@Jeri Tanner - this discussion by Beeke and Jones might help regarding the idea of Testament in Puritan theology:
The Nature of a Covenant
Peter Bulkeley (1583–1659) begins his defense of the conditionality of the covenant of grace with a simple argument: the promises of God’s covenant do not belong to unbelieving and unrepentant sinners. Rather, those who repent, believe, and walk in obedience are heirs of the promises. Some distinction needs to be made between Christians and non-Christians, and denying conditions necessarily removes the distinction between those who believe and those who do not. Some promises exist that seem to be absolute (unconditional) and do not mention faith as a condition (e.g., Isa. 43:25; Ezek. 36:22), but their existence does not mean the promises do not require faith. God forgives based upon the merits of Christ only (Heb. 9:22), even though Christ is not always explicitly mentioned in every promise of forgiveness. Likewise, God forgives based upon faith only, even though the condition of faith is not always mentioned explicitly.7 The promises offered by God occur in the context of the covenant, and the nature of the covenant is necessarily twosided, according to Bulkeley.
A covenant is an agreement between two or more parties, requiring mutual conditions from each. A promise may be unilateral (“one-sided”), but a covenant binds parties together. Francis Roberts (1609–1675) argued that it is “absurd, and contrary to the Nature of a Covenant” to make it one-sided: “Covenants imply reciprocal obligations between Federates.”8 Bulkeley recognizes that “covenant” may be used on a special occasion to denote a promise without conditions (Gen. 9:9), but says he knows of only one such instance: the Noahic covenant. Otherwise, a covenant, by its very nature, requires “mutual stipulation or condition on both parties.… Take away the condition, you must also take away the Covenant commanded; and if there be a Covenant commanded, there must of necessity be a condition” (Josh. 7:11).9 The relationship of covenant and testament also received much attention because the new covenant described in Hebrews 7–9 is not only a covenant but also a testament. This additional concept did not exclude conditions but did establish the absolute or inviolable nature of the new covenant.
Instead of the classical Greek word suntheke (“mutual agreement”), both the Septuagint Greek version of the Old Testament and the Greek New Testament prefer to use diatheke (“arrangement” or “testament” in the sense of last will and testament, i.e., a document “arranging” the disposing of one’s estate after death) as the equivalent of the Hebrew word berith (“covenant”). Berith therefore seems to denote something more than a mere mutual agreement (suntheke). For this reason, some Reformed theologians stressed the unconditional nature of the new covenant. For example, John Owen (1616–1683) argued that berith could refer to a single promise without a condition, as in the Noahic covenant (Gen. 6:18; 9:9). According to Owen, this idea is no doubt present in the New Testament when the writer to the Hebrews calls the covenant a “testament,” and in a “testamentary dispensation there is not in the nature of it any mutual stipulation required, but only a mere single favor and grant or concession.”10 Thus, where God’s covenant is mentioned in Scripture, a uniform meaning should not be imposed upon the word. Owen adds, “And they do not but deceive themselves who, from the name of a covenant between God and man, do conclude always unto the nature and conditions of it; for the word is used in great variety, and what is intended by it must be learned from the subject matter treated of, seeing there is no precept or promise of God but may be so called.”11 Owen certainly did not deny conditions in the new covenant, but, like Bulkeley, he emphasizes its absolute nature as a testament to show its unchangeableness. Nevertheless, Bulkeley shows that the language of Hebrews 9:15 (“they which are called”) indicates that conditions are still involved:
These words … do plainly and fully imply the condition required in the Covenant of life, our calling being finished in the working of faith, which is the condition of the Covenant; no man is effectually called so as to have part in that eternal inheritance until he believe, so that the Legacies of the Testament being to those that are called, that is, to those that do believe, it is most manifest that the intent of the Apostle in calling the Covenant by name of a Testament, was not to exclude the condition, but only (as was said) to show the stability and immutability of the Covenant.12
This shows that to speak of the covenant as one-sided or two-sided, conditional or absolute, depends on the context of each covenant. The new covenant, like most covenants, is two-sided. Certainly, Richard Muller is correct to argue, “The language of monopleuron and dipleuron describes the same covenant from different points of view.”13
Beeke, J. R., & Jones, M. (2012). A Puritan Theology: Doctrine for Life (pp. 306–307). Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books.
