Is God passive in anything?

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JM

Puritan Board Doctor
Is God passive in anything? (I know it's a very open questions...)
 
After a quick survey of my beliefS:

1. Inanimate: No. He holds all things together
2. Creatures: See above and he feeds them
3. Saved. Of course
4. Unsaved. He hardens them

That's off the cuff
 
God is "I AM." This means He is all Being, and has no Becoming. As all Being He is actus purissimus (most pure act), and is in no sense passive.
 
Is God passive in anything? (I know it's a very open questions...)

I think this question somewhat relates to another recent thread involving God's role in reprobation. Does God actively harden those who are reprobate or does He just sit back and allow an already depraved heart to continue in depravity?

I don't think He can be passive in the sense that we are. I.e. staring out the window as a car slams into a mailbox (or something like that). Other than that, I can't apprehend any event, minuscule or otherwise, that occurs as God "passively" observes.

Is. 46:9-10 for example.
 
God isn't passive in anything. I think the post on God hardening hearts is a clear example of how He isn't passive in demonstrating His grace...whether that be temporary grace or saving grace. No, God doesn't place sin in a persons heart which hardens a heart, but that isn't Him being passive. He is very active in the process of "hardening hearts" which is done by withdrawing his grace. Everyone's heart has some degree of His grace and that's what keeps mankind from being utterly depraved. The details are in how He is active in this process. The details are what some disagree over.
 
Does it not make you open your mouth and say,:wow:, we worship a God who is not uninvolved or passive in the least of His creatures acts, all acts and moves flow from the sovereign purposes of this God. How amazing indeed, my life touches the eternal puposes of God.
 
God is "I AM." This means He is all Being, and has no Becoming. As all Being He is actus purissimus (most pure act), and is in no sense passive.

I agree with Matthew that God is "all Being" in the sense of being self-existent, all-sufficient, absolutely perfect, and immutable. Whether this is the primary import of the Hebrew expression translated "I AM" (Exo. 3) is debatable. Whatever the case, we should reject the God of Process Theology and Open Theism who is in the state of "becoming" and who is in any ultimate or absolute sense passive in relation to historical events or states of affairs.

Affirming divine impassibility does not, in my opinion, preclude the portrayal of God as covenantally present within the matrix of human history, responding evaluatively, emotively, and redemptively/punitively to human sin and righteousness. These historically discreet responses serve to reveal God's unchangeable virtues of power, wisdom, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth as they relate to the created, fallen, and redeemed work of his hands. Even here, though, God's "responses" or "reactions" are not ultimately passive since He himself has ordained both the event or state of affairs as well as His response to that event or state of affairs.

Your servant,
 
As all Being He is actus purissimus (most pure act), and is in no sense passive.

Matthew,

I recall reading theologians employ this terminology, viz., God is "most pure act." To those unfamiliar with theological literature, it might give the impression of a kind of Pantheism (everything, including events, IS God) or Panentheism (God is IN everything and every event). Of course, I know that's not the way you're using the term. Am I correct that the terminology signifies the fact that God is the ultimate source of all activity? Or do orthodox theologians intend more by the phrase?

Your servant,
 
Affirming divine impassibility does not, in my opinion, preclude the portrayal of God as covenantally present within the matrix of human history, responding evaluatively, emotively, and redemptively/punitively to human sin and righteousness.

This is correct, as long as it is limited to the biblical definition of God "humbling Himself" and "speaking after the manner of men." I don't know any adults who would want their abilities to be judged on the basis of how they interact with their small children.

-----Added 1/22/2009 at 07:31:56 EST-----

I recall reading theologians employ this terminology, viz., God is "most pure act." To those unfamiliar with theological literature, it might give the impression of a kind of Pantheism (everything, including events, IS God) or Panentheism (God is IN everything and every event). Of course, I know that's not the way you're using the term. Am I correct that the terminology signifies the fact that God is the ultimate source of all activity? Or do orthodox theologians intend more by the phrase?

The phrase is in fact intended to guard against such falsehoods seeing as all pan theologies require God to share in the passivity and becoming of the creation. It is usual to say that God, being pure act, therefore has a nature of will rather than a will and a nature. Or, He wills His nature. This is in contrast to much false theology which tries to attribute dispositions to God.
 
. . . It is usual to say that God, being pure act, therefore has a nature of will rather than a will and a nature. Or, He wills His nature. This is in contrast to much false theology which tries to attribute dispositions to God.

EXACTLY. This understanding seems to fall by the wayside in most discussions about God's love and desire regarding men, especially the reprobate. God does not overule a desire to implement a decree.
 
. . . It is usual to say that God, being pure act, therefore has a nature of will rather than a will and a nature. Or, He wills His nature. This is in contrast to much false theology which tries to attribute dispositions to God.

