What exactly do we mean by "Autonomy"?

[jwright82]

You misunderstand my meaning: the beauty of skepticism is that you don't actually have to advance a positive position.

You are absolutly right if I were giving a direct strong deductive Modal argument, but I'm giving a TA so the rules are slightly different. Its like the term warranted assertibility, if the unbeleiver does not explain the thing in question than they have no warrant to assert anything about that thing.

Again, I would highly recommend Thomas Reid, who deconstructs this idea that there are no givens.

I'm waiting on tax return but it is one of those books I intend to buy, I even know where to get it at (if and when I get it I'll let you know what I think).

Again, this assumes a question that the unbeliever does not answer because either a) he doesn't understand exactly what he's being asked to prove b) he may see no need for metaphysics c) he may see no need for such an accounting d) he may just play the necessarily true card.

I think I see where you are going. If you prefer in your apologetic to not deal with such metaphysical abstractions than more power to you, this is the aproech that prefer on a practical level. I don't particularly like to criticize other Christian's aproech to apologetics so, I won't change that here. But logically this is an area that can be pressed on the unbeleiver, whether they like it or not. Remember Hitler probally saw nothing wrong with what he did, and probally saw no reason to debate it but he was still evil.

Maybe it's just my poor pre-Kantian notion of proof, but I saw no demands for any such thing in your proof. Why does a WV have to provide clear answers to every philosophical problem? Even Christianity contains a lot of paradox and mystery.

Well I did say that this "proof" would be very simplicistic and in a real setting it would get more complicated, also a whole book could be writen on a TA for just one thing like logic. Mystery and paradox are fine, it is just these play out in a particuler WV that matters.

Not quite--I would say that we all know what logic is, even though the definition is a bit tricky. Thus, we try various definitions until we find one that is sufficient to tell us what exactly logic is.

Were not talking about definitions as much as explinations.

But that's easy--most WVs do allow for logic, in fact they take it as an essential presupposition. You are assuming a view of WV that says that all WVs depend on a couple of basic premises where I would see a much larger base, some of which is just grounded in reality. You assume that all WVs are complete self-contained systems like the philosophies of Descartes, Russell, or Leibniz. In fact, though, the fact of the matter is that most worldviews are a whole lot bigger and fuzzier.

I agree with you on the "fuzzyness" of WVs, that is why it is imperative for the presupossitionalist to ask questions of the unbeleiver to get a feel for their WV, because we are finite we don't have all the answers to every question and we can't know everything.

 

[Philip]

You are absolutly right if I were giving a direct strong deductive Modal argument, but I'm giving a TA so the rules are slightly different. Its like the term warranted assertibility, if the unbeleiver does not explain the thing in question than they have no warrant to assert anything about that thing.

Why should the rules be different for a TA than for a deductive or inductive argument? What is it about a TA that makes it an epistemological trump card?

But logically this is an area that can be pressed on the unbeleiver, whether they like it or not.

That's news to them--I would argue that you're talking past the unbeliever (certainly, you'd be talking past me).

Remember Hitler probally saw nothing wrong with what he did, and probally saw no reason to debate it but he was still evil.

Wow--does Godwin's law actually work?

Well I did say that this "proof" would be very simplicistic and in a real setting it would get more complicated

That may be a practicality issue. Not only would the unbeliever not follow you, you'd have to flesh out the argument so much as to make its usefulness in a debate setting (ie: with time limits on speeches) suspect.

Were not talking about definitions as much as explinations.

You were speaking about explaining what a thing is--isn't that simply definition? Or do we have to define things by origins now? I would argue that this would be ridiculous in any other context, why should apologetics be privileged over other disciplines?

I agree with you on the "fuzzyness" of WVs, that is why it is imperative for the presupossitionalist to ask questions of the unbeleiver to get a feel for their WV, because we are finite we don't have all the answers to every question and we can't know everything.

And the thing we have to understand is that because we can't explain everything, the presuppositional method can be used against the Christian--it's a two-edged sword.

The trouble here is that the TA works by trying to vindicate logic or whatever--a noble goal, but beside the point for the apologist. The apologist's task is to prove that God--the Christian God--is there and is not silent. In reality, the TA ends up being just a (highly entertaining) philosophical game. I love playing philosophical games (it's part of why I love philosophy) but in apologetics, I'm more concerned with showing a) that God is there b) that the unbeliever doesn't have a reason for denying this (answers to objections) c) that God is good (the existential side of apologetics).

 

[Peairtach]

Here's the critique:

Assume 1-5

6a. In the Christian WV there is a Transcendant source of ethics
6b. In the Islamic WV there is a Transcendent source of ethics
6c. In the Buddhist WV there is a Transcendent source of ethics
6d. In the Taoist WV there is a transcendent source of ethics

See the problem? All that the skeptic has to do is posit a couple of possible alternatives without recommending any one of them. Unless there is a necessary connection or at least an analyzable argument, all we're left with here is a Kierkegaardian leap.

It seems to me that we have a couple of non sequitors here, since there is no "probable" and no necessary connection.

But do the God/gods/non-gods of the other religions provide an adequate foundation for ethics? Or are they sinking sand?

For their rock is not as our Rock; our enemies are by themselves (Deut. 32:31, ESV)


The foundations of the religions need to be compared transcendentally. This book is a good start on it and can be bought on another day than the Lord's Day:-

http://www.amazon.co.uk/World-Diffe...=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1267373993&sr=1-3

http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/...e=UTF8&n=266239&s=books&qid=1267373993&sr=1-3

 

[Philip]

Richard, what exactly do you mean by "adequate"? Is there an objective standard of adequacy to which the apologist can appeal and have the unbeliever accept? Or does "adequate" here simply mean, "satisfying to the apologist"? If this is the case, then presuppositionalism starts to look a whole lot like skepticism.

 

[Peairtach]

Internally coherent.

Have you got a better way of comparing false worldviews with Christianity than examining and comparing their foundations?

The Christian apologist starts with the non-sceptical belief that not all worldviews are true apart from Christianity. Then he compares the basic foundations of the worldview being discussed with those of Christianity, to reveal the internal incoherence and incoherence with reality of the false worldview, compared with Christianity.

It seems like a rational way of discussing and debating worldviews, which involve the basic assumptions/premises of the debaters.

Ultimately the apologetic will only be as good as the ability of the apologist to point out the incoherence of the false worldviews and the coherence of the Christian worldview.

