RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
Hart, David Bentley. Theological Territories: A David Bentley Hart Digest. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020.
This collection of essays reveals David Bentley Hart at his extreme best and extreme worst. In other words, it’s like everything else he has written.
Description of phenomenology: it always evokes a prior metaphysical deduction “because it always already assumes a metaphysical premise: that there is a real correlation between the givenness of the phenomena and the intentionality of the perceiver” (Hart 28).
Barthian theology sees God as a “Wholly Other,” thus reducing him to an aliud who is now posed “over against” creation. And if God is always “Wholly Other,” then he is always posed against the Other, which means creation is eternal. This is why Barthianism has always been caught in a dialectic of creation either being eternal or fallen.
Nicene metaphysics: abandoned the Middle Platonic hierarchy. In this case Logos is no longer a lesser manifestation of a God who is beyond all manifestation. “It is in fact the eternal reality of God’s manifestation of his own essence to himself” (37). The essence is a movement of infinite disclosure. He doesn’t relate to creation through a hierarchy of hypostases, but he is the “infinite act within and beyond every finite act.”
Bulgakov, Metaphysics, and Christology
This is where Hart’s reputation as a classical theist is on full display. If Hart’s view of capital punishment is him at his worst. This is him at his best. Of interest to Reformed readers is Hart’s interaction with Barthian scholar Bruce McCormack. While we have a proper distaste for Barth, McCormack is probably the sharpest Reformed thinker on Christology. The fact that McCormack is wrestling with Bulgakov and has appeared on Hart’s radar is something of note.
Sergius Bulgakov was a Russian theologian who was exiled by the Communists. He was easily the most profound thinker of the 20th century regarding God, creation, Christology, etc. Bulgakov realized that arbitrariness in “our understanding of the relation between divine transcendence and creation’s contingency” threatens both (58). This hinges on actuality and passivity. God is an infinite God of pure act. He cannot be determined by unrealized potentiality.
Hart summarizes the divine moments quite eloquently: “that infinite donation and surrender, that infinite receiving that is also the eternal constitution of the giver, that infinite outpouring in the other that is also the eternal being of God” (59). Hart wants to avoid any conception of God as having a “gnomic” or deliberative will. If God has to deliberate, then creation constitutes for him a real relation, and therefore “a pathos that modifies his nature.”
God is pure actuality. He is “the source of every act of being” (61). “God does not require the indeterminacy of the possible in order to be free because he is not some particular determination of being, some finite reduction of potency to act.”
Freedom and Universalism
You would expect me to argue against Hart that universalism is wrong. That’s not my argument, though. I’ll grant him the point for the time being. I won’t even say, “Yeah, but what about Hitler?” I’ll make it worse: will Hart and his disciples concede that Donald Trump will be in heaven? I’ll take my leave then.
We should look at his comments on freedom, though. He’s not entirely wrong and despite his sheer hatred of Calvinism, he sounds very Augustinian at times. Hart’s argument is that someone cannot freely and rationally choose the evil. A purely libertarian act cannot be one of sheer chance or mechanical impulse (this is also Jonathan Edwards’ argument). A truly free will, by contrast, is oriented towards the good.
Let’s not dismiss this argument too quickly. While he hates Calvinism, Hart is not giving the same arguments that your typical free-willer does. Quite the opposite, actually.
Science and Mind
This section is also quite good. Even if I am a physical system, I am an intentional physical system, which is problematic for hard naturalists since intentionality is not a physical process. Even worse, assuming evolution to be true, it cannot be reduced to pure physicality. Evolution is unintentionally (pun, maybe) hierarchical, with more complex systems superimposing on less complex ones. In short, I have reasons for being here and those reasons aren’t physical processes (131).
Science as science cannot tell us anything about science. It engages in what Heidegger calls “ge-stell,” or framing, the reducing the world to a collection of objects. There is no ontological participation between the objects.
Intentionality: the mind knows by being actively disposed toward what lies outside of itself (169).
