Reforming Apologetics (Fesko)

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RamistThomist

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Fesko, J. V. Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2019.

There is no way to write a review of this book that minimizes the potential for a literary bloodbath. I will start by stating the thesis in the most minimal of terms. This allows me to divide the review in three parts: 1) how the Reformed orthodox viewed prolegomena and natural theology; 2) overlap between classic Reformed and Van Tillian methods; 3) disagreements with Van Til.

Side bar: I’ve read James Anderson’s series of reviews on this book. Anderson agrees with much of Fesko’s presentation of natural law and common notions. He does a good job outlining Fesko’s position.

The hero of this book is the Puritan Anthony Burgess. From Burgess, Fesko presents an eloquent and compelling account of the importance of the book of nature and “common notions.” The law of nature is the common notions which are on our hearts (Fesko 15). For Burgess, the boundary of the law of nature is “the moral law delivered by Moses at Sinai” (16).

Aquinas: the principles of natural law are the same for all people. The conclusions they draw are not (Aquinas, ST Ia-IIae, qu. 94, quoted in Fesko 34). As Fesko, commenting elsewhere on Turretin, notes, “Immediate principles admit, but the noetic effects of sin due to the fall corrupt mediate principles” (43).

Although the chapter on Calvin explains Calvin’s views, it serves an equally important function: it rebuts the “Christological monism” that tempted historians and apologists for the last 200 years. That’s where people seek a unifying principle and deduce the rest of doctrine from it. This really only works with German idealism. In short, Calvin did not see Christ as the unifying principle of all theology and then deduced everything from him.

Following Richard Muller and others, Fesko notes that scholasticism was simply a method. Calvin's critical comments apply to the Sorbonne theologians, not to the scholastic method itself. It involved lectio, meditatio, and quaestio/disputatio. It was a classroom format. You can find elements of it in Calvin. Contrast the Beveridge translation of 1.16.9 with the Battles translation and you can see Calvin use scholastic terminology and methods.

I am not going to spend much time on Fesko’s analysis of Calvin. The literature is overwhelming. I do not think Calvin is a Thomist, yet it is obvious that Calvin is not saying what Van Til thinks he is saying.

Regarding Thomas Aquinas, Fesko’s main complaint is that Van Til gave nearly zero evidence that he actually read Thomas. Perhaps he did. That does not come out in his writings. We will cut a few moves off at the pass. According to presuppositionalists, Thomas is wrong for trying to synthesize Aristotle with Christ. However, it is not clear why Thomas is wrong for using concepts from Aristotle, yet it is fine for Van Til to use even more dubious concepts from Kant.

Regarding some of Thomas’s arguments, Fesko notes they are quia, not propter quid. In other words, they reason from effect to the cause, not cause to the effect. This is important because we cannot know God in his essence; therefore, we cannot reason from God to the world (78ff).

My favorite chapter is the one on worldview. There is a sense in which worldview talk is legitimate. If by it one means a way of viewing the world, then there is no big problem. That is not how it is used in the literature. Historic worldview theory (what Fesko labels HWT) seeks to deduce our understanding of reality from a single principle and provide an exhaustive (or near enough) explanation of reality (98). Not surprisingly, Van Til embraces HWT. It provides “the true interpretation of human experience” (Van Til, CA, 38, quoted in Fesko 106). This aspect of Van Til’s is fairly uncontroversial, so I will forgo the rest of the quotations. The problem is that if HWT is true, then there really cannot be any common notions between believer and unbeliever.

James Anderson, though, has demonstrated that Van Til held to common notions, at least in theory. Van Til rejected this later on (My Credo, JA, 21). There he moved to common ground, by which he meant the image of God.

Conclusion of the chapter: if one holds to HWT as defined above, then there is no legitimate place for natural revelation and common notions. Moreover, Scripture itself does not say that men will have unique knowledge regarding creation. God specifically tells Job there are a number of things that he will not know (Job 40:4).

I am tempted to skip the section on transcendental arguments. Fesko does not disagree with them in theory. He says they can be useful when you find the rare unbeliever who has a coherent worldview.

