On the Soul (Aristotle)

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RamistThomist

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Main idea: the soul is the animating principle of life.

The value in this book is its providing the grammar for almost all future discussions on the soul. On the other hand, Aristotle gets in over his head when he tries to apply his insights to the physical world. (That probably sums up everything he wrote).

He defines the soul as “the whatness of the body.” The body, having matter, and hence potentiality, cannot be the actualizing principle.

He has a very interesting assertion that the faculties of the soul in its knowing are potentially identifiable with the objects of knowledge (432b). This seems odd. If I think about a tree, my mind isn’t identical with the tree. I think something else is going on, though. I think he clarifies his position to mean that my mind is identical with the form of the object. That might work. And if applied to Christian theology, this prevents the logical move to pantheism (Since God knows all things, and I am an object of his knowledge, that would make me identical with God. Obviously, that isn’t the case).
 
my mind is identical with the form of the object.
What is the difference between saying that God's knowledge/mind is identical to the form of man and saying that universals exist in the mind of God?
I've been thinking on the last paragraph since yesterday and I'm struggling to put my question into the proper words.
 
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What is the difference between saying that God's knowledge/mind is identical to the form of man and saying that universals exist in the mind of God?
I've been thinking on the last paragraph since yesterday and I'm struggling to put my question into the proper words.

The answer, such as I understand it, is that the mind abstracts the form from the object. I don't know how it relates to universals in God's mind. I suspect Aristotle wouldn't have been bothered by that.
 
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