Scottish Common Sense Realism

[Justified]

I saw that there were earlier threads on this, but nothing really substantive. I wanted to know your guys' thoughts on SCR. Is it biblical? If not, what should our approach to epistemology be? I've heard that SCR might be at the root of the fall of Old Princeton. I personally think there were probably other, greater factors than that. Let me know your thoughts.

 

[Philip]

Historical notes:

Direct realism of some sort was pretty much assumed by all Christian theologians before Descartes and even most before Kant. The empirical tradition of Locke and co. raised critical questions in the 18th century that were brought to a head with the thoight of David Hume. After Hume, there were two trajectories: Kant (transcendental idealism) and Thomas Reid (SCR). The Kantian/Hegelian tradition only made inroads in American institutions at the end of the 19th century, by which time Common Sense Realism had, for the most part, given way to its red-headed stepchild, pragmatism.

The modernists who made inroads at Princeton in the early 20th century were all schooled in the German liberalism of the day, which assumed a Kantian framework rather than that of SCR.

 

[RamistThomist]

I am SCR mediated through plantiga

 

[Backwoods Presbyterian]

A good place to go is this book

http://www.amazon.com/Right-Reason-Princeton-Mind-Unorthodox/dp/1596381434

 

[Justified]

Historical notes:

Direct realism of some sort was pretty much assumed by all Christian theologians before Descartes and even most before Kant. The empirical tradition of Locke and co. raised critical questions in the 18th century that were brought to a head with the thoight of David Hume. After Hume, there were two trajectories: Kant (transcendental idealism) and Thomas Reid (SCR). The Kantian/Hegelian tradition only made inroads in American institutions at the end of the 19th century, by which time Common Sense Realism had, for the most part, given way to its red-headed stepchild, pragmatism.

The modernists who made inroads at Princeton in the early 20th century were all schooled in the German liberalism of the day, which assumed a Kantian framework rather than that of SCR.

Thanks, I was thinking that the Christian view of things ought to be some form of realism.

Ben, thanks for the book recommendation. I will probably read it eventually. The thesis of it is interesting. I was always wary of the claims that CSR was the cause of the fall of Princeton. As already mentioned by Phillip, it seems Kantian Modernism was the cause of the fall of Old Princeton.

 

[Grafted In]

You might find this recent discussion on the Reformed Forum interesting and instructive.

Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism - Reformed Forum

 

[RamistThomist]

I was always wary of the claims that CSR was the cause of the fall of Princeton.

Read George Marsden's essay on CSR in Faith and Rationality. At the end of the day everyone affirms some form of common sense realism when it comes to giving justifications for one's foundation. As Marsden notes, however, it was when CSR was wedded to a crass empiricism that it failed. As such, it couldn't withstand Darwinism.

But as Plantinga has shown today, Thomas Reid need not be wedded to empirical models.

 

[Afterthought]

I have appreciated the philosophy, although I still have some unresolved questions on the matter, including some asked by the pragmatists. But when it comes right down to it, it seems this sort of realist philosophy is inevitable. Indeed, that's what James McCosh argues in favor of it. I have also appreciated how one can use the philosophy in the context of presuppositional apologetics; even just trying to understand the arguments in favor of this realist philosophy is helpful in training the mind to see what is at the back of people's claims. Of course, the philosophy could be taken too far (e.g., being too confident in the abilities of inductive reasoning), but if we view our reasoning abilities as having come from the "self-attesting God of Scripture" and take into account the noetic effects of sin, then it seems to me to fall nicely within a Christian view of things.

Ronald Nash's works, especially his Life's Ultimate Questions have been recommended to me in the past on the matter. Life's Ultimate Questions is useful, but I personally found Dabney's The Sensualistic Philosophy of the 19th Century more useful. Perhaps because I am more familiar with the philosophy near that time period.

 

[Justified]

You might find this recent discussion on the Reformed Forum interesting and instructive.

Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism - Reformed Forum

Watched the segment, it seems to provide some pretty decent critiques to CSR, although clearly one hour is not enough time to settle the subject. Regardless if CSR is true, I think as Christians some form of realism is demanded.

 

[jwright82]

Well we all have beliefs that seem so obvious but that isn't the problem with CSR. The problem is in defining what counts as "common sense" and what doesn't. Without some criteria to determine what is "common sense" it is a usefull but problematic notion. I prefer the term immediate belief because it allows for what we all experience as what we may call "common sense" beliefs without In my humble opinion succombing to the problems of defining "common sense". As a Vantillian I must point out that I can't whole sale accept CSR but it has some useful ideasif qualified.

