Question concerning the Transcendental Argument

[natewood3]

I read this statement concerning the TA:

In the case of “direct” arguments (whether rational or empirical) the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments: it begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds to ask what conditions would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense. But if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent and sound) would nevertheless reach the same conclusion.

Can someone give me some actual examples of the following statement: "if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent and sound) would nevertheless reach the same conclusion."

I have seen other people make this claim, but I have not really seen this illustrated or any examples given of how this would work in a specific context.

 

[natewood3]

I really cannot believe that no one has any examples for this at all...Do you know someone that can give me some examples and/or explain this better?

 

[Cheshire Cat]

I’m not sure what the context of the quote is, but I’ll give it a shot. Take ‘morality’ as an example of the “experience or belief”. TAG says that in order to make sense out of morality, Christian theism must be the case. Someone might argue that there is no morality, and that everything is permissible. It is merely an illusion. At this point they have “negated” the statement of original belief (i.e. morality). But the conclusion of TAG still follows; that in order to make sense out of morality (i.e. its *existence*), Christian Theism must be the case. This is my interpretation of the quote at least. It may very well be wrong.

Btw, I don't see any problem in using direct arguments.

 

[Ron]

Nate, this has been a very confusing matter for quite some time. Maybe you might take a look at this:

Reformed Apologist: A Formal Blunder on Van Til by the WTJ, no less!

It addesses the matter. The bottom line, TAG is a kind of deductive argument. It need not take the form of Modus Tollens; nor can it take the form that Collett suggests, which I interact with.

I think the Bahnsen quote you referenced simply means that whether you argue for or against a transcendental, the transcendental must be affirmed being a transcendental. So, to deny logic or to affirm logic, logic must be employed.

Ron

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Ron, here is Tom Bombadil's thoughts on the form (taken from an email): "the form is, actually, a modal modus ponens: If X is possible, then Y is the case (because Y is the/a preconditions for X). X is possible. Therefore Y. Symbolicly

<>X --> Y

<>X

:.Y

 

[Bygracealone]

Sort of like somebody denying that air exists all the while breathing air to make the claim...

 

[Vytautas]

Ron, here is Tom Bombadil's thoughts on the form (taken from an email): "the form is, actually, a modal modus ponens: If X is possible, then Y is the case (because Y is the/a preconditions for X). X is possible. Therefore Y. Symbolicly

<>X --> Y

<>X

:.Y

It seems to me that if the first premise is true, then there is a proof from what is possible to the Christian worldview or the Christian God. If something is possible, then it is sufficent to demonstate the worldview. But those things must be revealed and cannot be reasoned to by knowing what is possible. I would think from the Christian worldview we can make sense of what is possible from the worldview. Hence, I think of the TAG as an indirect argument.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

It seems to me that if the first premise is true, then there is a proof from what is possible to the Christian worldview or the Christian God. If something is possible, then it is sufficent to demonstate the worldview. But those things must be revealed and cannot be reasoned to by knowing what is possible. I would think from the Christian worldview we can make sense of what is possible from the worldview. Hence, I think of the TAG as an indirect argument.

According to presuppositionalism, such truths can be attained by reason because of the point of contact (General revelation and the image of God, etc). Now, the dirty part is in arguing that x is possible (or the case). It seems to me that is where the direct argumentation comes in. So, in my view, even if the argument form itself is indirect, the premises are argued for in a direct manner.

Take morality as an example of 'x'. We might give a reductio that undercuts our opponents viewpoint, but we also are going to argue directly that our view of morality is the correct view to take. So there is direct argumentation within the indirect argument. In other words, our argument for the premise is not merely negative, but also positive.

 

[Vytautas]

It seems to me that if the first premise is true, then there is a proof from what is possible to the Christian worldview or the Christian God. If something is possible, then it is sufficent to demonstate the worldview. But those things must be revealed and cannot be reasoned to by knowing what is possible. I would think from the Christian worldview we can make sense of what is possible from the worldview. Hence, I think of the TAG as an indirect argument.

According to presuppositionalism, such truths can be attained by reason because of the point of contact (General revelation and the image of God, etc). Now, the dirty part is in arguing that x is possible (or the case). It seems to me that is where the direct argumentation comes in. So, in my view, even if the argument form itself is indirect, the premises are argued for in a direct manner.

