Turretin solves the Creation/Evolution debate?

[Afterthought]

Turretin writes:

"VII. For a thing to be denied by philosophy is different from not being taught by it. We do not deny that various theological mysteries are not taught in philosophy, but it does not follow that they are denied by it because the limits of the two sciences must be kept distinct. The physician does not meddle with geometry, nor the lawyer with natural science. So philosophy should be kept within its proper bounds and not be allowed to thrust its pruning hook into a different field. Therefore, because it says nothing about the Trinity and the incarnation, we must not suppose that it denies these doctrines.

XIII. Although theology teaches many things which philosophy knows not, it does not follow that a thing may be false in philosophy which is true in theology because truth is not at variance with truth, nor is light opposed to light. But care must be taken that philosophical truths be not extended beyond their own sphere and the ordinary powers of nature to those things which are of supernatural revelation or power; that the physical be not confounded with the hyper-physical or human with divine things. For example, it is true in philosophy that a virgin cannot bring forth, that a heavy body is carried downwards, that fire burns matter placed in contact with it, that from nothing, nothing can come--the contraries of which theology maintains. But they are not on this account opposed to each other because these things are spoken of in different relations.... In philosophy, they are denied with reference to the laws of nature, but in theology they are affirmed with reference to divine omnipotence and supernaturally." (Institutes First Topic, Thirteenth Question)


If I'm understanding Turretin correctly, something can be said in philosophy that contradicts theology, yet both propositions are true with respect to their fields. This is quite different from what I usually hear: that true science (and presumably true philosophy too) does not contradict theology or Scripture. So my questions. (1) Besides its potential for solving the "tension" between philosophy/science and theology, what other reasons are there for accepting this view? Why should we accept this view as correct? (I'm guessing the answer will be something like, "It's what we do anyway with respect to the virgin birth, etc.," but are there any other reasons?) I ask because I'm not sure whether the apparent contradiction is merely only apparent between the two (but that's addressed in a later question).

(2) Does this really resolve any "problems" between what science says and what Scriptures say? I ask because science (or philosophy) is supposed to be showing us what reality is like (or so scientists say), so it would seem that science done rightly would not contradict theology, or else it would appear God has been deceiving us. Of course, on the other hand, science would also say that a virgin cannot give birth, but is there a difference between a miracle recorded in Scripture on the one hand and the data we receive from the natural world on the other (or our natural reasoning in philosophy?)?

(3) How far can philosophy/science differ from theology? For example, we see the light of stars exploding, which according to natural science must show the universe to be billions of years old or else we would be seeing stars that never existed explode (and so presumably, God would be deceiving us). So does the difference between them "stop" at any point or can they differ as much as possible while still remaining true with respect to their fields?

(4) On this view, does it really matter what science says, provided we restrict it to the realm of natural causes? So, for example, could Christians say evolution and a very old universe are true with respect to science while affirming six day Creation with respect to theology?

(5) On this view, what would we make of such differences? Is it said, for example, that if God did not create, then we would have developed by evolution over many years? In other words, do we view the differing information we get from the natural world as a hypothetical scenario?

(6) Finally, and perhaps an easy question to answer, which really shows what reality is like when the two differ at a point? Philosophy/science or theology? (I'm guessing theology.)


There are other questions I could ask, I suppose, like the historical question of why in the world did Christians accept modern scientific findings if they had this easy of a solution in front of them and whether Christians should participate in scientific areas that contradict theology, but I'll stick with these to keep the thread more focused.

 

[Peairtach]

This is quite different than the view that I usually hear that true science (and presumably true philosophy too) does not contradict theology or Scripture.

In Turretin's time science was subsumed under philosophy as natural philosophy. Eventually science grew and took on a life of its own.

 

[Philip]

I wouldn't take this so far as to cover the six-day-creation/evolution debate.

