that you either reject foundationalism or embrace a very weak view of it?

I currently think that I have a quite strong version of it actually. I think one can test and be certain of their foundations.

CT

 

[Whitefield]

I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.

 

[cih1355]

I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.

They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.

 

[Confessor]

I disagree, natural revelation can be correctly interpreted. It actually has to be correctly interpreted in order to believe the Bible. We do not see our need for redemption because we read it in the Bible. The Bible is not the bad and the good news. It is the good news for the bad news that we already know though general revelation/natural theology.

A few things:

(1) Yes, natural revelation has to be interpreted correctly in some sense; otherwise there would be no truth to suppress -- for one has to possess the truth in order to suppress it.

(2) Yet, I would contend that the basic information given us by general revelation (i.e., "there is a god, and he will punish our sins") is non-inferential. There is simply no way that the truth-suppression Paul is referring to in Romans 1 is some abstruse philosophical argument -- and, in fact, that one person who has never heard of Christ is unaware of the general outline of the cosmological/moral arguments is enough to disprove the notion that Romans 1 is referring to the cosmological/moral arguments. Otherwise, the absurd number of idols in humanity, and the fact that all humans can be smitten by their consciences, is evidence enough to understand that this knowledge ("there is a god, and he will punish our sins") is non-inferential.

(3) I have never seen a natural theology that provides the "bad news." At the most it can tell us that some Lawgiver exists, but not necessarily that He is Judge.

(4) The fact that natural theology cannot identify the Lawgiver or First Cause is actually quite crucial, for it shows that general revelation, and therefore natural theology, tell us nothing that can further the apologetical case for Christ. If a humanist is convinced that a First Cause and Lawgiver exists, he can then relegate the former to eternal matter pre-Big Bang and the latter to humans themselves. The "generic" things that can be proved from general revelation (i.e., a First Cause and a Lawgiver) are entirely worthless, apologetically speaking. Just as the fact that I ate a sandwich today can be proven from general revelation but only proves God if understood in light of the presupposition of Scripture (e.g. I ate a sandwich that had to be made by Jehovah), so also the conclusion of natural theology only proves God if understood in light of the presupposition of Scripture. I see no value to natural theology when it is not used presuppositionally.

Well, I think you might be equivocating on "standard." Logic/coherence/internal consistency/etc. cannot be seen as some type of foundation or basis, but rather as a tool.

I do not have a problem calling it both.

How can mere internal consistency be a foundation? What propositional content can be contained in the category of "internal consistency"?

I have a feeling we might be close to discussing our different views on foundationalism.

-----Added 5/23/2009 at 06:29:45 EST-----

I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.

They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.

Yeah, this is basically it. Norman Geisler's and Frank Turek's I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist essentially follows the format of (a) prove theism via natural theology; (b) after reducing the options to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (which, by the way, is a false trichotomy given (a) but is not that crucial), prove Christianity via historical evidences.

 

[Whitefield]

I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.

They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.

I know this is what they try to prove. I didn't ask what they try to prove, but what can they prove (e.g., to the unregenerate and unbeliever)? For instance the ontological argument begins with a fundamental assumption, and if the listener (e.g., Kant, "existence is not a property of an object") doesn't accept that fundamental argument the entire "proof" falls the floor. The cosmological falters before the question "who caused God?" (since the first premise in the cosmological argument is "Everything that exists has a cause of its existence.") The teleological must assume design in everything, but is unsure of how to answer the challenge, "why do you assume order constitutes design?" The moral argument, the argument from religious experience, and the argument from miracles are so subjective that they carry no real weight in proving the objective. I find it difficult to believe that any of these arguments can be persuasive given human total depravity and the noetic effects of sin.

 

[steven-nemes]

The goal of all Christian apologists is to argue for the truth of Christianity. (We're not talking about mere abortion debates.) Therefore, if one's method of debate were to arrive at a dead end (e.g. when an atheist shrugs his shoulders at the cosmological or moral arguments), or if one's method of debate were to give an unbeliever more fuel for his unbelief (e.g. when he interprets the conclusions of the cosmological and moral arguments in his naturalistic worldview), then that method is clearly wrong. Yet that method is natural theology.

