Is classical apologetics Pelagian at root?

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Confessor

Puritan Board Senior
When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.

Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.

What do you all think?
 
When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.

Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.

What do you all think?

I think you are wrong :)

If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.

Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.

CT
 
When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.

Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.

What do you all think?

I think you are wrong :)

If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.

Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.

CT

Of course, the difference between a Christian presupposing the Bible to be true, as opposed to, say, a Muslim presupposing the Qur'an to be true is that the Bible is actually true.

My question to Ben would be: What role does the Holy Spirit play in apologetics? Have you thought about that question? It will dramatically effect everything else related to this field.
 
I think you are wrong :)

If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.

Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.

CT

Thank you for your honesty. :D

I dispute that it would be a rejection of general revelation, and frankly I don't mind rejecting natural theology (I assume you mean in the Thomistic tradition). I would rather contend that presuppositionalism is a rejection of the idea that man's interpretation of reality is for the most part permissible, i.e., that it does not need to first submit to God's interpretation of reality (God says that we are totally depraved, etc.). So, presuppositionalism would be a rejection of general revelation only if we presuppose that man can in fact correctly understand general revelation, which should be denied given the terrible misinterpretations of general revelation by unbelievers, e.g. evolutionism.

If some other religion tried the same thing, I would test their foundations, analyzing the coherency of the worldview set forth. Therefore I would in fact use logic, as you suggested. But using logic doesn't equate an acceptance of classical apologetics.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 04:23:56 EST-----

My question to Ben would be: What role does the Holy Spirit play in apologetics? Have you thought about that question? It will dramatically effect everything else related to this field.

As regards this thread, I would say that the (or rather, a) role the Holy Spirit plays in apologetics is in transforming the unbeliever, who used to believe in man's authoritative interpretation of reality (autonomy), to a believer who now believes in the preeminence of God's authoritative interpretation of reality (theonomy/Scripture).

That is, the change from autonomy to theonomy is wrought by the Holy Spirit. That is His role.
 
I think you are wrong :)

If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.

Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.

CT

Thank you for your honesty. :D

I dispute that it would be a rejection of general revelation, and frankly I don't mind rejecting natural theology (I assume you mean in the Thomistic tradition). I would rather contend that presuppositionalism is a rejection of the idea that man's interpretation of reality is for the most part permissible, i.e., that it does not need to first submit to God's interpretation of reality (God says that we are totally depraved, etc.). So, presuppositionalism would be a rejection of general revelation only if we presuppose that man can in fact correctly understand general revelation, which should be denied given the terrible misinterpretations of general revelation by unbelievers, e.g. evolutionism.

But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.

Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation.

If some other religion tried the same thing, I would test their foundations, analyzing the coherency of the worldview set forth. Therefore I would in fact use logic, as you suggested. But using logic doesn't equate an acceptance of classical apologetics.

Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.

CT
 
But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.

This is a good point. I should have clarified that this a moral inability and not a natural one. That is, man when left to his own devices will purposely distort and misinterpret reality from how he knows it should be interpreted.

Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation.

And, just as they are culpable for their bad interpretations of special revelation, so others can be culpable for their bad interpretations of general revelation. Nonetheless, special revelation provides the necessary basis for a correct interpretation.

Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.

Well, I think you might be equivocating on "standard." Logic/coherence/internal consistency/etc. cannot be seen as some type of foundation or basis, but rather as a tool.

And yes, people would be allowed to test the foundations when I assert the veracity of Christianity. But this does not mean that they should not accept the Gospel message immediately.
 
Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.

Quite right. Would I be correct in assuming, then, that you either reject foundationalism or embrace a very weak view of it?


By the way, Ben, Thomas Aquinas never appealed to any kind of autonomous reason to prove Christianity. His Five Ways are better regarded as a posteriori demonstrations of the coherence of Christian theology with the natural world. In that framework, they serve rather nicely.

For a study on how Cartesian Christians reworked earlier apologetics into a form of "evidentialism," I would recommend Alister McGrath's A Scientific Theology, Volume 1.
 
Does presenting a logical argument for the existence of a timeless, immaterial, powerful causer of the universe assume that a person and their reasoning faculties, etc., are unaffected by sin?