 

[JohnGill]

Turretin writes (I'll add the references when I get back to the book I have):

"VII. For a thing to be denied by philosophy is different from not being taught by it. We do not deny that various theological mysteries are not taught in philosophy, but it does not follow that they are denied by it because the limits of the two sciences must be kept distinct. The physician does not meddle with geometry, nor the lawyer with natural science. So philosophy should be kept within its proper bounds and not be allowed to thrust its pruning hook into a different field. Therefore, because it says nothing about the Trinity and the incarnation, we must not suppose that it denies these doctrines.

XIII. Although theology teaches many things which philosophy knows not, it does not follow that a thing may be false in philosophy which is true in theology because truth is not at variance with truth, nor is light opposed to light. But care must be taken that philosophical truths be not extended beyond their own sphere and the ordinary powers of nature to those things which are of supernatural revelation or power; that the physical be not confounded with the hyper-physical or human with divine things. For example, it is true in philosophy that a virgin cannot bring forth, that a heavy body is carried downwards, that fire burns matter placed in contact with it, that from nothing, nothing can come--the contraries of which theology maintains. But they are not on this account opposed to each other because these things are spoken of in different relations.... In philosophy, they are denied with reference to divine omnipotence and supernaturally." (This last sentence sounds weird. I'll have to double-check that I copied it down correctly)


If I'm understanding Turretin correctly, something can be said in philosophy that contradicts theology, yet both propositions are true with respect to their fields. This is quite different from what I usually hear: that true science (and presumably true philosophy too) does not contradict theology or Scripture. So my questions. (1) Besides its potential for solving the "tension" between philosophy/science and theology, what other reasons are there for accepting this view? Why should we accept this view as correct? (I'm guessing the answer will be something like, "It's what we do anyway with respect to the virgin birth, etc.," but are there any other reasons?) I ask because I'm not sure whether the apparent contradiction is merely only apparent between the two (but that's addressed in a later question)

(2) Does this really resolve any "problems" between what science says and what Scriptures say? I ask because science (or philosophy) is supposed to be showing us what reality is like (or so scientists say), so it would seem that science done rightly would not contradict theology, or else it would appear God has been deceiving us. Of course, on the other hand, science would also say that a virgin cannot give birth, but is there a difference between a miracle recorded in Scripture on the one hand and the data we receive from the natural world on the other (or our natural reasoning in philosophy?)?

(3) How far can philosophy/science differ from theology? For example, we see the light of stars exploding, which according to natural science must show the universe to be billions of years old or else we would be seeing stars that never existed explode (and so presumably, God would be deceiving us). So does the difference between them "stop" at any point or can they differ as much as possible while still remaining true with respect to their fields?

(4) On this view, does it really matter what science says, provided we restrict it to the realm of natural causes? So, for example, could Christians say evolution and a very old universe are true with respect to science while affirming six day Creation?

(5) On this view, what would we make of such differences? Is it said, for example, that if God did not create, then we would have developed by evolution over many years? In other words, do we view the differing information we get from the natural world as a hypothetical scenario?

(6) Finally, and perhaps an easy question to answer, which really shows what reality is like when the two differ at a point? Philosophy/science or theology? (I'm guessing theology.)


There are other questions I could ask, I suppose, like the historical question of why in the world did Christians accept modern scientific findings if they had this easy of a solution in front of them and whether Christians should participate in scientific areas that contradict theology, but I'll stick with these to keep the thread more focused.

It is erroneous to call evolution science. It is a philosophy first propounded by Anaximander. I also think your usage of "science" is ambiguous. There is operations science - modern tech is an example; and there is historical (origins) science - the philosophy of evolution. These two "sciences" are not the same.

I didn't get the same conclusion you did. It seems to me that Turretin is arguing that anything in philosophy which contradicts theology is not true. It appears to me that he is arguing for philosophers to stay within their fields. When an evolutionist claims to be a scientist and steps outside the bounds of science into origins, something science can never prove or disprove, he has stepped beyond his field.

2) Real science never contradicts scripture. So when someone claims science contradicts scripture he is using the term ambiguously.

3) Red shift/blue shift theory was disproved by Halton Arp. At any time scientists make claims contrary to scripture, those claims are not scientific, but are an expression of anti-christian philosophy.

