Neo-Orthodoxy Pt1 R.C. Sproul

[OPC'n]

Sarah, I will now bow out of this discussion, lest I become too much more of a broken record. We do not speak of mysticism in any way. Rather, the attributes are analogously reflected in us as accidents, attributed to us by that (analogous) similitude based upon the like effects produced. I'm sure Mr. Sproul would affirm this as well, as it is basic Reformed teaching.

Have a blessed Sabbath.

Umm, yes, actually you did sound like a broken record but only in that you continued to give me quotes and use sentences that I don't believe come from your own thought process on this subject.... just like the one above... bc the sentences contain a language structure and words that are foreign to your normal speech pattern and are completely "Turretinian" sounding. I think if you have really thought this through and thoroughly understand it, you would be able to use today's language to not only interpret what Turretin states but also explain this doctrine (to which you say all reformers hold yet it's completely new to me) in a meaningful way. We are going around in circles bc you've explained nothing only quoted Turretin and whoever AND have given little to no Scriptural support although I did ask for some. Now I'm not saying this to be mean, I'm just trying to make a point that you have not made your case or at least explained your case in any educative manner. In any case, this has little to do with the OP. You have a good Sabbath too!

 

[Prufrock]

I'm sorry I was not more helpful; but, for the record, the above was not a quote of anything: that was my sincere attempt at explaining as clearly as possible in my own speech patterns; however, I suppose that I am not surprised if, when attempting to explain something, my thought patterns tend to bear resemblance to those from whom I have learned. Most of my interaction here is probably done in a more "vocal," conversational style; at times, I suppose I slip into a written style. If you would, indeed, still like to have a discussion of the Reformed understanding of analogy and communication sometime in the next week, I'd be more than glad to participate in a new thread.

Either way, lest this thread interfere with anyone's Sabbath tomorrow, I am going to shut this one down until after Sunday.

 

[py3ak]

I've tried to understand this and I do in a very small way but not unto being educated. What I get from this is that God's attributes are His alone bc they are who He is, thus He is the source and He relies on nothing for Him to be His attributes. And that the creatures have them in some abstract way (some Scripture to support this would be helpful) but only as something added to the creature accidentally by God. He MUST define "accidentally" differently than how we now define it. Nothing happens outside of God's control by accident.

Yes, you are right that Turretin is using "accidentally" in a different way. If I can expand on Paul's excellently concise clarification, he doesn't mean something that happens by chance, but is contrasting something that is accidental with something that is essential. For instance, if a man goes bald, he is still a man, because hair is accidental to humanity; but if he were somehow deprived of his soul he would cease to be human, because it is of the essence of man to have a reasonable soul.

I'm not sure what you mean by creatures having God's attributes in some abstract way, so I'm not sure I can produce Scripture to support that point. Sticking with an example that's already been used, if Solomon is given wisdom by God, how can we say that God only is wise? I think the answer has to be that Solomon's wisdom isn't the same as God's, but is called wisdom because it bears some resemblance on a human level to what we call God's wisdom (which is God Himself being wise, because He is His attributes).

 

[MW]

Do you suggest taking Barth by his denial of Natural Revelation, not taking

Romans 1:18-21 seriously?

Certainly I would find fault with Barth on natural revelation, but I would find fault with his whole conception of revelation. He not only said God is wholly other, but so wholly other as to negate the reality of a revelation that is cognitive. This is the basic problem with neo-orthodoxy.

 

[MW]

If not, then please define, simply and completely, what is meant by "true". (I have always through of "true" meaning in concert with the nature and character of God; the opposite of false; what is, and not what is not.)

Truth is that which is according to fact. As reformed believers we receive our facts from God. They do not depend on the competency of our minds to validate them, but on the trustworthiness of God in revealing them. It is enough to know that God has spoken and God never lies. We do not need to know God as He is in Himself, nor could we survive it.