EXACTLY. This understanding seems to fall by the wayside in most discussions about God's love and desire regarding men, especially the reprobate. God does not overule a desire to implement a decree.

Interesting. Is this construal of God as pure act, as having a nature of will rather than a nature that includes a will, universally affirmed by Reformed theologians? If not, which theologians dissent? Does the Confession portray God's nature in this way? What proof texts are commonly employed to support this proposition?

Thanks
 
I will defer to the more astute Rev. Winzer for historical reference, but this is my understanding. It sounds like something I could find in Turretin. :think:

God is not internally conflicted by dispositions, the object of which are external to himself.

Just my :2cents:
 
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I will defer to the more astute Rev. Winzer for historical reference, but this is my understanding. It sounds like something I could find in Turretin. :think:

God does not will in accordance with or in light of dispositions, the object of which are external to himself.

Just my :2cents:

Thanks, brother. Just trying to get my mind around this concept. I've always conceived of God's desires, delights, and choices as conforming to his nature, which is all powerful, wise, holy, just, good, and true. Saying that God's nature is nothing more or less than pure will or act sounds a little like Nominalism. It is likely, though, that I don't fully understand the point.

Thanks,

-----Added 1/23/2009 at 12:55:16 EST-----

Affirming divine impassibility does not, in my opinion, preclude the portrayal of God as covenantally present within the matrix of human history, responding evaluatively, emotively, and redemptively/punitively to human sin and righteousness.

This is correct, as long as it is limited to the biblical definition of God "humbling Himself" and "speaking after the manner of men." I don't know any adults who would want their abilities to be judged on the basis of how they interact with their small children.

Matthew, I agree that the revelation of God's evaluations, emotive responses, and acts (redemptive or punitive) within the matrix of human history is analogical not univocal vis-a-vis human evaluations, emotive responses, and actions. Hence, God's evaluations, emotions, and actions are like those of his images (fallen dimensions excluded) not identical. In this sense, I can agree with the theological concept of "accommodation" (i.e., God's "humbling himself" and "speaking after the manner of men").

Nevertheless, the idea of accommodation can be pressed too far in my judgment. Following the illustration you've offered above, humans (as "small children") cannot know God in any other way except in the way in which He has chosen to reveal himself to us (in "childish" speach). Consequently, if he is substantially or essentially different in reality from the way in which he reveals himself to us as his image bearers, then we really cannot know the "adult" God but only the God who thinks, feels, and acts like the children to whom he is lisping. Of course, I don't believe we can know God as He knows himself. But I do believe we can know him as he wants us to know him via the self-revelation he has given.

I don't know that I'm disagreeing with you; just seeking greater clarity.

Thanks,
 
Consequently, if he is substantially or essentially different in reality from the way in which he reveals himself to us as his image bearers, then we really cannot know the "adult" God but only the God who thinks, feels, and acts like the children to whom he is lisping.

The word "essentially different" could be taken in any number of ways, e.g., the qualitative/quantitative debate.

In the accommodated revelation we have clear statements to the effect that God is not merely imminent, but also transcendent, and therefore the analogy breaks down with regard to the child-adult illustration at that point. The Scriptures demand that we think of God in terms of the Creator-creature distinction even as we engage in the Creator-creature relation by means of covenant. Blessings!
 
Consequently, if he is substantially or essentially different in reality from the way in which he reveals himself to us as his image bearers, then we really cannot know the "adult" God but only the God who thinks, feels, and acts like the children to whom he is lisping.

The word "essentially different" could be taken in any number of ways, e.g., the qualitative/quantitative debate.

In the accommodated revelation we have clear statements to the effect that God is not merely imminent, but also transcendent, and therefore the analogy breaks down with regard to the child-adult illustration at that point. The Scriptures demand that we think of God in terms of the Creator-creature distinction even as we engage in the Creator-creature relation by means of covenant. Blessings!

I agree that the adult-child a analogy should not be pressed too far. I also agree that the Creator-creature distinction must be maintained even when speaking of God relating to man in covenant. Thanks, Matthew.
 
Hebrews 1:3 Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high:

When I think about this verse, I tend to take it very literal. Meaning that Christ is literally upholding all things by the power of his word. And if Christ is not actively making sure the universe, my desk, or the atoms in the keyboard that I am now typing on keep together, they would all just fly apart. He is the one who brings order to world, and He is the one that keeps it all together.

So, yes, I would say that God is indeed very active in all things. He is the one that determines the tides, and he is the one that determines everything in my life. When I think upon these things, I think how high and how wide is my God. His mind is infinite, where my mind is finite. I can't even begin to understand how he accomplishes the work that he does. But I know he does it.
 