I fail to see where...
 
By the way, Ben, Thomas Aquinas never appealed to any kind of autonomous reason to prove Christianity. His Five Ways are better regarded as a posteriori demonstrations of the coherence of Christian theology with the natural world. In that framework, they serve rather nicely.

Thomas did have some things to say about the importance and validity of accepting Biblical statements on faith, but all of this was ultimately based on some evidentialism: fulfilled prophecy, evidence of miracles, and, of course, the Five Ways.

And frankly, if the Five Ways were used only to demonstrate that Christianity is consistent with certain facts of the world, I don't care at all. But classical apologetics always utilizes them in a sense that they try to prove from the ground up Christian doctrine.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 05:13:40 EST-----

Does presenting a logical argument for the existence of a timeless, immaterial, powerful causer of the universe assume that a person and their reasoning faculties, etc., are unaffected by sin?

I fail to see where...

Such a proof, assuming it is logically cogent, would tell us nothing of the authority of the Scriptures and its role in telling us how things are. Such a proof would basically say, "Now, upon looking around the world, we have established that a timeless etc. first cause exists; go on living your lives," without pointing to the need of repenting and believing.

In retrospect, I should also have pointed out that I believe the autonomy of secular philosophy in general presupposes Pelagianism, and since some of this Enlightenment thinking is maintained by classical apologists, they also retain some latent Pelagianism.
 
Such a proof, assuming it is logically cogent, would tell us nothing of the authority of the Scriptures and its role in telling us how things are. Such a proof would basically say, "Now, upon looking around the world, we have established that a timeless etc. first cause exists; go on living your lives," without pointing to the need of repenting and believing.

Let's say natural theologian X is attending a debate or having a discussion with an atheist. Is it necessary for him to even bring up the importance of repentance, etc? I should think not; the question is firstly where there is even a god to obey; the question of repentance from sin and such seems irrelevent.
 
On the OP,

Yes, it is semi-pelagian in method or approach.

CT,

Three quick points:

Men are rendered "without excuse" because the suppress the truth in unrighteousness. The fall affected the whole of man. It is not because the evidence isn't there. God has manifested his attributes in them and to them. But the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God’s law; indeed, it cannot. And the natural person does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned.

Secondly, our point of contact is that we both live in God's world, not that we agree on anything whatsoever. Any non-Christian view of the world will either be internally inconsistent or externally inapplicable. I wouldn't cry foul. I'd point out their inconsistency to the best of my ability, and show them that the Christian worldview accounts for the world as it is.

Thirdly, if you reject a presuppositional approach, how will you move from a 'god' who is subject to human reason to the God of the scriptures who grounds it? Once you bring 'god' before the bar of human reason -- to determine whether or not he is possible or probable, you have already given up your case for the God of the scriptures.
 
I see the evangelists (speaking of the Gospel writers) and the apostles using classical apologetics in places, so....
 
"But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.

Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation."

General revelation is non-propositional and does not require 'interpretation' per se. If you encounter a german sentence, say Ich bin you would not be confronted with the duty of affirming or denying it, unless you understood its propositional content. But you would come away with the awareness that some intelligent being had been at work.
 
But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.

This is a good point. I should have clarified that this a moral inability and not a natural one. That is, man when left to his own devices will purposely distort and misinterpret reality from how he knows it should be interpreted.

I want to clarify this. First, it is obvious that people who have not heard the Gospel have no ability at all to understand the world in Christian terms, for instance, Aristotle. For people such as he, they are still without excuse because there is a Creator-Judge who will punish their sins, and they know it, per Romans 1; but they are not punished for (e.g.) denying Total Depravity, because it was completely outside of their power to do so. But for someone who has heard the Gospel, e.g. an unbelieving American philosopher, he is even more culpable for constructing a philosophy contrary to the Gospel of Christ.

Therefore, everybody is certainly unable, in a sense that would remove moral responsibility, to construct a Biblical philosophy and worldview -- if they have not heard the Gospel. But yet, everyone is still without excuse because general revelation clearly attests to God qua Creator-Judge.