Let's use an illustration -- a heart surgeon and his patient. The surgeon has condescended to explain things in non-specialist terms. The patient knows what is going to happen to him insofar as the surgeon has explained it, but he does not know with the surgeon's specialist understanding.

 

[dr_parsley]

Do you suggest taking Barth by his denial of Natural Revelation, not taking

Romans 1:18-21 seriously?

Certainly I would find fault with Barth on natural revelation, but I would find fault with his whole conception of revelation. He not only said God is wholly other, but so wholly other as to negate the reality of a revelation that is cognitive. This is the basic problem with neo-orthodoxy.

At the risk of merging two threads, how can revelation be at the same time cognitive and non-propositional? I'm open to education, but at the moment I can only guess that to hold to that position you must have a definition of one or both of those things that is rather limited.

 

[MW]

At the risk of merging two threads, how can revelation be at the same time cognitive and non-propositional? I'm open to education, but at the moment I can only guess that to hold to that position you must have a definition of one or both of those things that is rather limited.

Think about the saying, "I don't know what the future holds, but I know who holds the future." We can conceive of eternity or infinity as a thought; but we know more than that when we know the God who is eternal and infinite.

 

[dr_parsley]

At the risk of merging two threads, how can revelation be at the same time cognitive and non-propositional? I'm open to education, but at the moment I can only guess that to hold to that position you must have a definition of one or both of those things that is rather limited.

Think about the saying, "I don't know what the future holds, but I know who holds the future." We can conceive of eternity or infinity as a thought; but we know more than that when we know the God who is eternal and infinite.

Hmm. I think I see what you're driving at. I was first trained as a Number Theorist, so my mind sees the word 'proposition' a bit differently to the standard dictionary definition! I would see "infinity" as a proposition itself and truths about infinity as proveable propositions. According to Gödel's theorem there are always unproveable true propositions and (not according to Gödel) amongst them are some of those that God proves in our hearts.

 

[discipulo]

I’ve been reading this thread with great interest, in spite of feeling the waters deeper than my grasp.

So I was trying to read a bit more to understand and I came across a very interesting mention.

Richard Muller’s PRRD, vol 3, the Divine Essence and Atributes, page 134

Many of the Orthodox Theologians, perhaps most notably Mastricht and Brakel, insist on relating each doctrinal point to the Christian life:
Discussions on the Divine Essence, Simplicity, Eternity, Immutability, and so forth, are not merely abstract doctrinal expositions, but each offers an approach for piety to the God of Salvation

I think it is a wise direction to keep in mind, as God’s Revelation is centred on Redemption and given throughout Redemptive History.

His condescension and grace towards His human creatures is relational and covenantal.

 

[OPC'n]

Do you suggest taking Barth by his denial of Natural Revelation, not taking

Romans 1:18-21 seriously?

Certainly I would find fault with Barth on natural revelation, but I would find fault with his whole conception of revelation. He not only said God is wholly other, but so wholly other as to negate the reality of a revelation that is cognitive. This is the basic problem with neo-orthodoxy.

Did you listen to Sproul's teaching on this? This is what I've been trying to tell you. To say that God is wholly other "is to negate the reality of a revelation that is cognitive". God would have been unable to tell us anything about Himself in a human cognitive manner. "So wholly other" is no different than "wholly other". If something is wholly, then it is complete. Placing the word "so" in front of it doesn't make it more whole. That is why the terms "wholly other" and "other" are used.....there is a difference between the two but no difference between "so wholly other" and "wholly other". Barth was the one who came up with the doctrine of "wholly other" and gave to it the definition that you give to "so wholly other".... possibly a term that you made up to replace "wholly other"? In the end:

Your terms: "so wholly other" and "wholly other" = the same thing which "is to negate the reality of a revelation that is cognitive" to mankind.

Sproul's terms: "wholly other" = "is to negate the reality of a revelation that is cognitive" to mankind and "other"= God being able to tell us something about Himself so that the revelation He has given to us is cognitive to mankind.