Take morality as an example of 'x'. We might give a reductio that undercuts our opponents viewpoint, but we also are going to argue directly that our view of morality is the correct view to take. So there is direct argumentation within the indirect argument. In other words, our argument for the premise is not merely negative, but also positive.

When I say 'those things that must be revealed', I had in mind the Trinity, Incarnation, etc. I did not mean what was common to all men such as morality. The 'dirty part' is not proving that morality is possible, since mostly all men would agree that is true. It is the idea that the Christian worldview accounts for morality, since unbelievers would disagree with that. You said we 'argue directly that our view of morality is the correct view to take'. It is if morality is possible, then Christianity. Which seems to argue from natural revelation to special revelation, but that seems backwards to me. But I think you have a different take on the matter, that we argue indirectly with non-Christianity.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

When I say 'those things that must be revealed', I had in mind the Trinity, Incarnation, etc. I did not mean what was common to all men such as morality.

Ah, okay.

The 'dirty part' is not proving that morality is possible, since mostly all men would agree that is true. It is the idea that the Christian worldview accounts for morality, since unbelievers would disagree with that.

That's what is meant by morality. The other views do not make sense of morality, so it is not possible if their views are correct.

You said we 'argue directly that our view of morality is the correct view to take'. It is if morality is possible, then Christianity. Which seems to argue from natural revelation to special revelation, but that seems backwards to me. But I think you have a different take on the matter, that we argue indirectly with non-Christianity.

In one sense we do. In practice, I don't see the difference between William Lane Craig giving the moral argument for God's existence and someone giving TAG using the moral argument. We argue that our opponents view is wrong, and that a Christian theistic viewpoint is right. Even when someone gives the cosmological argument for God's existence, we are dealing with different presuppositions of the nature of causality and time. It doesn't matter whether the cosmological argument or something like it doesn't prove God's existence with certainty. Neither does TAG. So I don't see the need to argue *only* indirectly.

 

[MW]

[In practice, I don't see the difference between William Lane Craig giving the moral argument for God's existence and someone giving TAG using the moral argument.

The moral argument, technically speaking, would be attempting to prove God exists on the basis that moral values exist. Whereas a transcendental argument would be attempting to demonstrate the possibility of moral values only because God exists. On the one side morality is presupposed, on the other side God is presupposed. I think that makes them substantially different.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

armourbearer, I don't think the idea that 'moral values exist' is presupposed in the moral argument. That is a premise that is argued for.

You are right in saying that in TAG the possibility of moral values is said to only make sense if God exists. To be honest, I don't see any relevant difference in saying

1)If there is a universal moral law, then there must be a universal moral lawgiver.
2)There is a universal moral law.
3)Therefore, there must be God.

and

1)If a universal moral law is possible, then there must be God (because the precondition of a universal moral law being possible is God's existence).
2)A universal moral law is possible
3) Therefore, there must be God

 

[BrianLanier]

Craig on Objective Moral Values and the Existence of God

His argument (as I see it) goes like this:

It is a basic deductive argument for the existence of God. It goes something like this:

(1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.

(2) Objective moral values do exist.

So,

(3) God exists.

Or formally,

Let 'G' stand for 'God exists', and 'M' stand for 'objective moral values exist', and where '>' represents the 'horsehorse' connective, so that

~G > ~M

M / :. G

-------------

(1) ~G > ~ M (premise)

(2) ~~M (premise)

(3) M (from 2, Double Negation)

(4) ~~G (from 1,2, Modus Tollens)

(5) G (from 4, Double Negation)

Q.E.D.

Sounds similar to saying:

(1) If God does not exist then the existence of objective moral values is impossible,

but

(2) the existence of objective moral values is possible (and actual!)

so that

(3) Therefore God exists.

 

[MW]

I would have thought a moral argument went something like this:
If good, then best;
good exists:
therefore best.
At which point God is brought in as the summum bonum.

On the other hand a transcendental argument raises the unique question as to whether good exists in a world where God doesn't. I think the presupposition is different, and that therefore makes them different types of arguments, even though one might be able to play with the symbols to make them look the same logically.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

The funny thing is, without reading Brian's post I was about to post Craig's argument from Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, which is the same argument Brian posted.

The argument I used was taken from John Depoe's page on Arguments from Morality for the Existence of God: Arguments from Morality for the Existence of God

I guess that specific formulation came from Mere Christianity.

 

[cih1355]

Can someone explain how the fact that the mind is not made of matter makes sense only in the Christian worldview?