The Epistemology of Scripturalism

[Civbert]

This is the point at which I believe Scripturalism departs from the reformed faith. WHAT the Bible teaches is only the "form" of knowledge. When one knows WHOM they have believed, then they have true knowledge, with the power thereof. Blessings!

No, that is where you believe Anthony departs from the reformed faith. What I wrote was not Scripturalism itself, but a position that I believe is coherent with Scripturalism. That is why I added the P.S..

Now the rest is getting further off track, but I am curious what you believe it means to know a person.

I am also curous what you mean by the ""form" of knowledge". What is this "form", and how is it that "what" the Bible teaches it is not knowledge.

For that matter, what is your definition of "knowledge"?

Finally, how can it be that one can believe "WHAT" the bible teaches and escape then believing in the WHOM of the bible. It seems to me that if you dont' believe in the whom the bible is speaking of, then ipso facto you don't really believe "what" the bible is teaching. Because what the Bible teaches is nothing if it is not Jesus Christ.

You're not one of these guys who goes around saying "you need to experience a personal relationship with Jesus" are you?

Jesus Christ is the Word of God. Scripture is the Word of God. I see no departure from the reformed faith here. What it means to "know" a person is up for debate.

 

[MW]

Anthony, though you think your view is an addendum to Scripturalism, I would regard it as the heart of the position. It is only on the assumption that revelation is entirely propositional that an assimilation with idealism can be made.

Concerning the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM, please consider the apostle's discussion of the Jews' "form of knowledge" in Rom. 2:17-24. Blessings!

 

[Magma2]

This is the point at which I believe Scripturalism departs from the reformed faith. WHAT the Bible teaches is only the "form" of knowledge. When one knows WHOM they have believed, then they have true knowledge, with the power thereof. Blessings!

Hardly a blessing if Scripturalism is a departure from the Reformed faith. Of course, if what you call the Reformed faith is a departure from the Scriptures then a blessing it is! After all, there are many men calling themselves Reformed who have departed in one place or another from Scripture, some even deny justification is by belief alone. So without something more substantial, your objection really has no force. It amounts to name calling.

Concerning the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM, please consider the apostle's discussion of the Jews' "form of knowledge" in Rom. 2:17-24. Blessings!

So is the Scripturalism of Gordon Clark guilty of a form of Phariseeism? You will need to do considerably more to back up this charge. The Reformed faith in the form of the Westminster Confession posits the Scriptures, the Word of God, first and necessarily prior to all that follows, so is the WCF guilty of a form of Phariseeism? I hardly think so.

You assert the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM which is undeniable, but a form of knowledge is not knowledge. It has the appearance of wisdom, but denies the truth. Paul also talks about those who are ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. Many of these are religionists too, some even posing as Christians. So what? You still haven’t shown there is a “whom” to know apart from knowing at least something of what he thinks. To know Christ -- to come to know any person -- is to know what He thinks and to know what Jesus thinks is to come to know the propositions of Scripture, the mind of Christ. Can anyone come to know Jesus Christ apart from Scripture? If so, I’d love to see your demonstration. Yet, Paul says the message the gospel, these very propositions, is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes. Jesus said His very words are spirit and they are life. John 20:31; “But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name.” To come to know that Jesus is the Christ is to know what is written.

Just as an aside, and not directed at you, despite those who want to greatly lower the epistemic threshold from logically sound arguments to nebulous, questionable, poorly defined and even fallacious “reliable processes,” knowledge is justified true belief. Ironically, Paul Manata who claims not to hold to the archaic idea that knowledge is justified true belief, when doing apologetics and when confronting atheists like Dan Barker, attacked the **reasons** for their non or anti-Christian beliefs. Maybe he doesn't do that now, but he certainly did in the debates I've listened to and read. He didn’t seem content to allow Barker for example the comfort of maintaining his beliefs even if they were the result of a reliable, albeit a non-Christian, belief-forming process.

 

[tewilder]

P.P.S. To tewilder and polemic_turtle,I did answer your questions, I don't want you to miss them since this thread has grown long and it was earlier on that I replied. I'd like others to participate and maybe help us clear up some of the questions I'm a little fuzzy on. Any Scripturalists out there want to add some comments?? Paul and I could easily dominate this thread but others may have more interesting comments and insights than I do.

I asked about classical foundationalism, because that is something that has come under a lot of critique, and is widely rejected today, by people who are still a sort of foundationalist, e.g. the Reformed Epistemology people.

In your answer, you just talk about foundationalism, which suggests to me that you are not in touch with the literature of the last twenty years.

I also asked about the "old saw" that "You don't know unless you know you know.", which is a typically classical foundationalist distinctive, as a way, really, of repeating my first question.

I take it from the answer to both that you are not engaged with these issues. But that reinforces my impression of Scripturalism, and in fact of the apologetics wars in general. That impression is that it lost touch with the intellectual universe decades ago, and has became a side show for those who, for no good reason, continue to be preoccupied with Cartesian standards of knowledge.