On Capital Punishment
This is Hart at his worst. His essay is full of invective. He comes across sneering. This is doubly unfortunate since he actually scores some points on Greek vocabulary. His main argument is that the Christian is forbidden from retributive justice per the Sermon on the Mount. That’s just the plain meaning of the passage, says Hart. He does not allow similar hermeneutical charity to those who would go to the “plain meaning” of Romans 13. I just want to focus on a few points:
1) I will grant to him that machairos doesn’t mean “sword of capital punishment,” but more like a police symbol. Okay, that might be true. The rest of the passage, though, does not admit Hart’s desire for “rehabilitative justice.” This “state as police” is to be a “terror to evildoers.” It cannot do that and rehabilitate them at the same time.
2) I can’t find the exact passage, but somewhere Hart says that Jesus never imagined the death penalty being used. I can only plead Matthew 13.
3) Hart’s petty childishness comes out when Feser quotes Hart’s more Anabaptist view of state punishment: “Again and again, the New Testament demands of Christians that they exercise limitless forgiveness, no matter how grievous the wrong” (Hart, quoted by Feser). Feser then gives the rhetorical counter: “We also have to refrain from punishing rapists, bank robbers, embezzlers, etc….The jails should be emptied” (quoted on p. 208). Feser has correctly cited Hart’s beliefs. How does Hart respond: “Twaddle...balderdash...I don’t need to explain a d*mned thing” (Hart 209).
Does this sound like an adult in control of his rational faculties?
Academic Freedom
Academic freedom should be more than just the negative freedom to say what I want. It should be the freedom to orient the will towards the Good and True. There is an intrinsic good to which the mind strives.
Beauty and Being
Whatever else Thomas Aquinas meant by beauty, he was correct that Beauty is pleasing just simply by being seen. A beautiful object must be complete and not lacking, its parts must be in proportion to each other, and it must be radiant (247).
Hart wants to go beyond this, and borrowing from Heidegger, he suggests a distinction between beauty and the event of beauty. Heidegger assimilates the event of beauty to the event of truth (249). “This is one of those rare moments in Heidegger when the light momentarily breaks through the clouds and he not only asks the right question but comes close to giving the right answer.” We understand beauty in the same way that we understand how the distinction between being and beings is made manifest. Beauty is the excess of Being as being gives itself to us, like in a Bach concerto. It is “a nimbus of utter gratuity” (250). This is also the language of “gift.” Beauty “shines out” as the sign and gift of that which transcends discrete beings.
This is similar to a Nicene ontology. As the other persons of the Trinity are coequal with the Father, there is no interval or gap that requires the Logos to be a lesser manifestation of the Father (252). “God’s eternal identity is convertible, without any reduction of degree, with his own manifestation of himself to himself.” As a result, creation becomes a free gift instead of a diminished manifestation.
On another note, while I generally don’t approve of Hart’s translation idiosyncrasies, I think he is quite close to the original context when it comes to the spirit realm. In any case, he is far more accurate than those who think in the traditional manner of “angels vs. demons.” There is a “realm of powers pervading this cosmos and mediating between it and the exalted, supercelestial realm of the truly divine, to theion…. [that] composed a whole unseen hierarchy” (365-366). We, on the other hand, are so numb to it we just call everything “angel” or “demon,” when usually they are neither.
I also like “vale of Abraham” (367). Hart runs into problems elsewhere on exactly where the “rich man” is, if not in torment. Still, he marshals a number of classical sources that translate kolpos as vale or valley. His comparison with the Greek of 1 Enoch 22 is very interesting. It is a series of four koiloi separated from each other.
Other notes:
Soul--life principle (374).
Spirit--able to exist outside the body. Hart rejects a pure incorporeality, if only because soul and spirit are irreducibly local. They aren’t physical, but we need to avoid later Cartesian readings. It can be spatially extended without having physical magnitude.
Conclusion
This book gives you a “taste” of almost everything Hart has written, both good and bad, very good and very, very bad. Whenever Hart comes against a Christian tradition he doesn’t like, he dispenses with argument and just starts making fun of them. Ironically, this is a caricature of the very fundamentalists he so disdains.
There are some legitimately funny moments. In critiquing an author for engaging in psychoanalysis, Hart writes, “Dilworth gratuitously [interjects] the observation that, in regard to this or that aspect of Jones’s life, ‘A Freudian might say…’ That is a sentence that need never be completed” (300).
