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Puritanboard Clerk
Cicero, On Academic Skepticism. Ed. Charles Brittain. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2006.
Skepticism is a word with an unfortunate history. It appears that it takes on a new nuance in each age of philosophy. Rarely are these nuances seen as positive. Today’s skeptic is taken as one who doubts anything is true. Descartes’ skepticism began with radical doubt. Cicero’s, by contrast, is not one of radical doubt, but suspension of judgment. That is important to keep in mind, since Cicero is not always clear on what he is suspending judgment.
This collection of texts, taken primarily from Cicero’s Luculla, is edited by Charles Brittain. He has a thorough introduction (at times too thorough), but his footnotes provide a crash course in post-Platonic Roman philosophy. Cicero’s interlocutor, Lucullus, is a Stoic. The broader nuances of Stoicism are not relevant to this text. Key to the discussion is the Stoic epistemology. In short, and this can only be so brief, the Stoic says the mind receives external impressions. These impressions are then molded onto the mind. In response, the mind “grasps” these impressions.
The mind has a natural power that is directed at things. It seizes on a primary impression, subordinating and organizing other impressions in the memory. This conception of things is an ennoai kai prolepsis (Luc. 2.29). It seems that Cicero does not actually disagree with the Stoic view so far. The problem arises in another Stoic claim: each thing has a distinguishing marker that allows us to identify a thing as this and not that.
In response, and in anticipation of modern philosophical challenges, Cicero says the view breaks down when faced with numerous analytical challenges. His argument is thus:
(4) is the problematic premise. Cicero says that for any true impression, it will have a mirror impression identical with it and for that reason indistinguishable from it. And if that is the case, then the two things are identical. In order for (4) to work, he needs one more premise:
The dialogue then descends into the standard philosophical dialogue: both sides attack extreme versions of the position which the other does not hold. Lucullus says Cicero holds to radical skepticism: if sense impressions are not reliable, then on what grounds does Cicero trust his senses to even have this discussion? In response, Cicero maintains that Lucullus cannot answer the famous “bent oar in the water” situation.
Who won the debate? It is hard to say. The Stoic epistemology seems right, and there might be some evidence that Cicero agrees with a large part of it. On the other hand, the Stoics are not clear on what the distinguishing criterion is. Not surprisingly, that might explain the ambiguity of Cicero’s (4). It does not seem true that there are no true impressions that do not have a mirror impression. At best, all that Cicero can say is that there are some impressions that have a mirror impression, which leads him to a much more modest conclusion:
Cicero seems to agree with the Stoics that there are “persuasive impressions.” He just denies that the act of apprehension is infallible. As a result, a Ciceronian skeptic does not doubt; rather, he suspends judgment.
Conclusion
The dialogue is often frustrating and is probably not the best place to start with Cicero. The Stoics should not claim that all sense impressions are accurate (and to be fair, they might not actually claim that). Moreover, Alvin Plantinga’s work on “proper function” (i.e., my cognitive faculties are functioning and are in a normal environment; cf. Warrant and Proper Function) answers many of Cicero’s objections.
Skepticism is a word with an unfortunate history. It appears that it takes on a new nuance in each age of philosophy. Rarely are these nuances seen as positive. Today’s skeptic is taken as one who doubts anything is true. Descartes’ skepticism began with radical doubt. Cicero’s, by contrast, is not one of radical doubt, but suspension of judgment. That is important to keep in mind, since Cicero is not always clear on what he is suspending judgment.
This collection of texts, taken primarily from Cicero’s Luculla, is edited by Charles Brittain. He has a thorough introduction (at times too thorough), but his footnotes provide a crash course in post-Platonic Roman philosophy. Cicero’s interlocutor, Lucullus, is a Stoic. The broader nuances of Stoicism are not relevant to this text. Key to the discussion is the Stoic epistemology. In short, and this can only be so brief, the Stoic says the mind receives external impressions. These impressions are then molded onto the mind. In response, the mind “grasps” these impressions.
The mind has a natural power that is directed at things. It seizes on a primary impression, subordinating and organizing other impressions in the memory. This conception of things is an ennoai kai prolepsis (Luc. 2.29). It seems that Cicero does not actually disagree with the Stoic view so far. The problem arises in another Stoic claim: each thing has a distinguishing marker that allows us to identify a thing as this and not that.
In response, and in anticipation of modern philosophical challenges, Cicero says the view breaks down when faced with numerous analytical challenges. His argument is thus:
- There are some false impressions;
- Those impressions are not apprehensible;
- When two impressions do not differ at all, it is not possible that one is apprehensible and one is not.
- There are no true impressions derived from the senses that may not be paired with another impression that does not differ from it at all but is not apprehensible.
(4) is the problematic premise. Cicero says that for any true impression, it will have a mirror impression identical with it and for that reason indistinguishable from it. And if that is the case, then the two things are identical. In order for (4) to work, he needs one more premise:
- There is no such distinguishing criterion.
The dialogue then descends into the standard philosophical dialogue: both sides attack extreme versions of the position which the other does not hold. Lucullus says Cicero holds to radical skepticism: if sense impressions are not reliable, then on what grounds does Cicero trust his senses to even have this discussion? In response, Cicero maintains that Lucullus cannot answer the famous “bent oar in the water” situation.
Who won the debate? It is hard to say. The Stoic epistemology seems right, and there might be some evidence that Cicero agrees with a large part of it. On the other hand, the Stoics are not clear on what the distinguishing criterion is. Not surprisingly, that might explain the ambiguity of Cicero’s (4). It does not seem true that there are no true impressions that do not have a mirror impression. At best, all that Cicero can say is that there are some impressions that have a mirror impression, which leads him to a much more modest conclusion:
- There are some impressions that cannot be separated from other impressions (cf. Roderick Chisholm’s On Metaphysics for several examples).
Cicero seems to agree with the Stoics that there are “persuasive impressions.” He just denies that the act of apprehension is infallible. As a result, a Ciceronian skeptic does not doubt; rather, he suspends judgment.
Conclusion
The dialogue is often frustrating and is probably not the best place to start with Cicero. The Stoics should not claim that all sense impressions are accurate (and to be fair, they might not actually claim that). Moreover, Alvin Plantinga’s work on “proper function” (i.e., my cognitive faculties are functioning and are in a normal environment; cf. Warrant and Proper Function) answers many of Cicero’s objections.