 

[MW]

We are in the realm of general revelation so the question of whether it is "biblical" will have to be adjusted accordingly. The Bible does not teach it per se, but it may be shown to agree with the facts of special revelation.

It comes down to whether this gives a good account of human consciousness. It obviously does, and it was articulated to emphasise certain fundamental beliefs which human beings share. However, from a Cartesian point of view, which requires the impossible task of doubting everything until proven by its own evidence, and with the rise of Hume's Gap and Kant's Wall, a foundationalist theory is hard to sustain philosophically. At that point the presuppositional approach becomes necessary.

 

[Philip]

The problem is in defining what counts as "common sense" and what doesn't. Without some criteria to determine what is "common sense" it is a usefull but problematic notion.

If what you mean is that one may have immediate (and warranted, on some coherent model of warrant) beliefs that are not "common sense" for people not sharing one's model of rationality, it's not necessarily problematic for common sense. Common sense is a family resemblance concept referring to beliefs that most rational people would hold.

In other words, many immediate beliefs are common-sense beliefs, but not all. And many (not necessarily all) immediate beliefs would be common sense (example of non-immediate common sense beliefs: Euclid's postulates).

 

[RamistThomist]

Well we all have beliefs that seem so obvious but that isn't the problem with CSR. The problem is in defining what counts as "common sense" and what doesn't. Without some criteria to determine what is "common sense" it is a usefull but problematic notion. I prefer the term immediate belief because it allows for what we all experience as what we may call "common sense" beliefs without In my humble opinion succombing to the problems of defining "common sense". As a Vantillian I must point out that I can't whole sale accept CSR but it has some useful ideasif qualified.

Defining what is "common sense" isn't what CSR is all about. Wolterstorff (Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology) makes that clear. It is not a database of knowledge (i.e., defining what common sense is) but rather a mode of knowing. Classical foundationalism is wrong because it is self-referentially incoherent. It is not the case that the foundationalist claim (a belief is properly basic because it is either self-evident to me or immediately present to my senses) meets its own criteria: it is not self-evidently true nor is it available to the senses . If a belief is formed in proper circumstances according to its proper cognitive design, it has warrant.

 

[Grafted In]

K. Scott Oliphint's critique of A. Plantinga and SCR in his excellent work Reasons for Faith is worth taking a look at.

 

[johnny]

For those of us that use logos occasionally.
Thomas Reid's work is on pre pub at the moment for only eight dollars.
(I have it ordered)

https://www.logos.com/product/29827/the-works-of-thomas-reid

 

[TylerRay]

In my extremely limited knowledge, I understand there to be various nuanced positions that would fall under the umbrella of epistemological realism. One would be the perspective of Calvin and of Augustine (who I understand to be virtually identical in their epistemology, unless someone can correct me), one would be Reid's SCSR, another would be Old-Princetonian realism, still another would be Plantinga and Wolterstorff's Reformed Epistemology.

I consider myself an epistemological realist, but I don't know just where I would fall in among all these perspectives.

 

[RamistThomist]

In my extremely limited knowledge, I understand there to be various nuanced positions that would fall under the umbrella of epistemological realism. One would be the perspective of Calvin and of Augustine (who I understand to be virtually identical in their epistemology, unless someone can correct me), one would be Reid's SCSR, another would be Old-Princetonian realism, still another would be Plantinga and Wolterstorff's Reformed Epistemology.

I consider myself an epistemological realist, but I don't know just where I would fall in among all these perspectives.

That's kind of accurate. All would agree that universals exist extra mente. The difference is how to account for belief-formation.

 

[Reformed Covenanter]

For those of us that use logos occasionally.
Thomas Reid's work is on pre pub at the moment for only eight dollars.
(I have it ordered)

https://www.logos.com/product/29827/the-works-of-thomas-reid

There is also a whole lot of material by Thomas Reid on archive.org

 

[jwright82]

well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?

Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.

It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.

But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.

 

[RamistThomist]

That's not really what CSR is aiming to do.

For example,

Bahnsenians used to parrot that "knowledge was justified, true belief." Bahnsen (and his disciples) were attempting to give an account of belief-formation, not whether particular beliefs (like how do we know the 66 books of the bible are the true canon?) are in fact correct. I don't see how CSR is any different. Of course it can't give a "silver-bullet" answer to every question. Bahnsenians at one time wanted TAG to do the same thing, but Frame dissauded them from that.

 

[MW]

McCosh's Scottish Philosophy indicates there were different strains of thought within common sense realism, so it is not really accurate to present it as if it were an unified system. Different perspectives had an influence on some thinkers within this school of thought. McCosh himself, and especially James Orr, introduced distinct presuppositional directions into the system. If I remember correctly it was Orr who had some influence on Van Til.

