Does the denial of the concept of natural law logically lead to a rejection of the notion of a covenant of works? If Adam and Eve were bound to obey the moral law (and the moral-positive command not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil), yet the moral law was not inscripturated at that time, then surely they must have been bound to obey the moral law as it was revealed in nature. If, however, you deny that there is such a concept as natural law then surely it must be impossible to retain the idea that there was a prelapsarian covenant of works which required Adam to obey the moral law? Because, on the one hand, if natural law does not exist, then Adam could not have been bound to obey a law that was not revealed at that point in time. If, on the other hand, natural does exist then it makes perfect sense to think of Adam being bound to obey a law which had been revealed to him by natural revelation. Does this make any sense?