Rutherford, The Gift of Prophecy, and the WCF

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Assuming Rutherford's view of prohecy that does not need to be apart of Scripture, then how do we deal with the word of knowledge and word of wisdom crowd? They make "prophetic" predictions all the time. Should they be condemned or exalted?

They argue that what they receive from God is small "p" prophecy versus big "P" prophecy and does not need to be canonized. I believe Wayne Grudem is a proponent of this type of prophecy especially when he was an apologist for the Vineyard.
Baxter has a section on how to evaluate claims of others to prophecy. Do you have his Christian Directory? I can try to find the section and direct you to it, but I don't want to lay it all out here (time constraints, etc.).

Is the Christian Directory available online?
 
Assuming Rutherford's view of prohecy that does not need to be apart of Scripture, then how do we deal with the word of knowledge and word of wisdom crowd? They make "prophetic" predictions all the time. Should they be condemned or exalted?

They argue that what they receive from God is small "p" prophecy versus big "P" prophecy and does not need to be canonized. I believe Wayne Grudem is a proponent of this type of prophecy especially when he was an apologist for the Vineyard.
Baxter has a section on how to evaluate claims of others to prophecy. Do you have his Christian Directory? I can try to find the section and direct you to it, but I don't want to lay it all out here (time constraints, etc.).

Sorry Scott, I don't have a copy of Baxter's Christian Directory.
 
Assuming Rutherford's view of prohecy that does not need to be apart of Scripture, then how do we deal with the word of knowledge and word of wisdom crowd? They make "prophetic" predictions all the time. Should they be condemned or exalted?

They argue that what they receive from God is small "p" prophecy versus big "P" prophecy and does not need to be canonized. I believe Wayne Grudem is a proponent of this type of prophecy especially when he was an apologist for the Vineyard.
Baxter has a section on how to evaluate claims of others to prophecy. Do you have his Christian Directory? I can try to find the section and direct you to it, but I don't want to lay it all out here (time constraints, etc.).

Is the Christian Directory available online?
Unfortunately, only bits and pieces are available online. It is worth getting, though.
 
Chris can probably highlight some materials on the PB to substantiate this. However, if you look at John Owen's A Dissertation on Divine Justice, in volume 10 of his works, he takes issue with Rutherford and William Twisse for teaching that God could (not did) have devised some other means for the redemption of sinners other than the death of Christ. This is nonsense, because how could God's justice be satisfied apart from Christ's atoning work? The answer, as Owen demonstrates, is that it could not; and so due, to the death of Christ, God saves sinners in a manner consistent with His justice. Hence Paul could say that God is "just and the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus" (Rom. 3:26).

I wasn't going to reply to this since it's a bit off topic; but it would seem a shame to let go an opportunity to delve into a subject which touches on the heart of reformed thought.

Owen's view is (1.) necessitarian, and (2.) contradictory to his own voluntarist view of the divine decree. In Death of Death he forcibly argues that God's attributes are not constrained to act in this or that manner towards the creature since all the acts of God are determined according to the freedom of His will. In the treatise on justice he says the contrary.

On four accounts the Larger Catechism (71) says justification is an act of God's free grace. (1.) In accepting the satisfaction from a surety. (2.) In providing the surety. (3.) In imputing the righteousness of the surety to believers. (4.) In giving faith as the means to receive this righteousness. Justice demanded satisfaction from the soul that sinned. If justice must be inflexibly satisfied there could be no possibility of substitution. It is better to consider atonement as the means which God freely determined to use for the display of the glory and harmony of His perfections in the salvation of sinners, rather than create a doctrine which might assist one aspect of reformed thought but which essentially undermines the reformed system because it exhibits God as enslaved to the principles of "nature."

I don't think that those of us in favour of the the absolute necessity of the atonement would say God is enslaved to "nature", but that He saves sinners in a manner consistent with His attributes. Rutherford's view means that God would have to be somebody else; as He could have saved sinners while His justice remained unsatisfied. Hence, He would not be a "just God and Saviour".
 