Dr. Gonzalez, you are probably familiar with these already, but the following quotations from Heppe's Reformed Dogmatics have been very helpful to me on this topic. The Greek phrases are going to look like garbage, because the Greek font from Gramcord doesn't show up on the PB. And copying and pasting removes most of the italics.


pp.53,54 para 12
—Even after his fall some remnants of his original knowledge of God survived for man. He may therefore by consideration of himself and of nature still know God's nature to some extent, indeed so that he may enter into living fellowship with God as with his God and Lord. Only, if man would attain to a certain knowledge of God that satisfies him, he must not limit himself to this cognitio Dei naturalis. Rather he must give heed to God's acts of revelation to which Holy Scripture gives testimony. Man only possesses right knowledge of God, when he is aware—and this is the whole point—what God is, not in and for Himself but for man. But even outward knowledge of God's outwards acts of revelation still does not ensure any living knowledge of the divine nature. This is imparted to man only by God attesting Himself to him by the Holy Spirit, by His letting him experience within himself the truth of the facts of revelation.

p.59, para 2
...Hottinger, p.44: "The attributes are distinguished neither from the essence nor from each other but only by our conceiving".—Hence, since every attribute is a manifestation of the same absolutely simple essentiality of God, it may justifiably be said (Braun, I, ii, 2, 19) that "God's righteousness is His goodness, is His knowledge, is His will; or His mercy is His righteousness, etc. But it would be wrong for me to say that the concept I have of the righteousness is the same concept which I have of the deity, mercy or eternity."

p.81, para 19
The divine will is the being of God Himself, so far as it is active actuosity in relation to Himself and to everything outside Himself.

pp.82,83, para 20
Since then the divine will is the actuosity of the divine being eternally identical with itself, which only to man appears an infinite manifold of expressions of will, it may be said that in the same act of will God may will otherwise but not that He may otherwise will. —Heidegger (III, 69): "Although God wills all things in one most single actus, e.g., to create and to destroy the world, to save some and condemn others, etc., yet we conceive various acts of the divine will by our reason and distinguish them by our conception. He cannot, it is true, will a thing otherwise, i.e., by a different act. Yet by one and the same act of willing He may will differently: e.g., that events should be one way and another and so that different sets of things should exist. Thus God will one things to exist for the sake of another. But that one thing is not strictly speaking the cause by which God's will is inwardly moved to decree the second."

p.83, para 22
"Since God's will is not a blind urge but an appetitus intelligens, it must indeed be distinguished from scientia. Yet it coincides with it in such a way, that it may be conceived as just the obverse of it, i.e., God wills precisely because He wills it: the divine willing is the divine nature itself."

p.84, para 23
We have to distinguish the way in which God wills Himself and that in which He wills things outside Himself. Himself God wills necessarily; since He is the highest good and goal of all things, He cannot not will Himself. Things on the other hand God wills freely, because as creatures they are not necessary but for God contingent; so that He wills all things in such a way that He might also not will them. —Riissen, III, 28: "God wills some things necessarily, some freely. Himself He wills necessarily; He is the final end and the highest goal, which He cannot not will and love, because He cannot not will His own glory or deny Himself. All other things He wills freely; nothing created is necessary as regards God, but contingent, since because He could have done without them, He wills them all in the sense that He might not have willed them".

p.93, para 30
Since holiness like all other attributes of God is the divine nature itself and so present in God in absolute perfection, it cannot be conceived as God's agreement with the law of the good. God Himself is rather the essential idea and principle of holiness.—Mastricht (II, 198): "Holiness belongs to God (1) not as an accessory but as His actual essence; nor (2) as something received from another source but as the fountain of all holiness in all things, Lev. 20. 8; 21. 15 (I am the Lord which sanctify you (him) Ezek 20. 12 (I am the Lord that sanctify) 1 Thess. 5. 23 (the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly); nor (3) by fixed measure; but without measure in an infinite degree, which accordingly cannot be increased or diminished, because this is its very essence, although it can and ought to be declared more and more, Mt. 6.9 (hallowed be thy name); nor (4) fashioned after the holiness of the law or anything (else), but as the idea and pattern and norm of all holiness, 1 Pet. 1. 15 (like as he which called you is holy), Eph. 4. 24 (the new man which after God hath been created in ... holiness ...): and not so much (5) as a particular attribute of it; but as a universal affection, affecting all and any of its attributes; not, in a word (6) some common affection of it, but by far the chief."

