Sub-Divisions Within Nomos

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Brian

Puritan Board Freshman
I searched around, and none of the threads I could find dealt with this issue explicitly enough (please point me in the right direction if there are). Several threads like here have broached the subject anew in my mind. Hopefully this is fruitful for others.

According to the Westminster Standards, there is a three-fold distinction to be seen in the Law of God: moral, ceremonial, and civil. Others have offered other suggestions:

Bahnsen: moral vs. ceremonial/restorative
Kline: law as unity with moral and typological elements
Dispensational: just a mess
Lutheran
etc.

My problem with this began when I did a paper on Law/Gospel last spring, and could find no external support for the WCF distinction - exegetical, theological, or otherwise.

So here is the voting:
  • How do you parse the Law, or should we?
    If you follow the WCF, who and how do we determine which law falls in which category?
    If you distinguish the law in a different way, explain how you practically relate to the Law in life and how you understand Christ's fulfillment/abrogation.

Thanks. I hope this isn't
:deadhorse:
 
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
Moral, civil, ceremonial.

Look at you, stringing us along like that! ;):p

So, Gabe, how do you determine which laws are moral (I assume those bind your conscience as how to act as a believer), and how you decide which ones are ceremonial/civil (again, assuming that you think these categories no longer bind you).

Also, I've tried, but do you know where the WCF and Standards get the grounds for this, exegetically or theologically?

Thanks.

For Christ, the telos of the Law,
BRIAN
 
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
Moral, civil, ceremonial.

:ditto:

The Westminster Assembly simply followed the standard classical Reformed division of God's law which is found in the writings of all major Reformers, such as Beza, Perkins, Dickson, Rutherford and others, notably Calvin's Institutes, Book IV, Chap. 20:

14. Old Testament law and the law of nations

In states, the thing next in importance to the magistrates is laws, the strongest sinews of government, or, as Cicero calls them after Plato, the soul, without which, the office of the magistrate cannot exist; just as, on the other hand, laws have no vigour without the magistrate. Hence nothing could be said more truly than that the law is a dumb magistrate, the magistrate a living law.

As I have undertaken to describe the laws by which Christian polity is to be governed, there is no reason to expect from me a long discussion on the best kind of laws. The subject is of vast extent, and belongs not to this place. I will only briefly observe, in passing, what the laws are which may be piously used with reference to God, and duly administered among men.

This I would rather have passed in silence, were I not aware that many dangerous errors are here committed. For there are some who deny that any commonwealth is rightly framed which neglects the law of Moses, and is ruled by the common law of nations. How perilous and seditious these views are, let others see: for me it is enough to demonstrate hat they are stupid and false.

We must attend to the well-known division which distributes the whole law of God, as promulgated by Moses, into the moral, the ceremonial, and the judicial law, and we must attend to each of these parts, in order to understand how far they do, or do not, pertain to us. Meanwhile, let no one be moved by the thought that the judicial and ceremonial laws relate to morals. For the ancients who adopted this division, though they were not unaware that the two latter classes had to do with morals, did not give them the name of moral, because they might be changed and abrogated without affecting morals. They give this name specially to the first class, without which, true holiness of life and an immutable rule of conduct cannot exist.

15. Moral, ceremonial, and judicial law distinguished

The moral law, then, (to begin with it,) being contained under two heads, the one of which simply enjoins us to worship God with pure faith and piety, the other to embrace men with sincere affection, is the true and eternal rule of righteousness prescribed to the men of all nations and of all times, who would frame their life agreeably to the will of God. For his eternal and immutable will is, that we are all to worship him, and mutually love one another.

The ceremonial law of the Jews was a tutelage by which the Lord was pleased to exercise, as it were, the childhood of that people, until the fulness of the time should come when he was fully to manifest his wisdom to the world, and exhibit the reality of those things which were then adumbrated by figures, (Gal. 3: 24; 4: 4.)

The judicial law, given them as a kind of polity, delivered certain forms of equity and justice, by which they might live together innocently and quietly.