I have come to the conclusion that the whole concept of apologetics as this sort of system building is misconceived. The problem I have with Scripturalism in particular, though, is that the writers say so little, and with such little clarity, that it is impossible to attribute exact epistemological views to them.

 

[Civbert]

Anthony, though you think your view is an addendum to Scripturalism, I would regard it as the heart of the position. It is only on the assumption that revelation is entirely propositional that an assimilation with idealism can be made.

I'm really not following you. What is this idealism you speak of and how is it a departure from reformed thought. And I still see no reason to claim my view of revelation (revealed knowledge) as propositional is a problem.

Concerning the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM, please consider the apostle's discussion of the Jews' "form of knowledge" in Rom. 2:17-24. Blessings!

I look up the verses and they were interesting - especially verse 20.

an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of babes, having the form of knowledge and truth in the law.
(Rom 2:20 nkj)

I read this is a confirmation of Scripturalism. The Bible both the truth, and the start of knowledge (form of knowledge). Paul seems to be asserting that Bible is a foundation for knowledge. The truths of the Bible are also the pattern on which more knowledge can be derived. From Scriptural truths, more knowledge can be deduced.

see Romans 15:4, Proverbs 22:19-21, Luke 1:3-4

[bible]Romans 15:4[/bible]
[bible]Proverbs 22:19-21[/bible]
[bible]Luk 1:3-4[/bible]

 

[Civbert]

I asked about classical foundationalism, because that is something that has come under a lot of critique, and is widely rejected today, by people who are still a sort of foundationalist, e.g. the Reformed Epistemology people.

In your answer, you just talk about foundationalism, which suggests to me that you are not in touch with the literature of the last twenty years.

Maybe so. I can't say that I am really up on contemporary philosophy. But from what I've read about the historical developments in philosophy (and logic), I don't think the field has necessarily progressed - especially recently. I don't assume the field is evolving - it does seem more obscure.

I would like to better understand modern philosophies (e.g. existentialism) just so I can better engage people who have been corrupted by it - but it is more important to engage the common man rather than the academics and intelligentsia.

I also asked about the "old saw" that "You don't know unless you know you know.", which is a typically classical foundationalist distinctive, as a way, really, of repeating my first question. I take it from the answer to both that you are not engaged with these issues. But that reinforces my impression of Scripturalism, and in fact of the apologetics wars in general.

That's fine. Would you care to explain your concerns (if any) and how they relate to foundationalism? If there's an "issue" I should be engaged in, I'd really like to know what it is. No ones really raised any clear problems with Scripturalism so if there is something that could be a problem with it, I'm all ears.

That impression is that it lost touch with the intellectual universe decades ago, and has became a side show for those who, for no good reason, continue to be preoccupied with Cartesian standards of knowledge.

Really? How so? What's the new-and-improved that has developed in the last decade?

I have come to the conclusion that the whole concept of apologetics as this sort of system building is misconceived. The problem I have with Scripturalism in particular, though, is that the writers say so little, and with such little clarity, that it is impossible to attribute exact epistemological views to them.

Wow! That's harsh. I think one of the strength of Scripturalism is that it is speaks with great clarity. I really have trouble with this kind of declaration - given without any supporting reasons or evidence. You may be right, but you have given me very little to judge your conclusion on.

 

[tewilder]

Maybe so. I can't say that I am really up on contemporary philosophy. But from what I've read about the historical developments in philosophy (and logic), I don't think the field has necessarily progressed - especially recently. I don't assume the field is evolving - it does seem more obscure.

I would like to better understand modern philosophies (e.g. existentialism) just so I can better engage people who have been corrupted by it - but it is more important to engage the common man rather than the academics and intelligentsia.


That's fine. Would you care to explain your concerns (if any) and how they relate to foundationalism? If there's an "issue" I should be engaged in, I'd really like to know what it is. No ones really raised any clear problems with Scripturalism so if there is something that could be a problem with it, I'm all ears.


Really? How so? What's the new-and-improved that has developed in the last decade?


Wow! That's harsh. I think one of the strength of Scripturalism is that it is speaks with great clarity. I really have trouble with this kind of declaration - given without any supporting reasons or evidence. You may be right, but you have given me very little to judge your conclusion on.

You could get Plantinga's three volume work on warranted belief and come up with something comparable for Scripturalism, and then we could see whether it held up.

As it is, we have no clue about what Scripturalism would look like. All Biblical exposition, commentaries, etc. (including Clark's) are done on the basis hermeneutics that grasps the meaning of language from a full cultural life experience, in order to get back of the metaphor to separate out what is the intended meaning.

No on has ever done Scripturalist exegesis to get to those axioms of Scripture. If you take the language of Scripture as it is, it is full of metaphor and contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language, which is useless as an axiomatic system. If you go for the meaning, you are immediately beyond the metal processes of logic.

