What exactly do we mean by "Autonomy"?

[ValiantforTruth]

creation/providence

I would agree with all of Ben's points above, I just think it is impossible to exhaustively prove them (especially 3).

What I'm going to say is my view based on how I learned presuppositional apologetics - not sure how well it fits in with Bahnsen, in particular. I think #3 is the clincher. But creation/providence is revealed. We believe it to be true on the basis of revelation. So it cannot be possible to interpret a fact correctly while denying creation/providence. It is not a matter of induction (testing all actual/possible worldviews and seeing that they do not fit). It is a comprehensive statement on the basis of authoritative revelation, which exceeds all other standards of proof. It is my ultimate assumption - unprovable, but true, known, certain.

 

[Philip]

But creation/providence is revealed. We believe it to be true on the basis of revelation. So it cannot be possible to interpret a fact correctly while denying creation/providence. It is not a matter of induction (testing all actual/possible worldviews and seeing that they do not fit). It is a comprehensive statement on the basis of authoritative revelation, which exceeds all other standards of proof. It is my ultimate assumption - unprovable, but true, known, certain.

So then, you have a coherence view of truth rather than a correspondence view of truth. That is, you take something to be true because it fits your worldview, not necessarily because it corresponds to reality.

I don't see how a worldview other than christianity could ever be consistant/non-contradictory?

I can see quite a few--the trouble is that you're assuming autonomy as the only presupposition, whereas I see every worldview as containing a set of presuppositions. Example:

Materialism
1. Only the world of space/time/matter/energy exists
2. The senses are reliable
3. Humans are merely the highest known intelligent life

This is an internally consistent set--unprovable but consistent. It may not correspond to reality, but that doesn't keep it from being consistent.

The Bible tells us that all unbeleiving worldviews are inconsistant/contradictory

Where? And what exactly is meant by "consistency"? Internal consistency or consistency with reality? I generally take consistency to mean internal consistency.

Also keep in mind that no Christian has ever fully lived out the Christian worldview.

On the TAG:

I've gone through Bahnsen's use of the TAG in, for example, the debate with Stein and he just never backs up his assertion that the non-existence of God is logically impossible. There are two ways that he could have gone: direct or indirect, and he chooses neither. Direct argument is, of course, out of the question for Bahnsen (as it is known as the ontological argument) while the indirect argument is humanly impossible. Instead, Bahnsen opts for assertion. After going through the transcript a couple times, my conclusion was that the only reason that Stein didn't win was that he was out of his league as a scientist trying to dabble in philosophy with no real training. Bahnsen repeatedly ignores the first rule of debate: the affirmative side has the burden of proof every time and all that the negative side has to do is invalidate the affirmative's argument. If you don't believe that such proof is possible/moral, then you should not be debating it in the first place.

 

[ValiantforTruth]

So then, you have a coherence view of truth rather than a correspondence view of truth. That is, you take something to be true because it fits your worldview, not necessarily because it corresponds to reality.

I'm not sure how my post above would indicate a coherence theory of truth, but I do not hold that view. All facts are created and governed by God. I know this on the basis of revelation, the highest source of authority. I don't believe that recognizing the highest source of intellectual authority entails a coherence theory of truth, because everyone has some highest source of authority, whether they admit it or not. Usually either human reason or human experience.

 

[jwright82]

So then, you have a coherence view of truth rather than a correspondence view of truth. That is, you take something to be true because it fits your worldview, not necessarily because it corresponds to reality.

No I hold to what Bahnsen would call "a broad view of truth" that encompasses the strengths of nearly all theories of truth. Here is a quote from me, two posts ago, in which I affirm a correspondance element to truth:

The method of argumentation that I employ is to examine the pressupositions of my opponant for logical consistancy and then, the most crucial element, to apply them to reality to see if they make sense out of it, as we experiance it.

Where? And what exactly is meant by "consistency"? Internal consistency or consistency with reality? I generally take consistency to mean internal consistency.

Well since I have already said that there is a strong correspondance element to the argument, and I think we all agree that any unbeleiving WV cannot possibly perfectly correspond to reality because reality is in fact created by God. I used the catagories of consistancy/nonconsistancy because those were the catagories used by someone else.

On the TAG:

I will adress your criticisms indirectly, no pun intended, by adressing the links that The Calvin Knight gave.

 

[jwright82]

In order to save time, and not to high jack this discussion too much from the op, I will point you to a couple of posts by Paul Manata over at Triablogue concerning this topic: Triablogue: Coming Out Of The Closet-read this and follow the link on the page. Then read this post after you read the others: Triablogue: Possibly a Presuppositionalist: Strong Modal TAG

In reading these I noticed a fatal mistake everyone in the discussions were making that needs to be clarified, this clarification may help this discussion along as well.

In the discussion evryone was making the mistake of collappsing 2 entirely different forms of argumentation and treating them as if they are the same, this is absolutly false. The 2 different types of arguments I am refering to are a Modal argument and a Transcendental argument. These two arguments both deal with the idea of necessity but in different ways. I'll explain:

Modal Argument: A modal argument takes a proposition, we'll call it X, and sees if it is (a) necessarelly true or (b) possibly true, this applys to falsity as well. These types of arguments can employ possible-worlds type arguments or other logical types. The important part here is that it is an entirely different form of an argument, just consult any Dictionary of Philosophy, from a Transcendental argument. But it deals with mainly single propositions and analyzes them to see which of the catagories above it corresponds to. Van Til and Bahnsen did not employ a Modal argument! So criticizing it as though it is a Modal argument is probally to commit a catagory-mistake. You are treating it as though it is in this catagory of argumentation when it is in fact in another one altogether.

Transcendental Argument: A Transcendental argument is an indirect rather than a direct argument. To understand the difference between a Transcendental statement over a regular statement I wil give an example.
Take these two different proposistions:

1. Mary And Goerge are the parents of Steve.
2. Steve beat Will in a game of chess.

Now it might seem like these two proposistions are the same in relation to eachother, but this is a serious mistake, P1 is a Trascendental statemant in relation to P2. P1 can determiine the meaningfullness of P2.
Lets assume that P1 is false not because Steve has different parants but because Steve as an entity does not exsist. This would then make P2 meaningless, if Steve doesn't exsist than P2 isn't even talking about a meaningful person. If we were to argue that this would only make P2 false for this reason doesn't make sense because the game never took place.

Now if P1 is true than P2 now can be a meaningful statement, it can now be either true or false. This may not be the best example of a Transcendental relationship but I hope it gets the point across. Now a Transcendental argument is arguing for the preconditions for making something intelligible( or meaningful from a certian P.O.V.). These may not be able to be expressed in short syllogistic form, Kant's filled a whole book. What a Transcendental argument does is this: it takes some thing (reason) and gives the necessary preconditions, or what must also be true a priori to this thing, in order for this thing to make sense, as we experience it.

Now Van Til and Bahnsen both employed a Transcendental method of argumentation, which has infinite aplicability. In my thread "The Moral Failure of Reason" I give a Transcendental explaination of Ethics. Now an unbeleiver( or beleiver) can challange my argument, on logical grounds, and offer an alternative Transcendental explaination. Or they can just critique mine but they can't take my Transcendental argument and treat it as though it is a Modal argument, two different kinds of arguments. Also to offer an indirect proof in the form of a Transcendental argument does not require me to critique each and every other possible P.O.V., if I were making a Modal argument than I would be required to.

The strong Modal statements that everyone has objected to aren't so strong after all, they are the necessary outworkings of the very idea of T/F( if Christianity as a WV is true than all other WV are false). If I have been confusing about anything just let me know and I will explain. These are somewhat technical Philosophical issues so anyone who is confused can ask me to explain and it might also be wise to Google these things.

 

[Philip]

Now it might seem like these two proposistions are the same in relation to eachother, but this is a serious mistake, P1 is a Trascendental statemant in relation to P2. P1 can determiine the meaningfullness of P2.

The question of whether Steve exists is not related a) to whether the sentence is meaningful b) to who his parents are.

First, how are we speaking of "meaning" here? Statements about non-existent entities are quite meaningful. For example, "All unicorns are pink" is meaningful even though unicorns don't exist. We all know what a unicorn is in spite of the fact that they don't exist and therefore we can speak meaningfully about them.

On the other hand, it is much harder to speak meaningfully about a bandersnatch simply because none of us knows what a bandersnatch is (other than that it may be frumious). We cannot say whether the proposition "All bandersnatches are frumious" is true or false because the terms are nonsense.

In other words, we may speak meaningfully about Steve even if he doesn't exist because we have some conception of Steve.

Even in a transcendental argument, one cannot simply assert the connection (as Bahnsen does). In order for the transcendental argument to be valid, one has to prove a necessary connection.