However, what I was saying is that any proofs of a Creator-Judge (e.g. the cosmological and moral arguments for the existence of God) necessarily fall short of bringing people to repentance. And if apologetics is incapable of that, then it is failing in its purpose of silencing the unbeliever. Such apologetics would tell the unbeliever that he is generally right in his worldview, because honestly those arguments prove next to nothing. (E.g. a secular humanist can view man as the "divine" Lawgiver and matter itself as the First Cause.)

Lastly, to get to the point -- that man is unable to interpret reality rightly -- to what I am referring is that humans, even when we have the Bible in our possession, which contains a complete world-and-life-view, we still have a rebellious tendency to prefer to interpret life according to our own limited perspective. This is both sinful (because it neglects God's Word) and stupid (because such a method cannot interpret reality correctly). And, as I said in the OP, it is Pelagian, for it believes that man is capable of interpreting reality correctly, objectively, without sinful bias.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 06:34:09 EST-----

Let's say natural theologian X is attending a debate or having a discussion with an atheist. Is it necessary for him to even bring up the importance of repentance, etc? I should think not; the question is firstly where there is even a god to obey; the question of repentance from sin and such seems irrelevent.

Well, in this case, the apologist is trying to use a piecemeal method wherein the apologist's ultimate goal (I hope) is that the atheist see the error of his ways and repent. And in doing so, the apologist will never arrive near his destination, because such a method cannot prove Biblical authority. Instead, whatever he proves will easily be interpreted within the context of the unbeliever's worldview and push him to continue in his unbelief -- because he is generally fit to interpret the world as he desires, i.e. Pelagianism.

In other words, inasmuch as apologetics is a battle between two completely opposing worldviews and not an innocent "let's see where the facts lead" approach, yes, repentance is very relevant.
 
I was serious with my little post above, but it always seems that crickets enter the room whenever that statement is presented.

There is room both for a presuppositional and a classical approach at different times. They do not have to be exclusive of each other, but far, far too often, Van Til lovers try and throw down the gauntlet (as was done in a round about manner in the OP) by attempting to gain some sort of moral high-ground in discrediting the theology behind other approaches. This is foolish.

If you thoughtfully read Luke-Acts in light of their opening statements you will see that both of those writings are basically one big evidentialist approach per - Luke in producing an extended account for the evidence of Christ's deity and work, and Acts in producing an furtherance of that account that also incorporates the validation of the works of the Holy Spirit.

As well, the opening of 1 John uses evidentialist techniques in that they don't just say "thus sayeth the Lord!", but bring personal and eyewitness materials to bear regarding the authentication of that message.

It is really unhelpful to try and pit either against the other (and I use both) as if there is some sort of theological deficiency underlying our Christian brothers who may engage in a method different from our own. And although I greatly respect much about Van Til and his method, it too often seems that the greatest sinners in that regard are from the presuppositional exclusivist camp.

My :2cents:
 
I was serious with my little post above, but it always seems that crickets enter the room whenever that statement is presented.

There is room both for a presuppositional and a classical approach at different times. They do not have to be exclusive of each other, but far, far too often, Van Til lovers try and throw down the gauntlet (as was done in a round about manner in the OP) by attempting to gain some sort of moral high-ground in discrediting the theology behind other approaches. This is foolish.

If you thoughtfully read Luke-Acts in light of their opening statements you will see that both of those writings are basically one big evidentialist approach per - Luke in producing an extended account for the evidence of Christ's deity and work, and Acts in producing an furtherance of that account that also incorporates the validation of the works of the Holy Spirit.

As well, the opening of 1 John uses evidentialist techniques in that they don't just say "thus sayeth the Lord!", but bring personal and eyewitness materials to bear regarding the authentication of that message.

It is really unhelpful to try and pit either against the other (and I use both) as if there is some sort of theological deficiency underlying our Christian brothers who may engage in a method different from our own. And although I greatly respect much about Van Til and his method, it too often seems that the greatest sinners in that regard are from the presuppositional exclusivist camp.

My :2cents:

I think some of this thought of apologetical pluralism stems somewhat from a desire for unity more than a concise understanding of terms.