Since all Biblical interpretation that has ever been done presupposes the reality of prior human knowledge including a pretty good grasp of what the world it like, so that we bring a competence with language to the reading of Scripture, we don't know what Scripturalism as useful knowledge would even begin to look like.

 

[Civbert]

Rant on the "Experts"

I want to add that I find it suspect when people use technical jargon and references to highly specialized concepts and theories, but have a great deal of trouble explaining themselves or speaking in familiar terms. I know, sometimes this is due to simple laziness and lack of time and energy to explain things one considers "basic knowledge", but I find this kind of elitism questionable.

No one wants to challenge the expert for fear of being belittled. There is a fear that the expert will make them look silly and you know why? Because so many of the experts, when asked a difficult question often resort to demeaning the non-expert rather than admit the difficulty. They might tell you to get a degree or read the writings of some other expert. Basically implying you can't grasp these higher concepts because you have not read so-in-so. Don't believe them.

Then there is the case of the new expert - the person who has recently learned the jargon and the "expert" arguments, but does not really understand them. They borrow capital from the true experts, but they are really pretenders. They present other peoples arguments as their own, but when they are challenged to explain them, they resort to making disparaging remarks about the intelligence to the challenger. You will rarely see these people admit that their grasp of the arguments is tenuous.

But from my studies and experience, I find that there is little that is really to difficult or deep to understand in these specialized fields of knowledge. It is almost always a matter of learning the language and becoming familiar with the general principles. Which means that those who refuse to "translate" their jargon into regular parlance, are often hiding their ignorance and are pretenders. True experts - those that really understand their fields of knowledge usually have little trouble explaining things in ways that are reasonably easy to understand. Of course, a real expert can also be an arrogant elitist - but never let him intimidate you.

If you ever run into "the expert" - don't be afraid to admit your own unfamiliarity with the issues - and ask him to explain something. If they can't then maybe they are pretenders or are simply arrogant. You will find though the risk is worth it when you find an expert who really knows his stuff and is willing to teach you something new. And sometimes you'll find a somewhat lazy expert. He might not have the energy to explain it all - but he will refer you to some article or post that answers your question perfectly. He won't tell you that you have to become an expert to understand the issues.

Well that's my rant-of-the-day. If you (the reader of this post) think I am writing this about you, there's a good chance I am. It would take that kind of arrogance I mentioned for someone to make such an assumption. But fear not, you're not the only one.

 

[Civbert]

You could get Plantinga's three volume work on warranted belief and come up with something comparable for Scripturalism, and then we could see whether it held up.

Whoops! I sent my prior post before I read this. I wasn't picking on you in my rant on experts. Just bad timing. Plantinga is on my reading list (and my Amazon wish list). What I've read of his work is very interesting.

I also noticed that contemporary philosophers don't seem to talk about knowledge - but "belief". I don't know if Plantinga considers a "warranted belief" to be knowledge - or if he even thinks real knowledge is possible. Maybe he doesn't. Someday I'll get to reading his work.

Some many books, so little time.

 

[tewilder]

I want to add that I find it suspect when people use technical jargon and references to highly specialized concepts and theories, but have a great deal of trouble explaining themselves or speaking in familiar terms. I know, sometimes this is due to simple laziness and lack of time and energy to explain things one considers "basic knowledge", but I find this kind of elitism questionable.

So if these can't be condensed to a few paragraphs in an internet post, then they are bunk?

Warrant: The Current Debate, by Alvin Plantinga, 240 pages, Oxford University Press, USA (May 27, 1993)

Warrant and Proper Function, by Alvin Plantinga, 256 pages, Oxford University Press, USA (May 27, 1993)

Warranted Christian Belief, by Alvin Plantinga 528 pages, Oxford University Press, USA (January 27, 2000)

For my part, I take them as the measure of credibility. Scripturalism and Vantillianism, for lack of anything like this, don't have a dog in the epistemology race.

 

[tewilder]

Whoops! I sent my prior post before I read this. I wasn't picking on you in my rant on experts. Just bad timing. Plantinga is on my reading list (and my Amazon wish list). What I've read of his work is very interesting.

I also noticed that contemporary philosophers don't seem to talk about knowledge - but "belief". I don't know if Plantinga considers a "warranted belief" to be knowledge - or if he even thinks real knowledge is possible. Maybe he doesn't. Someday I'll get to reading his work.

Some many books, so little time.

And I replied before I read this.

 

[tewilder]

I also noticed that contemporary philosophers don't seem to talk about knowledge - but "belief". I don't know if Plantinga considers a "warranted belief" to be knowledge - or if he even thinks real knowledge is possible. Maybe he doesn't. Someday I'll get to reading his work.

Some many books, so little time.

Since there is so much controversy over what knowledge is (is it justified true belief? Then want justifies a belief? What is truth?) it is possible to get a lot further with the preliminary question of the nature of warrant and deal with that before you insist on what knowledge is.

