Question on Turretin Contra Hypothetical Universalism

[TryingToLearn]

I was reading Turretin on hypothetical universalism and I am confused on how one of his arguments is supposed to logically follow. Here's the section:

Nor would the nature of the thing
allow this [That it can be said at the same time that Christ died for some absolutely and for all conditionally] since (on their hypothesis) there was as yet no consideration of the elect in the decree concerning the death of Christ, according to which he died
(indeed with the same intention with which the decree was passed, since the execution must answer to the destination; nor could there be any other affection and intention in Christ dying than in the Father destining). They hold that the
elect were separated by a posterior decree from others. Again, who can believe that in the one most simple act by which God decreed all things (although we have to conceive of it by parts), there were two intentions so diverse (not to say contrary) that in one manner Christ should die for all and in another only for some? Nay, since Christ could not will to die absolutely for the elect without
involving (by the law of contraries) a will not to die for the reprobate, it cannot be conceived how in one act he should will both to die for the reprobate and not to die for them.

But should not the word "absolutely" be added in after "(by the law of contraries) a will not to die for the reprobate" in order for this argument to work? Yet it cannot be since the logic doesn't follow.

So from the hypothetical universalist view, the order of decrees is so:

1. Christ dies for all conditionally
2. Christ dies for the elect absolutely
2.1 (therefore, by the law of contraries, Christ does not die for the reprobate absolutely).

There is no contradiction here. But Turretin in order to make his argument wants the order to be saying:

1. Christ dies for all conditionally
2. Christ dies for the elect absolutely
2.1 (therefore, by the law of contraries, Christ does not die for the reprobate at all).

Am I missing something? Is there a way to fix this argument?

 

[Romans922]

Vol and Pg. #??

 

[Contra_Mundum]

It appears to me Turretin says: upon HU suppositions, Christ must die with two contrary intentions. He must die on the one hand willing those for whom he dies (all without exception) to receive his benefits, albeit conditionally; and on the other hand, because he dies only once, he must also will that some for whom he dies (the reprobate) not receive his the same benefits, which is the end in conformity with the Father's will of election. It is a hopeless contradiction of willing that adding the term "absolutely" does not relieve.

 

[TryingToLearn]

It appears to me Turretin says: upon HU suppositions, Christ must die with two contrary intentions. He must die on the one hand willing those for whom he dies (all without exception) to receive his benefits, albeit conditionally; and on the other hand, because he dies only once, he must also will that some for whom he dies (the reprobate) not receive his the same benefits, which is the end in conformity with the Father's will of election. It is a hopeless contradiction of willing that adding the term "absolutely" does not relieve.

On HU, Christ has two intentions in dying. The first, to offer his benefits to all conditionally, and the second to offer them to the elect absolutely. He wills that the non-elect do not receive his benefits absolutely, but I can't see how this is a contradiction since the entire point is that they are only offered Christ's benefits conditionally. In other words,, they are distinct intentions, but I can't see how they are contradicting ones.

It is volume 2, pg. 460 btw.

 

[Contra_Mundum]

Here Turretin attends the one decree of God which is simple (in fact, not analytically) and refuses to accommodate multiple intentions: "who can believe that in the one most simple act..."

Following that, Turretin attends the one historic act of Christ, motivated by a unconflicted intention (so he cannot be both willing the benefits and nullifying the benefits of his death to the same party): "in one manner Christ should die... how in one act he should will both..."

That HU insists on two intentions, not compatible with but contrary to each other, is the substance of Turretin's counter-argument; and not whether the HU formula could be written in such a way as to avoid a formal fallacy. The additional terms "conditional" and "absolute" are, in his view, merely rhetorical.

The conditional decree supposes God would be pleased, in some plausible world, to give the death benefit of Christ to all without exception, even up to 100%, unto each and every exercise of faith; while suspending any consideration of election. Since all known substance obtains in this (prior) decree, God necessarily wills the salvation of the reprobate.

A new and absolute decree is then overlaid the first, containing the will to to give the death benefit of Christ to all the elect including in the benefit the power of faith, and the will to withhold the death benefit of Christ to all the reprobate. It is not alleged the prior decree undergoes any modification. Rhetorically, the divine will expressed in the prior decree is actually relegated to the status of "wishful thinking" as it respects the reprobate.

I think Turretin would say that it's not proper for men to so impute that sort of will-contortion to God. If the prior decree has substance, then it reflects divine intent--what God wills is done. If God includes a sine qua non, any condition, he absolutely ensures it. Furthermore, when Christ enters to fulfill the divine intention, he doesn't intend the least mere "possibility" by his death and its benefit, but absolutely ensures the end for his elect by the means.

The progress of human thought entails trade-off, the ranking of desires, so that the top desire is fulfilled even at the expense of lesser desires; and lacking omniscience, this process is frequently accompanied by second-guessing, reordering, and regret. There are places in the Bible where God's thought, by way of analogy, by anthropomorphic illustration, is explained as if he thought like a man. God is said to "repent." for example, even though elsewhere it is plainly taught that God is not a man "that he should repent."