In re-reading the paper from the PRCE, it identified 4 categories that Rutherford used regarding prophecies:

(1) Prophetical revelation;
(2) Revelation special to the elect only;
(3) Revelation of some facts peculiar to godly men;
(4) False and satanical revelation.

Category 1 is the type of prophecy that the Apostles and Prophets had, ie; concanical special revelation. It should be noted that Rutherford and Gillespie did believe that prophecies of this type has ceased so there would not have been any problem with the Scotish delegation regarding Chapter 1.1 of the WCF.

Category 2, In my humble opinion, represents illumination by God the Holy Spirit. The paper notes that this corresponds with Chapter 18.2 regarding assurance in that the testimony of the Spirit of adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God and how the Spirit will illuminate the believer as to the Truth of Scripture as well.

Category 3 & 4 have to do with predictions made by Godly men and ungodly men. In my humble opinion, this is a stretch in categorizing these as prophecies. These predictions may be categorized as a "foretelling" but certainly not in the biblical sense, ie; immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The paper notes that none of the Godly men claimed inspiration from the Holy Spirit or that their predictions needed to be believed since they were not speaking on behalf of God. For what it's worth, a broken clock is right at least twice a day.

It appears that Rutherford does not consider categories 2, 3 & 4 as prophecies as Scripture uses the term Prophecy.

It does appear that the Church of Scotland did follow Rutherford and Gillispie in that they were not willing to say that God could not raise up a Prophet during extra-ordinary times if He wanted to. They were not willing to limit God.

Going back to the OP, some of the things Oss has mentioned are accurate as to what Rutherford believed, but his conclusion that "Rutherford's understanding as a framer certainly leaves open alternative interpretations of the Confession than the prevailing cessationist interpretation today." is wrong. The Standards do represent a cessationist interpretation and if Oss is trying make allowances for the Word of Wisdom / Word of Knowledge crowd as Grudem does, he is falling way short.

HERE is a link to the OPC's position paper on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. If I remember right there was a judicial case in the PCA regarding spiritual gifts. Unfortunately I can't find anything on the PCA web site about it.
 
In re-reading the paper from the PRCE, it identified 4 categories that Rutherford used regarding prophecies:

(1) Prophetical revelation;
(2) Revelation special to the elect only;
(3) Revelation of some facts peculiar to godly men;
(4) False and satanical revelation.

Category 1 is the type of prophecy that the Apostles and Prophets had, ie; concanical special revelation. It should be noted that Rutherford and Gillespie did believe that prophecies of this type has ceased so there would not have been any problem with the Scotish delegation regarding Chapter 1.1 of the WCF.

Category 2, In my humble opinion, represents illumination by God the Holy Spirit. The paper notes that this corresponds with Chapter 18.2 regarding assurance in that the testimony of the Spirit of adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God and how the Spirit will illuminate the believer as to the Truth of Scripture as well.

Category 3 & 4 have to do with predictions made by Godly men and ungodly men. In my humble opinion, this is a stretch in categorizing these as prophecies. These predictions may be categorized as a "foretelling" but certainly not in the biblical sense, ie; immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The paper notes that none of the Godly men claimed inspiration from the Holy Spirit or that their predictions needed to be believed since they were not speaking on behalf of God. For what it's worth, a broken clock is right at least twice a day.

It appears that Rutherford does not consider categories 2, 3 & 4 as prophecies as Scripture uses the term Prophecy.

It does appear that the Church of Scotland did follow Rutherford and Gillispie in that they were not willing to say that God could not raise up a Prophet during extra-ordinary times if He wanted to. They were not willing to limit God.