For example:

3. God exists.
4. The laws of logic are true.

Now, if you are to make a transcendental argument here, you have the burden to prove that P4 necessarily presupposes P3. If you cannot prove this, you have no grounds for your claim that other worldviews "borrow" the laws of logic from Christianity.

What a Transcendental argument does is this: it takes some thing (reason) and gives the necessary preconditions, or what must also be true a priori to this thing, in order for this thing to make sense, as we experience it.

And it also assumes a noumenal/phenomenal distinction that I just cannot accept--there are plenty of things that make perfect sense but have no connection to reality. For example, I can make many perfectly meaningful statements about Elizabeth Bennett or Frodo Baggins even though no such persons exist or existed in reality. The fact that we can understand and write fiction suggests that meaning and reality are not the same.

All facts are created and governed by God. I know this on the basis of revelation, the highest source of authority.

Good, a muslim could claim the same thing and be consistent.

 

[jwright82]

3. God exists.
4. The laws of logic are true.

That is a Modal argument not a Transcendental one. The logical form of a Transcendental argument is this:
P1 is true therefore P2 can have logical meaning, in the sense that it can be either T or F. P1 is false therefore P2 is niether T or F, look at P. F. Strawson on this. In your argument you are proving that the 2 propositions are necessarally related to one another, a transcendental realationship is P1 truth value determines whether P2 can even be true or false. Your argument has the following form:
1. P1 is true therefore P2 is true
2. P1 is false therefore P2 is false
That is a kind of Modal argument
A transcendental argument would be this:
1. P1 is true therefore P2 can either be true or false
2. P1 is false therefore P2 can neither be true or false

And it also assumes a noumenal/phenomenal distinction that I just cannot accept--there are plenty of things that make perfect sense but have no connection to reality. For example, I can make many perfectly meaningful statements about Elizabeth Bennett or Frodo Baggins even though no such persons exist or existed in reality. The fact that we can understand and write fiction suggests that meaning and reality are not the same.

Well I guess I have not really defined "meaningful" good enough so I will atempt to to do so here. Meaningful means, as I use the term, that an explaination rationally fits with the wolrd as we experiance it. For instance I might try to explain reason through the use of a materistc explinaition of the mind, that our reasoning is nothing more than blind random synapse fires in our brain. This cannot explain reason as we all use it. If this theory were true than we could not trust our own reasoning and that would not fit with reasoning as we all use it. This theory may make sense, from a certain P.O.V., but it lacks explainatory power.

In other words, we may speak meaningfully about Steve even if he doesn't exist because we have some conception of Steve.

I meant in actuallity.

Even in a transcendental argument, one cannot simply assert the connection (as Bahnsen does). In order for the transcendental argument to be valid, one has to prove a necessary connection.

Not as a Modal argument, you are confusing the two forms. A Transcendental argument may seem like assertions but in actuality they are listing the preconditions for reasoning, or anything else, to make sense( in the way I described it above, my explination must make sense of the facts as we experiance them).

Now, if you are to make a transcendental argument here, you have the burden to prove that P4 necessarily presupposes P3. If you cannot prove this, you have no grounds for your claim that other worldviews "borrow" the laws of logic from Christianity.

Again, I hate to beat a dead horse, but this is to turn the Transcendental argument into a Modal argument. You must distinguish between the two or you make a catagory-mistake. Also we claim that the truth of christianity is the precondition for any laws of logic to make sense.

 

[Philip]

Let me then reformulate P3 and P4

3. God exists
4a. The laws of logic have meaning

Again, no necessary connection. Now maybe we're just running into a problem of language, but the meaningfulness of a statement depends only on the language. For example:

5. The present King of France is bald.

Even though there is no referent, the statement has meaning. The statement is obviously false because there is no present King of France. We could not say anything about the sentence unless it had meaning.

Same with Steve: P2 is meaningful even if there is no Steve--you cannot declare a sentence false unless it has meaning. The statement "All bandersnatches are frumious" is an example of a meaningless proposition. Even self-contradictory propositions have meaning, else we would be able to say nothing about them, not even that they are self-contradictory.

For instance I might try to explain reason through the use of a materistc explinaition of the mind, that our reasoning is nothing more than blind random synapse fires in our brain. This cannot explain reason as we all use it. If this theory were true than we could not trust our own reasoning and that would not fit with reasoning as we all use it. This theory may make sense, from a certain P.O.V., but it lacks explainatory power.

This doesn't seem to be "meaning" at all: this seems to describe metaphysical adequacy. Meaning merely refers to the sense of a proposition, regardless of whether it has reference. We cannot say anything about a sentence with no meaning because we cannot understand it--we cannot even say whether it is consistent.

Not as a Modal argument, you are confusing the two forms. A Transcendental argument may seem like assertions but in actuality they are listing the preconditions for reasoning, or anything else, to make sense

And who is to say that these are the preconditions and not some others? I could just as easily list a set of counter-preconditions. At that point we have an impasse, not a debate. Transcendental argumentation cuts both ways.

Also we claim that the truth of christianity is the precondition for any laws of logic to make sense.

And if the unbeliever does not agree to that assertion? Unless there's an analyzable argument, I can't distinguish that from "The truth of Islam is the precondition for any laws of logic to make sense." Again, to prove this, one has to prove either a) a necessary connection b) that all alternatives are false. Otherwise it's deductively invalid and inductively dubious.

Let's try, for example, a transcendental argument for Arminianism:

6. Arminianism is the necessary precondition for the notion of moral responsibility to make sense.
7. The notion of moral responsibility makes sense.
8. Therefore Arminianism is true.

See the problem? Now, one can argue P6 and disprove it. One can also cast doubt on the truth of your premise.

Again, I think that the necessary connection is actually provable--but the proof was unacceptable because Van Til and Bahnsen accepted Kant's critique of such arguments.

 

[jwright82]

And who is to say that these are the preconditions and not some others? I could just as easily list a set of counter-preconditions. At that point we have an impasse, not a debate. Transcendental argumentation cuts both ways.

That is the essence of the apologetical task, the unbeleiver can logically attempt to say destroy my Transcendental argument for ethics and they would have to foster up their own preconditions and then we would procede from there. I am only required to offer up my preconditions for ethics, for instance, I only have to deal with other P.O.V.'s if they are offered up to challange mine, utilitarianism etc. Then we go back and forth debating which kind of theory justifys ethical statements.

And if the unbeliever does not agree to that assertion? Unless there's an analyzable argument, I can't distinguish that from "The truth of Islam is the precondition for any laws of logic to make sense." Again, to prove this, one has to prove either a) a necessary connection b) that all alternatives are false. Otherwise it's deductively invalid and inductively dubious.

It is neither a deductive nor an inductive argument at all. It has a different logical form altogether that I gave already.
I know you are used to a more traditional form of argumentation but I think we can agree that if this argument is not a modal argument than it can't be treated as such. If you truly believe that it must meet the requirments of a Modal theory than I think you will have to prove that all arguments are modal in this sense.

If you want an example I will give you one and we can analyze it together, keep in mind that this will be highly simplistic as a Trascendental argument can be very complex.

1. We all make ethical statements
2. In order for ethical statements to mean anything at all they must refer to an objective standered
3. If we reduce ethics to mere opinion it has no objective status
4. If we reduce ethics to some empirical facts than it is a violation of the naturalistic fallacy
5. A Transcendant source of ethics is required to be binding on all people in an objective sense
6. In the christian WV there is a Transcendant source of ethics
7. God by virtue of being the Creator can make ethical demands of his creatures( Transcendant and objective)
8. If we assume the christian WV to be true than it satisfies the logical demands to make ethics meaningful

Notice how it is indirect rather than direct. Sure you could substitute another religion, like islam, and in a bare bones logical sense it would satisfy, at least initially, the argument, this would be borrowed capital. But we then would move into the other part of Van Til's apologetic and critique the WV behind the argument, in this case islam. If we compared the idea of human worth than there is no comparison between christianity and islam, humans have far greater worth in christianity than in islam. So I would offer up a similer argument of a Transcendental argument for human worth compare my argument with islam and there you go. This is why Van Til stressed that ultimatly we are not debating single issues but entire worldviews. That is why there is no slam-dunk, one-size-fits-all arguments that absolutly proves every single element of the christian WV and absolutly disproves every other concevable WV at the same time.

 

[Philip]

Here's the critique:

Assume 1-5

6a. In the Christian WV there is a Transcendant source of ethics
6b. In the Islamic WV there is a Transcendent source of ethics
6c. In the Buddhist WV there is a Transcendent source of ethics
6d. In the Taoist WV there is a transcendent source of ethics

See the problem? All that the skeptic has to do is posit a couple of possible alternatives without recommending any one of them. Unless there is a necessary connection or at least an analyzable argument, all we're left with here is a Kierkegaardian leap.

It seems to me that we have a couple of non sequitors here, since there is no "probable" and no necessary connection.

