RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
Alston, William P. Cornell University Press.
Alston gives a bold and somewhat convincing argument for religious experience as a source of belief and knowledge. In doing so, he surveys the current crisis and options in epistemology. He notes that modern epistemology cannot give noncircular defenses for the most basic accounts of knowledge and that religious experience (or Christian Mystical Perception, CP/M beliefs) are far less problematic in terms of epistemic justification.
Thesis: “The chief aim of this book is to defend the view that putative direct awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of beliefs about God” (Alston 9). Ironically, discussing religious perception raises questions about sense perception (SP). Therefore, Alston gives us his Theory of appearing: the notion of X’s appearing to S as so-and so is fundamental and unanalyzable (55). For S to perceive X is simply for X to appear to S as so-and-so. Applied to religious experience, this means:
*Is it possible that “God” should be appearing to S in y experience?
**Is it possible that God should figure in causation in that experience in such a way as to count as what is perceived?
***Is it possible that that experience should give rise to beliefs about God?
Alston then takes a brief detour to give an account of current epistemology. This is where the true "money" of the book is. I have some doubts as to how far his M-belief justification can be taken. But the book is worth it in terms of his Reidian epistemology.
Doxastic practices:
The problem of criterion and regress will face every scheme (146-147). However, we seek the justification of beliefs on adequate grounds. These ground are certain doxastic practices (belief-forming practices).
Enter Thomas Reid,
“
The Nature of Doxastic Practices
practice: a system or constellation of dispositions, habits, or “mechanisms” which yields a belief as “output” (153).
summary of argument so far: Since a doxastic practice is essentially the exercise of a family of belief-forming mechanisms, the unity of a doxastic practice is most centrally a function of important similarities in the constiutent mechanisms. And since a belief-forming mechanism is simply the realization of an input-output function, the unity of a doxastic practice most basically consists in important similarities in input, in output, and in the function connecting the two (165).
Evaluation and Conclusion:
Some of this book is dated. It appeared before Plantinga's celebrated trilogy. Further, Alston appears a bit trusting on the validity of other religious perception/traditions. Of course, he can always say those traditions are subject to "overriders" (what Plantinga calls "defeaters"). And that's a fair point. I have no problem in saying the Catholic or the Buddhist is prima-facie justified in believing he/she has a real religious experience. I say "prima-facie" justified. This is before we bring in defeaters. Of course, the Protestant Christian position is also subject to defeaters. Fair enough. I think there are defeaters to those defeaters, so I am not too worried.
The book was mostly excellent. The conclusions kind of spun out of control at the end.
Alston gives a bold and somewhat convincing argument for religious experience as a source of belief and knowledge. In doing so, he surveys the current crisis and options in epistemology. He notes that modern epistemology cannot give noncircular defenses for the most basic accounts of knowledge and that religious experience (or Christian Mystical Perception, CP/M beliefs) are far less problematic in terms of epistemic justification.
Thesis: “The chief aim of this book is to defend the view that putative direct awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of beliefs about God” (Alston 9). Ironically, discussing religious perception raises questions about sense perception (SP). Therefore, Alston gives us his Theory of appearing: the notion of X’s appearing to S as so-and so is fundamental and unanalyzable (55). For S to perceive X is simply for X to appear to S as so-and-so. Applied to religious experience, this means:
*Is it possible that “God” should be appearing to S in y experience?
**Is it possible that God should figure in causation in that experience in such a way as to count as what is perceived?
***Is it possible that that experience should give rise to beliefs about God?
Alston then takes a brief detour to give an account of current epistemology. This is where the true "money" of the book is. I have some doubts as to how far his M-belief justification can be taken. But the book is worth it in terms of his Reidian epistemology.
Doxastic practices:
The problem of criterion and regress will face every scheme (146-147). However, we seek the justification of beliefs on adequate grounds. These ground are certain doxastic practices (belief-forming practices).
Enter Thomas Reid,
“
I am very impressed with Alston on this section. I had feared that his previous argument: SP-beliefs are warranted because they take place within doxastic practices” would lead to a kind of coherentism. Alston is aware of this problem, but counters it by saying we have a “negative coherentism with regard to doxastic practices, but not with regard to our beliefs” (152-154).
The Nature of Doxastic Practices
practice: a system or constellation of dispositions, habits, or “mechanisms” which yields a belief as “output” (153).
summary of argument so far: Since a doxastic practice is essentially the exercise of a family of belief-forming mechanisms, the unity of a doxastic practice is most centrally a function of important similarities in the constiutent mechanisms. And since a belief-forming mechanism is simply the realization of an input-output function, the unity of a doxastic practice most basically consists in important similarities in input, in output, and in the function connecting the two (165).
Evaluation and Conclusion:
Some of this book is dated. It appeared before Plantinga's celebrated trilogy. Further, Alston appears a bit trusting on the validity of other religious perception/traditions. Of course, he can always say those traditions are subject to "overriders" (what Plantinga calls "defeaters"). And that's a fair point. I have no problem in saying the Catholic or the Buddhist is prima-facie justified in believing he/she has a real religious experience. I say "prima-facie" justified. This is before we bring in defeaters. Of course, the Protestant Christian position is also subject to defeaters. Fair enough. I think there are defeaters to those defeaters, so I am not too worried.
The book was mostly excellent. The conclusions kind of spun out of control at the end.