He includes a chapter on Dooyeweerd. I predicted in 2005 that there would be a return to Dooyeweerd’s thought in the Reformed world. It was a strange prediction, as Dooyeweerd is often incomprehensible. It turned out to be true, though.

To some extent for Van Til, but largely for Dooyeweerd, historic Christian thought has been plagued by the nature-grace dualism. This occurs when man absolutizes one of the modal spheres, usually the temporal one. Fesko counters this charge by noting a) Dooyeweerd mistakes duality for dualism, b) provides little analysis with the key sources, and c) uses a similar methodology to Adolf von Harnack.

Against this dualism, Dooyeweerd suggests the biblical ground motive of “creation, fall, and redemption.” Here we run into a problem. Dooyeweerd had elsewhere criticized Van Til for being too rationalist in getting his ideas from the Bible. For Dooyeweerd, we cannot use the bible as an object of theology. The problem, one among many, of which Dooyeweerd seems unaware, is that he got his biblical ground motive from the Bible!

Moreover, it is not true that Thomas Aquinas (and by extension the WCF) held to such a dualism regarding body and soul. For Thomas, the soul in-forms the body. It is the form of the body. It is not a ghost in the machine. It is one organic unity. Dooyeweerd mistook Thomas for Descartes.

And Dooyeweerd does not apply the same criticism to Calvin. Calvin specifically praised Plato on the soul (ICR, 1.15.16)! Calvin is not this pure font of only biblical theology. Even worse, Calvin said it was okay to start with the knowledge of man. The ordo docendi is not the same as the ordo essendi.

When we say that Dooyeweerd used the same methodology that Harnack did, we are not saying that he was a liberal who held the same beliefs. Rather, both believed that pure Christiant thought was corrupted by Greek philosophy.

In his concluding chapter on epistemology, Fesko shows how Van Tillians and classical Reformed can work together. Fesko’s comments on covenant sound very Van Tillian. Man’s covenantal origin allows us to embrace the book of nature.

With Van Tillians, we agree that epistemology is about wisdom (Fesko 198). Man submits to God’s authority, remembers his law, and responds with praise. We see a good example of this in Psalm 19.

Forgetting God’s law is the opposite of knowing. It is the same as disobedience. Van Til could have written this section.

There is one category confusion, though, that many Van Tillians make.They confuse axiology (the theory of value) with epistemology. An unbeliever will almost always have the wrong axiology. That does not mean he will have the wrong epistemology.

Conclusion

This book should not be seen as an attack on Van Til. The chapters on historic Reformed methodology are beyond dispute. The Reformed used the book of nature and believed in common notions. Nor is this book uncritical of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas was wrong on the donum superadditum. Finally, the real criticisms of Van Til should be appreciated for what they are. Van Til did not engage in serious historical analysis. That does not mean the rest of his project is wrong. Fesko even thinks the Transcendental Argument has its place (although I have my concerns).
 
It would be the alleged use of Kant by Van Til that would be the most disputed (and already debunked many times) claim.
 
It would be the alleged use of Kant by Van Til that would be the most disputed (and already debunked many times) claim.

Depends on how one says CVT used it. That he used Kantian transcendental arguments is beyond dispute. We are not saying, at least neither I nor Fesko, that CVT held to other Kantian claims: noumena/phenomena, antinomies, etc.I actually think he is more influenced by FH Bradley and Bernard Bousanquet. I actually respect Bradley as a philosopher. CVT is much closer in form, if not substance, to British Idealism than pure Kantianism.
 
Jacob, it is most certainly NOT beyond dispute that Van Til used Kantian transcendental arguments. Lane Tipton is the foremost expert on Van Til in the Reformed world. Watch his lectures on this very topic (on the Reformed Forum). Just because they both used the word "transcendental" does not mean Van Til used Kantian transcendental arguments.
 
Van Til's version of transcendental predication (that the Triune God's revelation in nature and Scripture is the pre-requisite of all knowledge) could not possibly be more antithetical to Kant's transcendendal idealism, which posits that the human mind is what makes all objects understandable. Kant never even admitted the theoretical possibility of God's revelation.
 
