The "Biola Turn" in Christian Philosophy (Or, a return from relativism)

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jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
He is pointing out the problem of identity in time. This is a controversial and well-discussed issue in philosophy and legal theory. He isn't making up things.
Legal theory, really. Ok identity over time is a temporal thing we recognize in things over time. Why a substance to sustain that?
 

jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
Hume asserted it. He didn't offer any non-self refuting constructive cases.

I am a substance. I know myself in a self-presenting way. Chisholm took Hume apart on this point.



No, I am not. I have given good reasons for why I believe in substances. I have shown that those like Hume who deny substance end up in very bad places, philosophically.
What good reasons?? You quoted history and the church fathers as far as I can tell, what reasons?
 

TylerRay

Puritan Board Graduate
Legal theory, really. Ok identity over time is a temporal thing we recognize in things over time. Why a substance to sustain that?
If essence is what you do, and you do different things at different times, what makes you the same thing/person while you are going about changing what you do? Are you not changing your essence?

If you and I do different things (and we do), are we different kinds of entities, as far as our very essence is concerned?
 

jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
If essence is what you do, and you do different things at different times, what makes you the same thing/person while you are going about changing what you do? Are you not changing your essence?

If you and I do different things (and we do), are we different kinds of entities, as far as our very essence is concerned?
Correct, one more problem for SM. Another is if I take a tree with a singular substance and chop it up into many pieces does the singular substance remain or has the substance divided somehow? If so than how? Outside of being a conceptual scheme what more use does it Have? But conceptual schemes can be revised. I prefer Dooyeweerd's aspects as a scheme. It doesn't have the same problems.
 

jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
I don't know what the qualifier "a temporal thing" adds to it. Research the Ship of Theseus problem.
Well aware of that problem. In post 31 you say that an essence is "exemplified" by it's properties but in post 33 you say a substance in the thing is the "continuation" of a thing over time. Are you making a distinction between essence and substance? If so what's the difference? They can't be both.
I prefer Dooyeweerd's scheme for understanding objects. I hope that makes more sense. He was no nominalist and neither am I. But SM ends in nominalism that's my point. That's Hume's point as well.
 

TylerRay

Puritan Board Graduate
Correct, one more problem for SM. Another is if I take a tree with a singular substance and chop it up into many pieces does the singular substance remain or has the substance divided somehow? If so than how? Outside of being a conceptual scheme what more use does it Have? But conceptual schemes can be revised. I prefer Dooyeweerd's aspects as a scheme. It doesn't have the same problems.
Do you believe that there is a constant principle that constitutes your identity through time?
 

jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
Do you believe that there is a constant principle that constitutes your identity through time?
Yes, me. My soul. But now you're calling it a principle. What's the difference between an essence, a substance, or now a principle? But those are just linguistic differences. My metaphysics is an awkward mixture of Dooyeweerd and the later Wittgenstein. Neither are nominalist.
 

TylerRay

Puritan Board Graduate
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Yes, me. My soul. But now you're calling it a principle. What's the difference between an essence, a substance, or now a principle? But those are just linguistic differences. My metaphysics is an awkward mixture of Dooyeweerd and the later Wittgenstein. Neither are nominalist.
What makes your soul the same thing today as it was yesterday?
 

jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
.

What makes your soul the same thing today as it was yesterday?
I believe that the soul is mystical in nature beyond our comprehension. But an essence, substance, or principle is an unnecessary assumption to acheive what a certain conceptual scheme labels a problem, there are other conceptual schemes that don't have that problem.
We must choose the best conceptual scheme that is the most useful and least problematic to think, talk, and make sense of the world. To choose one as the king of all schemes and say we have to go by this, problems and all, or else we're not orthodox is an unhealthy mixture of a particular philosophy and theology.
 

BayouHuguenot

Puritanboard Amanuensis
What's the difference between an essence, a substance, or now a principle?
Leaving principle aside for now, an essence is the structure of a thing. A substance is the this-ness of that essence.

This "unnecessary assumption," as you call it, is the backbone of historic Christian metaphysics. Tread at your own peril. To quote Nicholas Wolterstorff, as he denied the historic view of God and time, which he admitted, "Until you have mastered the tradition, don't reject it" (leaving aside the question whether Wolterstorff mastered it).
 

jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
Haeccity. A substance is this essence.


No, it doesn't. And you haven't successfully demonstrated it. I have rebutted every one of your challenges from Hume. And Hume was a nominalist.
And I rebutted every attempt, or lack thereof, of yours to show how we know a substance is there. But the explicit and implicit ad hominems keep coming. I've offered alternative explanations for you, ie TA, but you regect that. I think I'm bowing out. Have fun.
 

jwright82

Puritan Board Graduate
Leaving principle aside for now, an essence is the structure of a thing. A substance is the this-ness of that essence.

This "unnecessary assumption," as you call it, is the backbone of historic Christian metaphysics. Tread at your own peril. To quote Nicholas Wolterstorff, as he denied the historic view of God and time, which he admitted, "Until you have mastered the tradition, don't reject it" (leaving aside the question whether Wolterstorff mastered it).
I've also offered an alternative conceptual scheme, to which you didn't comment, for this issue. Again bowing out.
 
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