There's obviously more to this in Sproul's sermon but I'm wondering if you have listened to it yet?

 

[MW]

There's obviously more to this in Sproul's sermon but I'm wondering if you have listened to it yet?

Yes, I had some time yesterday to listen. Sproul certainly takes Barth to task for teaching God is wholly other. But in the process he affirms that God's being is "above and beyond" us. In the final analysis, it is not Barth's teaching of the wholly other which is criticised, but Barth's denial of the analogy of being. In other words, Barth so stresses God's transcendence as to deny an essential component of His immanence; and it is the denial of this component which makes cognitive revelation impossible.

My response is simply this -- God is so wholly other and such true being as to be able to fill all things and communicate with all being. While God is immense, and beyond the limits of time, space, and motion, He is also presence, and fills the limits of time, space, and motion.

 

[MW]

Richard Muller’s PRRD, vol 3, the Divine Essence and Atributes, page 134

Many of the Orthodox Theologians, perhaps most notably Mastricht and Brakel, insist on relating each doctrinal point to the Christian life:
Discussions on the Divine Essence, Simplicity, Eternity, Immutability, and so forth, are not merely abstract doctrinal expositions, but each offers an approach for piety to the God of Salvation

Excellent reference. Divinity is the science of living to God blessedly.

 

[DMcFadden]

I think that the discussion has gotten a bit off track and hung up on the reason for Sproul protesting the "totaliter aliter" notion. His point is not to deny the otherness of God or to critique the confession. Rather, he is pointing to the phrase used as a philosophical justification given by "neo-orthodox" theologians for objecting to affirmations of the objectivity of revelation and to propositional expressions of truth. In this sense, he is operating in the same venue as Carl F.H. Henry who made similar comments:

Kierkegaard’s driving antirationalism even requires that God be “wholly other” and “absolutely unlike” man (Philosophical Fragments, p. 37). Since the total otherness of God in Kierkegaard’s view is deliberately intended to affirm God’s complete unlikeness to any qualities predictable of humanity, he seems to disallow every scriptural affirmation about God including the declaration that God is our Father. The outcome of such theological negation can only be not simply the total otherness of God but his complete unknowability.

Voicing the possibility that man’s nature does involve a religious a priori (Kierkegaard discarded this possibility), Rudolf Otto referred spiritual experience not to a rational a priori, but to irrational intuition. Man has a nonrational capacity, says Otto, for intuitively feeling the presence of a transcendent, mysterious, “wholly other” reality: a mysterium tremendum et fascinosum (cf. Das Heilige). Otto’s view could not resist the rising tide of dialectical and existential theology that inundated Europe after World War I because like it he also minimized the rational aspects of the imago Dei in man and basically identified religious experience as mystery. Commenting on Otto’s premise that the religious reality is thus “wholly other,” Macintosh observes that the Divine may therefore be defined “only in negative terms, and it tends to become an object of superstitious dread, divested of all ideal spiritual qualities” (The Problem of Religious Knowledge, p. 302).

Henry, C. F. H. (1999). God, revelation, and authority. Originally published: Waco, Tex. : Word Books, c1976-c1983. (5:364). Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books.

Even neo-Protestantism, by its warped emphasis on universal and/or special revelation, vulnerably compressed discussion of transcendent deity; its dialectical and existential theology promulgated a “wholly Other” said to be known in inner volitional response and not in revealed and sharable propositional truths. Divine disclosure, it was alleged, conveys no objectively valid information about God’s nature and operations, but functions, rather, to arouse spiritual response and to evoke a right attitude of obedience. The suppression of rational revelational content fostered noncognitive relationships between man and the transcendent that could grant only symbolic value to the affirmations of orthodox theism.

Henry, C. F. H. (1999). God, revelation, and authority. Originally published: Waco, Tex. : Word Books, c1976-c1983. (6:40). Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books.