Going back to the OP, some of the things Oss has mentioned are accurate as to what Rutherford believed, but his conclusion that "Rutherford's understanding as a framer certainly leaves open alternative interpretations of the Confession than the prevailing cessationist interpretation today." is wrong. The Standards do represent a cessationist interpretation and if Oss is trying make allowances for the Word of Wisdom / Word of Knowledge crowd as Grudem does, he is falling way short.

Oss' words are in the context of a rebuttal of the argument that church history is decisively on the cessationist's side. To be fair to Oss, I think his main thrust is that given the beliefs of the Scots, the WCF is not the best weapon in the cessationist's arsenal. He seems to say that those cessationists who use the WCF as part of their argument are going beyond the original intent of the framers.
 
Assuming Rutherford's view of prohecy that does not need to be apart of Scripture, then how do we deal with the word of knowledge and word of wisdom crowd? They make "prophetic" predictions all the time. Should they be condemned or exalted?

They argue that what they receive from God is small "p" prophecy versus big "P" prophecy and does not need to be canonized. I believe Wayne Grudem is a proponent of this type of prophecy especially when he was an apologist for the Vineyard.
Baxter has a section on how to evaluate claims of others to prophecy. Do you have his Christian Directory? I can try to find the section and direct you to it, but I don't want to lay it all out here (time constraints, etc.).

Is the Christian Directory available online?

Sure, it's available online here.
 
Baxter has a section on how to evaluate claims of others to prophecy. Do you have his Christian Directory? I can try to find the section and direct you to it, but I don't want to lay it all out here (time constraints, etc.).

Is the Christian Directory available online?

Sure, it's available online here.

Hooray for Andrew!

Can you now point us to the chapter to which you are referring, Scott?
 
I don't think that those of us in favour of the the absolute necessity of the atonement would say God is enslaved to "nature", but that He saves sinners in a manner consistent with His attributes. Rutherford's view means that God would have to be somebody else; as He could have saved sinners while His justice remained unsatisfied. Hence, He would not be a "just God and Saviour".

"Absolute necessity" means God could not have done it any other way. That makes Him bound to one course of action in order to produce a specified outcome. This is not in accord with the fundamental concept of reformed thought -- the freedom of God. "Decretal necessity" as espoused by earlier reformed thought means that God decreed what served most for His glory. Given that fact, it can hardly be claimed that Rutherford's view makes God somebody else. It lets God be God -- acting how He chooses, not bound by a second God called "nature."
 
I don't think that those of us in favour of the the absolute necessity of the atonement would say God is enslaved to "nature", but that He saves sinners in a manner consistent with His attributes. Rutherford's view means that God would have to be somebody else; as He could have saved sinners while His justice remained unsatisfied. Hence, He would not be a "just God and Saviour".

"Absolute necessity" means God could not have done it any other way. That makes Him bound to one course of action in order to produce a specified outcome. This is not in accord with the fundamental concept of reformed thought -- the freedom of God. "Decretal necessity" as espoused by earlier reformed thought means that God decreed what served most for His glory. Given that fact, it can hardly be claimed that Rutherford's view makes God somebody else. It lets God be God -- acting how He chooses, not bound by a second God called "nature."

So how else could God have saved sinners in a manner consistent with His justice? God is bound by His own nature, therefore, Paul says that He "cannot lie." God cannot save sinners by setting aside the demands of His justice; that is what the "god" of Islam and Judaism does.
 
So how else could God have saved sinners in a manner consistent with His justice? God is bound by His own nature, therefore, Paul says that He "cannot lie." God cannot save sinners by setting aside the demands of His justice; that is what the "god" of Islam and Judaism does.

God's counsel is simple. God decreed sin, He decreed death to be the punishment of sin, and He decreed Christ to die in the place of elect sinners to save them from sin. One cannot speculate what God might have done differently in one aspect without calling into question the whole series of things decreed. It is "absolutely" possible that God could have forgiven sin by a mere declaration, but then it raises a series of questions respecting what else might have been differently decreed. It is better simply to adhere to Scripture, to what is, rather than ascend the ethereal realms in order to hypothesise what might have been.