It will only be fully satisfying to the target of the apologetic if he is converted by it, by the blessing of the Holy Spirit removing the sinful prejudice; but if not it may be a link in the chain.

The same was true for the Apostle Paul when reasoning with various unbelievers.

The Christian starts with his faith in God, the Muslim with his faith in Allah, the Buddhist with his faith in what he believes is ultimate. Which foundation is self-coherent and accords with reality? Obviously the Christian One. This isn't obvious to e.g. the Buddhist, but it is the task of the apologist to show the internal incoherence of the Buddhist worldview and its lack of coherence with agreed reality.

Only the Holy Spirit can bless the apologetic encounter, just as only the Holy Spirit can bless what is more generally called preaching and evangelism. But at the same time there is good preaching, evangelism, philosophy and apologetics, and not so good.

 

[Philip]

Internally coherent.

This seems to be an incomplete definition. Freudianism, by your definition, would be adequate because it is internally coherent even though it has, in fact, little basis in reality. If I were refuting a Freudian, would I apply an internal critique? No--I would apply an external one because its assertions are ridiculous.

The Christian apologist starts with the non-sceptical belief that not all worldviews are true apart from Christianity. Then he compares the basic foundations of the worldview being discussed with those of Christianity, to reveal the internal incoherence and incoherence with reality of the false worldview, compared with Christianity.

Comparing a worldview with Christianity is well and good, but it can only show that Christianity is better, not that Christianity is best.

What standard are we using in doing this? Common sense (Reid, Hodge)? Indubitability (Descartes)? Empirical data (Russell, Hume)? Evidence (James, Clifford)? And on what basis will you argue for that standard if it isn't commonly held?

It will only be fully satisfying to the target of the apologetic if he is converted by it, by the blessing of the Holy Spirit removing the sinful prejudice; but if not it may be a link in the chain.

But the apologist's task is to expose that prejudice in hope that the Holy Spirit will free him from it to judge rightly. By prejudice, I of course mean "unwarranted assumption that interferes with judgment."

Only the Holy Spirit can bless the apologetic encounter, just as only the Holy Spirit can bless what is more generally called preaching and evangelism. But at the same time there is good preaching, evangelism, philosophy and apologetics, and not so good.

Amen, which is why we need to be sure that our apologetic methods are warranted by Scripture and common sense.

 

[jwright82]

is this post closed?

 

[jwright82]

Wow--does Godwin's law actually work?

Yes it would seem it does. Hitler is the epitamy of evil inmost minds so this is probaly why Godwin is right. The incorect use of the "Reducto ad Hitleriam" is when you accuse someone of being Hitler, just to make their P.O.V. look bad.

That's news to them--I would argue that you're talking past the unbeliever (certainly, you'd be talking past me).

If I understand you correctly than this is one of those areas where the Clasicalist and the Presopossitionalist differ. CA allows the unbeleiver to take certian notions and ideas for granted as supossidly nuetral, which they are not completly nuetral at all. Now if this method of apologetics works for you then go for it. I prefer the PA aproech because it attacks the very roots of their WV allowing nothing to be taken for granted. Every supossidly nuetral word or idea must be justified withen their WV to make sense.
Assuming things to be true on a methodological level in a debate is just fine, my assumptions I have already layed out or the atheist thinking religion is evil. But to assume something to be true, in the sense of beyond debate, and using it to formulate your argument without proving it first is bad argumentation skills, an example of this would be when an atheist says that evolution proves a certian thing to be true but they also say that evolution is so true that they will not debate it.

Why should the rules be different for a TA than for a deductive or inductive argument? What is it about a TA that makes it an epistemological trump card?

The form of an argument determines its uniqueness. An inductive vs. a deductive form are both slightly different from one another. Also the idea of proof changes from non-traditional logical system to non-traditional logical system. Your still trying to lump them all together in one form.

you'd have to flesh out the argument so much as to make its usefulness in a debate setting (ie: with time limits on speeches) suspect.

Yeah this where Bahnsen was little weak but two things must be noted about that debate:
1. Nearly everyone, including Stien himself, thought that Bahnsen dominated the debate
2. Even John Fame, who is critical of Van Til on some major points, admited because of this, and other debates, that he though that Bahnsen was the greatest Christian debator of the time.
I feel as though better tecniques must be developed to make up for the mistakes that Bahnsen made, like asserting over and over again that Stien did really believe in God I mean how much time did that waste.

Not only would the unbeliever not follow you

It seems to me that both CA and PA both on some level both allow the unbeleiver to determine the method of apologetic, just from two different ways. You seem to make whether they would "not see the need in dealing with these with these questions" a primary goal for the apologets, but how is that not pandering to them unecassaraly? The PA on the other hand makes their own internal contraditions the determining factor for their method.

You were speaking about explaining what a thing is--isn't that simply definition? Or do we have to define things by origins now?

No it is not, defining what logic is is not explaining its exsistance. Do you really believe that an absolute naturalistic metaphysical theory could consistanly give the same explination for logic as a Chritian metaphysical theory would?

I would argue that this would be ridiculous in any other context, why should apologetics be privileged over other disciplines?

Two things here. The TA was a standered method of proof from Kant to the Post-Kantians on through the Idealists, so your statement here is a little stretching it. When the Pragmatists and the Analytical philosophers reacted against Idealism they kinda through this out with it, but as far as I can tell this was not one of their major concerns about Idealism (this could be an example of "throwing the baby out with the bath water"). Also something like the philosophy of science would, on a basic level, qualify as being one big TA (what are the preconditions to making science possible as we experiance it).

And the thing we have to understand is that because we can't explain everything, the presuppositional method can be used against the Christian--it's a two-edged sword.

In this sense logic is a two edged sword. Also you havn't produced, as far as I can tell, a single legitemate example of an unbeleiving TA that cancels out mine. Saying that something is theoretically possible is one thing but without some kind of concrete example it doesn't hold much water.

The trouble here is that the TA works by trying to vindicate logic or whatever--a noble goal, but beside the point for the apologist. The apologist's task is to prove that God--the Christian God--is there and is not silent. In reality, the TA ends up being just a (highly entertaining) philosophical game. I love playing philosophical games (it's part of why I love philosophy) but in apologetics, I'm more concerned with showing a) that God is there b) that the unbeliever doesn't have a reason for denying this (answers to objections) c) that God is good (the existential side of apologetics).