Now in this one Heppe not only expresses some of his own opinions, but also speaks of a change that came over Reformed thinking. One suspects that if his depiction is accurate, the change was unfortunate.
pp.93-95, para 31
But as little can it be said that God's act of willing is simply the nature of the divine holiness. For man, of course, God's will is the utterly holy law. But as regards God Himself the divine will is holy, because God only wills what corresponds with the holiness immanent in him, i.e., with His own will. As the absolute nature God is no way dependent on a law situated outside Him. As the morally perfect Spirit God cannot be other than true to Himself and thereby in His entire action display His own moral perfection as law immanent in Him.
Reformed dogmaticians as a whole are occupied with the question, whether goodness is good because God wills it, or whether God wills the good because it is good. Recognition of the absoluteness of God seemed to many reconcilable with the former. Hence, e.g., Polan (II, 26) says: "(1) God does, what by His own law He prohibits us; He passed the law for us, not for Himself. E.g., He does not bring it about that we admit no sin while living here, though He might most easily have done so.—(2) The supreme rule of divine righteousness is His most perfect and infallible will. God is a law to Himself. Whatever He wishes done, it is right by the very fact that He wills it. Whatever God does He knows and wills."—Yet the later dogmaticians let this idea drop. Voetius (I, 364ff.) discusses the question, whether there is in the divine nature an immanent, necessary and independent law, which, if God would not deny Himself, God must maintain, and he answers Yes. In reply to the objection that, if there is something good and right antecedently to God's will, then God must dutifully will and do it, which contradicts the absolute nature of God, Voetius rightly (!) insists (373) that "God is under no moral duty ab extra; He is due no one and there is no cause outside God which could bind or determine Him. But ab intra He may be bound (if I may so say) but not be subject (subesse); He is indebted to Himself and cannot deny Himself. So the Father in divine things is bound to love the Son, for He cannot not love. The Son is bound by the necessity of the divine nature to work from the Father, for he cannot not operate from the Father, as often as operation has to be instituted outside of God. So, too, in actions outwardly, it being given that creation has been produced, God is obliged to preserve it by His continual hold and continual influx (as long as He wills it) and in addition as the prime Mover, to move and govern it to His own glory, Prov. 16. 4 (the Lord hath made everything for its own end: yea even the wicked for the day of evil) Rom 11.36 (of Him and to Him and through Him are all things). This is immutably good and righteous, the opposite of which He cannot will". Similarly Voetius answers the objection, that God is "simply without law for everything outside Himself", in the sane sense (I, 375): "(1) He is exlex from the law which He fashioned for man, by formally adopting law as it is the law. But He is not free and absolute from all matter and content of law, so that He may enjoin or Himself make its opposite; e.g., as to believe that He is not God and to enjoin others to believe so, in opposition of course, to the first precept of the decalogue. (2) By hypothesis, as and when He wills to give precepts, He necessarily gives them good and righteous, nor in general can He do or will the opposite. (3) Specifically He also gives some righteous things antecedently to His free will, those in which He necessarily ends, being of course derived from His intrinsic nature and goodness". Similarly I, p.379: "There is in God an idea, which has the nature of the art and exemplar and principle of God's operations ad extra. If then some rule, norm, law or principle of the divine will and of the laws it makes for the creatures, with the help of outward methods concerning the creature, be posited in God as acceptable and fitting for God, it of course anything but overturns God's essence and will, prime, independent, a!narcon".
This thought is most fully and precisely expounded by Heidegger (Corp. Theol. III, 89-90): "Whatever the nature of the creature's holiness, righteousness and goodness, its first rule and norm with respect to God is not His free will and commands but His actual, essential righteousness. Things are not good, holy and righteous in themselves, because God willed and ordered them. He willed and ordered them because they ought to agree with the holiness of His most pure nature and essential righteousness. With respect to us indeed the source of all righteousness is to be sought nowhere else than in His will, which as most perfect is thus the rule of all righteousness and holiness. But with respect to God, although in those things which have free and positive goodness, as in ceremonies so instituted as also to admit of abolition, God's will is the first rule of righteousness; in those, however, which have innate goodness, the actual will of God derives a rule from no other source than from His essential holiness, righteousness and goodness or from His most Holy nature. Just as we are forthwith held to follow the free will and order of God of whatever kind, so we are bidden imitate God's holiness and righteousness, Lev. 19. 2 (ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy) Eph. 5. 2 (walk in love, even as Christ also loved you) 1 Cor. 11. 1 (hold fast the traditions) 2 Pet. 1. 4 (that through the promises ye might become partakers of the divine nature) Eph. 4. 24 (the new man which after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth). God is not subject to moral duty ad extra. He can be bound by no one. Nor does He depend either on another outside Himself or is liable to any law. But because He cannot deny Himself or conceal His excellences, He cannot fight against Himself and His holiness and truthfulness. He is a law unto Himself. Nor is He so absolved from all matter of law, that He can always do, enjoin and sanction the opposite. And God is also free ad extra, but not indifferent.
 
Is God passive in anything? (I know it's a very open questions...)

I think this question somewhat relates to another recent thread involving God's role in reprobation. Does God actively harden those who are reprobate or does He just sit back and allow an already depraved heart to continue in depravity?

Romans 9:18 "So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills."

I don't believe that this passage would be talking about a few select men. I believe this has a wider application to it. Would God select a few to harden then the rest who aren't elect just roam around on their own will?
 
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