As used by the likes of the existential theologians, calling God "totally other" was their cipher for saying that we can have no bridge to God other than a post-Kantian, existential, apprehension of the noumenal. All Sproul is saying is that this is a misrepresentation of Christian teaching. Frankly, I'm with R.C. Sproul and most evangelical critics of 20th century theologians. You can't believe in inerrancy and follow the road of Barth and gang.

Sproul describes himself in his own words:

It has become fashionable in our day to speak of God as being “wholly other.” This phrase was coined to safeguard the transcendence of God against all forms of pantheism that seek to identify God with or contain him within the universe. If taken literally, however, the term “wholly other” would be fatal to Christianity. If there is no sense in which God and man are similar, if there is no analogy of being between God and man, then there is no common basis for communication between us. Utterly dissimilar beings have no way of discourse between them.
Sproul, R. (2000, c1997). Grace unknown : The heart of reformed theology (34). Grand Rapids: Baker Books.

 

[MW]

Sproul describes himself in his own words:

It has become fashionable in our day to speak of God as being “wholly other.” This phrase was coined to safeguard the transcendence of God against all forms of pantheism that seek to identify God with or contain him within the universe. If taken literally, however, the term “wholly other” would be fatal to Christianity. If there is no sense in which God and man are similar, if there is no analogy of being between God and man, then there is no common basis for communication between us. Utterly dissimilar beings have no way of discourse between them.
Sproul, R. (2000, c1997). Grace unknown : The heart of reformed theology (34). Grand Rapids: Baker Books.

The problem with denying the "wholly other" and affirming a "common basis for communication" in the very order of being is that it identifies the "being" of God with the "becoming" of this world. At the point at which Sproul calls the "analogy of being" a "common basis" he has actually repudiated the "analogy of being" and substituted it with a "commonality of being." As stated in my first post, the answer is to be found in the condescending nature of God's revelation -- this is what makes communication a reality, and such a reality as ensures God is the revealer and man is the receiver.

 

[MW]

Hmm. I think I see what you're driving at. I was first trained as a Number Theorist, so my mind sees the word 'proposition' a bit differently to the standard dictionary definition! I would see "infinity" as a proposition itself and truths about infinity as proveable propositions. According to Gödel's theorem there are always unproveable true propositions and (not according to Gödel) amongst them are some of those that God proves in our hearts.

OK. So in this scheme would the "unknown" be like a dark hole in the universe rather than that which exceeds the limits of the universe?

I think this idea would fall to the ground after a process of explaining propositions brought us to the conclusion that man reasons in a circle.

 

[py3ak]

At the point at which Sproul calls the "analogy of being" a "common basis" he has actually repudiated the "analogy of being" and substituted it with a "commonality of being."

Do you have any recommendations for reading on the analogy of being?

 

[DMcFadden]

Muller has an interesting definition in his dictionary that throws some light on the discussion, including why a rationalististic Sproul would become so exercised with Barth.

analogia entis: the analogy of being; specifically, the assumption of an analogia (q.v.), or likeness, between finite and infinite being which lies at the basis of the a posteriori (q.v.) proofs of the existence of God and at the heart of the discussion of attributa divina (q.v.). The analogia entis is associated with the Thomist, as distinct from Scotist and nominalist, school in medieval and subsequent theology and philosophy. Since the proofs of God’s existence play only a minor role in the Protestant scholastic systems and, when stated, are usually expressed informally and seldom at any length, the analogia entis receives little emphasis among the Protestant scholastics. Beyond this, the Protestant scholastic statement of fundamental principles (principia theologiae, q.v.), critical of the pure Thomistic approach of the Middle Ages and quite sensitive to the separation of reason and revelation argued by Scotism, recognizes the inability of theology to rest its arguments on a principle of analogy between Creator and creature and, instead, tends to argue the use of ideas and terms on the basis of scriptural revelation. This tendency coheres with the Protestant scholastic view of the use of philosophy (See usus philosophiae).