 

[jwright82]

Here's the critique:

Assume 1-5

6a. In the Christian WV there is a Transcendant source of ethics
6b. In the Islamic WV there is a Transcendent source of ethics
6c. In the Buddhist WV there is a Transcendent source of ethics
6d. In the Taoist WV there is a transcendent source of ethics

See the problem? All that the skeptic has to do is posit a couple of possible alternatives without recommending any one of them. Unless there is a necessary connection or at least an analyzable argument, all we're left with here is a Kierkegaardian leap.

It seems to me that we have a couple of non sequitors here, since there is no "probable" and no necessary connection.

Well first off I said this was simplistic, in a real context I would have to go in-depth to the Christian WV to show how in its entirety it gives a basis for ethics.

See the problem?

No I do not see the problem with you doing sound philosophical analysis, that is what you are doing. You are stateing an obvious weakness in my argument and then I respond.
Keep in mind the law of excluded middle, which in this case means that just because two religions are making a similer claim does not mean they are making the same claim.
as far as a critique of 6b, I think Bahnsen does nice here:

In some people's minds it is the Muslim faith, however, which presents a threat to presuppositional apologetics because, it is imagined, Islam can counter(feit) each move in the Christian's argument. This too is an inaccurate preconception. The two worldviews are dissimilar in pivotal ways when one reflects on Islam's unitarianism, fatalism, moral concepts, lack of redemption, etc. Islam can be internally critiqued on its own presuppositions. Take an obvious example. The Koran acknowledges the words of Moses, David, and Jesus to be the words of prophets sent by Allah -- in which case the Koran may be, on its own terms, refuted because of its contradictions with earlier revelation (cf. Deuteronomy 13:1-5).

Sophisticated theologies offered by Muslim scholars interpret the theology of the Koran (cf. 42:11) as teaching the transcendence (tanzih) of unchanging Allah in such an extreme fashion that no human language (derived from changing experience) can positively and appropriate describe Allah -- in which case the Koran rules out what the Koran claims to be.

Then again, the Islamic worldview teaches that God is holy and just toward sin, but (unlike the theology of the Bible -- see here the words of Moses, David, and Jesus) there can indeed be "salvation" where guilt remains unremitted by the shedding of blood of a substitute for the sinner. The legalism of Islam (good works weighed against bad) does not address this problem because a person's previous bad works are not changed by later good ones, but continue on one's record in the very sight Allah (who supposedly cannot tolerate sin but must punish it).[2]

This quote came from this article: PA208
As far as 6c and 6d they both have the same systemic failure, they have a code of ethics but teach that right and wrong disapear when one is enlightened. If right and wrong are illusions than why do anything the monk calls right?
This beleif results in destroying objectivity.

Unless there is a necessary connection or at least an analyzable argument, all we're left with here is a Kierkegaardian leap.

It seems to me that we have a couple of non sequitors here, since there is no "probable" and no necessary connection.

I think your still trying to squeeze the Transcendental argument into a Modal argument. The difference is this in a Modal argument you would be directly proving the necessaty of God's exsistance by directly proving a necessary causal link between His exsistance and logic. The Transcendental argument is proving That the Christian WV justifies ethics, thus inderectly proving the necessaty of the Christian WV.

The catch 22 with a Transcendental argument is that if the unbeleiver admits that it is valid but is not prosuaded because they feel like I need to directly prove God's exsistance which will directly prove the validity of ethics, I would respond that by denying this argument they are denying ethics. They would either claim that ethics has no validity but when they turned around and ranted about the evils of religion, they would in fact be betraying their own admission that there is no such thing as evil! Or they would attempt to hold up a theory of ethics which did not fall under 3 or 4 of my argument, which I don't think is possible.

---------- Post added at 01:44 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:36 PM ----------

Here is another presupossitional critique of Islam: Two Towers Falling: A Presuppositional Critique of The Quran's Theology | Events & News | Spirituality & Religious Issues | religious social issues | religious news

 

[Philip]

The catch 22 with a Transcendental argument is that if the unbeleiver admits that it is valid but is not prosuaded because they feel like I need to directly prove God's exsistance which will directly prove the validity of ethics

I wouldn't admit that it is valid because validity is a deductive term--an argument can be valid if and only if it is in deductive form.

More importantly, I can bring up any number of counterexamples and unless every possible counterexample is answered, the argument is not sufficient.

Keep in mind the law of excluded middle, which in this case means that just because two religions are making a similer claim does not mean they are making the same claim.

Excuse me, but the law of the excluded middle is this:

(a v ~a) & ~(a & ~a)

I do not see how I have violated this law.

In this case, the various religions are all making the same claim: to be the basis for ethics.

 

[jwright82]

I wouldn't admit that it is valid because validity is a deductive term--an argument can be valid if and only if it is in deductive form.

I always thought an argument of any kind was valid if the conclusion followed logically from the premises, thats what my Dictionary of Philosophy says.

Excuse me, but the law of the excluded middle is this:

(a v ~a) & ~(a & ~a)

I do not see how I have violated this law.

You got me here I got the names swaped on two different things, what I meant was that your argument seemed to be dangerously close to committing the fallacy of the undistributed middle, they both have middle in them and I sometimes mix them up, sorry about that. Notice I said that you seemed dangerously close to commiting this fallacy but I am not acusing you of actually commiting it.
Here is why I am concerned:

1. All religions are equally valid in making a claim to justify ethics
2. Buddhism claims to justify ethics
3. Therefore Buddhism's claim is equaly as valid as any other religion

If that is what you are arguing than it is guilty of the fallacy I named, if this is not what you are saying than please elaborate.
Also I can invalidate the buddhist claims to being able to justify ethics through an internal critique without ever making reference to any other P.O.V.

More importantly, I can bring up any number of counterexamples and unless every possible counterexample is answered, the argument is not sufficient.

I disagree. This is a pretty steep burden of proof that no one seems to be able to overcome. If this were the burden of proof for each and every kind of argument than no argument would escape this and all knowledge would reduce to skepticism. Also I never claimed in my Transcendental argument that every other P.O.V. was wrong besides mine, I obviously believe that but it was not one of my premises( if it were than you would be absolutly right about the burden of proof but that was not part of my argument). Again a Transcendental argument is different from a Modal one, so unless you can prove that every single kind of argument is strictly Modal in nature than I don't see any reason to callapse a Transcendental argument down to a Modal one.

 

[jandrusk]

Since the original question was on the definition on autonomy, here are my thoughts. There are some good definitions here. THe one that I like especially after reading Bahnsen's book on Van Til's apologetic is, "Autonomy (Ancient Greek: αυτονόμος autonomos, Modern Greek: αυτονομία autonomia, from auto "self" + nomos, "law": one who gives oneself his/her own law) is a concept found in moral, political, and bioethical philosophy." This was repeatedly expounded in Bahnsen's book and was usually tied to his reference to autonomy (Man being a law onto himself) in that strictly from his own reason with no coercion from a creator he could make a rational worldview on the proposed creator. This of course is not possible as has already been stated due to the creator/creature distinction. So with this position it practically means that the autonomous man puts himself in a position whereby if he has formulated as to what would be convincing proofs he sets them and not the creator.

I have rarely seen the unbeliever offer up their requirements as to what would constitute their belief if the requirements were met on the spot. So essentially they put themselves in a position where it is not possible to accept any theistic position because they have essentially made themselves (Law onto themselves) the deity for which the Christian is trying to argue for.

 

[Philip]

jandrusk, could you point me to a place where Bahnsen or Van Til defines it as you have defined it? So far, I haven't been able to discover a definition in Bahnsen.

I always thought an argument of any kind was valid if the conclusion followed logically from the premises, thats what my Dictionary of Philosophy says.

But notice that the transcendental proof, as you have presented it yields only that the Christian worldview is sufficient justification, not that it is true--we still have to make a Kierkegaardian leap to accept it.

The other question which the argument raises is whether Christianity is using "borrowed capital."

Also I can invalidate the buddhist claims to being able to justify ethics through an internal critique without ever making reference to any other P.O.V.

The trouble is that there are nearly as many forms of Buddhism as there are of Christianity.

Here's my next counterexample, though. Suppose for 6 that I substitute "Arianism" for Christianity. What we have, essentially, are two systems which are so similar as to both provide the same justification for morality.

 

[jwright82]

The trouble is that there are nearly as many forms of Buddhism as there are of Christianity.

Name one that doesn't suffer from the systemic failure that I mentioned and I will be happy to deal with it, keep in mind though my critique would still hold true for all forms of Buddhism that hold to this particuler belief.

Here's my next counterexample, though. Suppose for 6 that I substitute "Arianism" for Christianity. What we have, essentially, are two systems which are so similar as to both provide the same justification for morality.