The Nature of a Covenant
Peter Bulkeley (1583–1659) begins his defense of the conditionality of the covenant of grace with a simple argument: the promises of God’s covenant do not belong to unbelieving and unrepentant sinners. Rather, those who repent, believe, and walk in obedience are heirs of the promises. Some distinction needs to be made between Christians and non-Christians, and denying conditions necessarily removes the distinction between those who believe and those who do not. Some promises exist that seem to be absolute (unconditional) and do not mention faith as a condition (e.g., Isa. 43:25; Ezek. 36:22), but their existence does not mean the promises do not require faith. God forgives based upon the merits of Christ only (Heb. 9:22), even though Christ is not always explicitly mentioned in every promise of forgiveness. Likewise, God forgives based upon faith only, even though the condition of faith is not always mentioned explicitly.7 The promises offered by God occur in the context of the covenant, and the nature of the covenant is necessarily twosided, according to Bulkeley.
A covenant is an agreement between two or more parties, requiring mutual conditions from each. A promise may be unilateral (“one-sided”), but a covenant binds parties together. Francis Roberts (1609–1675) argued that it is “absurd, and contrary to the Nature of a Covenant” to make it one-sided: “Covenants imply reciprocal obligations between Federates.”8 Bulkeley recognizes that “covenant” may be used on a special occasion to denote a promise without conditions (Gen. 9:9), but says he knows of only one such instance: the Noahic covenant. Otherwise, a covenant, by its very nature, requires “mutual stipulation or condition on both parties.… Take away the condition, you must also take away the Covenant commanded; and if there be a Covenant commanded, there must of necessity be a condition” (Josh. 7:11).9 The relationship of covenant and testament also received much attention because the new covenant described in Hebrews 7–9 is not only a covenant but also a testament. This additional concept did not exclude conditions but did establish the absolute or inviolable nature of the new covenant.
Instead of the classical Greek word suntheke (“mutual agreement”), both the Septuagint Greek version of the Old Testament and the Greek New Testament prefer to use diatheke (“arrangement” or “testament” in the sense of last will and testament, i.e., a document “arranging” the disposing of one’s estate after death) as the equivalent of the Hebrew word berith (“covenant”). Berith therefore seems to denote something more than a mere mutual agreement (suntheke). For this reason, some Reformed theologians stressed the unconditional nature of the new covenant. For example, John Owen (1616–1683) argued that berith could refer to a single promise without a condition, as in the Noahic covenant (Gen. 6:18; 9:9). According to Owen, this idea is no doubt present in the New Testament when the writer to the Hebrews calls the covenant a “testament,” and in a “testamentary dispensation there is not in the nature of it any mutual stipulation required, but only a mere single favor and grant or concession.”10 Thus, where God’s covenant is mentioned in Scripture, a uniform meaning should not be imposed upon the word. Owen adds, “And they do not but deceive themselves who, from the name of a covenant between God and man, do conclude always unto the nature and conditions of it; for the word is used in great variety, and what is intended by it must be learned from the subject matter treated of, seeing there is no precept or promise of God but may be so called.”11 Owen certainly did not deny conditions in the new covenant, but, like Bulkeley, he emphasizes its absolute nature as a testament to show its unchangeableness. Nevertheless, Bulkeley shows that the language of Hebrews 9:15 (“they which are called”) indicates that conditions are still involved:
These words … do plainly and fully imply the condition required in the Covenant of life, our calling being finished in the working of faith, which is the condition of the Covenant; no man is effectually called so as to have part in that eternal inheritance until he believe, so that the Legacies of the Testament being to those that are called, that is, to those that do believe, it is most manifest that the intent of the Apostle in calling the Covenant by name of a Testament, was not to exclude the condition, but only (as was said) to show the stability and immutability of the Covenant.12
This shows that to speak of the covenant as one-sided or two-sided, conditional or absolute, depends on the context of each covenant. The new covenant, like most covenants, is two-sided. Certainly, Richard Muller is correct to argue, “The language of monopleuron and dipleuron describes the same covenant from different points of view.”13
Beeke, J. R., & Jones, M. (2012). A Puritan Theology: Doctrine for Life (pp. 306–307). Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books.