4) The two are logically contradictory. Furthermore there is no scientific evidence for the earth being older than a few thousand years. Radiometric dating, ice core dating, etc. have all shown to be fraudulent. And since scripture teaches a young earth, the earth is young. Any claims to the contrary are automatically wrong.

5) The "data" received by Christians and non-christians is the same. The problem is that there is no such thing as brute facts. All facts are interpreted facts. We either interpret them according to the Christian worldview set forth in scripture. Or we interpret them according to some other worldview. The latter is sin.

6) Theology answers origin questions more so than operation questions.

Part of the reason for accepting parts of evolutionistic thinking go back to the philosophies Enlightenment and German Rationalism infecting Christendom. It's easy for us to look back now and think, I wouldn't have given into that. But with the attacks from both higher and lower criticism, the quest for the historical Jesus starting in the 18th century, the veneer of "science" added to Anaximander's philosophy, and I feel an abandonment of a high view of the Bible in some parts, it should come as no surprise that evolutionism made inroads into the church. But even though this occurred, God gave us men such as Machen and Van Til to fight this tendency within Christendom of trying to make Christendom look scientifically respectable. I think it came in through an attempt by well meaning theologians to deal with it. But as the saying goes, hindsight is 20/20.

 

[Philip]

Real science never contradicts scripture. So when someone claims science contradicts scripture he is using the term ambiguously.

So do the miracles of Jesus break scientific laws? If so, then scripture gives instances where scientific laws were contradicted. If not, then they were not really miracles (example: feeding of the five thousand vs. the laws of thermodynamics).

 

[JohnGill]

Real science never contradicts scripture. So when someone claims science contradicts scripture he is using the term ambiguously.

So do the miracles of Jesus break scientific laws? If so, then scripture gives instances where scientific laws were contradicted. If not, then they were not really miracles (example: feeding of the five thousand vs. the laws of thermodynamics).

Jesus didn't "break" natural law, he suspended it. Science doesn't deal with the suspension of the "laws" of the natural order. Science can only deal with events occurring under the normal operation of such "laws". Furthermore, the most science can say about miracles is that they are improbable unless the natural order is suspended. The feeding of the 5 thousand is a suspension of normal operations and therefore outside the realm of science. The problem arises when scientists erroneously claim miracles are impossible without adding the caveat, "without suspension of the natural order". But of course miracles are the suspension of natural order. And for any scientist to claim that the suspension of natural order is impossible is for him to claim omniscience. Dr. Bahnsen dealt with this in either his Gordon Stein debate or in his review of Michael Martin's works.

 

[Philip]

Science can only deal with events occurring under the normal operation of such "laws".

Is Divine intervention somehow abnormal or unnatural? Since God is there, I can think of nothing more natural than for God to interact with his creation.

 

[JohnGill]

Science can only deal with events occurring under the normal operation of such "laws".

Is Divine intervention somehow abnormal or unnatural? Since God is there, I can think of nothing more natural than for God to interact with his creation.

Do you believe science can understand a miracle such as the feeding of 5000 or Christ coming back to life?

 

[Philip]

Do you believe science can understand a miracle such as the feeding of 5000 or Christ coming back to life?

Yes. It can understand it as a miracle. If such is not the case, then theology and science are speaking different languages and there is no possibility of conflict between theology and science---even the science of an unbeliever.

 

[JohnGill]

Do you believe science can understand a miracle such as the feeding of 5000 or Christ coming back to life?

Yes. It can understand it as a miracle. If such is not the case, then theology and science are speaking different languages and there is no possibility of conflict between theology and science---even the science of an unbeliever.