Only if it it does not self-destruct in other areas, which I think we all agree it does. This WV denys a fundemental tenent of Christianity, thus deserving of a different name. Lutheranism and Calvinism are similer enough to both justify ethics, although they disagree on much but they agree on the essentials.

The other question which the argument raises is whether Christianity is using "borrowed capital."

I must say this is the first time I have ever seen this argument, it is a good one. First though I think "borrowed capital" is a metaphysical consequence of the idea of truth. Assuming Christianity to be true every other unbeleiving WV could not consistantly live in God's creation and pretend like He is not there. The very tools of reason they posses, because of Him, to try and disprove Him would be screaming loudly that they were hipocrites( metaphorically).
Also this raises the question of "autonomous metaphysics", theories which try to understand the nature of reality apart from God. I would recomend the book by James K. A. Smith entitled Introducing Radical Orthodoxy on this subject it really goes into this well.

But notice that the transcendental proof, as you have presented it yields only that the Christian worldview is sufficient justification, not that it is true--we still have to make a Kierkegaardian leap to accept it.

This is one area where you are right to a degree. The Transcendental form of argumentation is, as far as I can tell, not completly worked out in every minute detail in philosophy. What is worked out though is that this form of argument is not a Modal one, so to try to treat it as such is still, I think, a category-mistake, unless you can prove that every argument is at heart a Modal one. If anyone out there knows of any really good work in the technical areas of the Transcendental argument please share.

The Transcendental form of an argument is so different from any other kind of argument that it is tuff to tell how to procede logically from where we are, it is not a direct argument but is indirect so this makes a huge difference. So much technical work needs to be done in this area, but admiting this doesn't invalidate the form of argument( as far as I can tell it is a reconized form of argument). Also there is no leap of faith involved because the very nature of the Transcendental argument forces anyone who denys its validity to come up with a better explination or deny that the thing in question is intelligable( which is a self defeating argument).

 

[Philip]

Assuming Christianity to be true every other unbeleiving WV could not consistantly live in God's creation and pretend like He is not there. The very tools of reason they posses, because of Him, to try and disprove Him would be screaming loudly that they were hipocrites( metaphorically).

But you cannot assume that which you are trying to prove, namely the Christian worldview--circular reasoning is just as fallacious in apologetics as in any other area of philosophy. Van Til asserted that all reasoning is circular, which produces a coherence view of truth.

Also, adequacy does not equal necessity.

This is one area where you are right to a degree. The Transcendental form of argumentation is, as far as I can tell, not completly worked out in every minute detail in philosophy.

And if you try to use it to combat philosophies that are worked out to that degree, you will find it flawed. It's an argument that raises infinite numbers of questions.

Also there is no leap of faith involved because the very nature of the Transcendental argument forces anyone who denys its validity to come up with a better explination or deny that the thing in question is intelligable( which is a self defeating argument).

Or you can accept its validity and deny its truth. Let me show what I mean.

1. All smurfs are blue.
2. All blue things have antlers.
3. Therefore all smurfs have antlers.

The point being that even though the form is valid, the argument may still be false. Validity only means that the conclusion follows from the premises, not that the argument either a) is convincing b) yields truth.

The other problem is when the transcendental argument gets turned against you. How do I know that my own set of presuppositions will stand up against the presuppositional scrutiny of the unbeliever? The only way for that to happen would be if I had perfect theology--which I don't.

There is a leap of faith here because in order for my acceptance of the truth of Christianity does not follow from my acceptance of the adequacy of Christianity. You have (possibly) proved that Christianity is sufficient to explain morality--you have not proved that it is necessary to explain morality (which is how Bahnsen used the argument--at least in the Stein debate). It is possible for me to agree to the sufficiency and reject the necessity of Christianity as a precondition for morality.

 

[jwright82]

And if you try to use it to combat philosophies that are worked out to that degree, you will find it flawed. It's an argument that raises infinite numbers of questions.

I havn't come across a philosophy in 11 years that could compete with Christianity, or was that worked out. Admiting that the logical intricacies of the Transcendental argument are not worked out says nothing of its usefullness or validity. On a practical level I have been doing layman Apologetics for 11 years, I have been a Van Tillian for only about 2-3 years. So all those years I practiced Classical Apologetics and I can say that Van Til's aproech utterlly destroys the unbeleiver's arguments in a way the I don't think the Classical aproech can, now I'm not as critical of other aproechs as Van Til or Bahnsen were but on a practical level there is no comparison.

But you cannot assume that which you are trying to prove, namely the Christian worldview--circular reasoning is just as fallacious in apologetics as in any other area of philosophy. Van Til asserted that all reasoning is circular, which produces a coherence view of truth.

I'm not trying to prove anything whatsoever here, you brought up "borowed capital". It is an analytical fact that whatever WV is true than everyother WV would be false and therefore hipocritical on some level, this isn't proof of anything just a logical consequence of the very idea of truth itself.

Or you can accept its validity and deny its truth. Let me show what I mean.

1. All smurfs are blue.
2. All blue things have antlers.
3. Therefore all smurfs have antlers.

This isn't a Transcendental argument so you can't compare.

The point being that even though the form is valid, the argument may still be false. Validity only means that the conclusion follows from the premises, not that the argument either a) is convincing b) yields truth.

I agree but as far as I remember you offered no analytical critique of my argument. You did what any Philosopher worth their salt woud do and provided counter examples, and I as far as I can tell I refuted them.

The other problem is when the transcendental argument gets turned against you. How do I know that my own set of presuppositions will stand up against the presuppositional scrutiny of the unbeliever? The only way for that to happen would be if I had perfect theology--which I don't.

I think one point of confusion you have is in thinking that any claim to being a Transcendental argument are just as valid as anyother claim. Another strange thing about the Transcendental argument is that not every claim is the same. Each claim is evaluated on its own terms and then shown to be valid or not. If I were to criticize Kant's TA than I wouldn't claim that he was false because he couldn't disprove some later critique. In fact if you take your burden of proof to it's logical conclusion than no philosophical theory could in principle could be proven, after the person making the argument dies than they cannot defend against later/possible alternatives and we are left with pure skepticism.

It is possible for me to agree to the sufficiency and reject the necessity of Christianity as a precondition for morality.

Than the TA demands tha you( hypothetically if you reject Christianity) stop using or acting as if any value judgements of any kind exsist. Which I think is impossible.

There is a leap of faith here because in order for my acceptance of the truth of Christianity does not follow from my acceptance of the adequacy of Christianity.

It seems that your burden of proof makes all logical arguments of anykind a "leap of faith". The question is whether an unbeleiver can live consistantly in God's creation and rationally deny his exsistance. Lets cut to the heart of this, you and I both believe that the basic Reformed faith is true so do you believe that any unbeleiving theory could ever ultimatly explain the universe?

 

[Philip]

Than the TA demands tha you( hypothetically if you reject Christianity) stop using or acting as if any value judgements of any kind exsist. Which I think is impossible.

I'm not sure that you understand my meaning here--from the fact that the Christian worldview is sufficient to explain moral language it does not follow that it is a) the only possible worldview which could possibly do so b) that it is necessarily the actual precondition for moral language. Here was your conclusion:

"If we assume the christian WV to be true than it satisfies the logical demands to make ethics meaningful"

In order for the argument to have any force, it needs to prove the following:

"Ethics are meaningful if and only if Christianity is true."

Otherwise, it yields at best this conclusion:

1. If we assume the Christian WV to be true than it satisfies the logical demands to make ethics meaningful.
2. Ethics are meaningful.
3. It is possible that the Christian WV is true.

See the flaw? At best we have a "possibly." We end up with no compelling reason to think that Christianity is true. You can try to get around this by refuting other worldviews, but you still don't have a compelling reason: all you've done is to produce a stronger "maybe."

Lets cut to the heart of this, you and I both believe that the basic Reformed faith is true so do you believe that any unbeleiving theory could ever ultimatly explain the universe?

I believe that the heart of man is black enough to do so--that it can twist God-given reason that much.

In fact if you take your burden of proof to it's logical conclusion than no philosophical theory could in principle could be proven, after the person making the argument dies than they cannot defend against later/possible alternatives and we are left with pure skepticism.

You here assume that indubitability is a precondition for knowledge--I ask only for warrant. I'm generally skeptical of skepticism--which is why I think presuppositionalism as an epistemology to be inadequate.

This isn't a Transcendental argument so you can't compare.

My point with the argument that an argument may be valid and still false. If I gave my version of the ontological argument, you would probably accept its validity, but not its truth.

I can say that Van Til's aproech utterlly destroys the unbeleiver's arguments in a way the I don't think the Classical aproech can

Destroying the approach of the unbeliever is not my concern. Giving reasons to believe is. Sufficiency alone is not a reason to believe--necessity is. What I would like to see is a transcendental argument that proves the necessity of the Christian WV.