This collection of essays reveals David Bentley Hart at his extreme best and extreme worst. In other words, it’s like everything else he has written.
Description of phenomenology: it always evokes a prior metaphysical deduction “because it always already assumes a metaphysical premise: that there is a real correlation between the givenness of the phenomena and the intentionality of the perceiver” (Hart 28).
Barthian theology sees God as a “Wholly Other,” thus reducing him to an aliud who is now posed “over against” creation. And if God is always “Wholly Other,” then he is always posed against the Other, which means creation is eternal. This is why Barthianism has always been caught in a dialectic of creation either being eternal or fallen.
Nicene metaphysics: abandoned the Middle Platonic hierarchy. In this case Logos is no longer a lesser manifestation of a God who is beyond all manifestation. “It is in fact the eternal reality of God’s manifestation of his own essence to himself” (37). The essence is a movement of infinite disclosure. He doesn’t relate to creation through a hierarchy of hypostases, but he is the “infinite act within and beyond every finite act.”
Bulgakov, Metaphysics, and Christology
This is where Hart’s reputation as a classical theist is on full display. If Hart’s view of capital punishment is him at his worst. This is him at his best. Of interest to Reformed readers is Hart’s interaction with Barthian scholar Bruce McCormack. While we have a proper distaste for Barth, McCormack is probably the sharpest Reformed thinker on Christology. The fact that McCormack is wrestling with Bulgakov and has appeared on Hart’s radar is something of note.
Sergius Bulgakov was a Russian theologian who was exiled by the Communists. He was easily the most profound thinker of the 20th century regarding God, creation, Christology, etc. Bulgakov realized that arbitrariness in “our understanding of the relation between divine transcendence and creation’s contingency” threatens both (58). This hinges on actuality and passivity. God is an infinite God of pure act. He cannot be determined by unrealized potentiality.
Hart summarizes the divine moments quite eloquently: “that infinite donation and surrender, that infinite receiving that is also the eternal constitution of the giver, that infinite outpouring in the other that is also the eternal being of God” (59). Hart wants to avoid any conception of God as having a “gnomic” or deliberative will. If God has to deliberate, then creation constitutes for him a real relation, and therefore “a pathos that modifies his nature.”
God is pure actuality. He is “the source of every act of being” (61). “God does not require the indeterminacy of the possible in order to be free because he is not some particular determination of being, some finite reduction of potency to act.”
Freedom and Universalism
You would expect me to argue against Hart that universalism is wrong. That’s not my argument, though. I’ll grant him the point for the time being. I won’t even say, “Yeah, but what about Hitler?” I’ll make it worse: will Hart and his disciples concede that Donald Trump will be in heaven? I’ll take my leave then.
We should look at his comments on freedom, though. He’s not entirely wrong and despite his sheer hatred of Calvinism, he sounds very Augustinian at times. Hart’s argument is that someone cannot freely and rationally choose the evil. A purely libertarian act cannot be one of sheer chance or mechanical impulse (this is also Jonathan Edwards’ argument). A truly free will, by contrast, is oriented towards the good.
Let’s not dismiss this argument too quickly. While he hates Calvinism, Hart is not giving the same arguments that your typical free-willer does. Quite the opposite, actually.
Science and Mind
This section is also quite good. Even if I am a physical system, I am an intentional physical system, which is problematic for hard naturalists since intentionality is not a physical process. Even worse, assuming evolution to be true, it cannot be reduced to pure physicality. Evolution is unintentionally (pun, maybe) hierarchical, with more complex systems superimposing on less complex ones. In short, I have reasons for being here and those reasons aren’t physical processes (131).
Science as science cannot tell us anything about science. It engages in what Heidegger calls “ge-stell,” or framing, the reducing the world to a collection of objects. There is no ontological participation between the objects.
Intentionality: the mind knows by being actively disposed toward what lies outside of itself (169).