And as that exercise in ceremonies properly pertained to the doctrine of piety, inasmuch as it kept the Jewish Church in the worship and religion of God, yet was still distinguishable from piety itself, so the judicial form, though it looked only to the best method of preserving that charity which is enjoined by the eternal law of God, was still something distinct from the precept of love itself. Therefore, as ceremonies might be abrogated without at all interfering with piety, so also, when these judicial arrangements are removed, the duties and precepts of charity can still remain perpetual.

But if it is true that each nation has been left at liberty to enact the laws which it judges to be beneficial, still these are always to be tested by the rule of charity, so that while they vary in form, they must proceed on the same principle. Those barbarous and savage laws, for instance, which conferred honour on thieves, allowed the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, and other things even fouler and more absurd, I do not think entitled to be considered as laws, since they are not only altogether abhorrent to justice, but to humanity and civilised life.

16. Unity and diversity of laws

What I have said will become plain if we attend, as we ought, to two things connected with all laws, viz., the enactment of the law, and the equity on which the enactment is founded and rests. Equity, as it is natural, cannot but be the same in all, and therefore ought to be proposed by all laws, according to the nature of the thing enacted. As constitutions have some circumstances on which they partly depend, there is nothing to prevent their diversity, provided they all alike aim at equity as their end.

Now, as it is evident that the law of God which we call moral, is nothing else than the testimony of natural law, and of that conscience which God has engraven on the minds of men, the whole of this equity of which we now speak is prescribed in it. Hence it alone ought to be the aim, the rule, and the end of all laws.

Wherever laws are formed after this rule, directed to this aim, and restricted to this end, there is no reason why they should be disapproved by us, however much they may differ from the Jewish law, or from each other, (August. de Civil. Dei, Lib. 19 c. 17.)

The law of God forbids to steal. The punishment appointed for theft in the civil polity of the Jews may be seen in Exodus 22. Very ancient laws of other nations punished theft by exacting the double of what was stolen, while subsequent laws made a distinction between theft manifest and not manifest. Other laws went the length of punishing with exile, or with branding, while others made the punishment capital. Among the Jews, the punishment of the false witness was to "do unto him as he had thought to have done with his brothers" (Deut. 19: 19.) In some countries, the punishment is infamy, in others, hanging; in others, crucifixion. All laws alike avenge murder with blood, but the kinds of death are different. In some countries, adultery was punished more severely, in others more leniently. Yet we see that amid this diversity they all tend to the same end. For they all with one mouth declare against those crimes which are condemned by the eternal law at God, viz., murder, theft, adultery, and false witness; though they agree not as to the mode of punishment. This is not necessary, nor even expedient. There may be a country which, if murder were not visited with fearful punishments, would instantly become a prey to robbery and slaughter. There may be an age requiring that the severity of punishments should be increased. If the state is in a troubled condition, those things from which disturbances usually arise must be corrected by new edicts. In time of war, civilisation would disappear amid the noise of arms, were not men overawed by an unwonted severity of punishment. In sterility, in pestilence, were not stricter discipline employed, all things would grow worse. One nation might be more prone to a particular vice, were it not most severely repressed. How malignant were it, and invidious of the public good, to be offended at this diversity, which is admirably adapted to retain the observance of the divine law.

The allegation, that insult is offered to the law of God enacted by Moses, where it is abrogated and other new laws are preferred to it, is most absurd. Others are not preferred when they are more approved, not absolutely, but from regard to time and place, and the condition of the people, or when those things are abrogated which were never enacted for us. The Lord did not deliver it by the hand of Moses to be promulgated in all countries, and to be everywhere enforced; but having taken the Jewish nation under his special care, patronage, and guardianship, he was pleased to be specially its legislator, and as became a wise legislator, he had special regard to it in enacting laws.
 
Thanks Andrew. But I should apologize - I should have been clearer. I am familiar with Calvin and Perkin's line of reasoning. However, there is never any reason given for this distinction, except
For the ancients who adopted this division...
Which ancients, and do they give an explanation for a tripartisan reading? Also, I haven't read Rutherford, Beza, or Dickson. Do they give a reason?

