RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
That Dallas Willard had a huge impact, largely positive, on evangelicalism is undeniable. That his students have faithfully carried forth his work, applying it in new situations, is also true. A number of such books could probably be written from that angle. This book is unique because it suggests tensions and underdeveloped points, usually in Willard's psychological works, that should be addressed.
*Willard's Positive Case*
Willard's true gains were not so much in the basics of spiritual formation but in the structure of the human [[Soul]]. As will be noted later, for those of us who come from a classically Protestant background, there was not much noteworthy to us in books like *The Divine Conspiracy*. That is because the Reformed prize the means of grace which communicate to us the benefits of redemption. That mindset is absent to the larger American community, although it was to that community, not the Reformed one, Willard wrote.
As noted primarily in *Renovation of the Heart*, the body and soul exist in a symbiotic relationship that is particularly attuned to the hierarchy within the soul. For starters, for Dallas,
-"the will refers to the core dimension's 'power to initiate;"
-"the spirit refers to the core dimension's fundamental nature as distinct from the physical reality;'
-"the heart refers to the core dimension's center...to which every other component of the self owes its proper functioning" (Black).
The soul, then, is the unifying cohesion to the above dimensions.
*A Gentle Critique*
Willard's treatment of the soul was groundbreaking among broadly evangelical teachers. I think it is true in its basic outline. There are some tensions, though, which is student, J. P. Moreland, draws to our attention. First, some basic categories:
* a substance can be used in two ways: it could be an individual thing with properties and dispositions, or it can refer to a thing's [[Essence]], the range of actual and potential properties.
* A property is a universal; it is non-spatial and extra-temporal. On some readings, "properties (and relations) are universals that, when exemplified...become constituents of the ordinary particulars that have them."
* a relation is a 'being X than Y' state of affairs. It can be either internal or external. For our purposes, "the body stands in an internal relation to the soul such that the soul could exist without the body but not vice versa" (Moreland).
* A part as used here is a separable part, able to exist if removed from the whole.
* The faculties of the soul group its capacities.
So far, so good. Dallas's project runs into difficulty when pressed on whether "I am my body" or "I am my soul." He seemed to say both at times. Moreover, should we refer to ourselves as humans, persons, or human persons, or does it even matter? It seems that being human is somehow connected with having a body, in which case I can be a person in the afterlife without being human.
What happens when I die? My soul continues but not my body. This means my identity cannot be fundamentally connected with having a body. As Moreland notes, "If I am neither the soul or the body, it is hard to see how it could literally be that I survive death". Restating Dallas's view:
1. the soul is a mode of the body
2. My body is essential to my identity
3. Human relations cannot be separated from my bodily identity.
There is an obvious problem: this cannot account for the intermediate state, something on which Dallas so eloquently wrote.
Both Moreland Dallas (rightly) want to avoid Cartesian dualism. Moreland is going to opt for something like a modified Thomism. He suggests that some of Dallas's statements on personal identity should not be taken literally. I think that is a good start. Although I generally agree with Moreland's modified Thomism, I do think there is some promise in a phenomenological approach.
Moreland distinguishes between "thin" and "thick" particulars of substance. A thin particular is the essence or form. A thick particular is the concrete substance. In this view, the soul, a thin particular, is identical to the person.
*Putting on Christ as Speaking*
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, true to his representation, gives a speech-act account of spiritual formation. Although he does not explicitly mention it, his take on doctrine as cognitive therapy parallels Dallas's emphasis on the primacy of knowledge. Even more, it flows naturally from it, something the spiritual formation movement, not necessarily Dallas himself, has not always been able to do. "Doctrine resembles," says Vanhoozer, "cognitive therapy to the extent that it encourages certain ways of thinking about God, the world, and ourselves." It specifically allows us to "acquire theodramatic habits of thought." In short, it is character formation.
This helps bridge the gap for a problem that has somewhat haunted Christian ethics. The church, following St Paul's list of the fruit of the spirit, has always embraced a form of Aristotle's virtue ethics, and rightly so. But if one forms character out of repeated practice and habit, then it is not always clear why the gospel is needed. By rooting virtue formation in the specifically theological speech of the Bible, Vanhoozer is able to face this problem from a fresh perspective.
Lest we substitute a new and better, albeit mechanical, series of habits for the old ones, Vanhoozer reminds us this is not simply rote speech. Rather, "It involves our doing too, but a doing of a very particular kind: a participation in the doing (and the done) of Jesus Christ." Following some New Testament scholars, Paul's new theory of virtue formation locates us in the story of Jesus Christ."
quote: Scripture may be the soul of theology, but doxology is the soul's embodiment.
*Conclusion*
Even though I have enjoyed Dallas Willard's writings, not all of it resonated with me. For whatever perceived problems it might have, the Reformed faith, particularly as it understood the means of grace, never really suffered from the easy-believism which Dallas had to confront. As a result, I could only read some emphases with bewilderment. Moreover, I do not remember Dallas--or these authors--dealing with the means of grace, particularly the Lord's Supper. As a result, while Dallas gave much-needed critiques of broad evangelicalism, I wonder if he ever truly escaped it. To be sure, Dallas believed in the Lord's Supper and the importance of the local church. I simply wonder how much it actually structured his view of sanctification.