All you have done here is held up the CA method as the only legitemate one, which you have merely asserted not proven. If the TA a) indirectly proves God b) destroys the unbeleiver's very notion of rationality c) doesn't allow the unbeleiver to take anything for granted, I mean how is this not a valid method?

 

[Philip]

I prefer the PA aproech because it attacks the very roots of their WV allowing nothing to be taken for granted. Every supossidly nuetral word or idea must be justified withen their WV to make sense.

If nothing is taken for granted, then there is no worldview at all. Without givens, there is no debate because there is nothing to deconstruct. Even Christianity has givens.

In most WVs, logic, sense perception, and such are just givens--axiomatic.

The form of an argument determines its uniqueness. An inductive vs. a deductive form are both slightly different from one another. Also the idea of proof changes from non-traditional logical system to non-traditional logical system. Your still trying to lump them all together in one form.

Again, maybe it's just that I am a pre-modern (non-classical) foundationalist, but I simply see no reason why the metaphysical account of a thing has any bearing on whether his critique of your position is valid. Unless the critique itself presupposes something invalid, then you have to answer it. If you could explain the reasoning behind the TA that makes it able to make this kind of (to me) unusual demand.

Again, I'm taking a more or less common sense epistemology as a given, so if the argument wouldn't hold up in a courtroom or debate setting, then it shouldn't hold up here.

Yeah this where Bahnsen was little weak but two things must be noted about that debate:
1. Nearly everyone, including Stien himself, thought that Bahnsen dominated the debate
2. Even John Fame, who is critical of Van Til on some major points, admited because of this, and other debates, that he though that Bahnsen was the greatest Christian debator of the time.

I honestly don't think Stein knew what he was doing. Also, the way Bahnsen phrased the argument meant that he failed in his burden of proof and therefore in the debate. Wiping the floor with your opponent is fun, but pointless unless you produce a plausible argument for your own position--and I just didn't see Bahnsen doing that. The way he phrased it, Bahnsen's burden was to prove that the proposition "God does not exist" is self-referentially incoherent, which he did not do.

No it is not, defining what logic is is not explaining its exsistance.

If you're referring to the principle of sufficient reason, then all the unbeliever has to do is claim aseity (or, of course, he could deny PSR, as it is unprovable).

Two things here. The TA was a standered method of proof from Kant to the Post-Kantians on through the Idealists, so your statement here is a little stretching it. When the Pragmatists and the Analytical philosophers reacted against Idealism they kinda through this out with it, but as far as I can tell this was not one of their major concerns about Idealism (this could be an example of "throwing the baby out with the bath water"). Also something like the philosophy of science would, on a basic level, qualify as being one big TA (what are the preconditions to making science possible as we experiance it).

Currently, I'm wondering if Transcendental Argumentation actually makes sense. As far as I can tell, it doesn't actually prove anything definite--and certainly the same rules of argumentation and logic would apply to it as to any other type of argument.

Again, I'm more or less Pre-Kantian common sense in my assumptions. I don't think a TA would hold up in a courtroom or debate round and so I don't think it holds up in philosophy.

All you have done here is held up the CA method as the only legitemate one, which you have merely asserted not proven. If the TA a) indirectly proves God b) destroys the unbeleiver's very notion of rationality c) doesn't allow the unbeleiver to take anything for granted, I mean how is this not a valid method?

And this is my contention: the TA a) is inconclusive on the existence of God (aka, the conclusion of the argument is not "God exists" but "God is one possible explanation for rationality") b) doesn't address the unbeliever's notion of rationality (aka, I'm still not getting why positing one explanation necessitates a counter-explanation) c) assumes that there are givens (necessary for debate to take place).

As I recall, the TA is not necessary to PA (see also: John Frame), so I'm not doubting the validity of PA in certain contexts. However, the TA just (in my humble opinion) doesn't demonstrate anything conclusive. It builds a foundation the size of the great pyramid's and then places a tiny little obelisk on top. Nice obelisk, but hardly a justification for a foundation of such massive proportions.

A valid argument is only as good as what it actually does.

 

[jwright82]

If nothing is taken for granted, then there is no worldview at all. Without givens, there is no debate because there is nothing to deconstruct. Even Christianity has givens.

In most WVs, logic, sense perception, and such are just givens--axiomatic.

Here is one major difference between Clark and Bahnsen's take on Van Til, For Clark there are basic axioms that comprise the base of a WV but for Bahnsen this is a much more complex issue. The various beleifs that comprise a WV are developed in various ways and therefore must be treated individually as far as warrent goes but if you take the whole WV then you are not as worried about how they came to believe what they believe only the consitancy and applicability, to reality, of the total WV.
If the unbeleiver thinks that Christians are taking something for granted then they can point it out, so far in debating them I have never seen one.

Again, maybe it's just that I am a pre-modern (non-classical) foundationalist, but I simply see no reason why the metaphysical account of a thing has any bearing on whether his critique of your position is valid. Unless the critique itself presupposes something invalid, then you have to answer it. If you could explain the reasoning behind the TA that makes it able to make this kind of (to me) unusual demand.

Again, I'm taking a more or less common sense epistemology as a given, so if the argument wouldn't hold up in a courtroom or debate setting, then it shouldn't hold up here

I don't know about a court room setting, they must take things for granted just to function, but in a debate sure. Take the Atheistic Materialist (AM), they produce some critique of my WV, against miracles for instance, the conversation can take 2 different routes (I will only deal with one, also I like to try to respond to everything you write, because it is only fair to you, so I won't quote everything you say since you repeat this issue further in your post.)

The AM points out that miriacles are far fetched on a scientific level, which is of course debatable, he/she declares that reasonable people cannot possibly believe in a virgin birth. I could ask them what their metaphysical theory of the universe is, they would of course be surprised here but I would insist that they just humor me and they mention Naturalism as their theory. I would then ask what theory of mind they belong too, because there are differences among AM. They could respond with whatever I would then demonstrate how on their own proffessed Theories reason and even beliefs themselves don't make sense. I might even employ Lewis' famous argument from reason, against naturalism (or some form of it). After debating this I would point out that if they can't even make sense out of reason itself why should I even answer their question? If their whole house (appeal to the authority of reason) is built on crumbling foundations (innadequete metaphysical explinaitions) then they have no finished product (authority of reason).
They might respond with saying I'm in the same boat as them, I would then lay out the Christian WV on this matter and show how in the Christian WV the whole foundationalist/non-foundationalist debate is completly irrelavent and the authority of reason rests on God's thoughts about things and our repeating these thoughts in our use of reason. Therefore the foundation of reason, in the Christian WV, is God's eternal being.