Jacob, it is most certainly NOT beyond dispute that Van Til used Kantian transcendental arguments. Lane Tipton is the foremost expert on Van Til in the Reformed world. Watch his lectures on this very topic (on the Reformed Forum). Just because they both used the word "transcendental" does not mean Van Til used Kantian transcendental arguments.

I'm not trying to say CVT was Kantian just because he used a similar argument. In any case, Kant got shades of that argument from Aristotle. All TAs operate on the question "What are the presuppositions that make y possible?"
 
Van Til's version of transcendental predication (that the Triune God's revelation in nature and Scripture is the pre-requisite of all knowledge) could not possibly be more antithetical to Kant's transcendendal idealism, which posits that the human mind is what makes all objects understandable. Kant never even admitted the theoretical possibility of God's revelation.

I know that. I am saying the outward form of transc. arguments are the same, not the content.
 
All TAs employ the following:

X is the precondition for Y.
We know that Y is the case.
Therefore, X.

Anyone who has read and listened to Bahnsen can fill in the relevant blanks.

Fesko is not saying Van Til is wrong for using TAs. Fesko even thinks TAs can be useful. I don't, but he does. Tipton might be the foremost expert on Van Til, but Stern is the foremost expert on TAs.
 
I know that. I am saying the outward form of transc. arguments are the same, not the content.
This is not what you said before. You said VT used Kantian transcendental arguments. You mentioned nothing about the distinction between form and content. That's like saying eating and map-reading are similar because they both use the word "fork." Not helpful at all.

All TAs employ the following:

X is the precondition for Y.
We know that Y is the case.
Therefore, X.

Anyone who has read and listened to Bahnsen can fill in the relevant blanks.

Fesko is not saying Van Til is wrong for using TAs. Fesko even thinks TAs can be useful. I don't, but he does. Tipton might be the foremost expert on Van Til, but Stern is the foremost expert on TAs.

I would never use this form of argumentation, since it is the "begging the question" fallacy. The conclusion is simply a restatement of the first premise. TAs employ quite a different form of argument: X is the precondition for Y. Only the Christian worldview provides X. Therefore all other worldviews are incorrect. I'll take Bahnsen over Stern any day.
 
This is not what you said before. You said VT used Kantian transcendental arguments. You mentioned nothing about the distinction between form and content. That's like saying eating and map-reading are similar because they both use the word "fork." Not helpful at all.

Consider my follow up as a clarification.
I would never use this form of argumentation, since it is the "affirming the consequent" fallacy. The conclusion is simply a restatement of the first premise. TAs employ quite a different form of argument: X is the precondition for Y. Only the Christian worldview provides X. Therefore all other worldviews are incorrect. I'll take Bahnsen over Stern any day.

I didn't say it was affirming the consequent. That's not the criticism. That's not Stern's criticism, either. If one is explaining the preconditions of intelligiblity, then it isn't affirming the consequent. Michael Butler dealt with that in the Festschrift to Bahnsen.

Granted, what I did above was a very simplified version of the TA, but it isn't any different from what Bahnsen used in CVT: R&A.

P1: Without the Christian God, there can be no consistent intelligiblity.
P2: There is intelligibility (logic, science, etc).
Ergo, the Christian God.

Nothing I've said would be contested among Van Tillians. I didn't expect in this thread to be explaining and promoting the TAG.
 
Consider my follow up as a clarification.


I didn't say it was affirming the consequent. That's not the criticism. That's not Stern's criticism, either. If one is explaining the preconditions of intelligiblity, then it isn't affirming the consequent. Michael Butler dealt with that in the Festschrift to Bahnsen.

Granted, what I did above was a very simplified version of the TA, but it isn't any different from what Bahnsen used in CVT: R&A.

P1: Without the Christian God, there can be no consistent intelligiblity.
P2: There is intelligibility (logic, science, etc).
Ergo, the Christian God.