Let me ask again. Can science understand a miracle in the same manner it understands the procedure necessary to produce a microchip? Which entails the ability of science not only understanding the feeding of the five thousand or the resurrection of Christ, but replicating it. I don't disagree that science can recognizing a miracle as a miracle. But miracles are outside the purview of science. The purpose of science is to fulfill God's mandate in subduing God's creation. You can observe a miracle, but replicating a miracle is a different issue altogether. Operations science doesn't allow for the replicating of miracles. The supernatural is outside its field. Making observations and conclusions about the natural world as run by God's general providence is all science can do. "500 people drink poison. All 500 die. Therefore, if I drink that poison, I will die," Is completely different from Christ fed 5000 people. I can't assume that because Christ did it that I can now work a miracle to feed 5000 people. Science cannot even begin to help me understand the process by which that was accomplished. How did God create light? Provide the scientific answer. And your answer must allow for the duplication of the event. I want the process and I want to be able to do it today. I can explain to you how to make a microchip, and following my explanation, if you were willing to spend the money, you could make microchips. One is supernatural and the other is natural. Though science must have as its foundation Christian theology, it cannot inform us with regards to miracles. Nor can it comment on the doctrine of the Trinity, nor the doctrine of Original Sin, nor the doctrine of the Inspiration, Preservation, and Infallibility of Holy Scripture, nor Creation, etc. Any attempt to have science commenting on these issues is to redefine the word into meaninglessness.

---------- Post added at 07:39 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:35 PM ----------

So do the miracles of Jesus break scientific laws? If so, then scripture gives instances where scientific laws were contradicted. If not, then they were not really miracles (example: feeding of the five thousand vs. the laws of thermodynamics).

I feel I should also point out there is no such thing as a scientific law. There are only observations about God's general providence in creation. These observations help us to subdue God's creation. Your questions here would pit God's general providence against God working miracles.

 

[Afterthought]

In Turretin's time science was subsumed under philosophy as natural philosophy. Eventually science grew and took on a life of its own.

True, and I do think science is still very much connected to philosophy in that its methods are derived from it.

I wouldn't take this so far as to cover the six-day-creation/evolution debate.

Why not?

I also think your usage of "science" is ambiguous. There is operations science - modern tech is an example; and there is historical (origins) science - the philosophy of evolution. These two "sciences" are not the same.

Well, I was trying to avoid such terminology to keep the question general, especially considering I still see science--even what is called "operations science"--as very much connected to philosophy.

I didn't get the same conclusion you did. It seems to me that Turretin is arguing that anything in philosophy which contradicts theology is not true. It appears to me that he is arguing for philosophers to stay within their fields. When an evolutionist claims to be a scientist and steps outside the bounds of science into origins, something science can never prove or disprove, he has stepped beyond his field.

I re-read the portion, but I'm still getting the same conclusion. While I agree Turretin does say fields shouldn't step out of their bounds, he also says (and I fixed the quote): "For example, it is true in philosophy that a virgin cannot bring forth, that a heavy body is carried downwards, that fire burns matter placed in contact with it, that from nothing, nothing can come--the contraries of which theology maintains. But they are not on this account opposed to each other because these things are spoken of in different relations.... In philosophy, they are denied with reference to the laws of nature, but in theology they are affirmed with reference to divine omnipotence and supernaturally."

So something denied in philosophy is denied with respect to philosophy, while something affirmed with theology is affirmed with respect to theology. So though they give contradictory propositions "they are not on this account opposed to each other." And when philosophy says something contrary to theology the claim is not merely false because that claim with respect to philosophy "is true in philosophy." The examples given such as the virgin birth supports this reading "it is true in philosophy that a virgin cannot bring foth," not false in philosophy, yet from theology, we all know what actually happened.

Red shift/blue shift theory was disproved by Halton Arp.

Could I have a source to this study?

 

[Philip]

Why not?

Because if you did, you would relegate the Genesis accounts (by which I mean at least chapter 2 and following) to the status of something other than the history it is clearly meant to be.

Chris,

You are defining "science" rather more narrowly than the ordinary use of the term suggests. There's all kinds of science that doesn't deal with repeatable experimentation: social science, forensic science, archaeology, theoretical physics (string theory, multiverse theory, etc), much of astronomy, etc. So if archaeology, for instance, is a scientific endeavour, why should theories of species diversification be excluded?