Concerning this statement respecting the god of Islam and Judaism, I cannot see what relevance this has on a system which acknowledges decretal necessity. But I do detect in the statement the idea that God must do certain things in order to be God, which is as unreformed as both Islam and Judaism.
 
So how else could God have saved sinners in a manner consistent with His justice? God is bound by His own nature, therefore, Paul says that He "cannot lie." God cannot save sinners by setting aside the demands of His justice; that is what the "god" of Islam and Judaism does.

God's counsel is simple. God decreed sin, He decreed death to be the punishment of sin, and He decreed Christ to die in the place of elect sinners to save them from sin. One cannot speculate what God might have done differently in one aspect without calling into question the whole series of things decreed. It is "absolutely" possible that God could have forgiven sin by a mere declaration, but then it raises a series of questions respecting what else might have been differently decreed. It is better simply to adhere to Scripture, to what is, rather than ascend the ethereal realms in order to hypothesise what might have been.

Concerning this statement respecting the god of Islam and Judaism, I cannot see what relevance this has on a system which acknowledges decretal necessity. But I do detect in the statement the idea that God must do certain things in order to be God, which is as unreformed as both Islam and Judaism.

God does have to do things. He has to punish sin as He is a just God. If God does not have to punish sin then He is unjust.

Anyway, enough philosophy for one night...I have a bed to go to.
 
God does have to do things. He has to punish sin as He is a just God. If God does not have to punish sin then He is unjust.

Anyway, enough philosophy for one night...I have a bed to go to.

I wish you a good night's rest. :handshake:
 
This has been a very good discussion to read thus far.

As a general thought to throw out there, while I do know that some of the English Puritans did in fact believe in prophecy in a special revelation type of way, it is also true that the word was likewise used to sometimes refer to preaching, and the use thereof by the Spirit as a means of grace to convict the hearts and minds of believers and unbelievers alike, and bless the former. Could that sense of the word "prophecy" (preaching) have anything relevant to contribute to the current issue, including Rutherford's own use of the word, as well as the Divines' consensus on the issue in WCF 1?

Rev. Winzer, I found your initial post particularly helpful, where you talked about the different type of prophecy to which Rutherford referred, distinct from special revelation per se. Would you mind elaborating on just what he (and others) would have understood the nature of that to be. I think Wayne's recent post commenting on the article's characterization of the different "types" of supposed prophecies was likewise helpful in getting at some of that meaning. Would you characterize Rutherford's "prophecy" to fall into #2 (speaking on personal assurance of salvation; and also on illumination regarding Scripture's inspiration and content, as per the last sentence of WCF 1.5), or even one of those categories at all?
 
Owen's view is (1.) necessitarian, and (2.) contradictory to his own voluntarist view of the divine decree. In Death of Death he forcibly argues that God's attributes are not constrained to act in this or that manner towards the creature since all the acts of God are determined according to the freedom of His will. In the treatise on justice he says the contrary.

Well noted Matthew. It appears that Owen changed his mind on the subject between Death of Death and A Dissertation on Divine Justice. Why was this? The spectre of Socinianism seems mainly to be to blame.
 
I've been waiting for a new [ame="http://www.amazon.com/Westminster-Confession-Cessation-Revelation-Christian/dp/1842275216/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1196956237&sr=1-1"]book [/ame]that touches on the topic of this thread:

G. H. Milne, The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Cessation of Special Revelation (London: Paternoster Press, 2007).

Amazon says it was due out in April, but it is now December and, alas, we're still waiting ...
 
Rev. Winzer, I found your initial post particularly helpful, where you talked about the different type of prophecy to which Rutherford referred, distinct from special revelation per se. Would you mind elaborating on just what he (and others) would have understood the nature of that to be. I think Wayne's recent post commenting on the article's characterization of the different "types" of supposed prophecies was likewise helpful in getting at some of that meaning. Would you characterize Rutherford's "prophecy" to fall into #2 (speaking on personal assurance of salvation; and also on illumination regarding Scripture's inspiration and content, as per the last sentence of WCF 1.5), or even one of those categories at all?