Nothing I've said would be contested among Van Tillians. I didn't expect in this thread to be explaining and promoting the TAG.
I didn't say affirming the consequent was your critique or Stern's. That is my own critique of the way the argument was presented, and why I wouldn't use it. Your second example is actually a quite different form of the argument that amounts to a modus tollens argument, unlike the first version. Your second version looks like this:

No X, No Y
Y
Therefore X

This form of the argument is definitely one that Van Tillians will use, and it is logical. The way you phrased the first one doesn't look like this.
 
Also, if idealism is defined as positing that objects conform to the mind, then Van Til has no relationship except an antithetical one with all forms of it, whether Kantian, Hegelian, or British.
 
On deeper reflection, the original form of the argument is actually a modus ponens. The word "presupposes" kind of threw me for a bit.
 
Also, if idealism is defined as positing that objects conform to the mind, then Van Til has no relationship except an antithetical one with all forms of it, whether Kantian, Hegelian, or British.

I agree. Van Til was not an idealist. But as he said, "If we are to speak to them and win them, it is necessary to learn their language. There is no possibility of avoiding this" (Defense of the Faith [1955 edition], 23).

I never said CVT was wrong for using idealist language. I use Aristotelian and Platonic language (as did most of the church). In fact, I never said he was wrong on the TA (to the degree he actually developed the argument). To be sure, I have some misgivings on how a TAG could work with the man on the street. It also functionally asks the unbeliever to first presuppose skepticism, and I am not sure that is wise. Nonetheless, I am not saying it is logically wrong.
 
Jacob, this is what you wrote in your OP: "According to presuppositionalists, Thomas is wrong for trying to synthesize Aristotle with Christ. However, it is not clear why Thomas is wrong for using concepts from Aristotle, yet it is fine for Van Til to use even more dubious concepts from Kant." You have now admitted that CVT did not use concepts from Kant. Would you care to revise your previous statement, then? Most scholars agree that Thomas did in fact use the actual concepts from Aristotle. CVT's theology is, however, completely antithetical to Kant, and is not idealist at all. Using a term like "concrete universal" doesn't make CVT an idealist. So the parallel doesn't exist.
 
You have now admitted that CVT did not use concepts from Kant. Would you care to revise your previous statement, then? Most scholars agree that Thomas did in fact use the actual concepts from Aristotle. CVT's theology is, however, completely antithetical to Kant, and is not idealist at all. Using a term like "concrete universal" doesn't make CVT an idealist. So the parallel doesn't exist.

Concepts in the sense of language and ideas. That is different from saying that Van Til used Kant's conclusions. Van Til certainly used Hegelian terms like "concrete universal."
 
I know that. I am saying the outward form of transc. arguments are the same, not the content.

Concepts in the sense of language and ideas
Given that content and ideas are roughly synonymous expressions, I view what you say here in these two statements as contradictory. You do not understand CVT if you believe him to be an idealist, or in sympathy with them, or using idealist concepts. A superficial similarity in vocabulary does not mean that he borrowed ANY ideas from idealists. Look at the lectures by Lane Tipton and revise your opinion.
 
I actually think the language of "concrete universal" has something going for it. It really gets at the One/Many angle. I just think it needs a lot of explaining. But Van Til got that from a very specific philosophical tradition. And not everything later idealism said was bad. They were responding to legitimate concerns.
 
Watch Lane Tipton for the answer. You haven't answered my charge of contradiction.

I don't see myself as so much contradicting as the very nature of dialogue. We dialogue and have conversations to refine previous statements. You caught me in some ambiguity. That's fair. I wanted to refine my statement.

Yes, Van Til said the ontological Trinity is a concrete universal. I'm not actually disagreeing with him on that.
 
I'll grant for the sake of argument that CVT wasn't idealist. I think I said that half a dozen times. I'll even grant that his idealist language doesn't mean anything. It's not an important part of the review, since Fesko doesn't actually disagree with CVT on the TAG.
 