It is, I think, very difficult to interpret the cosmological and moral arguments (as William Lane Crag presents them, for example) within a naturalistic framework. I think they would incline a person away from naturalism. But even if they could be, and the unbeliever simply shrugs his shoulders and says, 'whatever'--so what? Is the apologist's job to get the unbeliever to get on his knees at that moment and pray for forgiveness? Clearly not, I should think; that sort of thing would be utterly impossible for mere argumentation to accomplish (which you would agree with), even if the method is supposedly biblical or not. I think it possible that the unbeliever could give the same indifferent response to a presuppositionalist's arguments as well. "So what if I can't account for logic/morality/whatever. Who cares. Your word games don't prove a thing."

The worst part about natural theology is that it assumes the unbeliever is generally correct in how he interprets the world. Rather than saying that at every juncture of his worldview he is wrong, it reserves the God-arguments for a few parts -- namely, causality and morality -- such that the unbeliever has much less he must ignore in order to remain in his unbelief. By telling the unbeliever that there are only two or so things in his worldview which would make him believe in God, one can make his truth-suppression that much easier.

I think the Bible even says that unbeleivers are correct in some of their interpretations of reality--the moral sense that even the most evil of unbelievers have, for example, or their acceptance that nature is indeed grand and wonderful rather than bland and uninteresting. Working from what generally is accepted by unbelievers to theistic conclusions is what natural theology sets out to do, and clearly there are some things that unbelievers perceive correctly, lest an unbeliever literally not have any true beliefs at all, which is nonsense.

Of course, classical apologists will always claim that with natural theology they're not proving Christianity, but rather some generic theism; they then proceed to prove Christianity evidentially. But this has manifold problems in itself, as there are an unbelievable amount of historical standards unbelievers will impose on someone if he attempts to prove the resurrection. Seriously, once one allows autonomy, he must submit to autonomous standards. And at that point a resurrection will very rarely be proven. I have encountered this firsthand, when I used to boast how my faith was stilted on historical evidence for the resurrection.

James White has pointed out in debate (I think) that the standards of judgment applied to resurrection evidence or New Testament document reliability, etc., often times would lead to the conclusion that almost nothing at all is known about the earliest times, which not a conclusion too many are willing to accept. That their arbitrary standards lead to nearly no knowledge is not a problem for the theist who was unable to prove the resurrection by them--it is a problem for the unbeliever who is being unreasonable and is denying any historical knowledge at all.

 

[Whitefield]

I think the Bible even says that unbeleivers are correct in some of their interpretations of reality--the moral sense that even the most evil of unbelievers have, for example, or their acceptance that nature is indeed grand and wonderful rather than bland and uninteresting. Working from what generally is accepted by unbelievers to theistic conclusions is what natural theology sets out to do, and clearly there are some things that unbelievers perceive correctly, lest an unbeliever literally not have any true beliefs at all, which is nonsense.

What (correct) theistic conclusions can the unbeliever come to?
What truth is derived from perceptions, even correct perceptions?
What true beliefs does the unbeliever have?

 

[Confessor]

It is, I think, very difficult to interpret the cosmological and moral arguments (as William Lane Crag presents them, for example) within a naturalistic framework. I think they would incline a person away from naturalism. But even if they could be, and the unbeliever simply shrugs his shoulders and says, 'whatever'--so what? Is the apologist's job to get the unbeliever to get on his knees at that moment and pray for forgiveness? Clearly not, I should think; that sort of thing would be utterly impossible for mere argumentation to accomplish (which you would agree with), even if the method is supposedly biblical or not. I think it possible that the unbeliever could give the same indifferent response to a presuppositionalist's arguments as well. "So what if I can't account for logic/morality/whatever. Who cares. Your word games don't prove a thing."

My point about the atheist's shrugging off natural theology is that it only confronts the unbeliever on a limited number of points. Rather than telling him that his entire philosophy is wrong, since he assumes his own prerogative to interpret reality without any assistance from God, natural theology tells him that a couple facts of his worldview -- namely, causality and morality -- supposedly entail the existence of an infinite invisible Being. This is hardly convincing, hence the response, "That's just a word game." Presup, on the other hand, stresses the ubiquitous errors of unbelief, which requires a total change in worldview, based on manifold irreconcilable inconsistencies with (usually) a secular humanist outlook.

Otherwise, I would maintain my point that the contentions of natural theology can very easily be interpreted in a naturalistic framework. The First Cause of the cosmological argument can be discerned to be matter itself: "before" the Big Bang, no time existed, and an infinitesimally dense ball of matter was all that existed, or so goes secularist mythology. Causality has gone nuts, since no time exists. Otherwise, have you seen the amount of atheistic literature about explanations for this? A multiverse, string theory, it goes on and on. As for the moral argument, secularists love to point to an evolutionary view on the subject.