I honestly don't think Stein knew what he was doing. Also, the way Bahnsen phrased the argument meant that he failed in his burden of proof and therefore in the debate. Wiping the floor with your opponent is fun, but pointless unless you produce a plausible argument for your own position--and I just didn't see Bahnsen doing that. The way he phrased it, Bahnsen's burden was to prove that the proposition "God does not exist" is self-referentially incoherent, which he did not do.

Again I would base my opinions of Bahnsen's ideas on more than just his debate here.

Currently, I'm wondering if Transcendental Argumentation actually makes sense. As far as I can tell, it doesn't actually prove anything definite--and certainly the same rules of argumentation and logic would apply to it as to any other type of argument.

Again you asserting that everyform of arguments must be the strong deductive Modal type, but I have seen no proof of this.

Again, I'm more or less Pre-Kantian common sense in my assumptions. I don't think a TA would hold up in a courtroom or debate round and so I don't think it holds up in philosophy.

There is nothing wrong with that, from what I understand Ried represented a different answer to Hume's criticism over Kant so maybe it might hold water. My only worry is that it seems to takes too much for granted logically speaking. Also there have been excellant studies done on why the the modern project that stated with Descarte was doomed for failure from the beggining. My question about Ried would be how he escaped these systemic failures in modernism? Read the book Introducing Radical Orthodoxy by James K. A. Smiths, also the Christian thinker who lives in canada and is connected to RZIM Joe Boot.

And this is my contention: the TA a) is inconclusive on the existence of God (aka, the conclusion of the argument is not "God exists" but "God is one possible explanation for rationality") b) doesn't address the unbeliever's notion of rationality (aka, I'm still not getting why positing one explanation necessitates a counter-explanation) c) assumes that there are givens (necessary for debate to take place).

Well it seems here that we come from different philosophical traditions, which we have both already admited, so perhaps that is an strong area of disagreement between us, we both want to frame the discussion in our respective traditions.

As I recall, the TA is not necessary to PA (see also: John Frame), so I'm not doubting the validity of PA in certain contexts. However, the TA just (in my humble opinion) doesn't demonstrate anything conclusive. It builds a foundation the size of the great pyramid's and then places a tiny little obelisk on top. Nice obelisk, but hardly a justification for a foundation of such massive proportions.

A valid argument is only as good as what it actually does.

Frame may admit this but I don't know of anyone else who would, they are probally out there though. My question for Frame would be is he trying to do what it seems you are trying to do and make a strong deductive Modal form of an argument the only legitemate form? I don't know but he seems to have a good grasp on the whole history of philosophy so, I can't say.

 

[Philip]

Here is one major difference between Clark and Bahnsen's take on Van Til, For Clark there are basic axioms that comprise the base of a WV but for Bahnsen this is a much more complex issue. The various beleifs that comprise a WV are developed in various ways and therefore must be treated individually as far as warrent goes but if you take the whole WV then you are not as worried about how they came to believe what they believe only the consitancy and applicability, to reality, of the total WV.

The question, then, is how a worldview functions. What exactly do you mean by "consistency" for instance? You seem to be taking it differently than I am. If, for example, you can find a direct contradiction between a WV's epistemology and its metaphysic, then you have something. If, though, all you find is a transcendental disconnect, all you've proved is that both are basic to it.

don't know about a court room setting, they must take things for granted just to function, but in a debate sure.

Actually, in debate you do as well--otherwise it would be a shouting match. For example, a debate is expected to be conducted in the same language and using the same laws of reasoning. Without these things, a debate cannot happen--by the act of debating, you admit that there are givens.

The trouble with the TA is that it is asking a question that only a small subset of epistemologists actually ask and an even smaller number have an answer to. The assumption that you are making is that one is unjustified in using reason unless one has a plausible metaphysical explanation for it. However, this assumption is not shared by most. I am justified in using a car, even though I can't explain the physics of internal combustion. I am justified in learning even though I don't (yet) understand the psychology of learning (and, really, no one does yet). What privileges epistemology? Why is agnosticism allowed in school and on the road and yet not in epistemology?

Again, just because you can prove you have a nice theory (which is all the TA really does) doesn't mean that it's true, it proves that you have a nice theory. Phlogiston is a nice theory that explains a lot: it also happens to be false.

Again you asserting that everyform of arguments must be the strong deductive Modal type, but I have seen no proof of this.

And I haven't seen you show me why the form of the TA proves anything more than that Christianity is a nice theory that explains a lot. I haven't seen why one TA demands another as refutation.

Also, what exactly do you mean by "modal". I mentioned the use you were making of the term to a logic professor who was unsure of exactly what you meant by the term.

There is nothing wrong with that, from what I understand Ried represented a different answer to Hume's criticism over Kant so maybe it might hold water. My only worry is that it seems to takes too much for granted logically speaking.

But that's based on a modern assumption that there are no givens: Reid argued that there are quite a lot of givens. For example, we can take it as a given that the things that I distinctly remember really did happen, that our sensations are of a reality that exists outside our minds, and that there are actually other minds in the world. Reid argued that if a line of argumentation would be silly in a courtroom, it's silly in philosophy. He argued that the givens of everyday life should be the givens of philosophy. It's the common sense or direct realist approach (Alvin Plantinga is a major proponent of this view).

Well it seems here that we come from different philosophical traditions, which we have both already admited, so perhaps that is an strong area of disagreement between us, we both want to frame the discussion in our respective traditions.

Which may actually highlight a problem for your position--why does the unbeliever have to accept transcendental argumentation at all? Just why can't there be givens? Are there properly basic assumptions that need no further warrant? Why does the unbeliever have to be able to tell a transcendental story about reason in order to be justified in using it? Seems to me that all he has to be able to do is show that he knows that reason is true by showing that it is properly basic.

 

[jwright82]

The question, then, is how a worldview functions. What exactly do you mean by "consistency" for instance? You seem to be taking it differently than I am. If, for example, you can find a direct contradiction between a WV's epistemology and its metaphysic, then you have something. If, though, all you find is a transcendental disconnect, all you've proved is that both are basic to it.