As I said, I am not endorsing evolutionary biological processes as a means by which God caused various species to diversify, merely pointing out that the hypothesis is, strictly speaking, within the realm of science.

nor Creation

If science is not dealing with creation, then it's not likely to be dealing with much of anything.

I feel I should also point out there is no such thing as a scientific law. There are only observations about God's general providence in creation.

And we call these scientific laws. Of course scientific laws don't exist, any more than economic laws. Nonetheless, they are exactly the means of God's ordinary providence and if miracles did not entail a contradiction of the ordinary means of God's providence, then in no sense would they be miraculous (physical contradiction, not logical contradiction).

 

[MW]

How far can philosophy/science differ from theology?

Consider Psalm 115:16 and Isaiah 55:9. If these two domains of knowledge are realised we will be confronted with a world of difference. Of course, there have been many attempts to make philosophy and theology relate to a single domain of knowledge, in which case no difference can be accepted.

 

[Afterthought]

I wonder if there are any more recent theologians who hold Turretin's view (I can't think of anyone who said evolution was true with respect to something while still believing six day Creation with respect to theology, not that I know of many people to begin with), but anyway...

Because if you did, you would relegate the Genesis accounts (by which I mean at least chapter 2 and following) to the status of something other than the history it is clearly meant to be.

I don't really see how, unless perhaps you mean that this system would keep theology as separate from philosophy as it keeps philosophy separate from theology. But even that is solved if one sees theology as the queen of science and so what it says ultimately overrules what the others say (or in other words, what theology says is what reality is like). Perhaps you can unpack your statement here some? I would think that this way of thinking of philosophy and theology would have the opposite effect because we would be less tempted to allow modern science (or philosophy) to sway our theological conclusions.

Consider Psalm 115:16 and Isaiah 55:9. If these two domains of knowledge are realised we will be confronted with a world of difference. Of course, there have been many attempts to make philosophy and theology relate to a single domain of knowledge, in which case no difference can be accepted.

What an interesting application of those verses! I think I'll have to concede that use of them. That would also lend support to the idea Turretin is suggesting, but only if it is accepted that science is man's thoughts on reality rather than a discovering of what reality actually is? However, I wonder (a) whether it can be said that the two relate to a single domain of reality at least (because if philosophy contradicts theology, I would think we'd say theology has the proposition that corresponds with the way things actually are), in which case the two speak to the same reality and (b) whether this kind of separation of philosophy and theology (which seems to be an epistemic separation?) goes far enough to support Turretin's suggestion that we can say something is true with respect to something even though it is false with respect to another (after all, isn't what is true usually referred to what actually is the case? I would think that using Turretin's suggestion the best one could say is that something is consistent or correct with respect to something)?

4) The two are logically contradictory. Furthermore there is no scientific evidence for the earth being older than a few thousand years. Radiometric dating, ice core dating, etc. have all shown to be fraudulent. And since scripture teaches a young earth, the earth is young. Any claims to the contrary are automatically wrong.

This is the point that I'm having a problem with too. But of course, it is admitted that the two propositions would be contradictory. I think the real problem is: how can we say both these are true (if we can)? The closest example I can think of is using one mathematical description of some event and then using a completely different mathematical system to describe the same event, but I don't know if "true" is the right word but rather they both "work" or both are "right."

 

[Philip]

But even that is solved if one sees theology as the queen of science and so what it says ultimately overrules what the others say (or in other words, what theology says is what reality is like). Perhaps you can unpack your statement here some?

What I mean is this: to say that the Genesis account does not contradict evolutionary theory on these grounds requires that one allow a certain kind of philosophical doublethink where what is presented as straightforward history in Genesis 2 and following be accepted as history, but only in theology. You see the problem? It's like saying that for the purposes of science, we must assume that Jesus did not rise from the dead, while in theology he did: it's doublethink of the most insidious nature, and certainly not what Turretin was meaning to say.

 

[MW]

I would think that using Turretin's suggestion the best one could say is that something is consistent or correct with respect to something)?