Muller, R. A. (1985). Dictionary of Latin and Greek theological terms : Drawn principally from Protestant scholastic theology. Includes index. (32). Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House.

 

[Brian Withnell]

Is the truthfulness of a glorified saint totally and completely different from truth which is God?

Yes. It does not make the saints liars because the truth they believe is that which is condescendingly revealed by God. It contains all the qualities of truth that creaturely limitation requires.

1) I would think that if something is true (objectively true) then it is a reflection of God (who is truth itself). So if a creature is truthful, then to the extent of the creatures truthfulness, the creature is reflecting the character of God (there is no truth outside God). Do you agree?

2) In your statement "is condescendingly revealed by God" has, from my argument, no relevance to the issue ... if it is true condescendingly revealed, it is still true absolutely (otherwise even what is revealed is not infallible, and the Bible itself is not truly true). If a person quotes the scripture, they are speaking the Word of God ... they are speaking truth, regardless of source, and so are in that quotation speaking in concert with what God has already said. They reflect the truth of God in doing so, imperfectly, but still reflective (and with the condescension of God in revealing that truth in the first place). If man does speak truth ... then does it really and truly reflect God?

3) Without use of terms of art (please no undefined jargon) what does "in our image and in our likeness" (Gen 1) mean if we are "wholly other" in a real sense (please, if you insist on using "analogy of being" or other jargon, explain the terms in plain English as to what it does and does not mean).

I would like to understand what you are trying to say ... but I really need more than a two sentence reply or quotes from books and tomes that I do not own. I'm looking for a clear statement in modern English that is complete in itself without the use of jargon -- which I think would communicate more quickly in any case.

I know I'm asking a lot, but I think it would go a long way toward not only my understanding what you mean, but everyone else understanding as well.

 

[dr_parsley]

Maybe I'm a simple man, but God is not wholly other if Jesus Christ is wholly God. That is wholly the point.

When we reach the point of 'wholly other' it is one of those places where philosophy needs to admit its inadequacy and revelation take over because we have a God who became manifest in the flesh. Going the other way, we know we can "become partakers of the divine nature" and "we shall be like him". It seems clear that, despite philosophy, God can do this thing.

Conclusion: God is not bound by the simplistic logic that governs philosophy.

 

[MW]

1) I would think that if something is true (objectively true) then it is a reflection of God (who is truth itself). So if a creature is truthful, then to the extent of the creatures truthfulness, the creature is reflecting the character of God (there is no truth outside God). Do you agree?

Certainly.

2) In your statement "is condescendingly revealed by God" has, from my argument, no relevance to the issue ... if it is true condescendingly revealed, it is still true absolutely (otherwise even what is revealed is not infallible, and the Bible itself is not truly true). If a person quotes the scripture, they are speaking the Word of God ... they are speaking truth, regardless of source, and so are in that quotation speaking in concert with what God has already said. They reflect the truth of God in doing so, imperfectly, but still reflective (and with the condescension of God in revealing that truth in the first place). If man does speak truth ... then does it really and truly reflect God?

Yes, it really and truly reflects God "as He has revealed Himself." Where you say, "it is still true absolutely," I would need to know what is meant by "absolutely." Does it mean the quality of truth is absolute? No doubt it is. But if it means man now knows absolutely, I cannot concur, for all our knowledge is based on God's self-revelation and is therefore relational.

3) Without use of terms of art (please no undefined jargon) what does "in our image and in our likeness" (Gen 1) mean if we are "wholly other" in a real sense (please, if you insist on using "analogy of being" or other jargon, explain the terms in plain English as to what it does and does not mean).

An essentially different order of being might reflect the qualities of its Maker. The heavens declare the glory of God. It only needs to be kept in mind that the creature possesses created qualities. Hence man exhibits the qualities of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, but does so according to his created capacity.

I would like to understand what you are trying to say ... but I really need more than a two sentence reply or quotes from books and tomes that I do not own. I'm looking for a clear statement in modern English that is complete in itself without the use of jargon -- which I think would communicate more quickly in any case.