I'll grant for the sake of argument that CVT wasn't idealist. I think I said that half a dozen times. I'll even grant that his idealist language doesn't mean anything. It's not an important part of the review, since Fesko doesn't actually disagree with CVT on the TAG.
Well I haven't read the book so I can't on it
Fesko, J. V. Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2019.

There is no way to write a review of this book that minimizes the potential for a literary bloodbath. I will start by stating the thesis in the most minimal of terms. This allows me to divide the review in three parts: 1) how the Reformed orthodox viewed prolegomena and natural theology; 2) overlap between classic Reformed and Van Tillian methods; 3) disagreements with Van Til.

Side bar: I’ve read James Anderson’s series of reviews on this book. Anderson agrees with much of Fesko’s presentation of natural law and common notions. He does a good job outlining Fesko’s position.

The hero of this book is the Puritan Anthony Burgess. From Burgess, Fesko presents an eloquent and compelling account of the importance of the book of nature and “common notions.” The law of nature is the common notions which are on our hearts (Fesko 15). For Burgess, the boundary of the law of nature is “the moral law delivered by Moses at Sinai” (16).

Aquinas: the principles of natural law are the same for all people. The conclusions they draw are not (Aquinas, ST Ia-IIae, qu. 94, quoted in Fesko 34). As Fesko, commenting elsewhere on Turretin, notes, “Immediate principles admit, but the noetic effects of sin due to the fall corrupt mediate principles” (43).

Although the chapter on Calvin explains Calvin’s views, it serves an equally important function: it rebuts the “Christological monism” that tempted historians and apologists for the last 200 years. That’s where people seek a unifying principle and deduce the rest of doctrine from it. This really only works with German idealism. In short, Calvin did not see Christ as the unifying principle of all theology and then deduced everything from him.

Following Richard Muller and others, Fesko notes that scholasticism was simply a method. Calvin's critical comments apply to the Sorbonne theologians, not to the scholastic method itself. It involved lectio, meditatio, and quaestio/disputatio. It was a classroom format. You can find elements of it in Calvin. Contrast the Beveridge translation of 1.16.9 with the Battles translation and you can see Calvin use scholastic terminology and methods.

I am not going to spend much time on Fesko’s analysis of Calvin. The literature is overwhelming. I do not think Calvin is a Thomist, yet it is obvious that Calvin is not saying what Van Til thinks he is saying.

Regarding Thomas Aquinas, Fesko’s main complaint is that Van Til gave nearly zero evidence that he actually read Thomas. Perhaps he did. That does not come out in his writings. We will cut a few moves off at the pass. According to presuppositionalists, Thomas is wrong for trying to synthesize Aristotle with Christ. However, it is not clear why Thomas is wrong for using concepts from Aristotle, yet it is fine for Van Til to use even more dubious concepts from Kant.

Regarding some of Thomas’s arguments, Fesko notes they are quia, not propter quid. In other words, they reason from effect to the cause, not cause to the effect. This is important because we cannot know God in his essence; therefore, we cannot reason from God to the world (78ff).

My favorite chapter is the one on worldview. There is a sense in which worldview talk is legitimate. If by it one means a way of viewing the world, then there is no big problem. That is not how it is used in the literature. Historic worldview theory (what Fesko labels HWT) seeks to deduce our understanding of reality from a single principle and provide an exhaustive (or near enough) explanation of reality (98). Not surprisingly, Van Til embraces HWT. It provides “the true interpretation of human experience” (Van Til, CA, 38, quoted in Fesko 106). This aspect of Van Til’s is fairly uncontroversial, so I will forgo the rest of the quotations. The problem is that if HWT is true, then there really cannot be any common notions between believer and unbeliever.

James Anderson, though, has demonstrated that Van Til held to common notions, at least in theory. Van Til rejected this later on (My Credo, JA, 21). There he moved to common ground, by which he meant the image of God.

Conclusion of the chapter: if one holds to HWT as defined above, then there is no legitimate place for natural revelation and common notions. Moreover, Scripture itself does not say that men will have unique knowledge regarding creation. God specifically tells Job there are a number of things that he will not know (Job 40:4).