Let's look at the philosophical maxim, Out of nothing nothing comes. Some theologians have attempted to deny it is true in the interests of upholding a supernatural worldview. In the end they do a disservice to that supernatural worldview because they destroy the ability to distinguish between what is ordinary and what is miraculous. In fact, everything becomes miraculous, and then it is impossible to distinguish between the work of God and counterfeits. How does a theologian with this presupposition distinguish between claims relative to the miraculous? He can't, because all things are by nature possible. If, on the other hand, we accept the maxim, and acknowledge that there is an impossible world so far as man is concerned, the impossible is reserved to what God can do, and a difference can be made between true and counterfeit miracles. We can use philosophically accepted criteria for determining what is and is not possible in the ordinary course of events, and of establishing grounds for concluding that something out of the ordinary has taken place. I consider this to be the basis on which Scripture sets forth its case for the miraculous. It is not an indiscriminate and naive acceptance of the miraculous, but the establishing of carefully defined criteria for acknowledging that a miracle has occurred.

For the maxim and its consequences to be accepted, however, we must acknowledge two different domains of human knowledge with their own unique limitations and conditions. We must be prepared to allow the difference between "out of nothing nothing comes" and the calling of "things which be not as though they were." We must grant what science tells us about the impossibility of wine coming forth from mere water in order to be able to credit a miracle in the turning of water into wine. Without that contrasting difference between observation and revelation we will have no way of distinguishing between the two and of discerning true and false revelation.

 

[Afterthought]

What I mean is this: to say that the Genesis account does not contradict evolutionary theory on these grounds requires that one allow a certain kind of philosophical doublethink where what is presented as straightforward history in Genesis 2 and following be accepted as history, but only in theology. You see the problem? It's like saying that for the purposes of science, we must assume that Jesus did not rise from the dead, while in theology he did: it's doublethink of the most insidious nature, and certainly not what Turretin was meaning to say.

Ahh, I see what you are getting at now; it seems to be the same problem I'm having with this.

Let's look at the philosophical maxim, Out of nothing nothing comes.

Thanks! That was quite helpful. So we can say that "this is true with respect to the way things ordinarily go, as we know from philosophy/science, but this other thing is true with respect to the way things actually went, as we know from theology." I'm much more comfortable with that.

So perhaps we could extend such thinking to the creation/evolution debate in the above sense, i.e., with respect to the ordinary course of things as opposed to specific events? So we could say that it is true that people do not rise from the dead--with respect to ordinary and natural causes. However, in Jesus' case--a specific event--it is true that a person did rise from the dead. And eventually, all people will rise from the dead. And so we could extend this to evolutionary theory too; it is true (well, assuming for the sake of the argument that evolution is a good theory) that species change greatly over time--with respect to ordinary and natural causes. However, in the case of the Creation of everything (assuming for the sake of the argument that six day creation is correct)--a specific event--we know that species did not change over time to bring themselves about, so it is true all things were Created by God out of nothing in the space of six days.

But it appears I may have run myself into a contradiction here because the theory of evolution (and similar theories like the big bang) relates to the specific event of Creation! So perhaps this sort of thinking can't be extended to that sort of debate; though even if it was, because of the assumptions I had to make to paint the above scenario, it seems to me it would leave the debate mostly as it is, except for helping the biblical interpreter stay safer from allowing science to determine his interpretation (which I suppose isn't exactly insignificant!). At any rate, from the scenario I painted above, it certainly appears that the two must speak to the same reality.

 

[SRoper]

I think one way Turretin's distinction applies to the debate is it frees one who believes in special creation from having to make the case on scientific grounds. That is, one is free to believe that the origin of species by natural selection is scientifically possible while still affirming that it isn't the way that God chose to create.

 

[Afterthought]

^I see; good point! So perhaps we could do something similar to what Descartes did by putting evolution in the realm of the hypothetical: "If things worked then as they work according to the ordinary course of things now, then evolution is an explanation of how things happened." So we could say evolution is true with respect to that hypothetical universe?