You are a hard taskmaster.

God is immense. His immensity in relation to space is called infinitude; in relation to time, eternity; in relation to motion, unchangeability. Whatever kind of being man is, he is bound within the limits of space, time, and motion. God, however, both fills all space, time, and motion (immanence), and exceeds the limits of these (transcendence). God is wholly unlike man. When man defines God he does so by excluding all the imperfections of creaturehood from his definition. Hence man defines God more in terms of what God is not rather than what He is. Man does not even know what space, time, and motion is, so he must have no ability to understand what it means to exceed the limits of these. Man can only know anything about God because God is pleased to reveal Himself to man in a manner which can be grasped by human capacity. What man knows is the accommodated truth of God, not the truth of God as He is in Himself.

Please understand that this is not a treatise on the subject; so any critique should bear in mind the summary nature of the statement and the "limitations of space."

 

[MW]

Maybe I'm a simple man, but God is not wholly other if Jesus Christ is wholly God. That is wholly the point.

Cur Deus homo?

 

[dr_parsley]

Maybe I'm a simple man, but God is not wholly other if Jesus Christ is wholly God. That is wholly the point.

Cur Deus homo?

Is est mysterium.

 

[MW]

Do you have any recommendations for reading on the analogy of being?

Not one individual source; but a good start would be Van Til's essay on Nature and Scripture in "The Infallible Word." Pp. 279-285 deal with Aquinas and analogy of being.

 

[Brian Withnell]

1) I would think that if something is true (objectively true) then it is a reflection of God (who is truth itself). So if a creature is truthful, then to the extent of the creatures truthfulness, the creature is reflecting the character of God (there is no truth outside God). Do you agree?

Certainly.

Thank you.

2) In your statement "is condescendingly revealed by God" has, from my argument, no relevance to the issue ... if it is true condescendingly revealed, it is still true absolutely (otherwise even what is revealed is not infallible, and the Bible itself is not truly true). If a person quotes the scripture, they are speaking the Word of God ... they are speaking truth, regardless of source, and so are in that quotation speaking in concert with what God has already said. They reflect the truth of God in doing so, imperfectly, but still reflective (and with the condescension of God in revealing that truth in the first place). If man does speak truth ... then does it really and truly reflect God?

Yes, it really and truly reflects God "as He has revealed Himself." Where you say, "it is still true absolutely," I would need to know what is meant by "absolutely." Does it mean the quality of truth is absolute? No doubt it is. But if it means man now knows absolutely, I cannot concur, for all our knowledge is based on God's self-revelation and is therefore relational.

But does not God bind himself, because it is impossible for God to lie, so therefore whatever God has revealed, condescendingly, God is bound by it for he himself is truth? At the point of God's speaking to man, is not his truth bound forever in revelation? We know absolutely -- in the sense of it is axiomatic (a priori) that God is in truth true. Unless we are "in violent agreement" because of the way the semantics are changing here ... I see you might be saying that what we know is absolute truth is not knowledge that we ourselves can fathom for ourselves ... that I agree 100% upon and always have.

3) Without use of terms of art (please no undefined jargon) what does "in our image and in our likeness" (Gen 1) mean if we are "wholly other" in a real sense (please, if you insist on using "analogy of being" or other jargon, explain the terms in plain English as to what it does and does not mean).

An essentially different order of being might reflect the qualities of its Maker. The heavens declare the glory of God. It only needs to be kept in mind that the creature possesses created qualities. Hence man exhibits the qualities of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, but does so according to his created capacity.

Okay, from what I can see you have stated very clearly the differences, but what similitude exists ("in our image" and "in our likeness" seem totally meaningless unless there is *some* kind of similitude.) Of course we are created beings, and God is creator (the essence is different, if for no other reason than he is necessarily self-existent and we are necessarily not self-existent.) That does not mean there is no similarity or the "image" would seem not only superfluous, but misleading and false. What is the similitude?

