Materialism and Morality - An Answer to the Problem?

Status
Not open for further replies.

WrittenFromUtopia

Puritan Board Graduate
Anyone have any thoughts on the following excerpt from the writings of a Materialist/Naturalist colleague of mine?

... Does Nietzsche mean that we can do what we please and it should be of no consequence? I don't have that answer. As someone that would identify his self as somewhat of a Nietzschean, this problem is something I must face on a regular basis. If there are no moral phenomenon, only our moral interpretations of phenomenon, then Nietzsche could not see the death camps [of the Holocaust] as evil ...

Where does this leave me, a Nietzschean? Am I to accept this fate (amor fati) decreed by Nietzsche? I do agree that there are no moral phenomenon. Actions, appearances and things are only judged based on our interpretations, our taste if you will. Breaking the law is of another matter. I am not concerned with that for this discussion. Murder is just one more action. There are no moral actions. A circle has closed for me. Do I accept this closure?

I do accept this closure. I must. I cannot remove myself from this. If I were a believer in god, then I could retreat to some claim of other-worldliness, but I, an anti-Christ, cannot run and hide from a world begging for this confrontation. In fact, I would have no place to hide. It would be dwelling on my conscience. I cannot run from murder in this way, but wait, what is that sound I am hearing? It is my conscience screaming at me, and I heard it.

There is one person that I must be on good terms with, and that person is myself (thank you father Socrates for such a perfect insight). Why do I not accept murder as [a] suitable course of action; because I myself do not want to be murdered. This is the thesis of reversability (enter [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty -- a Nietzschean par excellence).

"In being of flesh, one finds that one's very life is already the articulation of all other flesh. Before one can be oneself, whether that self be human or bear, one's body is already inextricably inerwoven with all other bodies."

How does this "flesh" ontological principle play out in ethics? We have begun from where we are in this foundation, the world -- the kingdom of men. We have not begun from a metaphysical kingdom of which we do not have access. We do not murder because we ourselves do not want to be murdered. In this ethic, we can state it as "act in a way that you feel it ok for others to act towards you." Of course, this is a quick overview and there are a few problems that arise quickly here (what if someone likes being punched in the face for starters). Some might say this is a rewording of the "golden rule." However, again, this is in no way related to anything metaphysical. This is of this world. Murder is removed (as we are left with the action of murdering someone that murders as they see it ok to be murdered -- so, we would only be acting in accord with what they see as ok -- in fact, this would be the polite thing to do to them).

p.s. oh, and remember, "The denial of an absolute ground is not equivalent to the absolute denial of all grounds." That is a misuse of logic to assume.

:detective:
 
I wonder why he jumps to the idea that we should act in such a way that we would like others to act toward us. Does materialism demand that conclusion? Does he even know why he would rather not be murdered? Is it fear of discomfort or of what?

Even if materialism does require the conclusion, then the process by which we codify permissible acts becomes complicated. Do we go with majority rule? The whims of the majority are fickle.

So if we decide that majority rule isn't the answer, then we must come up with an alternative. A king perhaps, or an elite group who determines how we should desire others to treat us.

Except then we get into that nasty idea "should". That supposes a standard of some kind. Does the mere fact that we share flesh point to such a standard? That is the question he will have to answer, I think, before he can be consistent.
 
I'm not sure he's concerned with being consistent. Most postmodern materialists have figured out that they cannot be either rational or consistent, so they usually end up being obsessed with phenomenology or other forms of subjective epistemology.
 
I'd certainly think that being a postmodern Nietzschean would make one confused. It sounds like he is grasping for an objective epistemology but doesn't realize it. An example of Romans 1:20.
 
Originally posted by victorbravo
I'd certainly think that being a postmodern Nietzschean would make one confused. It sounds like he is grasping for an objective epistemology but doesn't realize it. An example of Romans 1:20.

I think he does realize the consequences of an objective epistemology which is why we can not stand the taste of it in his mouth. But I definately agree, depraved mind.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top