 

[jwright82]

I'm not sure that you understand my meaning here--from the fact that the Christian worldview is sufficient to explain moral language it does not follow that it is a) the only possible worldview which could possibly do so b) that it is necessarily the actual precondition for moral language.

I see your point, I really do, but I think you have set a goal for all arguments to reach, which is deductivly modal in nature if I understand you, the TA does not reach this goal so therefore you conclude that it is not an absolute proof of any kind. But for the sake of argument look at it this way:
1. Lets assume you are asking the TA to take on a form( deductivly Modal) that only destroys what it essentially is( indirect vs. dierect), is that really logically fair?
2. What reason is there to assume that all arguments must pass your "burden of proof"( or warrant as you say later)?
(So far I havn't seen any, in fact given all the work done in philosophy in the last 100 years each and every beleif must be evaluated on its own terms to decide how much warrant a person requires in order to call it knowledge, justified true belief)

"If we assume the christian WV to be true than it satisfies the logical demands to make ethics meaningful"

In order for the argument to have any force, it needs to prove the following:

"Ethics are meaningful if and only if Christianity is true."

This is trying to turn the TA into a deductivly Modal one, it was never desighned to be able to be proven that way.

Otherwise, it yields at best this conclusion:

1. If we assume the Christian WV to be true than it satisfies the logical demands to make ethics meaningful.
2. Ethics are meaningful.
3. It is possible that the Christian WV is true.

See the flaw? At best we have a "possibly." We end up with no compelling reason to think that Christianity is true. You can try to get around this by refuting other worldviews, but you still don't have a compelling reason: all you've done is to produce a stronger "maybe."

I absolutly concede the argument here, if you take the TA and reformulate it as a deductive Modal argument it will never be able to be proven for all the wonderful reasons you have brought up during this discussion. But if all you have been criticizing is a Modal form of the argument and not a Transcendental form of the argument, how do avoid sliding into the fallacy of a "straw man"( I'm not accussing of of this, but it seems to me that unless you prove that all arguments must meet your requirments than I'm afraid you may be guilty of this one).

The flaws in these sorts of direct arguments is why Van Til favored his aproech over a direct one. Also as Bahnsen points out in his book on Van Til( pg. 487-488 ,footnote 41) "However, it has never been held (from Kant onward) that a TA (my abreviation not his) establishes necessity only by the exaustive elimination of real and imaginary ways of expressing the alternative..".
Think about it when Schopenhaur criticized Kant he didn't say that Kant ruled out every possibility but that Kan't preconditions were not correct. All the idealists did this because that is rationally how you deal with a TA. In fact there are two ways to criticize one:
1. Most importantly to preform an internal critique of the argument (Schopenhaur on Kant).
2. Or to present an alternitive that does better, but this is only after you have internally critiqued the argument. Also it is up to the critic to offer an actual TA that does better, not imagine a possibel one.

I believe that the heart of man is black enough to do so--that it can twist God-given reason that much.

Do you believe that this unbeleiving theory would ever practically work out? Like if I were to propose a theory that H2O actually freezes at 44 degrees farenheit (forgive me I'm a terrible speller) but this would not practically work out. I think practicallity plays a part in any theory of truth.

You here assume that indubitability is a precondition for knowledge--I ask only for warrant. I'm generally skeptical of skepticism--which is why I think presuppositionalism as an epistemology to be inadequate.

Well warrant isn't a bad thing, but I do think that every beleif should be judged on its own merit to see if it counts as knowledge (justified true belief). Take the proverbial "women's inuition", how many women with this gift could ever really lay out in perfect deductivly Modal form why they just know something, but they turn out to be right anyway, does their intuition really not count as knowledge?

My point with the argument that an argument may be valid and still false.

I agree but I still think TA's should be analyzed on their own ground and not on deductivly Modal ones.

If I gave my version of the ontological argument, you would probably accept its validity, but not its truth.

Oh I don't know try me, I'm not nearly as critical of the classical arguments as Van Til and Bahnsen were.

Destroying the approach of the unbeliever is not my concern. Giving reasons to believe is. Sufficiency alone is not a reason to believe--necessity is.

That is a steep "burden of proof" to apply to each in every possible argument, good luck with that.

What I would like to see is a transcendental argument that proves the necessity of the Christian WV.

If by necessity you mean your strict deductivly Modal sense than none exsists, but I think you are setting an unfair standered. Also given the size of the TA, in that it takes all of creation into account, a one-size-fits-all syllogistic argument is also out of the question, if you feel like this means it doesn't hold water than so be it.

 

[Philip]

My critique of transcendental argument, in the end, is that it at best yields the conclusion that Christianity is a sufficient condition for morality. However, it does not give a compelling reason why it is the actual precondition. Further, in starting from morality, without proving that it necessarily presupposes Christianity, aren't we just arguing from the common-sense standpoint that Van Til rejected?

We should evaluate an argument not only on its own terms, but on the terms of what it actually does. My impression was that the TA was intended to give a reason why Christianity is true, not an account of why Christianity is satisfactory. Bahnsen says in the debate that he is arguing for the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary, yet fails to demonstrate a) that God is a necessary being b) that his opponent is actually "borrowing" from the Christian worldview. The disconnect between what Bahnsen actually does and what he says he will do is striking.

 

[jwright82]

Bahnsen says in the debate

Well keep in mind that in a debate it is impossible to deal with all the intricate details involved here, so I would recomend his books and his free articles. Here is a website with some free resources: Free Articles.

My critique of transcendental argument, in the end, is that it at best yields the conclusion that Christianity is a sufficient condition for morality. However, it does not give a compelling reason why it is the actual precondition.

Being that it is an indirect vs. a direct argument this requirment would be much harder to do, although this says nothing about its usefullness.

Further, in starting from morality, without proving that it necessarily presupposes Christianity, aren't we just arguing from the common-sense standpoint that Van Til rejected?

What Van Til rejected, and what I reject, is that there is this thing out there called morality and it is set in stone for all people at all times in the sense that we all agree about what is moral and what is not moral, and the problem is in deciding why these things are moral. This is obviously false, people disagree about what is right and wrong. We make a mistake in assuming that us and the unbeleivers are in the same room sort of on different sides of it, no we are in different rooms altogether. This is the myth of nuetraility. Unbeleivers don't come about their contrary opinions in an honest way and they did good but just fell short, no they purposlly stacked the deck in their favor, they are operating with a contrary WV, they cannot serve two masters and their master is sin and the devil.

Look at the History channel, every time they do a show about some Biblical theme they always only bring on liberal thinkers who believe the supernatural claims of the Bible are false in principle. Is this because they have good or legitmate reasons for their beliefs? Have Christians fallen short in the area of Apologetics and we have let ourselves down? NO and NO, they have no good reasons for beleiving as they do, their WV demands that only natural things and processes are real, they rule out supernaturalism in principle not in fact! When you start asking them why they hold to these things in principle they cannot give an answer. And no we Christians have not dropped the ball, at least Reformed Christians hav'nt. No matter what school of apologetics you hold too we all agree that they have no reason for beleiving as they do!

We should evaluate an argument not only on its own terms, but on the terms of what it actually does. My impression was that the TA was intended to give a reason why Christianity is true, not an account of why Christianity is satisfactory.

Well you seem to think that the only way to show something to be true is a strong deductive Modal arguement, we disagree there. I don't see any reason why the TA doesn't give strong indirect reasons why Christianity is true. If it satisfies all the preconditions to explein reality as we experiance it than that is all the argument was intended to do, but don't count out the subtlety of this argument it is very powerful if used in the right ways.

Bahnsen says in the debate that he is arguing for the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary, yet fails to demonstrate a) that God is a necessary being b) that his opponent is actually "borrowing" from the Christian worldview.

The whole impossibility from the contrary thing is developed on to fronts:
1. It is simply a consequence of the idea of truth. If I claim Christianity to be true than I am by implication saying all other ones are false.
2. We as Christians know the truth, we know the unbeleiver in his most basic assumptions is wrong, that is a fact for us as beleivers. If you assume the Christian WV to be true this makes perfect sense. To the Atheist it is just the oppossite he/she thinks the Christian makes no sense so we begin the two pronged Apologetical debate, internal critique of eachothers WV and then apply the WV's to reality to see which explains the world as we experiance it.

As far as the whole borrowed capital thing goes it is arrived at on two fronts:
1. Metaphysically, we beleivers know this world to be God's creation, the unbeleiver is living in God's creation so in order to live practically in the world he/she must accept and use things that are inherently creational. An atheist cannot explain logic as we experiance it, but they use it on a daily basis, that is borrowed capital. The buddhist has a code of morality but as we have seen they cannot be consistant with their WV, this is borrowed capital.
2. It is a consequence of the TA. The argument gives the satisfactory preconditions for morality, as an example, if the unbeleiver rejects the argument than they are not rejecting a deductive argument, which would be fine, but because they are rejecting a TA they must show why the preconditions don't satisfy the logical demands and then give an opposite but better TA to satisfy the demands. If they fail to do this than everytime they use the word right and wrong they must assume the TA I gave to be right or we go back in a circle and they must do the cricism. To offer no TA in response to my TA and then go around calling things good and evil is selfcontradictory and implys they are borrowing from the Christian WV.

