WCF 24.4 and the American Revision

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chbrooking

Puritan Board Junior
Do any of you know the story behind striking "The man may not marry any of his wife's kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own; nor the woman of her husband's kindred nearer in blood than of her own." from the original WCF? Surely there is some historical tidbit that would shed light on this. Was it a result of demographics (not enough nice young reformed ladies to marry)? What was their reasoning?
 
Quite a lot of a story, actually. See Barry Waugh's Ph.D. dissertation at Westminster Seminary on the consanguinity clause. WTS has a copy on the shelf in the Montgomery Library, or you can order a copy through University Microfilms International.
 
A matter may well be biblical and binding on the conscience--some marital relation may be sinful, the pope might actually BE antichrist, etc.--and we simply don't confess that conviction together. The disagreements on that doctrine are not so vital that not to share harmony upon it does not undercut our common faith.
 
???

I'm not asking about justifying it or agreeing with it or disagreeing with it or anything. I was just asking about what led to the change. I'm just interested is all.

A matter may well be biblical and binding on the conscience--some marital relation may be sinful, the pope might actually BE antichrist, etc.--and we simply don't confess that conviction together. The disagreements on that doctrine are not so vital that not to share harmony upon it does not undercut our common faith.
 
Clark:

When next in the office, I'll look at Dr. Waugh's dissertation and if there is an abstract and if it provides pertinent information, I'll transcribe it for you here. The historical gist of things is that there were a number of men marrying their deceased wife's sister in the 19th century. One judicial case in particular in the Old School PCUSA was probably the core matter that eventually led to the change.
 
It has always struck me that historical circumstance of the annulment of the marriage of Henry VIII to Catherine of Aragon, (which had been approved and biblically justified by the Reformer Arcbishop Cranmer) had put an imprint on this doctrine in the English church for the episcopal and presbyterian factions alike. In other words, the national significance of this doctrine for England made this doctrine stick out in their minds.

But that's not to say they were wrong. I actually agree with the doctrine expressed in WCF 24:4 based on the teaching of Scripture (especially the Scripture proof provided: Leviticus 20:19)
 
That would be awesome. Thanks!
Clark:

When next in the office, I'll look at Dr. Waugh's dissertation and if there is an abstract and if it provides pertinent information, I'll transcribe it for you here. The historical gist of things is that there were a number of men marrying their deceased wife's sister in the 19th century. One judicial case in particular in the Old School PCUSA was probably the core matter that eventually led to the change.
 
Clark:

We may not have to wait. A bit of searching on the web produced the following from
Debating marriage: marrying the sister of a deceased wife and the Presbyterian church in Canada. - Free Online Library

In the United States marriage laws are a matter of state law, and a number of American states, recognizing the practical realities of eighteenth century marriage and family life, changed the law to allow previously proscribed marriages. Connecticut in 1750 and Massachusetts in 1785 began loosening the kin restrictions, with Massachusetts allowing marriage with a deceased wife's sister in 1785 and Connecticut making the same change in 1793. By the 1840s, Virginia, with its strong Episcopal (Anglican) heritage, was the only state in which such marriages still were disallowed. As Reformation-era prohibitions had a declining influence on civil law, religious denominations, including Presbyterians, were left to determine how to respond. Barry Waugh has shown, through some high profile cases from the 1820s to the 1840s, that the Presbyterian tradition moved from the excommunication of Donald McCrimmon--a ruling elder of Ottery's Church in Fayetteville, North Carolina, who had contracted a proscribed marriage--to allowing the Reverend Archibald McQueen, a minister in the Fayetteville Presbytery, to remain a minister in good standing despite his being married to his deceased wife's sister. (22) Given that the civil authorities had dealt with the issue years earlier, and that the church was seeking to respond to specific pastoral situations, the debate was about the meaning of the biblical texts and the theological implications of those texts, rather than about how to respond to the actions of the government. While the debate was theologically rooted, Brian Connolly notes that few references were made to the WCF in these American debates. (23)

The link above is primarily concerned with a Canadian context. Otherwise, let me know if the quote above is sufficient background. I'll still check to see if the dissertation bears an abstract, but at the moment I don't expect to find a precise that will have much more information than this quote.
 
No, that gives me a sense of the issue, some names to follow up on, and an in-depth source if I want to go even deeper. You've been EXCEEDINGLY helpful. Thanks.
 
Clark:

One last contribution, if you do chose to read a bit deeper on this topic: Dr. Waugh helped early on with some of the work digitizing articles from the Southern Presbyterian Review. Understandably, he chose to work on this article, among others:

"A Brief in the Case of the Marriage with a Deceased Wife’s Sister," by the Rev. L.G. Barbour, D.D.
http://www.pcahistory.org/HCLibrary/periodicals/spr/v35/35-2-1.pdf
 
This may be off topic, Clark, since you are asking the historical question, but I've always thought the revision to make good sense biblically. Otherwise, the practice of levirate marriage in the Bible was not acceptable. I was never convinced by the exegesis of the divines on this point: the texts simply do not say what they think it says. And my reasoning is that death breaks the marriage. The marriage relationship no longer exists. Therefore it would make sense if the "in-law" relationship legally ends with death as well. One could even go to Romans 7 for this principle.
 