Since inspiration and illumination (as we would call them) are the first two categories of revelation, that really places the third category somewhere in the vicinity of assurance. Obviously it is not the same as an assurance of an interest in Christ, but I think it can be demonstrated that it is functioning in the same way. What we have in this case are the general principles of the Word illuminating men who were wise observers of providence, zealous promoters of the cause of Christ, valiant in spiritual warfare, and fervent prayers in the Spirit. If a man has prayed importunately until he has received an assurance that God is going to answer his request, he will know something of the secret of the Lord.
 
Rev. Winzer, I found your initial post particularly helpful, where you talked about the different type of prophecy to which Rutherford referred, distinct from special revelation per se. Would you mind elaborating on just what he (and others) would have understood the nature of that to be. I think Wayne's recent post commenting on the article's characterization of the different "types" of supposed prophecies was likewise helpful in getting at some of that meaning. Would you characterize Rutherford's "prophecy" to fall into #2 (speaking on personal assurance of salvation; and also on illumination regarding Scripture's inspiration and content, as per the last sentence of WCF 1.5), or even one of those categories at all?

Since inspiration and illumination (as we would call them) are the first two categories of revelation, that really places the third category somewhere in the vicinity of assurance. Obviously it is not the same as an assurance of an interest in Christ, but I think it can be demonstrated that it is functioning in the same way. What we have in this case are the general principles of the Word illuminating men who were wise observers of providence, zealous promoters of the cause of Christ, valiant in spiritual warfare, and fervent prayers in the Spirit. If a man has prayed importunately until he has received an assurance that God is going to answer his request, he will know something of the secret of the Lord.

This would certainly describe Scotsmen like George Wishart!

Would this assurance be along the same lines as the fleece of Gideon?
 
Would this assurance be along the same lines as the fleece of Gideon?

No, that was God's condescension to unbelief, and in no sense a pattern for today. The assurance of faith is grounded on the testimony of Scripture.
 
So how else could God have saved sinners in a manner consistent with His justice? God is bound by His own nature, therefore, Paul says that He "cannot lie." God cannot save sinners by setting aside the demands of His justice; that is what the "god" of Islam and Judaism does.

God's counsel is simple. God decreed sin, He decreed death to be the punishment of sin, and He decreed Christ to die in the place of elect sinners to save them from sin. One cannot speculate what God might have done differently in one aspect without calling into question the whole series of things decreed. It is "absolutely" possible that God could have forgiven sin by a mere declaration, but then it raises a series of questions respecting what else might have been differently decreed. It is better simply to adhere to Scripture, to what is, rather than ascend the ethereal realms in order to hypothesise what might have been.

Concerning this statement respecting the god of Islam and Judaism, I cannot see what relevance this has on a system which acknowledges decretal necessity. But I do detect in the statement the idea that God must do certain things in order to be God, which is as unreformed as both Islam and Judaism.

Matthew,
I need some clarification on the last two paragraphs you posted here.
When you say this;
It is "absolutely" possible that God could have forgiven sin by a mere declaration, but then it raises a series of questions respecting what else might have been differently decreed. It is better simply to adhere to Scripture, to what is, rather than ascend the ethereal realms in order to hypothesise what might have been.
When I read a statement like this respecting God's decree, I do not think it is "absolutely" possible that God could have forgiven sin by a mere declaration in that I have been taught that God has always decreed whatever was most Holy and wise, in His Infinite Knowledge.
Would not the events of the cross be the most wise,Holy, and just solution possible. In that I could agree with the last part of your statement
It is better simply to adhere to Scripture, to what is, rather than ascend the ethereal realms in order to hypothesise what might have been.
Then this part-
But I do detect in the statement the idea that God must do certain things in order to be God, which is as unreformed as both Islam and Judaism.
[/QUOTE].