That is the big problem anyhow. "Justified" on the face of it, is an ethical term. Most epistemologists want to claim that there is some other sense of "justified" proper to epistemology itself, in which they use the term "justified". But what is it. By what norm is a belief justified so as to be knowledge? What is compelling about that norm (i.e. why does every normal person accept the belief as knowledge when the appreciate that the norm has been met)?

What this epistemic justification could be remains mysterious. So the nature of this mystery of warrant is what people concentrate on. One you get that you can go on to work on when and how warrant and belief relate so as to be knowledge.

As for the "Some many books, so little time.", that is the value of Plantinga's three volumes. You don't have to collect all the journal articles and monographs coming out over decades. He sums it up for you in an organized way and saves you a lot of time.

 

[Civbert]

As it is, we have no clue about what Scripturalism would look like. All Biblical exposition, commentaries, etc. (including Clark's) are done on the basis hermeneutics that grasps the meaning of language from a full cultural life experience, in order to get back of the metaphor to separate out what is the intended meaning.

I don't' think this is necessarily the case. The Scriptures themselves do not require a "full cultural life experience" to understand them. And it is the understand of the word that begins the process of knowledge. The truths of Scripture are true for all times, place, and peoples. A Scriptural truth understood in 1650 is the same exact scriptural truth understood in 2050. One may have trouble reading the exegesis written by a person in 1650, but that does not mean we are further from knowing the same truths from the same Word of God.

No on has ever done Scripturalist exegesis to get to those axioms of Scripture. If you take the language of Scripture as it is, it is full of metaphor and contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language, which is useless as an axiomatic system. If you go for the meaning, you are immediately beyond the metal processes of logic.

Read the Westminster Confession of Faith. That is Scripturalist exegesis. You will find many of the axioms in the Confessions and other reformed creeds and catechisms.

I strongly object to the statement that the language of Scripture is full of contradiction. There are no contradictions in Scripture. There are no metaphors. The Scriptures are the propositional truths behind the metaphor in the written text. A metaphor points to a truth, it is not a truth in itself.

You are not going beyond to metal processes of logic when you go for the meaning. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Sometimes we start with what we believe the meaning is without using formal logical processes, and then we use logic to test the meanings. This is also known as systematic theology. A good systematic theology text is Scripturalism in action.

Since all Biblical interpretation that has ever been done presupposes the reality of prior human knowledge including a pretty good grasp of what the world is like, so that we bring a competence with language to the reading of Scripture, we don't know what Scripturalism as useful knowledge would even begin to look like.

I think you are confusing logical and temporal priority. Of course one should have a grasp of language prior to employing Scripturalism (such as systematic theology). And a grasp of the culture at the time the text is written is helpful. But the Scripturalist epistemology is looking at logical priorities, not temporal. Scripture is the foundation knowledge. "The Scriptures alone are the Word of God" is the epistemological axiom. From there, you can test if something is knowledge or opinion. You don't start with a blank slate. You start with the revelation of God.

WCF 1:6 The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture:

That's the epistemology of Scripturalism in a nut shell.

 

[Magma2]

That impression is that it lost touch with the intellectual universe decades ago, and has became a side show for those who, for no good reason, continue to be preoccupied with Cartesian standards of knowledge.

I suppose an appeal to logic would be an antiquated preoccupation with Aristotelian standards, after all, Manata likes to talk about logics as if the Law of Identity, Excluded Middle and Contradiction were mere creations in his deteriorating Van Tilian universe. Regardless, where and when did Anthony assert anything like a self-evident axiom or truth? While the truths of the Christian faith are certainly self-authenticating (except of course for the Van Tilian, since they hold to an analogical view of truth and an incoherent doctrine of Scripture), they're hardly self-evident. So I don't think your condescension is really called for. I expect that kind of patronizing from Manata.

Of course, if you can demonstrate that Plantigna, Wolterstorff and others have not lowered the epistemic bar and are not more concerned with making theism intellectually respectable, I'll withdraw my comments. Simply because a person is naturally inclined to believe something doesn't mean that those beliefs are cognitive, even if some consider them to be properly basic. Respectability or not, hell is filled with theists. If epistemology is no longer concerned with truth and how it might be known, then what good is it? Has truth become a carnival sideshow too? Seems so, even among men who fancy themselves Christian not to mention Reformed.

I have come to the conclusion that the whole concept of apologetics as this sort of system building is misconceived.

Well, if you're either a teaching or ruling elder, or even a deacon, please inform your Session right away. But maybe you didn't have to vow to uphold the Confessional Standards as containing the system of doctrine taught in Scripture. I realize that would be passé. I'm sure those who did didn't realize they had lost touch with the intellectual universe and were merely engaging in an irrelevant comical amusement.

 

[Civbert]

Since there is so much controversy over what knowledge is (is it justified true belief? Then want justifies a belief? What is truth?) it is possible to get a lot further with the preliminary question of the nature of warrant and deal with that before you insist on what knowledge is.