I would like to understand what you are trying to say ... but I really need more than a two sentence reply or quotes from books and tomes that I do not own. I'm looking for a clear statement in modern English that is complete in itself without the use of jargon -- which I think would communicate more quickly in any case.

You are a hard taskmaster.

Thank you! You are a gracious teacher to take up the task (but I think "pastor" means you have no choice but to follow the call of Christ ).

God is immense. His immensity in relation to space is called infinitude; in relation to time, eternity; in relation to motion, unchangeability. Whatever kind of being man is, he is bound within the limits of space, time, and motion. God, however, both fills all space, time, and motion (immanence), and exceeds the limits of these (transcendence). God is wholly unlike man. When man defines God he does so by excluding all the imperfections of creaturehood from his definition. Hence man defines God more in terms of what God is not rather than what He is. Man does not even know what space, time, and motion is, so he must have no ability to understand what it means to exceed the limits of these. Man can only know anything about God because God is pleased to reveal Himself to man in a manner which can be grasped by human capacity. What man knows is the accommodated truth of God, not the truth of God as He is in Himself.

Please understand that this is not a treatise on the subject; so any critique should bear in mind the summary nature of the statement and the "limitations of space."

I think that my objection is strictly with "wholly other". I fully agree with *everything* else in the paragraph above ... except that term. I would think that by God's condescension it is possible for God to have made man in a way that there is a common framework (not substance) by which God has revealed his immanence through to man in that man can sense that which God reveals. This is not to say that a man (or Man) can reach this on his own -- it still would mean that God would have to reveal, even as God has revealed and so the "cat is out of the bag" so to speak.

If God is immanent, then it would seem man could at least perceive what God has revealed in his immanence. (There is a possibility that God could even impart to man a dependent transcendance. Part of us that can exist outside this created frame ... though I see philosophical chicken and the egg problems with that--if a created being can be existent outside of the creation framework, then by being a creation, does that ipso facto, extend the creation framework? Not going there ... no way to answer it apart from philosophy, and taking about souls of men in heaven and the eternal state of the saints is beyond angels dancing on the head of a pin!)

It would seem the only difference we have is "wholly other" as a term, and I'm still not sure if I understand your use of that term. Does that make any sense?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Do you have any recommendations for reading on the analogy of being?

Not one individual source; but a good start would be Van Til's essay on Nature and Scripture in "The Infallible Word." Pp. 279-285 deal with Aquinas and analogy of being.

I read that book a few months ago and had to answer some questions that summarized the treatment of Van Til on Natural Revelation. I hope this proves useful:

Nature and Scripture

How is natural theology necessary?

Scripture does not claim to speak to man in any other way than in conjunction with nature. God's revelation of Himself in nature combined with His revelation of Himself in Scripture form God's one grand schem of covenant relationship of Himself with man. The two forms presuppose and complement one another.

It was necessary in the garden as the lower act of obedience learned from avoiding the tree of knowledge of good and evil man might learn the higher things of obedience to God. The natural appeared in the regularity of nature.
After the fall, the natural appears under to curse of God and not merely regular. God's curse on nature is revealed along with regularity. The natural reveals an unalleviated picture of folly and ruin and speaks to the need for a Redeemer.

To the believer the natural or regular with all its complexity always appears as the playground for the process of differentiation which leads ever onward to the fullness of the glory of God.

What is the authority of natural revelation?

The same God who reveals Himself in Scripture is the God who reveals Himself in nature. They are of the same authority even if the former is superior in clarity than the latter. We are analogues to God and our respect for revelation in both spheres must be maintained and it is only when we refuse to act as creatures that we contrast authority between natural and special revelation. What comes to man by his rational and moral nature (created in God's image) is no less objective than what comes to him through the created order as all is in Covenant relationship to God. All created activity is inherently revelational of the nature and will of God.