Also Andrew, how do relate to the Pentateuch and how do you practically divide the law in your own life? What is your standard?

Appreciate your response,
BRIAN
 
The moral laws are commandments from God regarding how we are to live holy unto Him and reflect His image (i.e. the Decalogue and other moral commands).

The civil laws are applications of the moral law in the legal sphere and in our personal lives as well (i.e. put a guard rail around your roof so you don't accidentally murder someone by their falling off).

The ceremonial laws are commandments and ordinances which typified Christ and His work and are all abrogated in His priesthood (priesthood ordinances and rituals, sacrifice, temple design, instrumental and Levitical worship, burnt offerings, etc.).
 
A defense for a two-fold distinction:

1Ti 5:17 Let the elders who rule well be considered worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in preaching and teaching;
1Ti 5:18 for the scripture says, "You shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain," and, "The laborer deserves his wages."

The quotation is from Deuteronomy 25:4. I don't think anyone would take this verse, or any other verse in the context or the whole chapter, as moral law binding on God's people today.

In Paul's mind, these verses are not to be taken literalistically. "Or do you think God cares for oxen?" (cf. I Corinthians 9:13-14). The three-fold distinction seems to not hold the full meaning strongly enough. If Deuteronomy 25.4 is civil/ceremonial, it should be abrogated and not applied to the believer. But Paul clearly does apply it to New Covenant believers.
If Deut. 25.4 is a moral law, then we either need to be treating our oxen and livestock in a certain way, or else we need a hermeneutic that allows us to understand it in the allegorical way that Paul does in I Timothy.

Both ventures seem dubious to me at best.

Therefore, what if we follow Kline and say that Torah is a unity (something that seems very exegetically sound. Paul does not recognize distinction in the NT.) and can be viewed in a moral "lens" or "paradigm" and a typological lens/paradigm. Then every law in the Pentateuch has a dimension that is fulfilled in Christ and a dimension that is morally binding for some time frame.

Also, this allows all fragments of the law to have a typological/fulfilled sense, and doesn't leave the civil out. From Kline,
We must recognize that the symbolico-typical dimension informs the civil as well as the cultic side of the Mosaic institution. Israel as a whole was a holy theocratic kingdom, a prototype of the consummated eternal kingdom, and as such not paralleled by any earthly institution in New Testament times "“ not by the state, for it is not holy, and not by the church, for it is not a geopolitical kingdom, at least not in its present phase of existence as a visible organization on earth (Review of Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, in Christian Scholar's Review 10:2 [1981] 175).

In this understanding, I take Colossians 2:14 to be dealing with the curses and ramifications for covenant breaching.

Hallelujah to the Law-giver and Law-fulfiller,
BRIAN
 
If the civil law is application of the moral law, how can it, in substance, EVER be abrogated?

Thus, Paul applies it to paying pastors. It was still binding.
 
Sorry, Gabe. Good post, I missed it before I posted. Sorry.
The civil laws are applications of the moral law in the legal sphere and in our personal lives as well (i.e. put a guard rail around your roof so you don't accidentally murder someone by their falling off).

So, just to clarify, you WILL have a guard rail on your roof? Or if you own a house now, you have one up there? Can I, in my first year of marriage, declare myself free of public duty (cf. Deuteronomy 24:5)? For that matter, what declension do you employ to decide which law goes in which category?

Thanks Gabe.
BRIAn
 
In other words, the railing on a roof is an application of "thou shalt not murder - even by accident." To apply that in the 21st Century, we lock up our guns in our homes separate from the ammo, we keep knives out of reach of children, we put a fence around our pools, etc. The substance of "thou shalt not murder" as applied by the judicial law is still very much binding on all peoples. Even our government applies them, ever heard of a speed limit? ;)
 
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
I said the substance is still binding, not the administration.

But the substance is the moral law. The judicial law has no substance. It takes all its value and authoity from the moral law. That is like saying that since government is binging in the substance, that a particular ruler can never pass away.
 