Well to get started - a proposition is justified true if it is deducible from prior true propositions.

 

[tewilder]

I don't' think this is necessarily the case. The Scriptures themselves do not require a "full cultural life experience" to understand them.

It is exactly what they require. Otherwise infants would understand them.

The truths of Scripture are true for all times, place, and peoples.

True, and it makes my point. To get at this truth for all times and peoples you have to come to terms with the language and metaphor.

Read the Westminster Confession of Faith. That is Scripturalist exegesis.

It is not exegesis. It is a creed. It is so far from exegesis the Parliament required the addition of proof texts.

You will find many of the axioms in the Confessions and other reformed creeds and catechisms.

Maybe, but derived from Scripture by humanistic scholarship, not Scripturalist methodology. It is this human linguistic and epistemic competence that is needed to show the derivation of the creeds from the language of Scripture. Leave that out, and the claim that these creeds contain the axioms of Scripture is just simply a wild claim.

I strongly object to the statement that the language of Scripture is full of contradiction. There are no contradictions in Scripture.

Object all you like, but the language of Scripture says than man cannot see God and live, but that Moses and the elders saw God, and so on. Those don't realize that you have to get beyond the language of Scripture to the theological truths preach lots of bad, contradictory sermons on these texts.

There are no metaphors.

How about "I am the door." Was Jesus made of wood? Did he swing on hinges?

The Scriptures are the propositional truths behind the metaphor in the written text. A metaphor points to a truth, it is not a truth in itself.

So now we have a Bible beyond the Bible. The infra-Bible we have only "points to" this meta-Bible. Can Karl Barth be far away?

You are not going beyond to metal processes of logic when you go for the meaning. In fact, it is quite the opposite.

Which you contradict yourself in the next sentence.

Sometimes we start with what we believe the meaning is without using formal logical processes, and then we use logic to test the meanings.

But this believing that you start with before you apply the test of systematic theology! Almost the whole of linguistic competence and hermeneutics is hidden in that simple phrase!

This is also known as systematic theology. A good systematic theology text is Scripturalism in action.

Between "Scipturalism in action" and the linguistic phenemena of the Bible, what a great gulf there is!

I think you are confusing logical and temporal priority. Of course one should have a grasp of language prior to employing Scripturalism (such as systematic theology). And a grasp of the culture at the time the text is written is helpful. But the Scripturalist epistemology is looking at logical priorities, not temporal. Scripture is the foundation knowledge. "The Scriptures alone are the Word of God" is the epistemological axiom. From there, you can test if something is knowledge or opinion. You don't start with a blank slate. You start with the revelation of God.

That's the epistemology of Scripturalism in a nut shell.

Kierkegaard once compared Hegel to a man who builds a magnificent castle and then proceeds to life in a rude hut outside. The system is a marvelous theoretical edifice, but not reachable from real lived experience.

The same could be said of Scripturalism. There are those axioms of Scripture, the eternal truths that the metaphors of the Bible "point to". But there is no way into that castle of axioms unless to storm the castle by the methods of humanist scholarship: the competence of human knowledge before the axioms of Scripture have be derived.

 

[Civbert]

That is the big problem anyhow. "Justified" on the face of it, is an ethical term. Most epistemologists want to claim that there is some other sense of "justified" proper to epistemology itself, in which they use the term "justified". But what is it. By what norm is a belief justified so as to be knowledge? What is compelling about that norm (i.e. why does every normal person accept the belief as knowledge when the appreciate that the norm has been met)?

If someone objects to the term because they associate justified with ethical connotation, then we can substitute something that carries less baggage. I have not object to saying knowledge is warranted true belief. However, that term is taken and might cause confusion.

I've said before that justified is accountable. If one can give an account of how some proposition is true, then the truth of the proposition is justified.

I can think of nothing that gives a better accounting than basic Aristotelian deductive logic. It seems a compelling norm has been around for a few thousand years.

What this epistemic justification could be remains mysterious. So the nature of this mystery of warrant is what people concentrate on. One you get that you can go on to work on when and how warrant and belief relate so as to be knowledge.

Consider it done. It's not so mysterious. It does make it difficult to justify empiricism and that really sticks in the craw of worldly philosophies - but why should that concern us. We are not of this world.

As for the "Some many books, so little time.", that is the value of Plantinga's three volumes. You don't have to collect all the journal articles and monographs coming out over decades. He sums it up for you in an organized way and saves you a lot of time.

I've heard high praise of his work and I think it would go a ways to getting me up to speed in contemporary philosophy - which will make it all that much easier to shoot down contemporary worldly philosophies.

Do consider the effect empiricism has played in contemporary and world philosophy. The Gettier problems that attempt to defeat the traditional formulation of knowledge really presume that sensory based observations are enough to justify a truth.