The disconnect between what Bahnsen actually does and what he says he will do is striking.

Keep in mind that if you are interpriting the things he is saying in a debate through a strong deductive Modal lens only than you will come to this conclusion, but if you interprit them through the Transcendental lens than I think it makes more sense, although that doesn't imply that you will be convinced.

 

[Philip]

Well keep in mind that in a debate it is impossible to deal with all the intricate details involved here

If you can't spell out everything involved in an argument, then you shouldn't use it in a debate.

We make a mistake in assuming that us and the unbeleivers are in the same room sort of on different sides of it, no we are in different rooms altogether. This is the myth of nuetraility. Unbeleivers don't come about their contrary opinions in an honest way and they did good but just fell short, no they purposlly stacked the deck in their favor, they are operating with a contrary WV, they cannot serve two masters and their master is sin and the devil.

What exactly do you mean by "neutrality"? If there is no actual common ground between the believer and the unbeliever, then there can be no debate because they would be speaking two completely different languages, using two completely different logical systems, etc. In other words, communication possible if and only there is actual and perceived common ground.

The logical conclusion you come to is with this line of thought is, "Belief cannot argue with unbelief: it can only preach to it." ~Karl Barth (I'm still looking into the similarities between Van Til's epistemology and Barth's).

All that one has to so to expose the unbeliever's unreasonableness is to point out a couple common-sense principles. For example: if it's ridiculous in the courtroom, it's ridiculous in philosophy (Thomas Reid).

Well you seem to think that the only way to show something to be true is a strong deductive Modal arguement, we disagree there. I don't see any reason why the TA doesn't give strong indirect reasons why Christianity is true.

I haven't seen any reason why it gives any reasons at all for why I should believe Christianity. Again, what is the conclusion? Christianity is possible--not necessary, not even probable, possible. Sorry, but the unbeliever has already given you that by discussing it at all.

1. It is simply a consequence of the idea of truth. If I claim Christianity to be true than I am by implication saying all other ones are false.

Indeed--so demonstrate it.

2. We as Christians know the truth, we know the unbeleiver in his most basic assumptions is wrong, that is a fact for us as beleivers. If you assume the Christian WV to be true this makes perfect sense.

So how to prove that the Christian WV is a properly basic assumption? In order for this to be proven, a necessary connection must be made. To prove that the Christian WV is a sufficient precondition for thought is almost a given for the unbeliever--only a proof that it is a probable or necessary precondition is compelling.

1. Metaphysically, we beleivers know this world to be God's creation, the unbeleiver is living in God's creation so in order to live practically in the world he/she must accept and use things that are inherently creational. An atheist cannot explain logic as we experiance it, but they use it on a daily basis, that is borrowed capital. The buddhist has a code of morality but as we have seen they cannot be consistant with their WV, this is borrowed capital.

You can say this in theory, but you and I both know that the mere assertion of it is not convincing to anyone. The atheist can claim that logic is necessarily true. The Buddhist can claim that the disconnect is only seeming. Is there a compelling argument out there that at least makes it probable that the unbeliever is doing this?

Also, you assume here that every WV has to provide a systematic account of everything. Why? Why should the unbeliever accept this assumption? Does everyone have to have a systematically complete philosophy?

It is a consequence of the TA. The argument gives the satisfactory preconditions for morality, as an example, if the unbeleiver rejects the argument than they are not rejecting a deductive argument, which would be fine, but because they are rejecting a TA they must show why the preconditions don't satisfy the logical demands and then give an opposite but better TA to satisfy the demands.

The trouble with the TA is it only proves a possibility. The TA does not prove that actuality. So what if Christianity provides sufficient preconditions for morality? The proposition you should be proving is that morality is justified only if Christianity is true. Otherwise, there's no compelling reason. Again, why assume that every WV absolutely has to provide preconditions for everything.

To reject the TA is not to reject its explanatory power--but explanatory power is not the same as a compelling argument.

Keep in mind that if you are interpriting the things he is saying in a debate through a strong deductive Modal lens only than you will come to this conclusion, but if you interprit them through the Transcendental lens than I think it makes more sense, although that doesn't imply that you will be convinced.

Again, he makes much stronger statements than you are making. You cannot simply assert the impossibility of the contrary: you cannot simply assert that the unbeliever is "borrowing": you have to demonstrate that it is necessarily so. You must demonstrate that the Christian WV is necessary for logic, that it is necessary for morality. Otherwise, all you do is prove sufficiency, which just proves that you are consistent--you could just be consistently wrong.

You are assuming here that all WVs are built on a single basic assumptions apart from reality. I maintain that all WVs are built on a set of assumptions that are then taken for granted--some of which (logic, morality, etc) are necessarily true. Some WVs are going to be more consistent than others--some may even be completely consistent and a) wrong b) right on some points. All non-Christian WVs are built on half-truths, not outright falsehoods.

 

[The Calvin Knight]

I've been busy this week with school but I'll try to catch up and join back into the discussion in the next couple days. Having grazed over some of the post I would have to say that the transcendental argument is in some way a modal argument and some people have made this point as of late, see the recent issue of Philosophia Christi.

 

[jwright82]

If you can't spell out everything involved in an argument, then you shouldn't use it in a debate.

Our finitude is the problem here, the classical arguments have more problems than this one.

What exactly do you mean by "neutrality"? If there is no actual common ground between the believer and the unbeliever, then there can be no debate because they would be speaking two completely different languages, using two completely different logical systems, etc. In other words, communication possible if and only there is actual and perceived common ground.

I suggest you read Bahnsens book on Van Til especially chp. 6. I will try to explain it though. I used to be very critical of Van Til, and I would make this crticism as well. But the more I studied him, mainly through Bahnsen and Frame, I began to notice that the problem was not him it was me. I simplified his thinking where it was complex, I took his broad strokes with a brush to be absolute and intricate statements. This is true here as well.

The point at which I noticed this was when I reflected on Wittgenstiens later theories of language. The atheist and I could both use the same word to describe the same thing but be saying two different things, I'll explain. The atheist and I can both use the word good to describe a noble action, but what I mean by good, as in what corresponds to God's law, and what he means by good, as in whatever theory or lack there of he would put up to explain morality, are two different things. So on the one hand Van Til would say that psychologically speaking we both mean roughly the same thing by the same words but epistemologically we mean two different things.

We both use the same tool of logic (psychologically) but how we both explain what reason is is totally different (epistomologically). so there is common ground on two fronts:
1. psychologically beleivers and unbeleivers inhabit the same world so we use common notions in a broad sense
2. metaphysically speaking we are both made in the image of God we both can't escape it

Epistemologically speaking there is no common ground between the believer's and unbeliever's respective WV. Since the WV is the lens through which we interpret the world there can be no common ground in this sense.

The logical conclusion you come to is with this line of thought is, "Belief cannot argue with unbelief: it can only preach to it." ~Karl Barth (I'm still looking into the similarities between Van Til's epistemology and Barth's).

I used to think the same thing until I read Van Til's book called Christianity and Barthianism. Also I have studied Barth for many years now and the similariaties I thought were there really were not.

All that one has to so to expose the unbeliever's unreasonableness is to point out a couple common-sense principles. For example: if it's ridiculous in the courtroom, it's ridiculous in philosophy (Thomas Reid).

I'm not accuainted with Reid first hand only through secondary sources so I'll refrain from criticizing him directly.

I haven't seen any reason why it gives any reasons at all for why I should believe Christianity. Again, what is the conclusion? Christianity is possible--not necessary, not even probable, possible. Sorry, but the unbeliever has already given you that by discussing it at all.

The reason is unless you can logically criticize the TA and offer a better TA than you must give up explaining whatever the thing in question is, that is a reason. To show that Christianity makes sense of the world as we experiance it and to reduce whatever oppossing WV in question to absurdity is a reason.

So how to prove that the Christian WV is a properly basic assumption? In order for this to be proven, a necessary connection must be made. To prove that the Christian WV is a sufficient precondition for thought is almost a given for the unbeliever--only a proof that it is a probable or necessary precondition is compelling.

I must say you keep asserting this strong deductive Modal burden of proof but you have not demonstrated why it is the only burden of proof. So it seems you may be arguing by assertion.

You can say this in theory, but you and I both know that the mere assertion of it is not convincing to anyone.