Originally posted by fredtgreco
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
I said the substance is still binding, not the administration.

But the substance is the moral law. The judicial law has no substance. It takes all its value and authoity from the moral law. That is like saying that since government is binging in the substance, that a particular ruler can never pass away.

Is the command to put a railing around your roof to protect others a moral law or judicial law?
 
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
Originally posted by fredtgreco
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
I said the substance is still binding, not the administration.

But the substance is the moral law. The judicial law has no substance. It takes all its value and authoity from the moral law. That is like saying that since government is binging in the substance, that a particular ruler can never pass away.

Is the command to put a railing around your roof to protect others a moral law or judicial law?

A judicial law. That is why I am not bound to do it. But the substance of that law -- "Thou shalt not kill" (explicated in accordance with WLC 99) , is (in Israel's case in 1000 BC) to build a parapet. For me, it is a fence around my swimming pool. Same substance. Same principle abides.

I might better put it this way, a means of fulfilling the moral law that I am commanded to keep is the judicial command. Judicial laws are a help and assistance to understanding and keeping the moral law. That is why Calvin covers the Pentateuch (less Genesis and the first 19 of Exodus) by way of a harmony on the 10 Commandments.

[Edited on 8/19/2005 by fredtgreco]
 
Fred is quite right.

The three-fold division of God's law is of tremendous importance in rightly dividing the word of God. What is binding today? What is not? What is the nature of the law?

I have not researched the history of the three-fold division. I know it is covered in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica, who may be one of the ancients to whom Calvin referred. I cited a number of sources which discuss the divisions (notably between moral and judicial) in the ongoing theonomy thread, including Perkins, Beza, and Rutherford. Althusius' Politica also addresses this. If I recall correctly, Ursinus treats this as well in his Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism. I can't think of any Reformed commentator from the Reformation era who disagreed with the three-fold division of God's law.

The Westminster Confession and commentaries on the Confession (Dickson, Shaw, Hodge, etc.) explain the nature of the division. The Bible does not give us a list of which laws fall into which category (much like it does not give us the word "Trinity"), but by exegetical analysis over time the Reformed Church has come to see that only one category of law still binds the Christian today: moral (Decalogue). Ceremonial laws are specifically abolished (Col. 2); and judicial laws expired with the state of Israel. To explore what the Westminster Divines understood by general equity as referred to in the Confession, I would commend this article which covers some of the history and theology related to the division of God's law.
 
What defines the Decalogue, then? How do we apply it to situations it does not immediately address (whereas the judicial laws do).

What was Paul doing when he applied the judicial law to New Covenant regulations? Did he not see the substance of those laws as binding and applicable in his context? There isn't anything in the moral law that teaches us to pay pastors.
 
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
What defines the Decalogue, then? How do we apply it to situations it does not immediately address (whereas the judicial laws do).

What was Paul doing when he applied the judicial law to New Covenant regulations? Did he not see the substance of those laws as binding and applicable in his context? There isn't anything in the moral law that teaches us to pay pastors.

That's the whole point! The Decalogue is bigger than the judicial laws.

WLC 99 What rules are to be observed for the right understanding of the ten commandments? A. For the right understanding of the ten commandments, these rules are to be observed: 1. That the law is perfect, and bindeth everyone to full conformity in the whole man unto the righteousness thereof, and unto entire obedience for ever, so as to require the utmost perfection of every duty, and to forbid the least degree of every sin.(1) 2. That it is spiritual, and so reacheth the understanding, will, affections, and all other powers of the soul; as well as words, works, and gestures.(2) 3. That one and the same thing, in divers respects, is required or forbidden in several commandments.(3) 4. That as, where a duty is commanded, the contrary sin is forbidden;(4) and, where a sin is forbidden, the contrary duty is commanded;(5) so, where a promise is annexed, the contrary threatening is included;(6) and where a threatening is annexed, the contrary promise is included.(7) 5. That what God forbids, is at no time to be done;(8) what he commands, is always our duty;(9) and yet every particular duty is not to be done at all times.(10) 6. That under one sin or duty, all of the same kind are forbidden or commanded together with all the causes, means, occasions and appearances thereof, and provocations thereunto. (11) 7. That what is forbidden or commanded to ourselves, we are bound, according to our places, to endeavour that it may be avoided or performed by others, according to the duty of their places.(12) 8. That in what is commanded to others, we are bound, according to our places and callings, to be helpful to them;(13) and to take heed of partaking with others in what is forbidden them.(14)
 