I saw Joe in a room, therefore Joe is in the room. But Gettier comes along and says, you were looking at a Joe manikin - not Joe at all, so your knowledge is unjustified. But he adds a cute wrinkle by saying Joe was hiding under a table in the room, so "Joe is in the room" is true. I think what Gettier has done was not demolish the JTB model of knowledge - but raise questions about the reliability of the senses for justifying anything is true. The problem is not in the traditional formulation, but the assumptions that perceptions can give an account for truth.

 

[tewilder]

Well to get started - a proposition is justified true if it is deducible from prior true propositions.

Really?

Suppose there is a proposition, Q that is deducible from proposition P and proposition L.

Suppose P and L happen to be true, but you think that P and L are false. Suppose you decide to believe Q anyway. Is your belief in Q justified, and it therefore knowledge?

 

[Civbert]

It is exactly what they require. Otherwise infants would understand them.

Sorry. I did not understand your point. I thought you were referring to the culture of the time the text was written.

True, and it makes my point. To get at this truth for all times and peoples you have to come to terms with the language and metaphor.

...

I'll try to come back and answer in more detail, but I want to add that it is not simply human reasoning involved, it all depends on the Spirit. That is one of the requirements for any sound Christian epistemology. If all we had to work with was the human ability to reason and understand, then knowledge would be impossible to justify.

 

[tewilder]

I saw Joe in a room, therefore Joe is in the room. But Gettier comes along and says, you were looking at a Joe manikin - not Joe at all, so your knowledge is unjustified. But he adds a cute wrinkle by saying Joe was hiding under a table in the room, so "Joe is in the room" is true. I think what Gettier has done was not demolish the JTB model of knowledge - but raise questions about the reliability of the senses for justifying anything is true. The problem is not in the traditional formulation, but the assumptions that perceptions can give an account for truth.

This sort of philosophy is done by people who share a certain world view, which they don't think they have to go into and justify. So what they are thinking is that belief has to be causally related to the things that it is about, and that this happens in a metaphysically materialistic scenerio.

So then they jump right into discussing what this causal relationship has to be like to be sufficient for belief to be knowledge.

 

[Civbert]

Really?

Suppose there is a proposition, Q that is deducible from proposition P and proposition L.

Suppose P and L happen to be true, but you think that P and L are false. Suppose you decide to believe Q anyway. Is your belief in Q justified, and it therefore knowledge?

First, if I believe P and L are false, and I believe Q is deduced correctly from P and L, then I will not believe Q unless I am irrational. Justification by "good and necessary consequences" only works with true premises. False premises imply nothing regarding truth.

So my belief itself is not justified, but JTB does not look at justifying believing Q. What is in question is if Q is justified true. Since it is justified (due to P and L actually being true), then I know Q. I don't know I know Q, because I can't personally account for Q, so unless I am irrational, I would not say or be aware that I know Q, much less say I am justified in believing Q.

Recall that all men have the knowledge of the existence of God. This is knowledge we are born with. It's not that they simply believe in God, they know God exists. How, because this knowledge is justified true and they believe it is true, but have suppressed that knowledge.

It is one thing to justify believing a proposition. It is another for a proposition to be justified true.

 

[tewilder]

First, if I believe P and L are false, and I believe Q is deduced correctly from P and L, then I will not believe Q unless I am irrational. Justification by "good and necessary consequences" only works with true premises. False premises imply nothing regarding truth.

So my belief itself is not justified, but JTB does not look at justifying believing Q. What is in question is if Q is justified true. Since it is justified (due to P and L actually being true), then I know Q. I don't know I know Q, because I can't personally account for Q, so unless I am irrational, I would not say or be aware that I know Q, much less say I am justified in believing Q.

Recall that all men have the knowledge of the existence of God. This is knowledge we are born with. It's not that they simply believe in God, they know God exists. How, because this knowledge is justified true and they believe it is true, but have suppressed that knowledge.

It is one thing to justify believing a proposition. It is another for a proposition to be justified true.

You seem to be saying that you can have knowledge which it is irrational for you to believe.

 

[Don]

Well to get started - a proposition is justified true if it is deducible from prior true propositions.

Just a quick comment: Actually deductive inference does not generate justification, it only transfers it. So if your prior propositions are true but not justified, then your inferential beliefs will not be justified either.

 

[MW]

Hardly a blessing if Scripturalism is a departure from the Reformed faith. Of course, if what you call the Reformed faith is a departure from the Scriptures then a blessing it is! After all, there are many men calling themselves Reformed who have departed in one place or another from Scripture, some even deny justification is by belief alone. So without something more substantial, your objection really has no force. It amounts to name calling.

Sean, I imagine nearly every reformed theologian has denied that justification is by belief alone. They generally maintain that faith includes trust.

So is the Scripturalism of Gordon Clark guilty of a form of Phariseeism? You will need to do considerably more to back up this charge. The Reformed faith in the form of the Westminster Confession posits the Scriptures, the Word of God, first and necessarily prior to all that follows, so is the WCF guilty of a form of Phariseeism? I hardly think so.