You are correct but I'm not asserting this in my argument, this is a methodological assumption I make when engaging in the apologetical task. You have your own assumptions about the unbeleiver in your method of doing apologetics as well, everyone has. I guess I didn't make that clear so my bad. These assumptions I make when doing apologetics are only my assumptions not part of my argument. I will be more clear in the future about this.

The atheist can claim that logic is necessarily true. The Buddhist can claim that the disconnect is only seeming.

They can claim anything they want, but they must present a TA for it that demonstrates that it logically fullfills the preconditions for logic or whatever. I have not met an atheist that even wants to do this they seem to think that the use of reason is sufficiant enough to explain it but they are two different things.

Also, you assume here that every WV has to provide a systematic account of everything. Why? Why should the unbeliever accept this assumption? Does everyone have to have a systematically complete philosophy?

Not an omniscient WV but it must basically be able to provide expinaitions for our experiance. It really depends on which unbeleiving WV you are refering to. I have debated mostly with atheists so I can say that they don't really like explaining anything, they want to take for granted things like morality and reason but offer no explination. Some philosophers get it like Danial Dennet in his philosophy does appear to understand the gravity of this but Hitcheson and Dawkins are hoplessly inadequate here.

Again, he makes much stronger statements than you are making.

He does, and I am a little critical of him here. I have refrained from using the word necassary because you understand the word in one way, which as far as I can tell you only assert this to be the case.

The trouble with the TA is it only proves a possibility. The TA does not prove that actuality. So what if Christianity provides sufficient preconditions for morality? The proposition you should be proving is that morality is justified only if Christianity is true. Otherwise, there's no compelling reason. Again, why assume that every WV absolutely has to provide preconditions for everything.

To reject the TA is not to reject its explanatory power--but explanatory power is not the same as a compelling argument.

This statement only makes sense if you can defend the notion that all TAs must be transformed into a strong deductive Modal argument and then be proven that way, which it seems you have only asserted and not proven. I didn't want to shift the debate to the classical arguments but they don't even meet this burden of proof.

You cannot simply assert the impossibility of the contrary: you cannot simply assert that the unbeliever is "borrowing": you have to demonstrate that it is necessarily so.

Again this is more of a methodological assumption made, but in the course of the debate with the unbeleiver if they cannot account for say morality but they keep insisting on assuming there is such a thing as good and evil than they either criticize my TA and offer a better TA or that is borrowing from my WV.

You must demonstrate that the Christian WV is necessary for logic, that it is necessary for morality. Otherwise, all you do is prove sufficiency

You mean these words in one way so I try not to use them, I do believe the TA proves more than just suffitancy but I don't use necessaty because you would read something in one way, so I try to avoid confusion as much as possible.

which just proves that you are consistent--you could just be consistently wrong.

This is one of those areas were I think Van Til is right on in his critique of classical apologetics. The pressopossitionalist and the reformed classicalist both agree that the unbeleiver is suppressing the truth in unrightousness, but then the classicalist assumes the unbeleiver will be fair in their setting the burden of proof. The classicalist also assumes that they can deny what they know to be true (the chritian WV) and actually make headway in apologetics. I make a claim about the unbeleiver, that you probally agree with, but demand that I apeasse the unbeleiver's burden of proof as if it were fair and balanced? Sorry but I have never met a fair and balanced person we all have biases, one of theirs is that they hate the truth.

some of which (logic, morality, etc) are necessarily true.

I doubt you could prove that these are "necessarily" true as you understand the term.

You are assuming here that all WVs are built on a single basic assumptions apart from reality. I maintain that all WVs are built on a set of assumptions that are then taken for granted--some of which (logic, morality, etc) are necessarily true. Some WVs are going to be more consistent than others--some may even be completely consistent and a) wrong b) right on some points. All non-Christian WVs are built on half-truths, not outright falsehoods.

I wonder if you could give biblical data to support this theory about the unbeleivers epistomological status, when the new testament declares that they have become "futile in their thinking" I think that sums it up.

 

[Philip]

Epistemologically speaking there is no common ground between the believer's and unbeliever's respective WV. Since the WV is the lens through which we interpret the world there can be no common ground in this sense.

What exactly do you mean by Worldview here? Do you mean cultural lens? Ideological lens? Philosophical lens? Any of these will have elements of truth in them.

I'm not arguing with the method of the TA, but with your idea that it somehow forms a compelling case for the truth of Christianity. Simply proving that Christianity is sufficient for logic does not prove that it is actually true--if you are going to argue for the latter proposition, there needs to be at least a reason why Christianity is probably true. In other words, you have to prove that the denial of Christianity equals the denial of logic necessarily.

If one is to do such an argument, would it not be better to prove that the denial of Christianity entails the denial of the law of non-contradiction, the reliability of sense perception, the law of the excluded middle, or the analogical use of language? The TA just isn't sufficient to prove that the denial of Christianity entails any of these.

Van Til accuses the classicist of assuming a fair standard of proof and indeed he does--because he assumes the ordinary standard of proof. If one were to use courtroom procedures to establish the resurrection, there would be no contest: the testimony would be sufficient to establish it. And that's the point: in denying Christianity, the unbeliever is assuming a set of criteria that would be absurd in any other context. The presuppositionalist wants to stack the deck the other way, while the classical apologist wants to even out the deck because he is confident enough in the evidence that is there and which the unbeliever denies.

I would agree that in principle, we don't even have to provide such evidence because we have no burden of proof. However, I would submit that in undertaking the task of apologetics, we are playing the prosecution, not the defendant and therefore we have the burden of proof. The battle is for the soul and we call upon the soul to "decide this day whom you will serve." In engaging in debate we call upon the unbeliever to judge: it is not God in the dock, but on the witness stand. And ultimately, the decider is whether the Holy Spirit moves in the unbeliever's heart.

My question about the TA is whether it would stand in a courtroom or even in a debate round? I don't think it would (at least not with me as a judge). At best it would yield a double loss where both sides have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.

Sorry but I have never met a fair and balanced person we all have biases, one of theirs is that they hate the truth.

I haven't either--which is why we have to expose the bias--but exposing the bias of the judge is not tantamount to proving one's own position.

I'm not denying that presuppositional sets play a very significant role in our judgments and perceptions, just that there can be no common ground between them. I'm a presuppositional common sense epistemologist.

 

[jwright82]

What exactly do you mean by Worldview here? Do you mean cultural lens? Ideological lens? Philosophical lens? Any of these will have elements of truth in them.

What I mean here is a web of beleifs that are derived from various ways, the most central and basic ones are the most important elements. It is these beleifs that we use in interpreting reality around us.

I'm not arguing with the method of the TA, but with your idea that it somehow forms a compelling case for the truth of Christianity. Simply proving that Christianity is sufficient for logic does not prove that it is actually true--if you are going to argue for the latter proposition, there needs to be at least a reason why Christianity is probably true. In other words, you have to prove that the denial of Christianity equals the denial of logic necessarily.

If one is to do such an argument, would it not be better to prove that the denial of Christianity entails the denial of the law of non-contradiction, the reliability of sense perception, the law of the excluded middle, or the analogical use of language? The TA just isn't sufficient to prove that the denial of Christianity entails any of these.

Van Til accuses the classicist of assuming a fair standard of proof and indeed he does--because he assumes the ordinary standard of proof. If one were to use courtroom procedures to establish the resurrection, there would be no contest: the testimony would be sufficient to establish it. And that's the point: in denying Christianity, the unbeliever is assuming a set of criteria that would be absurd in any other context. The presuppositionalist wants to stack the deck the other way, while the classical apologist wants to even out the deck because he is confident enough in the evidence that is there and which the unbeliever denies.

I would agree that in principle, we don't even have to provide such evidence because we have no burden of proof. However, I would submit that in undertaking the task of apologetics, we are playing the prosecution, not the defendant and therefore we have the burden of proof. The battle is for the soul and we call upon the soul to "decide this day whom you will serve." In engaging in debate we call upon the unbeliever to judge: it is not God in the dock, but on the witness stand. And ultimately, the decider is whether the Holy Spirit moves in the unbeliever's heart.

My question about the TA is whether it would stand in a courtroom or even in a debate round? I don't think it would (at least not with me as a judge). At best it would yield a double loss where both sides have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.