God's " must" can only be spoken of in terms of what He Himself has sweared to do.
13For when God made promise to Abraham, because he could swear by no greater, he sware by himself,
17Wherein God, willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath:

Am I mis-reading the post? I am almost sure that i am missing something here.:rolleyes:
I think the reference to God's immutability was not "in order to be God", but because He is God.
 
Thanks, Anthony, for your post. I don't think you are missing anything. If we accept that God has decreed what is for His glory, this safeguards the doctrine of God's freedom from being misconstrued as any kind of arbitrariness. What He wills He wills freely, and yet He wills what manifests His glorious perfection.

We just need to be careful where we place the point of necessity. It cannot be in the things willed. He has not determined what shall come to pass because these things are wise and good in themselves, as if there is some standard outside of God which binds Him to act in this or that way. Rather, the things decreed are wise and good because the wise and good God freely determines them.

Sin and grace are the two main themes of holy Scripture. If we reflect for a little on these themes we will see that both preclude the idea of necessity in God's determination of whatsoever comes to pass. Sin can't be decreed necessarily, otherwise God would be the author of sin. Nor can grace be decreed necessarily, otherwise grace would cease to be distinguishing and would end up being nothing more than a divine obligation to seek the salvation of all.

Blessings!
 
Rev. Winzer, I'm sorry if this is a stupid question, and I know the verse was referenced before -- I probably just didn't understand how it was addressed. In light of what you said above, could you expand more specifically on how you would explain the statement in Titus that refers to God as One 'that cannot lie', seemingly referencing His character as underlying and adding an additional force to His promise? (Is not His promise made before the world began His 'decree'? How can His character add force to His decree if there is no 'necessity' or assurance of anything outside of His decree? Surely He didn't 'decree' His being as truthful and unchanging? Would His constantly complete self-actualization reconcile His freedom and 'necessity' to some degree so that we can speak of things He 'cannot' do?)
 
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Rev. Winzer, I'm sorry if this is a stupid question, and I know the verse was referenced before -- I probably just didn't understand how it was addressed. In light of what you said above, could you expand more specifically on how you would explain the statement in Titus that refers to God as One 'that cannot lie', seemingly referencing His character as underlying and adding an additional force to His promise? (Is not His promise made before the world began His 'decree'? How can His character add force to His decree if there is no 'necessity' or assurance of anything outside of His decree? Surely He didn't 'decree' His being as truthful and unchanging? Would His constantly complete self-actualization reconcile His freedom and 'necessity' to some degree so that we can speak of things He 'cannot' do?)

Mrs. Zartman, It is certainly the case that there are things which God cannot do. He cannot change and He cannot lie. He would not be God if He could do these things because these are characteristics of moral weakness. But there is a difference between saying God must be true and then saying He must act in this or that way in order to be true. In the former God is the standard of truth, whilst in the latter a second standard is being imposed upon Him.

To refer this back to the original thought concerning God's justice -- it is undoubtedly true that God cannot be unjust, but it is going too far to say that it would have been absolutely unjust of God to forgive sin without satisfaction. Such statements bind God to external standards and effectively create a "second" God. We know that God has decreed to manifest His justice by requiring a satisfaction for sin. This should content us.
 
Thank you, Rev. Winzer. Personally I'm more comfortable with affirming God's freedom and speaking in terms of what He has decreed than of what He 'had to' or 'might have' decreed.

I did have a further question though. You explained that 'there is a difference between saying God must be true and then saying He must act in this or that way in order to be true' and referred that back to His justice: we can say that God is just, as I understand it, but we cannot say that He 'has' to act this or that way in order to be just. Yet 'truth' in the sense of not being able to lie does necessarily mean (or there doesn't seem to be much content) some kind of action. I can say that God must not say something which is false or opposite of what He said previously because He can't lie. I don't know if I'm expressing this very well.... I was wondering where you would place the distinction between His truthfulness and His action in the sense that we can say He is truthful and this means He 'must not' lie?