This may be off topic, Clark, since you are asking the historical question, but I've always thought the revision to make good sense biblically. Otherwise, the practice of levirate marriage in the Bible was not acceptable. I was never convinced by the exegesis of the divines on this point: the texts simply do not say what they think it says. And my reasoning is that death breaks the marriage. The marriage relationship no longer exists. Therefore it would make sense if the "in-law" relationship legally ends with death as well. One could even go to Romans 7 for this principle.

Could levirate marriage be the exception to the rule? After all, it was quite an anamoly. Just about everything about it was unique to particular circumstances. The Westminster divines and I think that Leviticus 20:19-21 sets the general rule.
 
I realize that this is the passage used to defend this principle. However, there is no mention made there of any of his wife's kindred. It is only talking about his own kindred. If there is another passage that more clearly connects the same principles there to a man's wife's kindred, that's one thing. However, to argue that this passage includes the wife's kindred has to be argued. I just don't see it there.
 
I realize that this is the passage used to defend this principle. However, there is no mention made there of any of his wife's kindred. It is only talking about his own kindred. If there is another passage that more clearly connects the same principles there to a man's wife's kindred, that's one thing. However, to argue that this passage includes the wife's kindred has to be argued. I just don't see it there.

I suppose it seems to be perfectly reciprocal, that if a man can't take his brother's wife, then a woman can't take her sister's husband, either. What's good for one sex, seems to be good for the other, in most moral cases. No?
 
I realize that this is the passage used to defend this principle. However, there is no mention made there of any of his wife's kindred. It is only talking about his own kindred. If there is another passage that more clearly connects the same principles there to a man's wife's kindred, that's one thing. However, to argue that this passage includes the wife's kindred has to be argued. I just don't see it there.

I suppose it seems to be perfectly reciprocal, that if a man can't take his brother's wife, then a woman can't take her sister's husband, either. What's good for one sex, seems to be good for the other, in most moral cases. No?

I would agree in the case of brother-in-law and sister-in-law. However, the original WCF extended this principle to any kindred of his wife's family (and vice versa for the husband's) that was the same degree of consanguinity as his own. To me, this seems like an unwarranted extension of the principle. For instance, it is not clear to me that a woman could not marry her deceased husband's nephew. There does need to be adequate weight given to the fact that death severs the marriage relationship.
 
...but Wayne had already stolen away, out the back door of this thread and has now entered another (undisclosed) thread....
 
I realize that this is the passage used to defend this principle. However, there is no mention made there of any of his wife's kindred. It is only talking about his own kindred. If there is another passage that more clearly connects the same principles there to a man's wife's kindred, that's one thing. However, to argue that this passage includes the wife's kindred has to be argued. I just don't see it there.

I suppose it seems to be perfectly reciprocal, that if a man can't take his brother's wife, then a woman can't take her sister's husband, either. What's good for one sex, seems to be good for the other, in most moral cases. No?

I would agree in the case of brother-in-law and sister-in-law. However, the original WCF extended this principle to any kindred of his wife's family (and vice versa for the husband's) that was the same degree of consanguinity as his own. To me, this seems like an unwarranted extension of the principle. For instance, it is not clear to me that a woman could not marry her deceased husband's nephew. There does need to be adequate weight given to the fact that death severs the marriage relationship.

So you mean that my daughter's first cousin could be her stepmom, and her 2nd cousin, her sister? Kinda weird.
 
Riley, I think the point that Lane is making is that the death of a spouse breaks the bond such that you could not continue to speak of former such relations in the present tense.
 
Riley, I think the point that Lane is making is that the death of a spouse breaks the bond such that you could not continue to speak of former such relations in the present tense.

Seems to me like Leviticus 20 is primarily concerned with relations after the death of a spouse. If your spouse is still alive, it's a given that you can't "lay with" other people. So what would be the point of this passage?
 
Riley, I think the point that Lane is making is that the death of a spouse breaks the bond such that you could not continue to speak of former such relations in the present tense.

Ruth continues to be regarded as Naomi's daughter in law after the death of Ruth's husband. Once land inheritance is taken into account in any legal system it will be impossible to divorce the spouse of the deceased from the family line. It has only been made a working possibility in the modern world as a result of urbanisation and the fact that economy is not tied to the land.
 
I'm going to have to side with John the Baptist on this one: "It is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's wife" (Mark 6:18).
 
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