The problem with natural theology is that its results are far too generic and malleable, allowing unbelievers to conform them perfectly to their own worldview -- which is exactly what has happened.

I think the Bible even says that unbeleivers are correct in some of their interpretations of reality--the moral sense that even the most evil of unbelievers have, for example, or their acceptance that nature is indeed grand and wonderful rather than bland and uninteresting. Working from what generally is accepted by unbelievers to theistic conclusions is what natural theology sets out to do, and clearly there are some things that unbelievers perceive correctly, lest an unbeliever literally not have any true beliefs at all, which is nonsense.

When I said that natural theology assumes the unbeliever is generally correct in his worldview, I was referring to his espoused worldview. For instance, they would know that some actions are wrong, but they would somehow try to explain it on evolutionary terms; and they would view the grandioseness of nature to be something other than the work of God. I would contend that unbelievers do have some knowledge, and they do have some correct interpretations of reality -- but only because of blessed inconsistency.

James White has pointed out in debate (I think) that the standards of judgment applied to resurrection evidence or New Testament document reliability, etc., often times would lead to the conclusion that almost nothing at all is known about the earliest times, which not a conclusion too many are willing to accept. That their arbitrary standards lead to nearly no knowledge is not a problem for the theist who was unable to prove the resurrection by them--it is a problem for the unbeliever who is being unreasonable and is denying any historical knowledge at all.

First, I don't think unbelievers would be unwilling to create a historical skepticism to protect their unbelief if in fact the standards they create are unfair. Second, the criteria that I have seen have a nasty penchant to apply only to what I am trying to demonstrate (i.e., the historicity of the Gospels) -- for instance, the application of "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" to prove miracles.

In fact, I think it's safe to say that the anti-miraculous view of secularism is what creates all the outrageous standards they impose. And, sadly, as long as secularism is not challenged presuppositionally, they are entirely within their epistemic rights to hold those stringent standards.

 

[Whitefield]

When I said that natural theology assumes the unbeliever is generally correct in his worldview, I was referring to his espoused worldview. For instance, they would know that some actions are wrong, but they would somehow try to explain it on evolutionary terms; and they would view the grandioseness of nature to be something other than the work of God. I would contend that unbelievers do have some knowledge, and they do have some correct interpretations of reality -- but only because of blessed inconsistency.

Yes, a broken clock is correct twice a day, but it doesn't know when that is.

 

[mgeoffriau]

How does a believer communicate intelligibly with an unbeliever, if their worldviews have no common ground? Don't words and propositions constructed of words rely on one's worldview for meaning?

Doesn't the fact that the believer can challenge the underpinnings of the unbeliever's worldview imply that in fact there is some common ground which allows for intelligible communication?

 

[Confessor]

How does a believer communicate intelligibly with an unbeliever, if their worldviews have no common ground? Don't words and propositions constructed of words rely on one's worldview for meaning?

Doesn't the fact that the believer can challenge the underpinnings of the unbeliever's worldview imply that in fact there is some common ground which allows for intelligible communication?

The reason we can communicate is because of blessed inconsistency. Although there is absolutely no common ground in our espoused worldviews (i.e., if the logical implications are drawn out fully for each), there absolutely is common ground in our practiced worldviews; for the unbeliever must borrow from Christian principles to have knowledge and speak intelligibly. In fact, pointing out this worldview-theft to the unbeliever is the goal of Van Tillian presuppositionalism.

...or so the argument goes. I'm a novice at demonstrating this adequately. I've got more reading to do.

But if nothing else, hopefully I have demonstrated that presuppositionalism is not inconsistent in speaking of the impossibility of common ground.

 

[mgeoffriau]

Doesn't language and communication require interpretive activity? How is the unbeliever able to converse with the believer at all? The believer is communicating via propositional truth -- how does the unbeliever "receive" these statements without first filtering them through his interpretive grid?

In other words, why is the unbeliever not going to use his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the transcendental argument just as he uses his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the classical arguments?

 

[Confessor]

In other words, why is the unbeliever not going to use his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the transcendental argument just as he uses his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the classical arguments?

Because with the latter, he is able to interpret it through the scope of his presupposition (e.g. a secularist saying that the First Cause could be matter itself), whereas with the former, his presupposition is itself being attacked and his depravity unmasked.