*Willard's Positive Case*
Willard's true gains were not so much in the basics of spiritual formation but in the structure of the human [[Soul]]. As will be noted later, for those of us who come from a classically Protestant background, there was not much noteworthy to us in books like *The Divine Conspiracy*. That is because the Reformed prize the means of grace which communicate to us the benefits of redemption. That mindset is absent to the larger American community, although it was to that community, not the Reformed one, Willard wrote.
As noted primarily in *Renovation of the Heart*, the body and soul exist in a symbiotic relationship that is particularly attuned to the hierarchy within the soul. For starters, for Dallas,
-"the will refers to the core dimension's 'power to initiate;"
-"the spirit refers to the core dimension's fundamental nature as distinct from the physical reality;'
-"the heart refers to the core dimension's center...to which every other component of the self owes its proper functioning" (Black).
The soul, then, is the unifying cohesion to the above dimensions.
*A Gentle Critique*
Willard's treatment of the soul was groundbreaking among broadly evangelical teachers. I think it is true in its basic outline. There are some tensions, though, which is student, J. P. Moreland, draws to our attention. First, some basic categories:
* a substance can be used in two ways: it could be an individual thing with properties and dispositions, or it can refer to a thing's [[Essence]], the range of actual and potential properties.
* A property is a universal; it is non-spatial and extra-temporal. On some readings, "properties (and relations) are universals that, when exemplified...become constituents of the ordinary particulars that have them."
* a relation is a 'being X than Y' state of affairs. It can be either internal or external. For our purposes, "the body stands in an internal relation to the soul such that the soul could exist without the body but not vice versa" (Moreland).
* A part as used here is a separable part, able to exist if removed from the whole.
* The faculties of the soul group its capacities.
So far, so good. Dallas's project runs into difficulty when pressed on whether "I am my body" or "I am my soul." He seemed to say both at times. Moreover, should we refer to ourselves as humans, persons, or human persons, or does it even matter? It seems that being human is somehow connected with having a body, in which case I can be a person in the afterlife without being human.
What happens when I die? My soul continues but not my body. This means my identity cannot be fundamentally connected with having a body. As Moreland notes, "If I am neither the soul or the body, it is hard to see how it could literally be that I survive death". Restating Dallas's view:
1. the soul is a mode of the body
2. My body is essential to my identity
3. Human relations cannot be separated from my bodily identity.
There is an obvious problem: this cannot account for the intermediate state, something on which Dallas so eloquently wrote.
Both Moreland Dallas (rightly) want to avoid Cartesian dualism. Moreland is going to opt for something like a modified Thomism. He suggests that some of Dallas's statements on personal identity should not be taken literally. I think that is a good start. Although I generally agree with Moreland's modified Thomism, I do think there is some promise in a phenomenological approach.
Moreland distinguishes between "thin" and "thick" particulars of substance. A thin particular is the essence or form. A thick particular is the concrete substance. In this view, the soul, a thin particular, is identical to the person.
*Putting on Christ as Speaking*
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, true to his representation, gives a speech-act account of spiritual formation. Although he does not explicitly mention it, his take on doctrine as cognitive therapy parallels Dallas's emphasis on the primacy of knowledge. Even more, it flows naturally from it, something the spiritual formation movement, not necessarily Dallas himself, has not always been able to do. "Doctrine resembles," says Vanhoozer, "cognitive therapy to the extent that it encourages certain ways of thinking about God, the world, and ourselves." It specifically allows us to "acquire theodramatic habits of thought." In short, it is character formation.
This helps bridge the gap for a problem that has somewhat haunted Christian ethics. The church, following St Paul's list of the fruit of the spirit, has always embraced a form of Aristotle's virtue ethics, and rightly so. But if one forms character out of repeated practice and habit, then it is not always clear why the gospel is needed. By rooting virtue formation in the specifically theological speech of the Bible, Vanhoozer is able to face this problem from a fresh perspective.
Lest we substitute a new and better, albeit mechanical, series of habits for the old ones, Vanhoozer reminds us this is not simply rote speech. Rather, "It involves our doing too, but a doing of a very particular kind: a participation in the doing (and the done) of Jesus Christ." Following some New Testament scholars, Paul's new theory of virtue formation locates us in the story of Jesus Christ."
quote: Scripture may be the soul of theology, but doxology is the soul's embodiment.
*Conclusion*
Even though I have enjoyed Dallas Willard's writings, not all of it resonated with me. For whatever perceived problems it might have, the Reformed faith, particularly as it understood the means of grace, never really suffered from the easy-believism which Dallas had to confront. As a result, I could only read some emphases with bewilderment. Moreover, I do not remember Dallas--or these authors--dealing with the means of grace, particularly the Lord's Supper. As a result, while Dallas gave much-needed critiques of broad evangelicalism, I wonder if he ever truly escaped it. To be sure, Dallas believed in the Lord's Supper and the importance of the local church. I simply wonder how much it actually structured his view of sanctification.