A WV is the web of beleifs we use:
1. In interpreting the world around us
2. Functioning in reality and society
3. aquisition of new knowledge
The list could probally go on but I hope you get the gist of it.

Actually, in debate you do as well--otherwise it would be a shouting match. For example, a debate is expected to be conducted in the same language and using the same laws of reasoning. Without these things, a debate cannot happen--by the act of debating, you admit that there are givens.

I admit only that they are neceassery for debate sure, but not that they are these givens which we cannot analyze or expalin. If I debate an AM and I show how their WV destroys the notion of reason and beleifs than that would raise the question as to why they are debating in the first place, a TA is possible for the very act of debate as well (Bahnsen alluded to this in his debate I believe).

The assumption that you are making is that one is unjustified in using reason unless one has a plausible metaphysical explanation for it.

Why is this unjustified? Also a TA is not a plausible explination at all, again you are lumping all the forms of arguments together.

The trouble with the TA is that it is asking a question that only a small subset of epistemologists actually ask and an even smaller number have an answer to.

Everyone has a WV, every WV has an implcit answer as well. A theory of mind or reality has logical consequences and one of those will be the nature of reason itself.

However, this assumption is not shared by most. I am justified in using a car, even though I can't explain the physics of internal combustion. I am justified in learning even though I don't (yet) understand the psychology of learning (and, really, no one does yet). What privileges epistemology? Why is agnosticism allowed in school and on the road and yet not in epistemology?

This is only a difference in methodology, the CA verses PA. If you wish to not deal with these issues that go for it, but I wish to press the unbeleiver on these issues.

Again, just because you can prove you have a nice theory (which is all the TA really does) doesn't mean that it's true, it proves that you have a nice theory. Phlogiston is a nice theory that explains a lot: it also happens to be false.

And I haven't seen you show me why the form of the TA proves anything more than that Christianity is a nice theory that explains a lot. I haven't seen why one TA demands another as refutation.

These two statements are lumping all forms of arguments together again.

Also, what exactly do you mean by "modal". I mentioned the use you were making of the term to a logic professor who was unsure of exactly what you meant by the term.

In the discussion, and links given, the word modal was used as a synonim for a strong view of necessaty. The forms of arguments given were of a modal form, possible world scenerios and the like, so I thought I would use the word instead of necessaty because everyone was using it already. I have refrained from using the word necessaty because I think you allow for one meaning and that is the strong version, does that clear it up?

But that's based on a modern assumption that there are no givens: Reid argued that there are quite a lot of givens. For example, we can take it as a given that the things that I distinctly remember really did happen, that our sensations are of a reality that exists outside our minds, and that there are actually other minds in the world. Reid argued that if a line of argumentation would be silly in a courtroom, it's silly in philosophy. He argued that the givens of everyday life should be the givens of philosophy. It's the common sense or direct realist approach (Alvin Plantinga is a major proponent of this view).

In philosophy there are no givens. Now I am all about common sense in philosophy, but from a more Wittgenstienian P.O.V. These "givens" are actually some of the most central elements in any WV. I think the court room may be a bad analogy but if you want I think the place of an expert testamony is somewhat like a TA. If an expert witness gets up for the defense and the prosecutor shows that through considering their backround they have no right to actually be asserting what they are, than that in rough form is a basic TA of the expert's expertese.

Which may actually highlight a problem for your position--why does the unbeliever have to accept transcendental argumentation at all?

Your point would be well taken if I invented some new form of argumentation, then the unbeleiver could rightly claim that the burden of proof was on me for proving its validity as a form of argumentation. But in the case of TA the unbeleiver must analytically show why all forms of TA invalid, this is a nearly impossible task. If they simply say they don't accept it but can't give me any reason why, than they have the problem not me. Remember I never said the form of argumentation that you prefer was invalid, only that it may not apply to all beleifs. I also pointed out that if you believe that all forms of argumentation must be of this strong "necessatty" form than you would have to prove that.

Seems to me that all he has to be able to do is show that he knows that reason is true by showing that it is properly basic.

Much easier said than done. This view point is riddled with problems. What is the criteria for being "properly basic"? To my knowledge there is no consensus on this so it would do no one any good by throwing this phrase around.

Why does the unbeliever have to be able to tell a transcendental story about reason in order to be justified in using it?

Only if this were the line of argumentation I wished to employ. Like I said I could go in manydifferent directions but this is one of them. I could never raise the issue of explaining reason and let them keep on using it, but challenge their WV in other ways.

 

[Philip]

A WV is the web of beleifs we use:
1. In interpreting the world around us
2. Functioning in reality and society
3. aquisition of new knowledge
The list could probally go on but I hope you get the gist of it.

Whereas I see it as an edifice of beliefs built on a few foundational beliefs from which the others are derived.

I admit only that they are neceassery for debate sure, but not that they are these givens which we cannot analyze or expalin. If I debate an AM and I show how their WV destroys the notion of reason and beleifs than that would raise the question as to why they are debating in the first place, a TA is possible for the very act of debate as well (Bahnsen alluded to this in his debate I believe).

If this were really true, then the debate should not be allowed to continue because you've proven that a) the non-believer cannot reason b) therefore the non-believer cannot be reasoned with c) therefore further discussion would be pointless.

Why is this unjustified? Also a TA is not a plausible explination at all, again you are lumping all the forms of arguments together.

It's unjustified because you are asking the non-believer to provide a very sophisticated philosophical argument in order to justify your debating him at all. Just how many non-believers do you know who would even be able to understand your argument, much less be able to provide a counter-argument? I'm still not sure I understand your argument, since you are claiming a whole lot more for it than is warranted by the actual argument.

Again, please explain to me exactly how the TA provides more than a plausible explanation (ie: more than the conclusion warrants). I keep asking you to explain why exactly you feel justified in claiming more for the TA than the argument itself seems to warrant. I have asked a logician what you might mean here and he point-blank denied that your giving a TA in any way necessitates the non-believer providing a counter-TA.

Everyone has a WV, every WV has an implcit answer as well. A theory of mind or reality has logical consequences and one of those will be the nature of reason itself.

How do you know this? Have you examined every worldview?

This is only a difference in methodology, the CA verses PA. If you wish to not deal with these issues that go for it, but I wish to press the unbeleiver on these issues.