Presuppositionalists do not eschew evidences. But we do eschew evidences that claim to prove God from a neutral framework, "from the ground up," piecemeal. I would contend that presuppositionalism puts evidence in its proper perspective.

So, if you would, please instantiate the verses where a classical apologetic is utilized, and I can show you what I mean or be rebuked.

Also -- and this is extremely important -- the fact that the Gospels describe a time prior to the close of the canon is immensely significant. I will elaborate on this when I reply to whatever verses you provide.
 
If it's a moral inability and not a natural inability, then what is the purpose of describing it as sin's effect upon reasoning rather than describing it as sin's effect upon the will which wields reasoning to its own desires?

In other words, when my hands do evil things, I don't see the need to claim that sin has actually tainted my fingers and palms and nails. The actions of my hands are bound to my will, and therefore I commit sinful acts with my hands because my will is sinful. Why complicate the issue simply because we are talking about mental actions rather than physical actions? My will is sinful; therefore, it wields my ability to reason in a sinful way and perverts my natural ability to do good through my reasoning, just as my sinful will perverts my natural ability to do good with my hands.

Otherwise, I don't see how one can avoid the necessity of claiming that ALL natural capacities are individually perverted and tainted by sin, rather than the much simpler view that the will is sinful and wields those natural capacities to accomplish its sinful desires.
 
Classical Apologetics might be said to be Semi-Pelagian if they assert that man, in his fallen condition, can be fruitful in his knowledge of the Creator from the things created.

Reformed theology maintains that the light of nature leaves men without excuse for worshipping God as He is revealed from Creation. Nevertheless, even as the Scriptures are explicitly that men are universally without excuse because the heavens and the earth declare the majesty of God but they also, without exception, suppress that knowledge and gain no fruition from it.

Notice how Aquinas essentially asserts that man, with unaided human reason, can attain to a great deal of knowledge and that Scripture only fills in the gaps with respect to things concerning salvation. I believe he underestimates the extent of the Fall on human reason:
Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

Objection 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science---even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.

I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Is. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.

Calvin writes in Book 1, Chapter 4
Section 1. The knowledge of God suppressed by ignorance, many falling away into superstition. Such persons, however, inexcusable, because their error is accompanied with pride and stubbornness.

But though experience testifies that a seed of religion is divinely sown in all, scarcely one in a hundred is found who cherishes it in his heart, and not one in whom it grows to maturity so far is it from yielding fruit in its season. Moreover, while some lose themselves in superstitious observances, and others, of set purpose, wickedly revolt from God, the result is, that, in reward to the true knowledge of him, all are so degenerate, that in no part of the world can genuine godliness be found. In saying that some fall away into superstition, I mean not to insinuate that their excessive absurdity frees them from guilt; for the blindness under which they labour is almost invariably accompanied with vain pride and stubbornness. Mingled vanity and pride appear in this, that when miserable men do seek after God, instead of ascending higher than themselves as they ought to do, they measure him by their own carnal stupidity, and neglecting solid inquiry, fly off to indulge their curiosity in vain speculation. Hence, they do not conceive of him in the character in which he is manifested, but imagine him to be whatever their own rashness has devised. This abyss standing open, they cannot move one footstep without rushing headlong to destruction. With such an idea of God, nothing which they may attempt to offer in the way of worship or obedience can have any value in his sight, because it is not him they worship, but, instead of him, the dream and figment of their own heart. This corrupt procedure is admirably described by Paul, when he says, that "thinking to be wise, they became fools" (Rom 1: 22) He had previously said that "they became vain in their imaginations," but lest any should suppose them blameless, he afterwards adds that they were deservedly blinded, because, not contented with sober inquiry, because, arrogating to themselves more than they have any title to do, they of their own accord court darkness, nay, bewitch themselves with perverse, empty show. Hence it is that their folly, the result not only of vain curiosity, but of licentious desire and overweening confidence in the pursuit of forbidden knowledge, cannot be excused.

Section 2. Stubbornness the companion of impiety.