I haven't accused Gordon Clark of Pharisaism. The reference to Rom. 2 was for the purpose of showing Anthony that it is quite possible to have the form of knowledge without the power thereof. There was no charge made against Clark or Scripturalism in making that reference.

You assert the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM which is undeniable, but a form of knowledge is not knowledge. It has the appearance of wisdom, but denies the truth. Paul also talks about those who are ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. Many of these are religionists too, some even posing as Christians. So what? You still haven’t shown there is a “whom” to know apart from knowing at least something of what he thinks. To know Christ -- to come to know any person -- is to know what He thinks and to know what Jesus thinks is to come to know the propositions of Scripture, the mind of Christ. Can anyone come to know Jesus Christ apart from Scripture? If so, I’d love to see your demonstration. Yet, Paul says the message the gospel, these very propositions, is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes. Jesus said His very words are spirit and they are life. John 20:31; “But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name.” To come to know that Jesus is the Christ is to know what is written.

Your challenge is irrelevant, Sean. I would never maintain that Christ can be known apart from His Word. I fully agree that revelation is propositional. But I do not maintain that it is entirely propositional. It is also deeply personal. An individual could have a thorough knowledge of the Scriptures and still not know Christ.

 

[MW]

I'm really not following you. What is this idealism you speak of and how is it a departure from reformed thought. And I still see no reason to claim my view of revelation (revealed knowledge) as propositional is a problem.

Anthony, as I said, I am not intending to enter into a critique of the position. However, for the sake of clarification, Scripturalism replaces Plato's forms with the axioms of revelation. It teaches one can have no knowledge of anything without these forms, and that to know these forms is true knowledge.

Regarding the statement about revealed knowledge as propositional, I cannot see a problem with it. The problem rests in saying that it is ONLY propositional.

 

[Magma2]

No on has ever done Scripturalist exegesis to get to those axioms of Scripture. If you take the language of Scripture as it is, it is full of metaphor and contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language, which is useless as an axiomatic system. If you go for the meaning, you are immediately beyond the metal processes of logic.

If you mean by "contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language" a literary paradox, then it is simply false that biblical metaphor and literary paradox are useless as part of an axiomatic system, for they only have meaning as part of that same axiomatic system. The meaning of Scripture, after all, is one.

In addition, while the Scriptures are the axiom of the Christian faith, the axiom itself is not deduced from anything prior otherwise it would cease to function as an axiom. As far as the exegetical and biblical support for the claim that the bible has a monopoly on truth, this would be no different than the typical defense against all enemies of the faith who would attack the principle of sola Scriptura. 2 Timothy 3:15-17 is a good place to start, followed by John 17:17; Acts 20:26-27, 32; 1 Cor. 4:6 and we also have Acts 15 and the account given of the Jerusalem council. While there are others, Isa 8:20 is a good OT verse that can be adduced in support of the axiom of Scripture; To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.

. . . we don't know what Scripturalism as useful knowledge would even begin to look like.

This is just an incredible thing to say. Please tell that the T. E. in your sig is your name and not your title?

 

[Magma2]

Your challenge is irrelevant, Sean. I would never maintain that Christ can be known apart from His Word. I fully agree that revelation is propositional. But I do not maintain that it is entirely propositional. It is also deeply personal. An individual could have a thorough knowledge of the Scriptures and still not know Christ.

Then, with all due respect, you either miss how the word knowledge is being use (which is justified true belief) or you are simply equivocating on the word unknowingly (no pun intended). Of course, you could be equivocating knowingly, but I simply would not expect that from you (I've long ago come to expect it from Manata, but he isn't talking to me). The point of Rom. 2:20 is that the teachers needed to be taught. As Gill says; "they had not a true knowledge of the law; only a draught and scheme, the outward form of the law, and a mere shadow and appearance of the knowledge of the truth of it." Calvin says much the same thing; "Paul in these words detects the wickedness of hypocrites; for the more detestable they were, as they were thus inflated with false glory; they profaned the name of God, while they pretended to be his heralds, and as it were his prophets." And, again, in his commentary on Romans:

"I take what follows, having the form of knowledge, as a reason for the preceding; and it may be thus explained, — “because thou hast the form of knowledge.” For they professed to be the teachers of others, because they seemed to carry in their breasts all the secrets of the law. The word form is put for model (exemplar — pattern); for Paul . . . intended, I think, to point out the conspicuous pomp of their teaching, and what is commonly called display; and it certainly appears that they were destitute of that knowledge which they pretended."

What could be said of the Pharisees could be said of papists and every other false teacher. They have the form or the appearance of knowledge, but not the truth. Knowledge, if it means anything (at least as far as epistemological discussions and study) has to do with the knowledge of the truth and nothing less (even if some so-called "Reformed" epistemologist don't want to look like sideshow freaks for young sophisticates at Harvard, or, more to the point, Notre Dame).