And I am saying that your pressing this issue in this situation is unjustified because a) he would not be asked to do this in any other discipline b) he may not actually have an answer--agnosticism is a perfectly fine position. It's perfectly legitimate for him to say "I don't know what metaphysical preconditions are necessary for reason (or whatever), but since they are necessary for this debate to proceed, I am justified in using it."

These two statements are lumping all forms of arguments together again.

How so? I keep asking you to explain exactly how you think the TA operates on a completely different plane. The conclusion doesn't justify the strength you seem to want to give it (unless you're really operating on Van Til/Bahnsen's coherence view of knowledge).

In the discussion, and links given, the word modal was used as a synonim for a strong view of necessaty. The forms of arguments given were of a modal form, possible world scenerios and the like, so I thought I would use the word instead of necessaty because everyone was using it already. I have refrained from using the word necessaty because I think you allow for one meaning and that is the strong version, does that clear it up?

It shows that you're misunderstanding my use of logic. I'm asking for the conclusion that God exists to actually follow from the premises of the argument. All that follows from it is that postulating God would provide the metaphysical preconditions necessary for knowledge. It does not follow from the conclusion that God actually exists.

In philosophy there are no givens.

So says the skeptic. This is the road to skepticism. If there are no givens, then you know nothing whatsoever--you are in an epistemic void. To say that there are no givens is to doubt everything--the first mistake of modern epistemology.

I think the court room may be a bad analogy but if you want I think the place of an expert testamony is somewhat like a TA. If an expert witness gets up for the defense and the prosecutor shows that through considering their backround they have no right to actually be asserting what they are, than that in rough form is a basic TA of the expert's expertese.

A TA is not a witness, but the argument used by the defense attorney.

But in the case of TA the unbeleiver must analytically show why all forms of TA invalid, this is a nearly impossible task. If they simply say they don't accept it but can't give me any reason why, than they have the problem not me.

But as I keep pointing out, the argument may be valid, but the conclusion is too weak to actually warrant my believing in Christianity.

In the courtroom scenario, your prosecution strategy is to call up the witness, have him testify, give a theory as to how this is possible and tell the defense, "Now prove that your position is justified." At this point, all the defense attorney has to do is point out to the judge that the prosecution has shown that his theory explains a lot, but it doesn't prove that his theory is actually correct. The defense, remember, only has a burden of disproof: prove that the prosecutor's arguments are inconclusive.

Your point would be well taken if I invented some new form of argumentation, then the unbeleiver could rightly claim that the burden of proof was on me for proving its validity as a form of argumentation. But in the case of TA the unbeleiver must analytically show why all forms of TA invalid, this is a nearly impossible task.

If you would explain exactly why the TA's rather inconclusive "conclusion" proves anything other than what I have said, then maybe I will be able to answer this. Exactly why does a transcendental argument necessitate a transcendental counter-argument? Again, the logician I talked to thought this was nonsense.

Only if this were the line of argumentation I wished to employ. Like I said I could go in manydifferent directions but this is one of them. I could never raise the issue of explaining reason and let them keep on using it, but challenge their WV in other ways.

This is just a dodge. The question I keep asking is this: Why does the unbeliever in order to justify his assumption of __fill-in-the-blank__ have to tell a metaphysical story about why this is possible? Why can't the assumption be properly basic?

 

[jwright82]

Whereas I see it as an edifice of beliefs built on a few foundational beliefs from which the others are derived.

There may only be semantical differences between your view here and mine. Are you familier with the whole foundationalist/non-foundationalist debate?

If this were really true, then the debate should not be allowed to continue because you've proven that a) the non-believer cannot reason b) therefore the non-believer cannot be reasoned with c) therefore further discussion would be pointless.

This isn't a statement about whether or not the unbeleiver can actually debate or not it is only about their WV, which we Christians believe is wrong.

I have asked a logician what you might mean here and he point-blank denied that your giving a TA in any way necessitates the non-believer providing a counter-TA.

Only if he/she cannot critique my TA. They cannot sit back, logically speaking, and say I don't accept your TA but I'm not going to give an explination to the problem but lets reason anyway. You may be ok with debating them but I would choose on methodological grounds to press them here. Your teacher is correct but if someone were to criticize my TA, it would be perfectly legitemate of me to respond with asking them to come up with a better solution, it is not as though the debate gods have declared that to be an illegitmate response on my part. If I criticized Reid's response to Hume than it would be perfectly legitemate of you to ask me to come up with a better solution.

Now it seems that your post is roughly divided into two major disagreements we are having so I will save space and try to deal with those in some detail.

1. You seem to only accept the deductive "strong necessaty" (is that the right word to describe your view?) as the only valid form of an argument. Now the form of this argument is a logically different form of argument from inductive, TAs, and some non-traditional forms of logic so this presents a problem for you. You must demonstrate why even though they have different forms of arguments different from the one you prefer to use but they at the end of the day are really concealed forms of the one you prefer to use. Or that they may be different but that the burden of proof your prefered form has is the only valid one anyway?
Even if you answer that question you still have problems to deal with; like the fact that I have never seen a form of the classical arguments that could ever meet your burden of proof. Also your burden of proof can't apply to all beleifs, and it doesn't account for the complexities of the human beings. In fact if Gordon Clark is right the classical arguments are all based on induction and therefore are formal fallacies.
2. We seem to be having a lot of trouble wrestling with the idea of a TA. You seem, in connection with the above point, to demand that I directly prove the exsistance of God with this proof. Since I am not making a direct argument I don't really have to answer that question, unless of course you provide an answer to point 1, or until you show why I can only give a direct argument. You want to prove God's exsistance directly, good do it, I wish to provide an indirect proof, but this is not a logical problem but a methodological issue only. Also from a biblical P.O.V. why do think it is wise to allow the unbeleiver, who the bible declares is biased against the truth, to set all rules? Do you really think those rules will be fair? Calvinism does have epistomological consequences to it, how do those play out in your prefered method?

If your ok with this I think we can reduce our discussion down to these 2 points rather than debating 20 things at once.

 

[Philip]

The question, as I see it, is this:

The conclusion of the TA does not yield a compelling reason for the unbeliever to accept the existence of God as the actual precondition for knowledge and therefore it yields no compelling reason for the unbeliever to posit a counter-argument. You say that it does so indirectly, yet somehow, I'm just not getting the connection. Can you please describe to me in detail how exactly it does this?