 

[Philip]

For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?

That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.

How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?

What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?

Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?

What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally post hoc and on an ad hoc basis.

 

[jwright82]

That's not really what CSR is aiming to do.

For example,

Bahnsenians used to parrot that "knowledge was justified, true belief." Bahnsen (and his disciples) were attempting to give an account of belief-formation, not whether particular beliefs (like how do we know the 66 books of the bible are the true canon?) are in fact correct. I don't see how CSR is any different. Of course it can't give a "silver-bullet" answer to every question. Bahnsenians at one time wanted TAG to do the same thing, but Frame dissauded them from that.

No point of view can give a "silver bullet" answer to every question but we can make persuasive arguments in our favor. The question is what sort of argument does that? I would say that CSR as Plantinga and Wolterstorff interpret it is useful to a certain point but need to supplemented by something else. The original post asked what anyone thought about CSR so I thought it would be useful to include both positive and negative assessments of it. I agree with you to the extent that CSR has limitations and we ought to realize that upfront but is useful to some extent as well and ought to be incorporated in our thinking.

I also agree that Vantillians can just as much as anyone miss use their P.O.V. to be obnoxious, their are some presuppositionalists I could name but won't, as anyone else can, CSR included. It is hard to know how much Bahnsen had interaction with Plantinga but he did have a Phd in epistemology, so he wasn't ignorant of anything. I do worry that CSR, like Presuppositionalists, can miss use their view to avoid answering certain questions that are begging to be answered.

 

[jwright82]

For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?

That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.

How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?

What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?

Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?

What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally post hoc and on an ad hoc basis.

Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.

 

[RamistThomist]

For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?

That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.

How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?

What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?

Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?

What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally post hoc and on an ad hoc basis.

Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.

Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.

Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.

 

[Philip]

But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics.

What precisely does this mean? It might mean a) that the only explanation that could be provided is a Christian one (empirically false) b) that only a Christian explanation could, even in principle, be logically coherent (unprovable and unlikely) c) that the only existentially satisfying explanation is Christian (subjective) d) that the Christian explanation is the best one that we know of (pragmatic and subjective).

Part of why I bring this up is that most Christian accounts of ethics merely import a Christian metaphysical grounding into a pre-existing mold. Thus some Calvinists and fundamentalist treat Scriptural commands as categorical imperatives (Kantianism and other rule-based forms of reasoning), or pop Evangelicalism argues from consequences (utilitarianism, pragmatism, and ethical egoism), or the more recent virtue ethics of MacIntyre and Hauerwas.

I think we would all agree that the central ethical question is "how should we live?" but answering it depends, not merely on the metaphysics of one's worldview, but on the pre-theoretical commitments which underlie it.

By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate.

Even in this case, though, two individuals might arrive at two very different conclusions despite beginning with very similar commitments. For example, Calvinistic theonomists, 2kers, and transformationalists.

 

[jwright82]

For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?

That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.

How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?

What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?

Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?

What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally post hoc and on an ad hoc basis.

Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.

Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.

Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.

You will either have no Ethick or
A Christian one.

 

[jwright82]

But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics.

What precisely does this mean? It might mean a) that the only explanation that could be provided is a Christian one (empirically false) b) that only a Christian explanation could, even in principle, be logically coherent (unprovable and unlikely) c) that the only existentially satisfying explanation is Christian (subjective) d) that the Christian explanation is the best one that we know of (pragmatic and subjective).

Part of why I bring this up is that most Christian accounts of ethics merely import a Christian metaphysical grounding into a pre-existing mold. Thus some Calvinists and fundamentalist treat Scriptural commands as categorical imperatives (Kantianism and other rule-based forms of reasoning), or pop Evangelicalism argues from consequences (utilitarianism, pragmatism, and ethical egoism), or the more recent virtue ethics of MacIntyre and Hauerwas.

I think we would all agree that the central ethical question is "how should we live?" but answering it depends, not merely on the metaphysics of one's worldview, but on the pre-theoretical commitments which underlie it.

By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate.

Even in this case, though, two individuals might arrive at two very different conclusions despite beginning with very similar commitments. For example, Calvinistic theonomists, 2kers, and transformationalists.

It would mix nicely with my pov but you seem rule that out. Maybes CS has more do with V An TIl than you think.

 

[RamistThomist]

For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?

That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.

How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?

What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?

Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?

What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally post hoc and on an ad hoc basis.

Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.

Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.

Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.

You will either have no Ethick or
A Christian one.

I think you mean to say "no consistent ethic." Anyway, it doesn't touch Reid's position, since Reid began his epistemology with God.

 

[joebonni63]

well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?

Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.

It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.

But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.

I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.