The expression of David, (Psa 14: 1, 53: 1) "The fool has said in his heart, There is no God," is primarily applied to those who, as will shortly farther appear, stifle the light of nature, and intentionally stupefy themselves. We see many, after they have become hardened in a daring course of sin, madly banishing all remembrance of God, though spontaneously suggested to them from within, by natural sense. To show how detestable this madness is, the Psalmist introduces them as distinctly denying that there is a God, because although they do not disown his essence, they rob him of his justice and providence, and represent him as sitting idly in heaven. Nothing being less accordant with the nature of God than to cast off the government of the world, leaving it to chance, and so to wink at the crimes of men that they may wanton with impunity in evil courses; it follows, that every man who indulges in security, after extinguishing all fear of divine judgment, virtually denies that there is a God. As a just punishment of the wicked, after they have closed their own eyes, God makes their hearts dull and heavy, and hence, seeing, they see not. David, indeed, is the best interpreter of his own meaning, when he says elsewhere, the wicked has "no fear of God before his eyes," (Psa 36: 1) and, again, "He has said in his heart, God has forgotten; he hideth his face; he will never see it." Thus although they are forced to acknowledge that there is some God, they, however, rob him of his glory by denying his power. For, as Paul declares, "If we believe not, he abideth faithful, he cannot deny himself," (2Ti 2: 13) so those who feign to themselves a dead and dumb idol, are truly said to deny God. It is, moreover, to be observed, that though they struggle with their own convictions, and would fain not only banish God from their minds, but from heaven also, their stupefaction is never so complete as to secure them from being occasionally dragged before the divine tribunal. Still, as no fear restrains them from rushing violently in the face of God, so long as they are hurried on by that blind impulse, it cannot be denied that their prevailing state of mind in regard to him is brutish oblivion.

Section 3. No pretext can justify superstition. This proved, first, from reason; and, secondly, from Scripture.

In this way, the vain pretext which many employ to clothe their superstition is overthrown. They deem it enough that they have some kind of zeal for religion, how preposterous soever it may be, not observing that true religion must be conformable to the will of God as its unerring standard; that he can never deny himself, and is no spectra or phantom, to be metamorphosed at each individual's caprice. It is easy to see how superstition, with its false glosses, mocks God, while it tries to please him. Usually fastening merely on things on which he has declared he sets no value, it either contemptuously overlooks, or even undisguisedly rejects, the things which he expressly enjoins, or in which we are assured that he takes pleasure. Those, therefore, who set up a fictitious worship, merely worship and adore their own delirious fancies; indeed, they would never dare so to trifle with God, had they not previously fashioned him after their own childish conceits. Hence that vague and wandering opinion of Deity is declared by an apostle to be ignorance of God: "Howbeit, then, when ye knew not God, ye did service unto them which by nature are no gods." And he elsewhere declares, that the Ephesians were "without God" (Eph. 2: 12) at the time when they wandered without any correct knowledge of him. It makes little difference, at least in this respect, whether you hold the existence of one God, or a plurality of gods, since, in both cases alike, by departing from the true God, you have nothing left but an execrable idol. It remains, therefore, to conclude with Lactantius, (Instit. Div. lib i. 2, 6) "No religion is genuine that is not in accordance with truth."

Section 4. The wicked never willingly come into the presence of God. Hence their hypocrisy. Hence, too, their sense of Deity leads to no good result.