Even Kant's transcendental arguments only describe possible preconditions rather than actual ones.

Also, what exactly do you mean by "indirect"? Do you mean that the conclusion makes it likely that God exists?

In fact if Gordon Clark is right the classical arguments are all based on induction and therefore are formal fallacies.

I do admit induction, first of all, as a generally reliable method of proof, else I would not be a common sense philosopher (unlike Clark). Sometime I will actually produce and defend my analysis and defense of certain forms of the ontological argument.

In dealing with the unbeliever, my argument is most likely going to be a common sense one: calling the unbeliever to set aside unreasonable prejudice and actually look at the evidence which God has put before all. If the Holy Spirit is truly working in him, then he may actually do so--my job is to present the arguments and evidence, but it is the job of the Holy Spirit to convince.

If I criticized Reid's response to Hume than it would be perfectly legitemate of you to ask me to come up with a better solution.

And it would be perfectly legitimate of you to say, "I don't have one yet." Your critique, though, might be justified regardless of whether or not you actually have an answer to the problem. Again, a skeptic needs no answers, only doubt.

 

[jwright82]

Do you mean that the conclusion makes it likely that God exists?

The classical arguments all have this in common, they are directly trying to prove the exsistance of God, so God's exsistance is the object under discussion. The TA is not trying to prove God's exsistance, God's exsistance is not the object under discussion. The object under discussion is whatever you are doing the transcendental analysis of, so in our discussion this would be morality or reason. So the TA is trying to show things about whatever is under discussion, if God is listed as a precondition for this thing then He indirectly enters the picture, He is not the direct referent of the argument. That is one major difference between the classical arguments and this one.

The conclusion of the TA does not yield a compelling reason for the unbeliever to accept the existence of God as the actual precondition for knowledge and therefore it yields no compelling reason for the unbeliever to posit a counter-argument.

Lets take the example of an atheist who denies that a TA for ethics is possible, how then can they justify using the words good and evil (keep in mind that the second this person gives an answer they are making a TA of some kind)? If they are simply criticizing my TA than you are correct they are not required to give a TA of their own. But if they cannot criticize my argument but simply refuse to accept it than I can ask them to give one of their own, if they refuse to do so than at that point the debate is probally over.
The actuality in the argument comes from the starting point, experiance. We start with something as both people of the debate actually experiance it, reason or whatever, and than analyze the necessary preconditions (or problems that must be solved by a WV) to make it what we actually experiance it as. If my oponant's WV cannot explain it as it actually is than they have no explination at all. Lets take science for example the major problem associated with any transcendental analysis of science will include the following at least a solution to the problem of induction, or some reason why such a solution is impossible.
We actually do science on a daily basis that is the actuality of the argument.

[I do admit induction, first of all, as a generally reliable method of proof, else I would not be a common sense philosopher (unlike Clark).

I do to, my point was that no pure inductive argument could ever meet the burden of proof you seem to be advocating.

Sometime I will actually produce and defend my analysis and defense of certain forms of the ontological argument.

I look foward to it.

In dealing with the unbeliever, my argument is most likely going to be a common sense one: calling the unbeliever to set aside unreasonable prejudice and actually look at the evidence which God has put before all. If the Holy Spirit is truly working in him, then he may actually do so--my job is to present the arguments and evidence, but it is the job of the Holy Spirit to convince.

That is your method, you have yours and I have mine. I also perfectly admit the validity of your method as well. I would gladly stand next to you defending the truth only we would use 2 different methods for doing so.

And it would be perfectly legitimate of you to say, "I don't have one yet." Your critique, though, might be justified regardless of whether or not you actually have an answer to the problem. Again, a skeptic needs no answers, only doubt.

The critic could say this but it doesn't erase the problem, basically if they demolished my TA but didn't have one of their own then that basically would end the debate.

 

[Philip]

The classical arguments all have this in common, they are directly trying to prove the exsistance of God, so God's exsistance is the object under discussion. The TA is not trying to prove God's exsistance, God's exsistance is not the object under discussion. The object under discussion is whatever you are doing the transcendental analysis of, so in our discussion this would be morality or reason.

But is this the job of apologetics? The job of the apologist is to show the unbeliever that God is there. By all means, God is the ground of our philosophy--but do not confuse simple philosophy with apologetics. All that the TAG proves is that the Christian WV has an answer to a question that only a certain subset of philosophers actually ask.

But if they cannot criticize my argument but simply refuse to accept it than I can ask them to give one of their own, if they refuse to do so than at that point the debate is probally over.

You can, but they can, at the very least, claim that they need to do more research before giving an opinion. In a formal context, you simply cannot expect a good counter-TA from an unbeliever who has probably never considered the question before. Again, the argument as it stands gives the unbeliever no reason, direct or indirect, to accept that God exists because he does not share your frame of reference. The TA only works if the unbeliever shares your worldview, which he obviously doesn't.

If my oponant's WV cannot explain it as it actually is than they have no explination at all.

Having no explanation is not the same as having no justification/warrant. A metaphysical explanation (from the unbeliever's POV) may or may not be possible, but the belief may be justified without it.

I do to, my point was that no pure inductive argument could ever meet the burden of proof you seem to be advocating.

Is any inductive argument truly "pure": most inductive arguments can actually be expressed in a valid deductive form without committing a formal fallacy.

The critic could say this but it doesn't erase the problem, basically if they demolished my TA but didn't have one of their own then that basically would end the debate.

Indeed this is so if you take the coherentist/Van Tillian view of knowledge/worldview.

 

[jwright82]

But is this the job of apologetics? The job of the apologist is to show the unbeliever that God is there. By all means, God is the ground of our philosophy--but do not confuse simple philosophy with apologetics. All that the TAG proves is that the Christian WV has an answer to a question that only a certain subset of philosophers actually ask

I can definantly see your point here. I have been trying to break down Van Til's thinking for the person on the street, Bahnsen tried to do this but he was way to philosophical. One thing about apologetics is to challange th eunbeleiver in their blasphamas WV, so this method works.

You can, but they can, at the very least, claim that they need to do more research before giving an opinion. In a formal context, you simply cannot expect a good counter-TA from an unbeliever who has probably never considered the question before.

I agree with you and if this were the answer I got than I wouldn't pursue the matter anymore, apologetics should be done with love.