God's perfect thought is not discursive. He doesn't need time to think through and rank his desires. He doesn't have unfulfilled desires. He does all his holy will, and what he leaves undone we may safely say he did not will. While I may want two things, only one of which is achievable; only in a conflicted sense is it accurate to say I did not want what I chose to drop, and wanted only what I kept. My limitations forced my hand, and I may doubt my choice. Divine omnipotence and omniscience relieve him of all conflict. And if the Bible describes God as any way having "wishful thinking," we are obliged to regard those expressions as accommodated language, so our thoughts of him do no disservice to his perfections.

Turretin, it seems to me, regards it much too high a cost to divine excellency to relegate any part of the saving decree of God to hypothesis. If election is the place where salvation starts, there's no prior decree that gets partly affirmed. There's no double--and certainly no conflicted--intention, rhetorical and substantial.

Anyway, that's how I see it.

 

[TryingToLearn]

Here Turretin attends the one decree of God which is simple (in fact, not analytically) and refuses to accommodate multiple intentions: "who can believe that in the one most simple act..."

Following that, Turretin attends the one historic act of Christ, motivated by a unconflicted intention (so he cannot be both willing the benefits and nullifying the benefits of his death to the same party): "in one manner Christ should die... how in one act he should will both..."

That HU insists on two intentions, not compatible with but contrary to each other, is the substance of Turretin's counter-argument; and not whether the HU formula could be written in such a way as to avoid a formal fallacy. The additional terms "conditional" and "absolute" are, in his view, merely rhetorical.

The conditional decree supposes God would be pleased, in some plausible world, to give the death benefit of Christ to all without exception, even up to 100%, unto each and every exercise of faith; while suspending any consideration of election. Since all known substance obtains in this (prior) decree, God necessarily wills the salvation of the reprobate.

A new and absolute decree is then overlaid the first, containing the will to to give the death benefit of Christ to all the elect including in the benefit the power of faith, and the will to withhold the death benefit of Christ to all the reprobate. It is not alleged the prior decree undergoes any modification. Rhetorically, the divine will expressed in the prior decree is actually relegated to the status of "wishful thinking" as it respects the reprobate.

I think Turretin would say that it's not proper for men to so impute that sort of will-contortion to God. If the prior decree has substance, then it reflects divine intent--what God wills is done. If God includes a sine qua non, any condition, he absolutely ensures it. Furthermore, when Christ enters to fulfill the divine intention, he doesn't intend the least mere "possibility" by his death and its benefit, but absolutely ensures the end for his elect by the means.

The progress of human thought entails trade-off, the ranking of desires, so that the top desire is fulfilled even at the expense of lesser desires; and lacking omniscience, this process is frequently accompanied by second-guessing, reordering, and regret. There are places in the Bible where God's thought, by way of analogy, by anthropomorphic illustration, is explained as if he thought like a man. God is said to "repent." for example, even though elsewhere it is plainly taught that God is not a man "that he should repent."

God's perfect thought is not discursive. He doesn't need time to think through and rank his desires. He doesn't have unfulfilled desires. He does all his holy will, and what he leaves undone we may safely say he did not will. While I may want two things, only one of which is achievable; only in a conflicted sense is it accurate to say I did not want what I chose to drop, and wanted only what I kept. My limitations forced my hand, and I may doubt my choice. Divine omnipotence and omniscience relieve him of all conflict. And if the Bible describes God as any way having "wishful thinking," we are obliged to regard those expressions as accommodated language, so our thoughts of him do no disservice to his perfections.

Turretin, it seems to me, regards it much too high a cost to divine excellency to relegate any part of the saving decree of God to hypothesis. If election is the place where salvation starts, there's no prior decree that gets partly affirmed. There's no double--and certainly no conflicted--intention, rhetorical and substantial.

Anyway, that's how I see it.

Thanks for the well-thought out answer.

It is all very difficult for me to wrap my head around still. I suppose the part that confuses me is when Turretin says,

"there were two intentions so diverse (not to say contrary) that in one manner Christ should die for all and in another only for some"

I cannot see how they are contrary if the intentions are that Christ should die *in one manner for all* and *in another manner for some*. If there is a distinction made between the two intents, then how can there be a contradiction between them? There would surely be a contradiction if Christ were said to both die and not to die for all/some *in the same manner*, but this is not the case on HU since he does so in different manners.

 

[Contra_Mundum]

It is possible to have a formally valid argument, and yet the argument fails because of a faulty premise. Turretin denies the premise, not the formal validity of a suitably constructed argument, one that avoids being caught in a formal fallacy. He points to the supposition that God should will in diverse manner, and tries to show error in the premise.

In my opinion, the proposal that Christ's death benefit has general application ordained for all humanity, distinct from the same death's particular application to the elect and willful refusal of said benefit toward the reprobate, at best succeeds rhetorically. It seems to relieve God of the "harsh" judgment that resting in a simple decree of election (and consequent reprobation by necessity) must accept.

The elective decree is original and ultimate; a decree-for-universal-redemption is not. Accepting divine right in this matter is where Reformed theology has a stark, sharp edge we dare not soften. God makes a demand of us, that we bow the knee. HU proposes there is some way to yet smuggle in a gray area between the love of God and election, by which the human will is cushioned from the latter.