Also, to address the first half of your post, I would say that unbelievers can intelligibly use language in spite, not because, of their presuppositions.

 

[Brian Withnell]

In response to the OP ...

One thing that is somewhat difficult for the classical apologist is that if there is logic, there are axioms upon which the system of logic is built. (This is from a formal logic perspective ... without a base, that is a set of axioms, you cannot make any deductions.) So in a very real sense, even classical apologetics is presuppositional at the base. There have to be some set of things that are accepted as true without proof, or you cannot prove anything. (Leave it to a mathematician to see things in pure logical terms!)

So the main difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics appears to be that the presuppositional apologist sees the axioms more clearly, and is much more open to stating the axioms up front.

 

[Confessor]

In response to the OP ...

One thing that is somewhat difficult for the classical apologist is that if there is logic, there are axioms upon which the system of logic is built. (This is from a formal logic perspective ... without a base, that is a set of axioms, you cannot make any deductions.) So in a very real sense, even classical apologetics is presuppositional at the base. There have to be some set of things that are accepted as true without proof, or you cannot prove anything. (Leave it to a mathematician to see things in pure logical terms!)

So the main difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics appears to be that the presuppositional apologist sees the axioms more clearly, and is much more open to stating the axioms up front.

Well, the bases don't necessarily have to be axioms; the premises could be any properly basic beliefs, e.g. "A computer is in front of me presently."

But now we're getting into foundationalism, since we will probably have to discuss what can be allowed as properly basic...shall we continue?

By the way, I like the quote in your signature.

 

[Brian Withnell]

In response to the OP ...

One thing that is somewhat difficult for the classical apologist is that if there is logic, there are axioms upon which the system of logic is built. (This is from a formal logic perspective ... without a base, that is a set of axioms, you cannot make any deductions.) So in a very real sense, even classical apologetics is presuppositional at the base. There have to be some set of things that are accepted as true without proof, or you cannot prove anything. (Leave it to a mathematician to see things in pure logical terms!)

So the main difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics appears to be that the presuppositional apologist sees the axioms more clearly, and is much more open to stating the axioms up front.

Well, the bases don't necessarily have to be axioms; the premises could be any properly basic beliefs, e.g. "A computer is in front of me presently."

Every premise has a basic axiom at its foundation (the computer in front of you is not a figment ... so you extend a system of thought based on evidence of the physical world being "real" and so your statement of the computer is valid.)

But now we're getting into foundationalism, since we will probably have to discuss what can be allowed as properly basic...shall we continue?

By the way, I like the quote in your signature.

Hmmm... I didn't know that my signature line was a quote, though I suppose it could be very close to something someone else has said. I said something akin to it when I was in the midst of my first beloved wife dying of cancer. It was years long. During that time, I could hardly read a Bible, and prayer was mostly crying to the God that was in control without any words that would form. I had been "training for war" long before that particular battle started. The fact that I could only keep focused for a very short time was the battle. I was living on trust in God that I had developed over years of preparing. I had not known the purpose of the preparation, but I was grateful that God had given me grace to prepare before need it.

If there is a quote that is similar, please direct me to it. I would LOVE to know the person that thinks the same way I do.

 

[Whitefield]

Doesn't language and communication require interpretive activity? How is the unbeliever able to converse with the believer at all? The believer is communicating via propositional truth -- how does the unbeliever "receive" these statements without first filtering them through his interpretive grid?

In other words, why is the unbeliever not going to use his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the transcendental argument just as he uses his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the classical arguments?

If he does reject it, then he is left in stark contradiction. He would be using logic to deny logic. The purpose of presuppositionalism (cf. the Bahnsen/Stein debate) is to reveal that without borrowing from the Christian explanation for logic, he has no explanation for it. This is similar to the one who says, "There is a no absolute truth." That statement is an absolute truth statement that there is no absolute truth. Presuppositionalism does not try to reason with the unbeliever to achieve some intermediate and agreed upon conclusions, as classical apologetics attempts, but declares that the unbeliever at the very beginning cannot even get out of the "starting blocks" without using the very thing he denies.

(Van Til uses the image of the little girl he once saw on a train who was sitting on her father's lap. She slaps him in defiance, not realizing that if she hadn't been on his lap she couldn't have slapped him.)