I am tempted to skip the section on transcendental arguments. Fesko does not disagree with them in theory. He says they can be useful when you find the rare unbeliever who has a coherent worldview.

He includes a chapter on Dooyeweerd. I predicted in 2005 that there would be a return to Dooyeweerd’s thought in the Reformed world. It was a strange prediction, as Dooyeweerd is often incomprehensible. It turned out to be true, though.

To some extent for Van Til, but largely for Dooyeweerd, historic Christian thought has been plagued by the nature-grace dualism. This occurs when man absolutizes one of the modal spheres, usually the temporal one. Fesko counters this charge by noting a) Dooyeweerd mistakes duality for dualism, b) provides little analysis with the key sources, and c) uses a similar methodology to Adolf von Harnack.

Against this dualism, Dooyeweerd suggests the biblical ground motive of “creation, fall, and redemption.” Here we run into a problem. Dooyeweerd had elsewhere criticized Van Til for being too rationalist in getting his ideas from the Bible. For Dooyeweerd, we cannot use the bible as an object of theology. The problem, one among many, of which Dooyeweerd seems unaware, is that he got his biblical ground motive from the Bible!

Moreover, it is not true that Thomas Aquinas (and by extension the WCF) held to such a dualism regarding body and soul. For Thomas, the soul in-forms the body. It is the form of the body. It is not a ghost in the machine. It is one organic unity. Dooyeweerd mistook Thomas for Descartes.

And Dooyeweerd does not apply the same criticism to Calvin. Calvin specifically praised Plato on the soul (ICR, 1.15.16)! Calvin is not this pure font of only biblical theology. Even worse, Calvin said it was okay to start with the knowledge of man. The ordo docendi is not the same as the ordo essendi.

When we say that Dooyeweerd used the same methodology that Harnack did, we are not saying that he was a liberal who held the same beliefs. Rather, both believed that pure Christiant thought was corrupted by Greek philosophy.

In his concluding chapter on epistemology, Fesko shows how Van Tillians and classical Reformed can work together. Fesko’s comments on covenant sound very Van Tillian. Man’s covenantal origin allows us to embrace the book of nature.

With Van Tillians, we agree that epistemology is about wisdom (Fesko 198). Man submits to God’s authority, remembers his law, and responds with praise. We see a good example of this in Psalm 19.

Forgetting God’s law is the opposite of knowing. It is the same as disobedience. Van Til could have written this section.

There is one category confusion, though, that many Van Tillians make.They confuse axiology (the theory of value) with epistemology. An unbeliever will almost always have the wrong axiology. That does not mean he will have the wrong epistemology.

Conclusion

This book should not be seen as an attack on Van Til. The chapters on historic Reformed methodology are beyond dispute. The Reformed used the book of nature and believed in common notions. Nor is this book uncritical of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas was wrong on the donum superadditum. Finally, the real criticisms of Van Til should be appreciated for what they are. Van Til did not engage in serious historical analysis. That does not mean the rest of his project is wrong. Fesko even thinks the Transcendental Argument has its place (although I have my concerns).
Well several things in response, I will not be discussing the "Kant and Idealism" thing you already corrected yourself (and Lane already nicely dealt with it). My thanks to Lane for the source on Lane Tipton, it looks fascinating! I'll only say this I hope if anyone thinks TA's are only an Idealist thing they should go to the link provided by Jacob, my thanks to you for that, and anyone can see most (if not all, except Kant) of the philosophers quoted are analytical philosophers. For some reason Van Friessian (I hope I spelled his name right) was left out.

As far as Dooyweerd goes one can consult Robert Knudsen's lectures at WTS media archives (he gives a class on Dooyeweerd) and/or his collection of essays "Roots and Branches" for a sympathetic confessional perspective on Dooyeweerd. He actually studied with him. Being that I like Dooyeweerd I am no slave to his thinking or Van Til's I do agree with the criticism of him given in your review.