On Capital Punishment
This is Hart at his worst. His essay is full of invective. He comes across sneering. This is doubly unfortunate since he actually scores some points on Greek vocabulary. His main argument is that the Christian is forbidden from retributive justice per the Sermon on the Mount. That’s just the plain meaning of the passage, says Hart. He does not allow similar hermeneutical charity to those who would go to the “plain meaning” of Romans 13. I just want to focus on a few points:
1) I will grant to him that machairos doesn’t mean “sword of capital punishment,” but more like a police symbol. Okay, that might be true. The rest of the passage, though, does not admit Hart’s desire for “rehabilitative justice.” This “state as police” is to be a “terror to evildoers.” It cannot do that and rehabilitate them at the same time.
2) I can’t find the exact passage, but somewhere Hart says that Jesus never imagined the death penalty being used. I can only plead Matthew 13.
3) Hart’s petty childishness comes out when Feser quotes Hart’s more Anabaptist view of state punishment: “Again and again, the New Testament demands of Christians that they exercise limitless forgiveness, no matter how grievous the wrong” (Hart, quoted by Feser). Feser then gives the rhetorical counter: “We also have to refrain from punishing rapists, bank robbers, embezzlers, etc….The jails should be emptied” (quoted on p. 208). Feser has correctly cited Hart’s beliefs. How does Hart respond: “Twaddle...balderdash...I don’t need to explain a d*mned thing” (Hart 209).
Does this sound like an adult in control of his rational faculties?
Academic Freedom
Academic freedom should be more than just the negative freedom to say what I want. It should be the freedom to orient the will towards the Good and True. There is an intrinsic good to which the mind strives.
Beauty and Being
Whatever else Thomas Aquinas meant by beauty, he was correct that Beauty is pleasing just simply by being seen. A beautiful object must be complete and not lacking, its parts must be in proportion to each other, and it must be radiant (247).
Hart wants to go beyond this, and borrowing from Heidegger, he suggests a distinction between beauty and the event of beauty. Heidegger assimilates the event of beauty to the event of truth (249). “This is one of those rare moments in Heidegger when the light momentarily breaks through the clouds and he not only asks the right question but comes close to giving the right answer.” We understand beauty in the same way that we understand how the distinction between being and beings is made manifest. Beauty is the excess of Being as being gives itself to us, like in a Bach concerto. It is “a nimbus of utter gratuity” (250). This is also the language of “gift.” Beauty “shines out” as the sign and gift of that which transcends discrete beings.
This is similar to a Nicene ontology. As the other persons of the Trinity are coequal with the Father, there is no interval or gap that requires the Logos to be a lesser manifestation of the Father (252). “God’s eternal identity is convertible, without any reduction of degree, with his own manifestation of himself to himself.” As a result, creation becomes a free gift instead of a diminished manifestation.
On another note, while I generally don’t approve of Hart’s translation idiosyncrasies, I think he is quite close to the original context when it comes to the spirit realm. In any case, he is far more accurate than those who think in the traditional manner of “angels vs. demons.” There is a “realm of powers pervading this cosmos and mediating between it and the exalted, supercelestial realm of the truly divine, to theion…. [that] composed a whole unseen hierarchy” (365-366). We, on the other hand, are so numb to it we just call everything “angel” or “demon,” when usually they are neither.
I also like “vale of Abraham” (367). Hart runs into problems elsewhere on exactly where the “rich man” is, if not in torment. Still, he marshals a number of classical sources that translate kolpos as vale or valley. His comparison with the Greek of 1 Enoch 22 is very interesting. It is a series of four koiloi separated from each other.
Other notes:
Soul--life principle (374).
Spirit--able to exist outside the body. Hart rejects a pure incorporeality, if only because soul and spirit are irreducibly local. They aren’t physical, but we need to avoid later Cartesian readings. It can be spatially extended without having physical magnitude.
Conclusion
This book gives you a “taste” of almost everything Hart has written, both good and bad, very good and very, very bad. Whenever Hart comes against a Christian tradition he doesn’t like, he dispenses with argument and just starts making fun of them. Ironically, this is a caricature of the very fundamentalists he so disdains.
There are some legitimately funny moments. In critiquing an author for engaging in psychoanalysis, Hart writes, “Dilworth gratuitously [interjects] the observation that, in regard to this or that aspect of Jones’s life, ‘A Freudian might say…’ That is a sentence that need never be completed” (300).