Brian,

In regards to Ursinus, you may find his remarks in his Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism regarding the "Thirty-Fourth Lord's Day" helpful, wrt to section II, What are the Parts of the Law, and What are their Differences? (p. 490, P&R edition) and section III, To What Extent Has Christ Abrograted the Law, and to What Extent is it Still in Force? (p. 492).
 
Fred -
A judicial law. That is why I am not bound to do it. But the substance of that law -- "Thou shalt not kill" (explicated in accordance with WLC 99), is (in Israel's case in 1000 BC) to build a parapet. For me, it is a fence around my swimming pool. Same substance. Same principle abides.
I am guessing that you don't go around looking for Christians with uninhibited access points to their pools. So we are dealing with objective laws that have subjective applications. Correct?
I might better put it this way, a means of fulfilling the moral law that I am commanded to keep is the judicial command. Judicial laws are a help and assistance to understanding and keeping the moral law.
But am I correct in saying that under the Old Covenant one was guilty for failure to keep a judicial law? That he was deserving of punishment? But are we not guilty for failing to keep various applications of objective law in the New Covenant?
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
What defines the Decalogue, then? How do we apply it to situations it does not immediately address (whereas the judicial laws do).

What was Paul doing when he applied the judicial law to New Covenant regulations? Did he not see the substance of those laws as binding and applicable in his context? There isn't anything in the moral law that teaches us to pay pastors.


That's the whole point! The Decalogue is bigger than the judicial laws.

But I don't see how WLC 99 helps us with why Paul applies an application, and not a moral law, to NC believers.

I have not finished the sources Andrew et al have provided me with. I'll keep plugging away.

Thanks for all your help, gentlemen. May God richly bless your study and ministry.

For Christ, the substance of nomos,
BRIAN
 
Andrew-
The Westminster Confession and commentaries on the Confession (Dickson, Shaw, Hodge, etc.) explain the nature of the division. The Bible does not give us a list of which laws fall into which category (much like it does not give us the word "Trinity"), but by exegetical analysis over time the Reformed Church has come to see that only one category of law still binds the Christian today: moral (Decalogue). Ceremonial laws are specifically abolished (Col. 2); and judicial laws expired with the state of Israel. To explore what the Westminster Divines understood by general equity as referred to in the Confession, I would commend this article which covers some of the history and theology related to the division of God's law.

While I agree with your sentiments, the people I am trying to convince of these truths don't start with your (our) presuppositions concerning the continuity/abrogation of the Old Covenant and the Law. Neither does credence from the creeds add up to much. However, exegetical siege and blitzkrieg, lathered in prayer, does have an effect by the Spirit.

Thanks for all your help, and I want to keep pushing this to the bone.

All God's grace to you and yours,
BRIAN
 
The creeds and confessions are not presuppositions, but summary of Biblical truth. You should still start there when attempting to defend a doctrinal truth.

Good providence in your efforts.
 
I chose "other." I'm not satisfied with Aquinas' tripartite division of the law into moral, civil, and ceremonial nor Bahnsen's bi-fold division. Obviously, certain distinctions are delineated in Scripture. Moral, however, is not a Scriptural category of thought. It's Greek, in fact. Cristopher J. H. Wright has furthered the discussion with his magnum opus Old Testament Ethics for the People of God. He writes that "the traditional hope of being able to lay bare a distinct category of 'moral law', as opposed to 'civil law' or 'ceremonial or cultic law', is not very fruitful," (288) and then goes on to demonstrate "how futile it is to think of isolating a separate category of 'moral law.' Rather, it is clear that there are moral principles to be found in all the different categories of law as they functioned in ancient Israel" (300-301). Wright further suggests the following categories of Old Testament law: criminal law (289-292), case law (292-293), family law (293-294), cultic law (294-299), and compassionate law(300-301). His argument that all OT law is authoritative for the Christian based on 2 Tim 3:15-17 is compelling. The question should not be which laws am I as a Christian under, but rather, how can I as a Christian obey all of God's laws. Wright presents a thoughtful step by step guidline for how a Christian may apply the principles of OT law:

(1) Distinguish the different kinds of law in the text. (321)

(2) Analyse the social function and relative status of particular laws and institutions. (322)

(3) Define the objective(s) of the law in Israelite society. (322-323)

(4) Preserve the objective but change the context. (323-324)

At 479 pages, it takes a while to get through it, but it's well worth it. Even the traditionalist who disagrees with Chris Wright (no relation to N.T. Wright) will benefit from much of his scholarship.
 
It sounds like Wright holds a similar view to Bahnsen as far as how the all of God's laws are to be binding on people today, at least in substance.
 
William Gouge on Heb. 7.12:

Sec. 68. Of the abrogation of the ceremonial law.
...
The Jews were under a threefold law, moral, ceremonial, and judicial.
...
The moral law concerns all the sons of Adam, but the two other concern the sons of Abraham.
...
Sec. 69. Of the judicial law of the Jews.

Besides the ceremonial law, the Jews had a judicial law, proper and peculiar to that polity. This law concerned especially their civil estate. Many branches of that law appertained to the Jewish priesthood; as, the particular laws about the cities of refuge, whither such as slew any unawares fled, and there abode till the death of the high priest, Num. xxxv.25. And laws about lepers, which the priest was to judge, Lev. xiv.3. And sundy other cases which the priest was to judge of, Deut. xvii.9. So also the laws of distinguishing tribes, Num. xxxvi.7; of reserving inheritances to special tribes and families, of selling them to the next of kin, Ruth iv.4; of raising seed to a brother that died without issue, Gen. xxxviii.8, 9; of all manner of freedoms at the year of jubilee, Lev. xxv.13, etc.

There were other branches of the judicial law which rested upon common equity, and were means of keeping the moral law: as putting to death idolaters and such as enticed others thereunto; and witches, and wilful murderers, and other notorious malefactors. So likewise laws against incest and incestuous marriages; laws of reverencing and obeying superiors and governors, and of dealing justly in borrowing, restoring, buying, selling, and all manner of contracts, Exod. xxii.20; Deut. xiii.9; Exod. xx.18; Num. xxxv.30; Lev. xx.11, etc., 32, 35.

The former sort were abolished together with the priesthood.

The latter sort remain as good directions to order even Christian politics accordingly.

1. By these kinds of laws the wisdom of God was manifested in observing what was fit for the particular kind and condition of people; and in giving them answerable laws, and yet not tying all nations and states thereunto.

2. That liberty which God affordeth to others to have laws most agreeable to their own country, so as they be not contrary to equity and piety, bindeth them more obediently to submit themselves to their own wholesome laws, and to keep peace, unity, and amity among themselves.
 
(From some old notes. Hebrew and Greek references removed.)

The distinction between moral, judicial and ceremonial emerges within the text of Scripture itself. In Exod. 20:1-17, the ten words are delivered verbally by God. In chaps. 21-24, positive legislation for the State of Israel is added; and in chaps. 25-31, ritualistic ordinances are provided which dictate how the people of Israel shall approach unto the Lord.

The historic trichotomy has emerged from the consideration that the law is treated in three different ways in the NT, and especially in the Pauline writings. In certain contexts it is equivalent to the unalterable will of God (moral), e.g., Rom. 7. These passages speak of "the commandment/s." In other contexts it is abrogated (ceremonial), e.g., Col. 2. These passages speak of "ordinances." In still another context the law is transformed to suit the NT situation (judicial), e.g., the oxen of 1 Cor. 9. This passage specifically speaks of "the law of Moses."
 
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