Test your reasoning skills

[Jim Johnston]

I know you were, but I used it to springboard into a post. I also made some comments indicating the light-hearted nature I was responding in. Just so there's no misunderstanding, I'll add one of these !

Btw, I ordered the Fisher book....

 

[BrianLanier]

I know you were, but I used it to springboard into a post. I also made some comments indicating the light-hearted nature I was responding in. Just so there's no misunderstanding, I'll add one of these !

Btw, I ordered the Fisher book....

Ha...I was writing my last post before I saw yours! I know your posts were 'lightheartedness' instantiated! So no need for the , at least with me.

 

[Jim Johnston]

I know your posts were 'lightheartedness' instantiated!

do abstract universals have the property of being abstract? Is the property of being abstract instantiated in abstract entities?

 

[BrianLanier]

Now, I may say that I *think* you are mistaken, and so for your claim to be analogius, you'd have to edit your answer on page one that "one *is not* the answer." In fact, if M.T. isn't a universally valid way of reasoning, then how don't see how you could say that my answer was wrong. At best you'd have to say something like, "I don't think it is correct, but it could be."

Likewise, if what you said about M.T. above is correct, then I don't see how my answer was wrong; given those assumtions.

Not so!

We can empirically test our reasoning (sometimes) to see whether or not the rule that we take apriori to be truth-functional is in a certain instance. So in case of the test above, we can empirically test to see whether or not *this* use of the conditional is a truth-perserving instance (as a said before, *most* cases are). And as we can see, it is a truth-perserving instance, therefore I can have a lot more warrant for my belief that your answer was incorrect than just "I don't think it was incorrect".

 

[Jim Johnston]

Too fast!

Then why not test it on the | 8 | as well? Why assume affirming the consequent necessarily leads to a false conclusion?

 

[BrianLanier]

I know your posts were 'lightheartedness' instantiated!

do abstract universals have the property of being abstract? Is the property of being abstract instantiated in abstract entities?

If abstract universals have any property whatever, they must have the property of being identical to itself, namely of being 'abstract'.

I don't know what you mean by 'in' abstract entities. Do you mean 'in' as in 'in the description' of abstract entities? Or do you mean 'in' as in 'of' abstract entities? Wasn't the nature of your post an 'instance' of being 'lightheartedness'? If so, then wouldn't it be an instantiation of it?

 

[Jim Johnston]

I know your posts were 'lightheartedness' instantiated!

do abstract universals have the property of being abstract? Is the property of being abstract instantiated in abstract entities?

If abstract universals have any property whatever, they must have the property of being identical to itself, namely of being 'abstract'.

I don't know what you mean by 'in' abstract entities. Do you mean 'in' as in 'in the description' of abstract entities? Or do you mean 'in' as in 'of' abstract entities? Wasn't the nature of your post an 'instance' of being 'lightheartedness'? If so, then wouldn't it be an instantiation of it?

it didn't have much to do with what you said, i was just spring boarding again and bringing up what some consider an interesting problem for realists....

 

[BrianLanier]

do abstract universals have the property of being abstract? Is the property of being abstract instantiated in abstract entities?

If abstract universals have any property whatever, they must have the property of being identical to itself, namely of being 'abstract'.

I don't know what you mean by 'in' abstract entities. Do you mean 'in' as in 'in the description' of abstract entities? Or do you mean 'in' as in 'of' abstract entities? Wasn't the nature of your post an 'instance' of being 'lightheartedness'? If so, then wouldn't it be an instantiation of it?

it didn't have much to do with what you said, i was just spring boarding again and bringing up what some consider an interesting problem for realists....

I figured as much, since that is not something that I would expect you to argue for, at least not in the actual world (and given that you don't exist in any other world [given Actualism], I don't have much to worry about)!

 

[Mushroom]

Considering that both of you are merely figments of my (or your?) imagination, none of this actually (given Actualism) matters. This is an abstract universality that posesses the characteristic of being both abstract and universal both 'in' as 'in the description' of an abstract entity AND "in" as in 'in' an abstract entity.

 

[Jim Johnston]

Considering that both of you are merely figments of my (or your?) imagination, none of this actually (given Actualism) matters. This is an abstract universality that posesses the characteristic of being both abstract and universal both 'in' as 'in the description' of an abstract entity AND "in" as in 'in' an abstract entity.

Especially since I'm a solipsist what you just said doesn't matter! Dang it! I said "you." It's so hard to be a solipsist these days, it was easier when no one was around.

 

[BrianLanier]

The answer has now been posted in the opening post. Thanks all for participating, and patiently waiting for the answer to be posted.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

booyaa! My logic class has finally payed off.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Paul, you write "How about this argument:

1. If it rains today, then it will not rain hard.
2. It did rain hard today.
3. Therefore, it did not rain today. (2,3, M.T.)"

I didn't read the back and forth on this subject, partly because I am too lazy, but also because I don't have the time. Anyway, I don't really see what's wrong here. Of course the argument is valid, but it is not sound. Premise 2 necessitates the falsity of premise 1. If the argument is not sound, then what is the problem?

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Gentlemen,

Forgive me for jumping into a thread which I know not the context.

1. If it rains today, then it will not rain hard.
2. It did rain hard today.
3. Therefore, it did not rain today. (2,3, M.T.)"

I didn't read the back and forth on this subject, partly because I am too lazy, but also because I don't have the time. Anyway, I don't really see what's wrong here. Of course the argument is valid, but it is not sound. Premise 2 necessitates the falsity of premise 1. If the argument is not sound, then what is the problem?

This argument is not valid. Premise 2 is not the antecedent of the conditional in premise 1. Here is what I think was meant...

Premise 1: A → B
Premise 2: A ∧ ¬B

From these two premises one can validly conclude to B. What is interesting is that one can validly conclude to anything. The reason for this is that the two premises are inconsistent. Premise 1 is logically equivalent to ¬(A ∧ ¬B), which is the contradiction of premise 2. From a contradiction everything (or anything) follows.

Brian

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Hmmm Brian I thought the form was...

premise 1: If p, then ~q
premise 2: ~~q (actually q, but its equivalent to ~~q)
C: Therefore ~p.

Which would be a valid modus tollens. No?

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Caleb,

Yep, you are correct. My bad. I did not pay close enough attention. Let's make this precise.

Let 'P' stand for "it rains today". Let '¬Q' stand for "it will not rain hard today". Then our argument is like this...

1. P → ¬Q
2. Q (Notice: this says, "It will rain hard today.")
3. ¬¬Q
4. ¬P

This is a valid argument. The conclusion states that "it is not the case that it rains today." Now, the trouble people are having here is that we understand Q → P to be the case. We have already proved ¬P (step 4). With the additional understanding that Q → P we can show ¬Q. In light of premise 2 (Q), this means the premises are inconsistent. Here is an interesting epistemological question, which premise do we give up?

A. Q → P
B. P → ¬Q
C. Q

They cannot all be held consistently. A seems to be definitionally true. However, A can be held consistently with both B and C. So, which one do we give up? How do we determine which premise to dismiss given contradictory premises? This question speaks to the heart of such issues as falsifiability.

Brian