Perhaps I also may be able to not run into a contradiction through a modification of my earlier statement. We can say "evolution is true with respect to the ordinary course of things but what really happened in the specific event of the universe's origin was Creation (which we know from theology)." (the impossible universe evolution cuts off would then be one that is created in a short space of time, among other things) And of course from there, we can say that in a hypothetical universe where the ordinary course of things always functioned, evolution happens--even in bringing things about. Thoughts? Perhaps we can never allow for such hypotheticals in our thinking because we must try to think God's thoughts after Him? (Indeed, even if science is man's thoughts, shouldn't--in thinking God's thoughts after him--we then bring science into conformity with theology rather than leaving it alone?)

 

[Afterthought]

Thoughts? Do I still fall into a "doublethink" in the above post? I also was wondering what else this could be applied to, but it appears to only apply to miraculous events that break the ordinary course of things, so, for example, it doesn't seem to help the geocentrism vs heliocentrism issue.

 

[MW]

Thoughts? Do I still fall into a "doublethink" in the above post? I also was wondering what else this could be applied to, but it appears to only apply to miraculous events that break the ordinary course of things, so, for example, it doesn't seem to help the geocentrism vs heliocentrism issue.

I don't think creation-evolution properly fits within the two domains of knowledge. Evolution is not centrally based on observation. There is much that the hypothesis does not claim to be able to demonstrate. More fitted to the two domains is the young-old earth debate. Observation can tell us, for example, the time it takes for light to travel between two points. Revelation teaches us that God created the light and its course. Likewise, geocentrism reflects a revelation perspective and heliocentrism an observation perspective. It seems to me to be perfectly suited to just this kind of problem.

 

[Afterthought]

Thank you, Rev. Winzer! I guess you're right about that; technically, evolution (in the sense we're using it here) is an explanation of observations rather than observation itself, so it would perhaps better be stated: "Evolution is an explanation of the ordinary course of things--that we in turn know from observation--were the ordinary course of things to have always been this way," which puts it in the realm of the hypothetical instead (I guess that goes for certain theories of cosmology and perhaps particle physics too, although I'm having a little difficulty distinguishing between an hypothesis like evolution and the use of hypotheses to account for things we call "observation" eventually).

That is probably the clear difference I've been trying to find between what Turretin said and what Descartes suggested, namely, the former speaking of knowledge while the latter speaking of the use of a hypothetical universe, that extends before Creation, in science. It then appears that the two domains of knowledge only applies to the creation/evolution debate indirectly (along with keeping us from having to give a scientific account of creation while letting us acknowledge evolution within the realm of scientific possibility).

What do you (or anyone else) think about what I wrote about the hypothetical universe and whether we might be allowed to use it in science? I seem to remember Poythress also suggesting something along those lines, albeit, merely as a possibility (since I think he goes with the framework view). Creation scientists would probably disagree with such hypotheticals--and indeed, some might see them as morally wrong--and have us explain observations in conformity with the data from theology.



Edit: Just to show what I read from Descartes so as to better show what I mean by hypothetical universes...

"There is no doubt that the world was created right from the start with all the perfection which it now has. The sun and the earth existed in the beginning and... Adam and Eve were born not as babies but as fully grown people. This is the doctrine of the Christian faith and our natural reason convinces us that it was so.... Nevertheless, if we want to understand the nature of plants or of men, it is much better to consider how they can gradually grow from seeds than to consider how they were created by God in the beginning.... Thus we may be able to think up certain very simple and easily known principles which can serve, as it were, as the seeds from which we can demonstrate that the stars, the earth and indeed everything we observe in this visible world could have sprung (Principles of Philosophy III 45)."

I suppose there could be some scientific benefit to such, perhaps by knowing better what sorts of conditions must be maintained now in the ordinary course of things for life to not die. Or perhaps it may be useful in terraforming planets. =/ Or perhaps it may be useful in testing the universality of laws. But (as my questions in a couple posts back in this thread implied) I wonder whether it would indeed be idolatry to postulate a hypothetical world merely to demonstrate how "everything we observe in this visible world could have sprung."

 

[Afterthought]

I guess I'll bump this one more time; if the thread sinks, maybe I'll make a different thread on the "hypothetical universe" question later.