Again, the argument as it stands gives the unbeliever no reason, direct or indirect, to accept that God exists because he does not share your frame of reference. The TA only works if the unbeliever shares your worldview, which he obviously doesn't.

You are correct that is why it is imperative to include both WVs in the discussion.

Having no explanation is not the same as having no justification/warrant. A metaphysical explanation (from the unbeliever's POV) may or may not be possible, but the belief may be justified without it.

The point is whether their WV can support a metaphysical explinaition of whatever is under discussion.

Is any inductive argument truly "pure": most inductive arguments can actually be expressed in a valid deductive form without committing a formal fallacy.

You may be right but the two forms differ here:
1. A deductive argument moves from a general premise to a less general premise to a conclusion that is implied by the premises, here necessaty plays a big role.
2. An inductive argument moves from particuler observations to a general premise to a conclusion, all that is needed to disprove the general premise is counter-observation.

Indeed this is so if you take the coherentist/Van Tillian view of knowledge/worldview.

This is a big part of his ideas but comparing these WVs to reality is essential to his ideas as well.

 

[Philip]

You are correct that is why it is imperative to include both WVs in the discussion.

And what I'm saying is that the worldview clash that you would like to think happens just doesn't--the trains pass on separate tracks. With no point of contact, there is not simply no argument--there is no contradiction! Since this is manifestly absurd, I think we can reject transcendental argumentation as being in any way conclusive---its apologetic usefulness is limited.

 

[jwright82]

You are correct that is why it is imperative to include both WVs in the discussion.

And what I'm saying is that the worldview clash that you would like to think happens just doesn't--the trains pass on separate tracks. With no point of contact, there is not simply no argument--there is no contradiction! Since this is manifestly absurd, I think we can reject transcendental argumentation as being in any way conclusive---its apologetic usefulness is limited.

Well, I am abit confused about something? It is essential of any Transcendental Analysis to take experiance into account in its proccess, yet you merely assert that it is only a clash of WV's. This is out of step with the whole history of TA and Van Til, in short you are talking about something else. Now of course you could demonstrate that I am wrong, either historically or logically, but you have to admit that I have made exeriance essential to what I am saying.

We have covered a lot of ground in this discussion and I have a lot of respect for you, and your obvious talents. There are an incrediable amount of problems in you saying that the clash of WV's doesn't happen, do you believe that every person comes to each and every new moment of experience with a blank mind or a tabula rasa? I think not, every person has a web of beleifs that they bring to each and every moment of experience. Since this web of beleifs is all a WV is than it seems, and I could be misunderstanding you here, you are talking about something else.

 

[Philip]

Well, I am abit confused about something? It is essential of any Transcendental Analysis to take experiance into account in its proccess, yet you merely assert that it is only a clash of WV's. This is out of step with the whole history of TA and Van Til, in short you are talking about something else. Now of course you could demonstrate that I am wrong, either historically or logically, but you have to admit that I have made exeriance essential to what I am saying.

Yes--but in doing so you assume that one can have experience apart from one's worldview. To see at all is to see through a lens.

I think not, every person has a web of beleifs that they bring to each and every moment of experience. Since this web of beleifs is all a WV is than it seems, and I could be misunderstanding you here, you are talking about something else.

That web of beliefs is part and parcel of the experience. the data are filtered through the worldview--which is why we can say anything about reality at all. The only way not to interpret is to not experience. Unless there is some point of commonality between two WVs, there can be no debate because language itself shapes and is part of our worldviews. Since debate between worldviews does happen, we are left with the conclusion that there are points of commonality.

This is the view I would hold:

We are born with a set of cognitive faculties: a sense of space and time, language skills, sense perception, rational intuitions, logical skills (inductive and deductive), etc. These, though affected by human limitations and by the fall, are basically accurate (common grace). What the fall did was to cause humans to lift certain ones over others or to try and use them without God (autonomy). In addition, other non-sinful effects of the fall that affect our faculties include upbringing, culture, etc. The result is a strange situation: on the one hand, we are all perceiving the same reality and there are points of commonality between all of us, we also have to reckon with the fact that no two of us perceive reality in exactly the same way.

 

[jwright82]

We are born with a set of cognitive faculties: a sense of space and time, language skills, sense perception, rational intuitions, logical skills (inductive and deductive), etc. These, though affected by human limitations and by the fall, are basically accurate (common grace). What the fall did was to cause humans to lift certain ones over others or to try and use them without God (autonomy). In addition, other non-sinful effects of the fall that affect our faculties include upbringing, culture, etc. The result is a strange situation: on the one hand, we are all perceiving the same reality and there are points of commonality between all of us, we also have to reckon with the fact that no two of us perceive reality in exactly the same way.

I can agree with everything you say here, in principle. But I think you and I would derive different conclusions from these beleifs and therefore our methods diverge, but at least we can agree on these. Van Til did say that there was commonality between the beleiver and the unbeleiver, the problem is that there is not complete commonality on a single point, I'll explain. The clasicacist seems to believe that something like ethics in its bare bones is a neutral concept between the beleiver and the unbeleiver but since, as you say, everything is interpreted through a lens, WV. This means that the spiritual condition of the person affects their ultimate meaning of a term. The unbeleiver will attempt to interpret ethics from a non-christian P.O.V. causing an awkward mixture of truth and lie in their interpretation of ethics.

This awkward mixture will be different from unbeleiver to unbeleiver but they all have one thing in common they are unbeleivers. I think we both can agree that the world is divided between two different people beleivers and unbeleivers. All Van Til did was say these things:
1. We beleivers know the Bible to be the truth.
2. So we can take the basic insights that it gives us about the mental state of the unbeleiver and incorperate them into our method of Apologetics.
3. We assume these insights in our method and therefore don't have to seek to prove them directly before we can use them.

Yes--but in doing so you assume that one can have experience apart from one's worldview. To see at all is to see through a lens.

That web of beliefs is part and parcel of the experience. the data are filtered through the worldview--which is why we can say anything about reality at all. The only way not to interpret is to not experience. Unless there is some point of commonality between two WVs, there can be no debate because language itself shapes and is part of our worldviews. Since debate between worldviews does happen, we are left with the conclusion that there are points of commonality.

I'm a little confused here? In your last post you seemed to have interpreted my P.O.V. as having no connection to experiance. Which would, as you illustrate, make WV disagreements basically in a vacuum, this would just cancel eachother out. Now in these posts you are admitting a definant connection between a WV and experiance.