To this fault they add a second, viz., that when they do think of God it is against their will; never approaching him without being dragged into his presence, and when there, instead of the voluntary fear flowing from reverence of the divine majesty, feeling only that forced and servile fear which divine judgment extorts judgment which, from the impossibility of escape, they are compelled to dread, but which, while they dread, they at the same time also hate. To impiety, and to it alone, the saying of Statius properly applies: "Fear first brought gods into the world," (Theb. lib. i.) Those whose inclinations are at variance with the justice of God, knowing that his tribunal has been erected for the punishment of transgression, earnestly wish that that tribunal were overthrown. Under the influence of this feeling they are actually warring against God, justice being one of his essential attributes. Perceiving that they are always within reach of his power, that resistance and evasion are alike impossible, they fear and tremble. Accordingly, to avoid the appearance of condemning a majesty by which all are overawed, they have recourse to some species of religious observance, never ceasing meanwhile to defile themselves with every kind of vice, and add crime to crime, until they have broken the holy law of the Lord in every one of its requirements, and set his whole righteousness at nought; at all events, they are not so restrained by their semblance of fear as not to luxuriate and take pleasure in iniquity, choosing rather to indulge their carnal propensities than to curb them with the bridle of the Holy Spirit. But since this shadow of religion (it scarcely even deserves to be called a shadow) is false and vain, it is easy to infer how much this confused knowledge of God differs from that piety which is instilled into the breasts of believers, and from which alone true religion springs. And yet hypocrites would fain, by means of tortuous windings, make a show of being near to God at the very time they are fleeing from him. For while the whole life ought to be one perpetual course of obedience, they rebel without fear in almost all their actions, and seek to appease him with a few paltry sacrifices; while they ought to serve him with integrity of heart and holiness of life, they endeavour to procure his favour by means of frivolous devices and punctilios of no value. Nay, they take greater license in their grovelling indulgences, because they imagine that they can fulfil their duty to him by preposterous expiations; in short, while their confidence ought to have been fixed upon him, they put him aside, and rest in themselves or the creatures. At length they bewilder themselves in such a maze of error, that the darkness of ignorance obscures, and ultimately extinguishes, those sparks which were designed to show them the glory of God. Still, however, the conviction that there is some Deity continues to exist, like a plant which can never be completely eradicated, though so corrupt, that it is only capable of producing the worst of fruit. Nay, we have still stronger evidence of the proposition for which I now contend, viz., that a sense of Deity is naturally engraven on the human heart, in the fact, that the very reprobate are forced to acknowledge it. When at their ease, they can jest about God, and talk pertly and loquaciously in disparagement of his power; but should despair, from any cause, overtake them, it will stimulate them to seek him, and dictate ejaculatory prayers, proving that they were not entirely ignorant of God, but had perversely suppressed feelings which ought to have been earlier manifested.

I believe that nature is only perspicuous as a source of revelation for those who have been born again and who are no longer hostile to God.
 
When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.

Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.

What do you all think?

That seems to be nearly overly simplistic. I would say that the big difference between Presupp and Classical is the word "revelation".

You're right that secular philosophy has an autonomous view of man's reasoning...but you seem to have shifted it from an "autonomous" view of reasoning, to a "non-autonomous" view...which is to reduce the difference to simply reasoning itself.

Foundationally, presuppositionalism rests on revelation from the Triune God...Classical apologetics, in practice, rejects the notion of natural revelation altogether.
 
Otherwise, I don't see how one can avoid the necessity of claiming that ALL natural capacities are individually perverted and tainted by sin, rather than the much simpler view that the will is sinful and wields those natural capacities to accomplish its sinful desires.

Honestly, if you want to sum up all the faculties you can think of under one label of "will," go ahead. Sometimes it can just help to convey concepts if I talk about sin's effect on man's reasoning rather than on his will which thereby affects his reasoning.

It's Total Depravity either way, so long as we define our terms correctly.
 
Except that's not really what Van Til is claiming -- he's not simply using the noetic effect of sin as shorthand for saying that the will is sinful and therefore is prone to use reasoning sinfully. He is specifically claiming that man's faculty of reasoning itself is in and of itself tainted by sin.
 
Except that's not really what Van Til is claiming -- he's not simply using the noetic effect of sin as shorthand for saying that the will is sinful and therefore is prone to use reasoning sinfully. He is specifically claiming that man's faculty of reasoning itself is in and of itself tainted by sin.

And he would say that this noetic effect of sin is manifested in that man chooses to accept his own interpretation of reality (i.e., secular philosophies) as the ground from which we prove things, rather than accepting God's interpretation (i.e., the Bible). The natural man will choose to reason a specific way, starting from false bases. Thus sin affects his will, and his will plays a part in his reasoning; thus sin affects his reasoning.
 
And that view, I believe, stems from Van Til's inherent favor for a coherence view of truth, and that's one of the main issues I have with him.

Anyway, just testing that line of argumentation to see if anything new would pop up, I hadn't thought about it in a while. Please continue, apologies for the interruption. :D
 
You're right that secular philosophy has an autonomous view of man's reasoning...but you seem to have shifted it from an "autonomous" view of reasoning, to a "non-autonomous" view...which is to reduce the difference to simply reasoning itself.