I have not read Fesko’s book, but the Reformed Forum did a review that everyone should check out, so I can't comment on the content of what your review says. Fesko is a scholar of historical and systematic theology so he knows his stuff. You claim it is beyond dispute, ok. One question though, since it is also beyond dispute that two of Van Til's biggest influences are Vos and Bavink, did they both get Reformed Orthodoxy wrong as well? Or could it be shown that Van Til misunderstood them? I don't know but you have hinted here and elsewhere that Van Til is out of step with RO.
Now on TA (I don't like TAG, it completely fuzzys everything up) the best of WTS refers to it by other more helpful names. Knudsen (Transcendental Perspective) and William Edgar (Transcendental Aproach) both have names that imply a method more than an argument. For Knudsen see the former book and for Edgar see his WTS lectures at the WTS media archives.
I also advise anyone who is confused on the logical structure of TA's should consult Don Collett's work on this. He has a "back and forth" on this with Frame. See Frame's website I'm sure we're all familiar with and his contribution to Frame's festrift as well as his essay "Van Til and Transcendental Arguments" in the book "Reason and Revelation: New Essays In Reformed Apologetics" edited by Lane Tipton and K. Scott Oliphant.
The logical structure given is this; in order for the predicate of true or false to be applied to proposition y, proposition x must be true. If proposition x is false than proposition y is neither true or false. That is my own way of saying it but an example.
Jake is either a good father or a bad father presupposes that it is true that he is a father. If he's not a father than it is neither true or false that is he good or bad at it (its meaningless). Thats an example of the proper logical structure to be employed by the "method" of TA's. I don't know if Fesko discusses these in the book but thats the correct way of looking at it.
As far as HWT goes I wonder if Fesko or yourself can account the prevalence of it in modern western culture? Everyone assumes it, even the person in the street. They use less technical names of course but everyone uses the ideas in ordinary language, you might even say its "common sense". I apologize for the length but I wanted to give plenty of resources to anyone who reads the book or this review to consult on the people and issues brought up. So if you wish to respond to the points or questions I posed, I apologize that they are sprinkled around all that.
 
Oh for the record my laughing response to your OP was not about the whole post only the "bloodbath" comment, it was funny.
 
I've been wondering what the presuppositionalist/Van Tillian position is on the Reformed Scholastics.

How well does Van Til square with them?
 
I've been wondering what the presuppositionalist/Van Tillian position is on the Reformed Scholastics.

How well does Van Til square with them?

The Reconstructionist Van Tillians are openly hostile the scholastics (and hence, the historic Reformed tradition).
The theonomic Van Tillians accept the scholastics, albeit uneasily.
The more mainline Van Tillians accept the scholastics.

And that's great. I just hasten to add that the Reformed scholastics used the classical arguments and Aristotelian causality (see Van Asselt).
 
Well several things in response, I will not be discussing the "Kant and Idealism" thing you already corrected yourself (and Lane already nicely dealt with it).

I still think he used idealist language. I merely conceded the other points for the sake of argument and to move the discussion forward.
One question though, since it is also beyond dispute that two of Van Til's biggest influences are Vos and Bavink, did they both get Reformed Orthodoxy wrong as well? Or could it be shown that Van Til misunderstood them? I don't know but you have hinted here and elsewhere that Van Til is out of step with RO.

Vos in Ref. Dogm. 1 said we reason from effect to cause in the existence of God. Van Til's TA moves in precisely the opposite direction.

Van Til said Bavinck was too Thomist and too scholastic. CVT didn't misunderstand Bavinck. He knew exactly what Bavinck was saying.
As far as HWT goes I wonder if Fesko or yourself can account the prevalence of it in modern western culture? Everyone assumes it, even the person in the street. They use less technical names of course but everyone uses the ideas in ordinary language, you might even say its "common sense". I apologize for the length but I wanted to give plenty of resources to anyone who reads the book or this review to consult on the people and issues brought up. So if you wish to respond to the points or questions I posed, I apologize that they are sprinkled around all that.

I hinted at that. Depends on what one means by w-view. If it is simply a frame for looking at the world, then it's fairly obvious. Fesko reviews the literature from James Orr onward and notes that there it has a very different meaning.
 
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