Yeah like you said Van Til and Bahnsen made very strong statements about necessaty and absolute truth that make me a little uncomfortable but I think Frame is to critical. I must say that I don't have ready answers to some of your questions, so you got me there. I do believe the TA to be the best argument for Christianity but I welcome other aproechs as well. So in all fairness to I will state explicitly my beleifs about this method for consideration:
1. I believe the TA absolutly proves its truthfullness against individual opposing WV. As far as an absolute metaphysical proof, that is one-size-fits-all syllogism, that can ecompass all oppossing WV in a single bound, no I am not comfortable making that statement, I don't know at this point if it is right or wrong.
2. I agree with you that you cannot prove that the denial of Christianity equals the denial of logic. Although I would point out that the logical form of that statement is that it is a deductive argument not a TA form.
3. I don't really see why I would have to make such an omniscient argument encompassing everything all at once, a God's eye view of things (plus such a proof for anything in any form is impossible). But I see no reason why I must choose between an omniscient P.O.V. (modernism) or pure skepticism about everything (postmodernism). Each individual beleif is judged on its own ground.
4. I hesitate to say either way if Van Til was wrong in any of areas were I kinda refused to give an answer either way. But I do think I am well within the Presupossitional camp, although I am not as critical of other aproechs as the stricter Van Tillians would be.
5. TA must be judged on their own ground and not turned into different argument forms and swiftly disproven.

My question about the TA is whether it would stand in a courtroom or even in a debate round? I don't think it would (at least not with me as a judge). At best it would yield a double loss where both sides have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.

Here is how the TA would have proceeded if you were an unbeleiver. As soon as you started mentioning rational necessity and all that I would have said that I would be glad to engage in those questions but first you must account for reason itself. The reason why we do this is because if the unbeleiver can give no satisfactory explinaition to justify reason than I'm not required to answer his rational objections at all.

Since for him/her reason is the ultimate authority but if he/she cannot explain what reason is and why we should listen to it than I am under no obligation to take seriously his/her objections. Than I would show how Christianity as a WV satisfies the logical conditions to succesfully explain reason, which causes a problem for them not me. The reason it is a problem is because if they cannot provide a satisfactory explinaition for reason and a logical critique of mine than if they use reason they are borrowing from my WV. If I can give even a satisfactory explinaition of reason than that atleast answers thequestion I posed to them. If they cannot give a satisfactory explinaition for reason than everytime they make the same arguments you did I can point that if they cannot explian reason than I owe them no explinaition.

Does that sort of clear up the fog in the whole thing? Let me know if it does or not? Your a great philosopher by the way, you have mastered one of the greatest skills any philosopher must master, making my job hard for me.

 

[Philip]

I'll confine my reply here to the last part:

The reason why we do this is because if the unbeleiver can give no satisfactory explinaition to justify reason than I'm not required to answer his rational objections at all.

Actually, you do still have to answer them. The critique may be valid even if his worldview cannot provide an explanation. And again, what if he denies the need for such an obviously circular proof for the use of reason?

Since for him/her reason is the ultimate authority but if he/she cannot explain what reason is and why we should listen to it than I am under no obligation to take seriously his/her objections.

Because even if he/she cannot account for reason, you can. A critique presupposes nothing.

The reason it is a problem is because if they cannot provide a satisfactory explinaition for reason and a logical critique of mine than if they use reason they are borrowing from my WV.

Not necessarily--your WV might be borrowing from some other WV. Again, why should the non-believer be required to give a metaphysical account (whatever that means) that satisfies you?

And again, there's always the famous "The laws of logic are necessarily true and therefore need no explanation" line.

Again, what is needed is a criterion by which the debate will be judged before the debate begins. For a debate to take place, terms have to be agreed upon by all involved, else it's just a shouting match.

Does that sort of clear up the fog in the whole thing? Let me know if it does or not?

I understand the argument better, if that's what you mean. I still don't think that it gives a rationally compelling reason why a non-believer should accept Christianity--at best it only proves that the Christian faith has a more complete metaphysical explanation for certain questions which the non-believer may or may not think are relevant to whether he may use reason.

Anyway, I have learned a lot from you as well and eventually I'll have to get around to outlining a more complete epistemology (as well as revising my defense of the modal ontological argument).

And calling me a great philosopher is flattering, but rather a hyperbole.

 

[jwright82]

Actually, you do still have to answer them. The critique may be valid even if his worldview cannot provide an explanation. And again, what if he denies the need for such an obviously circular proof for the use of reason?

The reason this is a problem that requires an answer is because in every WV their view of things affects what the nature of a thing must be in order for them tobe consistant. For instance a materialist has a WV that determines that logic must be a material thing but there are all sorts of problems with that, as contemporary philosophy points out.

So what if denies that an explination is needed, in good philosophy you can't take things for granted. I would ask him why, knowing in advance that he could only give about 3 types of answers and I'm basically prepared for them.

Because even if he/she cannot account for reason, you can. A critique presupposes nothing.

Your absolutly right so I can give rational objections to their WV, but they can't consistly critique mine. It goes without saying it that these hypothetical debates I'm refering to are ideal scenerios and in the real world it wouldn't go this smooth, but I think it lays out the basic form.

Not necessarily--your WV might be borrowing from some other WV.

That is true but you can't give a legitamate critique like this in the abstract. This means that if I claim my opponant is borrowing from the Christian WV I must show 2 things:
1. That they cannot critique my TA of whatever the thing in question is
2. That they insist on using this thing without demonstrating any other WV that can satisfy the argument
You may not agree with it but the bottom line is it is a concrete connection I have shown not abstract, I'll show the difference.
If the unbeleiver asks me how do I know if I am not borrowing from another WV I would ask which one if he couldn't answer the question than I see no need to pay it any mind. It would be like someone looking at a logical argument I gave and saying how do you know you havn't made a mistake, but pointing out no problems whatsoever. It is the responsability of the critic to point out actual problems not hypotheticlly abstract ones.

Again, why should the non-believer be required to give a metaphysical account (whatever that means) that satisfies you?

The Transcendental analysis of the thing in question determines the problems that must be satisfied. Logic demands it, if were to have made my argument in the deductive form all your criticisms would have been right on and logic would have required an answer from me.

And again, there's always the famous "The laws of logic are necessarily true and therefore need no explanation" line.

I have actually heard this one a lot from people. The problem with it is that it only proves that you cannot escape logic, its like using logic to try to disprove logic it is self-defeating. But this in no way explains what logic is, in every WV their metaphysics would determine what logic is. The apologist would examine their WV and see if it made sense out of logic or not, or to say it another way does their WV allow for logic. If a WV said that logic is impossible than it would obviously disprove the WV on those grounds alone.

Again, what is needed is a criterion by which the debate will be judged before the debate begins. For a debate to take place, terms have to be agreed upon by all involved, else it's just a shouting match.

The beleiver and the unbeleiver are both using the same logical tools just for different purposes. Psychologically speaking we both inhabit the same creation so that will foster some agreement but I'm not sure what terms you are refering to, I thought you were making a point about a point of contact.

at best it only proves that the Christian faith has a more complete metaphysical explanation for certain questions which the non-believer may or may not think are relevant to whether he may use reason.

Concretely I have not met a single unbeleiver that did, although professional philosophers reconize how important these questions are, but they still must give a reason that makes sense why these questions are irelavant.

I'll have to get around to outlining a more complete epistemology (as well as revising my defense of the modal ontological argument).

I look foward to reading it, I'm sure it will be impressive.

 

[Philip]

Your absolutly right so I can give rational objections to their WV, but they can't consistly critique mine. It goes without saying it that these hypothetical debates I'm refering to are ideal scenerios and in the real world it wouldn't go this smooth, but I think it lays out the basic form.

You misunderstand my meaning: the beauty of skepticism is that you don't actually have to advance a positive position.

So what if denies that an explination is needed, in good philosophy you can't take things for granted.

Again, I would highly recommend Thomas Reid, who deconstructs this idea that there are no givens.

1. That they cannot critique my TA of whatever the thing in question is
2. That they insist on using this thing without demonstrating any other WV that can satisfy the argument
You may not agree with it but the bottom line is it is a concrete connection I have shown not abstract, I'll show the difference.

Again, this assumes a question that the unbeliever does not answer because either a) he doesn't understand exactly what he's being asked to prove b) he may see no need for metaphysics c) he may see no need for such an accounting d) he may just play the necessarily true card.

The Transcendental analysis of the thing in question determines the problems that must be satisfied.

Maybe it's just my poor pre-Kantian notion of proof, but I saw no demands for any such thing in your proof. Why does a WV have to provide clear answers to every philosophical problem? Even Christianity contains a lot of paradox and mystery.

But this in no way explains what logic is, in every WV their metaphysics would determine what logic is.

Not quite--I would say that we all know what logic is, even though the definition is a bit tricky. Thus, we try various definitions until we find one that is sufficient to tell us what exactly logic is.

The apologist would examine their WV and see if it made sense out of logic or not, or to say it another way does their WV allow for logic.

But that's easy--most WVs do allow for logic, in fact they take it as an essential presupposition. You are assuming a view of WV that says that all WVs depend on a couple of basic premises where I would see a much larger base, some of which is just grounded in reality. You assume that all WVs are complete self-contained systems like the philosophies of Descartes, Russell, or Leibniz. In fact, though, the fact of the matter is that most worldviews are a whole lot bigger and fuzzier.