[Also, do not many of the words we use to describe God in the catechism have no meaning apart from actions He must or must not do? Such His being immortal? Do we have very much approach to describing His Being apart from necessary action? Am I confusing two kinds of action?]
 
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I was wondering where you would place the distinction between His truthfulness and His action in the sense that we can say He is truthful and this means He 'must not' lie?

[Also, do not many of the words we use to describe God in the catechism have no meaning apart from actions He must or must not do? Such His being immortal? Do we have very much approach to describing His Being apart from necessary action? Am I confusing two kinds of action?]

If we take the apostle's statement -- "Let God be true and every man a liar" -- as establishing a genuine antithesis between truth and falsehood, then the proposition "God is true" necessarily includes within it the converse proposition that "God cannot lie."

This principle applies to all His perfections. The fact that God is just necessarily implies He is no respecter of persons. But we cannot then argue that because God is just He is not able to confer saving grace on one and pass by another. Likewise, we have no grounds for arguing that because God is just He is not able to forgive a sinner without satisfaction being made for sin. In both instances there is a grave mistake being made. Both types of argument could only be correct if God were ONLY just. But the very idea of salvation in the first instance and forgiveness in the second instance supposes that God is BOTH just AND gracious. Hence He cannot be bound to an external standard which consists ONLY of justice.

It should follow from the fact that God is not ONLY just, but is BOTH just AND gracious, that He does not act out of some necessity of nature when He manifests either justice or grace, but such manifestations are free acts of His own will. What God has determined to do in the salvation and forgiveness of sinners is what pleases Him and brings praise to His glory.

The fact that God's Being is "simple" should also lead us to the same conclusion. Thomas Boston explains, "God’s attributes are God himself. Neither are these attributes separable from one another; for though we, through weakness, must think and speak of them separately, yet they are truly but the one infinite perfection of the divine nature, which cannot be separated therefrom, without denying that he is an infinitely perfect being." (Works, 1:57.) Now if this is so, then we ought not to conceive of God's attributes as parts of the whole. "Justice" and "goodness" are expressions of God's essence accommodated to our state of being. As such they can only be free acts of His will.
 
I've been waiting for a new book that touches on the topic of this thread:

G. H. Milne, The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Cessation of Special Revelation (London: Paternoster Press, 2007).

Amazon says it was due out in April, but it is now December and, alas, we're still waiting ...

It appears to be in stock at Paternoster Press. :2cents:

My copy of The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Cessation of Special Revelation: The Majority Puritan Viewpoint on Whether Extra-Biblical Prophecy is Still Possible arrived today. While I'm not prepared to analyze it yet, it looks fascinating. I'm looking forward to reading it very much. :pilgrim:
 
I've been waiting for a new book that touches on the topic of this thread:

G. H. Milne, The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Cessation of Special Revelation (London: Paternoster Press, 2007).

Amazon says it was due out in April, but it is now December and, alas, we're still waiting ...

It appears to be in stock at Paternoster Press. :2cents:

My copy of The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Cessation of Special Revelation: The Majority Puritan Viewpoint on Whether Extra-Biblical Prophecy is Still Possible arrived today. While I'm not prepared to analyze it yet, it looks fascinating. I'm looking forward to reading it very much. :pilgrim:


How much is it in US Dollars?
 
My copy of The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Cessation of Special Revelation: The Majority Puritan Viewpoint on Whether Extra-Biblical Prophecy is Still Possible arrived today. While I'm not prepared to analyze it yet, it looks fascinating. I'm looking forward to reading it very much. :pilgrim:

"Fascinating" is not the word. From the very first footnote on the definition of "miracle" to the concluding appendix on "providence" the author has his finger on the pulse. It's just what the doctor ordered for the present confused state of the church.
 
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