As to what part of revelation is not propositional, ("I do not maintain that it is entirely propositional") I have no idea what you're driving at? Is it a feeling? A hunch? An existential sense of dread? What does non propositional revelation consist of and how would you know it?

 

[MW]

Sean, the point you seem unwilling to accept is that the Scriptures themselves use the word "knowledge" with an equivocation, sometimes referring to true spiritual knowlege, sometimes only to an understanding of mere facts.

Yes, the Scriptures inculcate feelings as well as thoughts: "Rejoice in the Lord alway." They muse on themes which are in themselves "unspeakable." The revelation of God should strike us to the core of our being and bring us to tremble at His Word, not simply to nod our head in theoretical approval.

Now do not mistake me. I am not saying the revelation of Scripture is irrational. Scripture always speaks coherently with the system of truth taught in Scripture. Hence there can be no personal revelation which contradicts the propositional content of divine revelation. But the Scriptures address more than our minds, and they lead us to seek out and rest in personal communion with the Lord Jesus Christ, not in a mere proposition.

 

[Magma2]

Sean, the point you seem unwilling to accept is that the Scriptures themselves use the word "knowledge" with an equivocation, sometimes referring to true spiritual knowlege, sometimes only to an understanding of mere facts.

I am not unwilling in the least. I absolutely affirm and maintain that the Scriptures do indeed use the word "to know" in different senses. But the point you seem unwilling to accept is the sense of the word under discussion.

Yes, the Scriptures inculcate feelings as well as thoughts: "Rejoice in the Lord alway." They muse on themes which are in themselves "unspeakable." The revelation of God should strike us to the core of our being and bring us to tremble at His Word, not simply to nod our head in theoretical approval.

No one has denied that the Scriptures inculcate feelings, the question is whether feelings themselves are cognitive. This you haven't shown.

Now do not mistake me. I am not saying the revelation of Scripture is irrational. Scripture always speaks coherently with the system of truth taught in Scripture. Hence there can be no personal revelation which contradicts the propositional content of divine revelation. But the Scriptures address more than our minds, and they lead us to seek out and rest in personal communion with the Lord Jesus Christ, not in a mere proposition.

I honestly don't think we're far apart, but if the Scriptures address more than our minds you simply haven't made the case. So far you've adduced that Scripture commands we rejoice in the Lord always, and indeed we should. However, minds rejoice, and, if they're rejoicing in the Lord that presupposes at least some knowledge of the Lord we're supposed to be rejoicing in. Further, personal communion, at least in the Christian sense, presupposes thought as well and not the absence of thought as in some sort of mystical attempt to empty the mind in order to become one with the universal void. Ommmm. To commune with the Lord generally refers to prayer (hardly non-propositional) and meditating on His word (again, hardly non-propositional).

As for things being "unspeakable," Paul speaks of being "caught up into paradise and hearing "unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." However, none of what Paul describes suggests anything which is unintelligible. What was revealed to Paul, what he heard, was more than he was lawfully allowed to speak.

 

[Magma2]

I'm going to see if I can ignore Sean and just talk to Anthony,

Thank goodness. Who really has the time to wade through all that anyway. You'll kill him with volume. For a man who keeps promising and threatening to drop out and wash his hands of the whole Scripturalist thing, good riddance and all, you certainly have a lot to say.

However you did say something earlier which again points to the bankruptcy of your own position (which is probably the reason you just can’t leave this discussion). You said:

The cognitive factulty that produces alethic beliefs should be a reliable one. Does Sean deny that? But, that's not sufficient for warrant. For example, a thermometer stuck at 74 degrees, if placed in San Diego, would be a reliable indicator of the temp here (since it's 74 degrees here 350 out of the 365 days of the year). One's belief based on this reliability, though, would not be warranted. Or, a brain lesion that reliably produces the belief that one has a brain lesion, and this doxastic input obtains upon seeing red objects, does not count as knowledge. That's because the cognitive faculties aren't functioning properly.

First, it seems to me that a thermometer stuck at 74 degrees in San Diego would indeed provide sufficient warrant for the belief that it's 74 degrees for the very reason you state, the temperature in San Diego is normally 74 degrees. What might be more difficult to determine is that your thermometer is actually stuck. Alaska, not so much. So, while you may not have warrant asserting that the temp is 74 degrees due to your busted thermometer, up until such time as you realize the bleeding thing is busted, if ever, you would have had just as much warrant as your local weatherman to look at your thermometer and reliably assume it's right. It seems to me that warrant is a purely subjective standard since what might constitute warrant one day might not the next.

In addition, how do you know that the beliefs produced due to brain lesions are unreliable? Perhaps brain lesions render the “doxastic input” obtained all the more reliable, not less so. Perhaps what you consider an improper functioning brain is really the proper one and more people should have brain lesions? Maybe you’re just a bigot when it comes to brain lesions?