I apologize if I misspoke; I meant to say that the alternatives are essentially to reason autonomously (i.e. view as authoritative our own interpretation of reality; secular thought) or to reason theonomously (i.e. view as authoritative God's interpretation of reality; Scripture).

Of course this is not an exhaustive dichotomy, for it does not take into account those who might view (e.g.) Koranic authority as properly basic. But for all intents and purposes secular thought is pervasive in American education, such that nearly all academic unbelief in America is secular. Even those of other religions, and even many Christians, have a secular understanding of life.

That seems to be nearly overly simplistic. I would say that the big difference between Presupp and Classical is the word "revelation". [...] Classical apologetics, in practice, rejects the notion of natural revelation altogether.

Can you elaborate on these statements of yours? I especially do not understand what you mean by the latter.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 08:22:51 EST-----

Anyway, just testing that line of argumentation to see if anything new would pop up, I hadn't thought about it in a while. Please continue, apologies for the interruption. :D

No problem at all. :)

And that view, I believe, stems from Van Til's inherent favor for a coherence view of truth, and that's one of the main issues I have with him.

Do you want to start a new thread on this? It looks terribly interesting, but it's a bit :offtopic:. I never thought that Van Til accepted a coherence view of truth (perhaps of epistemic justification), so it could be very fruitful to discuss.
 
Do you want to start a new thread on this? It looks terribly interesting, but it's a bit :offtopic:. I never thought that Van Til accepted a coherence view of truth (perhaps of epistemic justification), so it could be very fruitful to discuss.

In brief, I believe Van Til's formulation of "worldviews" and the claim that the anti-Christian and the Christian worldview have no common ground implies that truth statements are evaluated relationally via internal consistency. I find the backdoor route of claiming the unbeliever's "psychology" can immediately apprehend parts of God's truth (when necessary to function in God's world) without interpretation or reasoning to be clumsy and overly complicated.

Anyway, if anyone wishes to follow that rabbit trail further I'd be happy to discuss it further in a new thread.
 
Can you elaborate on these statements of yours? I especially do not understand what you mean by the latter.

On the former, I'm only pointing out that presuppositionalism begins with the Triune God who speaks revelationally.

On the latter, I think I misspoke...I was thinking "evidential" when that is a different breed than "classical"...mea culpa :eek:
 
Of course, the difference between a Christian presupposing the Bible to be true, as opposed to, say, a Muslim presupposing the Qur'an to be true is that the Bible is actually true.

The problem with this is that it can tend to be a circular argument, the bible is inspired because it says that it is inspired, well anyone can say that.

I thought the notion was that you start with the bible as a presupposition because that is how it is written, it does not seek to prove the existence of God it presupposes it and is written from the standpoint that God just exists.
 
Well, in this case, the apologist is trying to use a piecemeal method wherein the apologist's ultimate goal (I hope) is that the atheist see the error of his ways and repent.

Why must the apologists goal be to have the atheist repent of his sins? I have always thought that an apologist is defined as someone who defends the faith; but since when should an apologist likewise be an evangelist? Especially when the question of whether or not Christianity is true (like, let's say during a debate on whether abortion is wrong, or God exists, etc.) is irrelevant.

And in doing so, the apologist will never arrive near his destination, because such a method cannot prove Biblical authority.

Perhaps a classicist/evidentialist like William Lane Craig, who uses arguments for Jesus' resurrection during debates, could get to this point by arguing for the reliability of the New Testament documents.

Instead, whatever he proves will easily be interpreted within the context of the unbeliever's worldview and push him to continue in his unbelief -- because he is generally fit to interpret the world as he desires, i.e. Pelagianism.

Some facts could be incredibly difficult to interpret through his worldview-filter, like perhaps an overwhelmingly complex and convincing argument for the existence of a necessary being external to the universe, or a very good case for the resurrection and a refutation of all other alternatives. In a situation like that, it could lead him to abandon his naturalistic worldview, like in Antony Flew's case.
 
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