RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
Schaeffer, Francis. He is There and He is Not Silent. Tyndale. 1979 reprint.
On page 1 Schaeffer defines metaphysics as “the existence of Being.” That’s an ambiguous statement at best. Does he mean that there is an entity called Being which itself exists? That’s not necessarily wrong, and a good Platonist would have no problem with it, but I don’t think that’s what he means. In normal usage metaphysics means something like “the nature of reality” or the study of being.”
“An impersonal beginning leads to some sort of reductionism” (8). Schaeffer suggests that if all is bare particularity and there is no universal (or universals) to bind the particulars together, then they can’t have any significance. I like the idea, but I think it is under-developed. He explains the idea better with pantheism. If all is essence, or one, or whatever, then there is nothing to distinguish the particulars. They don’t have any meaning. You don’t have any meaning.
Schaeffer’s argument is quite simple: you have to begin with the infinite-personal Trinity in order to have meaning. He means something like only the Trinity, and the propositional revelation of God-in-Christ, can allow for predication between universals and particulars. I agree. I just think he needs more than 100 pages to make the case.
He has two long chapters on epistemology. They were surprisingly good and the astute reader can sense the Van Til. He begins, as all must, with pointing out the failures of the Greeks. Their gods were personal, but finite. As a result sometimes the gods controlled fate; sometimes fate controlled the gods. Knowledge and morality were iffy.
Plato rightly championed universals, but where was the universal that held everything to be located? The gods were finite and fate was impersonal.
He makes a fascinating suggestion that the Reformation’s insistence, not merely on sola scriptura, but on propositional revelation, solved the problem of nature and grace. Verbal, propositional revelation had both an infinitely personal God (universals; upper storey) that speaks to the space-time world (62). It’s a brilliant suggestion worthy of a doctoral dissertation.
This book is much better than The God Who is There. Schaeffer’s argument is “tighter” and he doesn’t get sidetracked on philosophical issues that are beyond his capacity.
On page 1 Schaeffer defines metaphysics as “the existence of Being.” That’s an ambiguous statement at best. Does he mean that there is an entity called Being which itself exists? That’s not necessarily wrong, and a good Platonist would have no problem with it, but I don’t think that’s what he means. In normal usage metaphysics means something like “the nature of reality” or the study of being.”
“An impersonal beginning leads to some sort of reductionism” (8). Schaeffer suggests that if all is bare particularity and there is no universal (or universals) to bind the particulars together, then they can’t have any significance. I like the idea, but I think it is under-developed. He explains the idea better with pantheism. If all is essence, or one, or whatever, then there is nothing to distinguish the particulars. They don’t have any meaning. You don’t have any meaning.
Schaeffer’s argument is quite simple: you have to begin with the infinite-personal Trinity in order to have meaning. He means something like only the Trinity, and the propositional revelation of God-in-Christ, can allow for predication between universals and particulars. I agree. I just think he needs more than 100 pages to make the case.
He has two long chapters on epistemology. They were surprisingly good and the astute reader can sense the Van Til. He begins, as all must, with pointing out the failures of the Greeks. Their gods were personal, but finite. As a result sometimes the gods controlled fate; sometimes fate controlled the gods. Knowledge and morality were iffy.
Plato rightly championed universals, but where was the universal that held everything to be located? The gods were finite and fate was impersonal.
He makes a fascinating suggestion that the Reformation’s insistence, not merely on sola scriptura, but on propositional revelation, solved the problem of nature and grace. Verbal, propositional revelation had both an infinitely personal God (universals; upper storey) that speaks to the space-time world (62). It’s a brilliant suggestion worthy of a doctoral dissertation.
This book is much better than The God Who is There. Schaeffer’s argument is “tighter” and he doesn’t get sidetracked on philosophical issues that are beyond his capacity.