 

[snap_dragon]

Just the thread I was looking for as I wade somewhat confusedly through the Bahnsen books I ordered. Thanks to all for the learned responses...and to Confessor for a great thread.

(sorry for interruption...we now bring you back to the program...)

 

[mgeoffriau]

If he does reject it, then he is left in stark contradiction. He would be using logic to deny logic. The purpose of presuppositionalism (cf. the Bahnsen/Stein debate) is to reveal that without borrowing from the Christian explanation for logic, he has no explanation for it. This is similar to the one who says, "There is a no absolute truth." That statement is an absolute truth statement that there is no absolute truth. Presuppositionalism does not try to reason with the unbeliever to achieve some intermediate and agreed upon conclusions, as classical apologetics attempts, but declares that the unbeliever at the very beginning cannot even get out of the "starting blocks" without using the very thing he denies.

(Van Til uses the image of the little girl he once saw on a train who was sitting on her father's lap. She slaps him in defiance, not realizing that if she hadn't been on his lap she couldn't have slapped him.)

I think the question remains -- how is the unbeliever able to understand these arguments without filtering them through his interpretive grid? Van Til wants to deny the classical apologist the common ground on which to reason with the unbeliever, but he readily accepts common ground of language, logic, and intelligibility in order to communicate his transcendental argument to the unbeliever.

 

[Whitefield]

If he does reject it, then he is left in stark contradiction. He would be using logic to deny logic. The purpose of presuppositionalism (cf. the Bahnsen/Stein debate) is to reveal that without borrowing from the Christian explanation for logic, he has no explanation for it. This is similar to the one who says, "There is a no absolute truth." That statement is an absolute truth statement that there is no absolute truth. Presuppositionalism does not try to reason with the unbeliever to achieve some intermediate and agreed upon conclusions, as classical apologetics attempts, but declares that the unbeliever at the very beginning cannot even get out of the "starting blocks" without using the very thing he denies.

(Van Til uses the image of the little girl he once saw on a train who was sitting on her father's lap. She slaps him in defiance, not realizing that if she hadn't been on his lap she couldn't have slapped him.)

I think the question remains -- how is the unbeliever able to understand these arguments without filtering them through his interpretive grid? Van Til wants to deny the classical apologist the common ground on which to reason with the unbeliever, but he readily accepts common ground of language, logic, and intelligibility in order to communicate his transcendental argument to the unbeliever.

And Van Til, when the unbeliever nods that he can understand the language, logic, and intelligibility, immediately declares the unbeliever a thief if he does not immediately attribute those abilities to the Christian God.

 

[mgeoffriau]

And Van Til, when the unbeliever nods that he can understand the language, logic, and intelligibility, immediately declares the unbeliever a thief if he does not immediately attribute those abilities to the Christian God.

So then, we are in agreement that the unbeliever can reason rightly in limited and specific instances?

 

[Beth Ellen Nagle]

I think the question remains -- how is the unbeliever able to understand these arguments without filtering them through his interpretive grid? Van Til wants to deny the classical apologist the common ground on which to reason with the unbeliever, but he readily accepts common ground of language, logic, and intelligibility in order to communicate his transcendental argument to the unbeliever.

Exactly.

 

[Whitefield]

And Van Til, when the unbeliever nods that he can understand the language, logic, and intelligibility, immediately declares the unbeliever a thief if he does not immediately attribute those abilities to the Christian God.

So then, we are in agreement that the unbeliever can reason rightly in limited and specific instances?

Well, now you insert a new twist. I think Van Til and Clark (and their descendants) would agree that the unbeliever can reason, but I doubt they would agree that then can reason rightly. The noetic effects of sin have knocked reason off its proper base. There is a difference between just launching a rocket and launching a rocket rightly. The fact that the rocket lifts off the ground one can say it launched, but that it flew west instead of east one would not say it launched correctly (rightly).

 

[mgeoffriau]

Fair point, let me rephrase more specifically:

Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?

 

[Whitefield]

Fair point, let me rephrase more specifically:

Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?

I'm not a Van Tilian expert, but I think both Van Til and Clark would question the use of the word fact without clear definition. It seems to me that both deny there are "independent facts" which the unaided mind can determine to be true.

If by fact you mean that which can be determined to be true, then I think, and definitely I could be wrong on this, that Van Til and Clark begin with the presupposition that Jesus Christ is the truth, and any reasoning which does not begin with that presupposition is doomed to error and failure when trying to determine what is true.