What is the sufficiency of natural revelation?

It is sufficient to leave men without excuse for their sin and denying the God they know they are created to worship but insufficient at revealing the grace of God in salvation. Natural revelation was never meant to function by itself (as above) but it was historically sufficient as it renders without excuse. God's revelation in nature is sufficient in history to differentiate between those who who would and who would not serve God.

What is meant by the perspicuity of natural revelation?

God's revelation in nature was always meant to serve alongside His special revelation. God is a revealing God and the perspicuity of nature is bound up in the fact that He voluntarily reveals. Both natural and special revelation would be impossible if God remained incomprehensible as He is in Himself (archetypal theology). Man cannot penetrate God as He is Himself - he cannot comprehend God. But created man may see clearly what is revealed clearly even if he does not see exhaustively. Man need not have exhaustive knowledge in order to know truly and certainly.

God's thoughts about Himself are self-contained but man is an analogue who thinks in covenant relation to the One who created him. Thus man's interpretation of nature follows what is fully interpreted by God. Man thinks God's thoughts after him - not comprehensively but analogically.
The Psalmist doesn't declare that the heavens possibly or probably declare the glory of God. Paul does not say that the wrath of God is probably revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. Scripture takes the clarity of God's revelation for granted at every stage of human history. The God who speaks in Scripture cannot refer to anything that is not already authoratively revelational of Himself for the evidence of His own existence. Everything exists that is His creation.

It is no easier for sinners to accept God in nature than it is for them to accept Him in Scripture. The two are inseparable in their clarity. We need the Holy Spirit to understand both. Man must be a Christian to study nature in a proper frame of mind.

How does Greek natural theology and the natural theology of Kant result in denying any rationality higher than itself?

Neither allow analogical reasoning to understand the world. They start from nature and try to argue for a god who must be finite in nature. It starts with a "mute" universe that has no revelation and makes it revelational only with respect to the autonomous mind of man. No distinction is made between Creator and creature.

Kant's great contribution to philosophy consisted in stressing the activity of the experiencing subject. It is this point to which the idea of a Copernican revolution is usually applied. Kant argued that since it is the thinking subject that itself contributes the categories of universality and necessity, we must not think of these as covering any reality that exists or may exist wholly independent of the human mind. The validity of universals is to be taken as frankly due to a motion and a vote; it is conventional and nothing more.
Plato and Aristotle, as well as Kant, assumed the autonomy of man. On such a basis man may reason univocally (have the same mind as God) and reach a God who is just an extension of the creature or he may reason equivocally and reach a God who has no contact with him at all. Man is left with either God being part of nature (pantheism) or being so transcendent that He cannot get into nature (deism).

We're now left with a world where the scientist supposedly interacts with the physical world and can learn about the world apart from any reference to God and "ministers" who speak about God's revelation that has no reference to history and interaction with the world. Man is fractured intellectually where reason deals with things of the world and faith deals with things that cannot affect reason or the world.

The very idea of Kant's Copernican revolution was that the autonomous mind itself must assume the responsibility for making all factual differentiation and logical validation. To such a mind the God of Christianity cannot speak. Such a mind will hear no voice but its own.

1 Stonehouse and Woolley, The Infallible Word, New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 1967, p 263.
2 Ibid, p 267.
3 Ibid, p 271.
4 Ibid, p 272.
5 Ibid, p 274
6 Ibid, p 275.
7 Ibid, p 276.
8 Ibid, p 278.
9 Ibid, p 278.
10 Ibid, p 279.
11 Ibid, p 296.
12 Ibid, p 297.
13 Ibid, p 298.

 

[MW]

But does not God bind himself, because it is impossible for God to lie, so therefore whatever God has revealed, condescendingly, God is bound by it for he himself is truth? At the point of God's speaking to man, is not his truth bound forever in revelation? We know absolutely -- in the sense of it is axiomatic (a priori) that God is in truth true. Unless we are "in violent agreement" because of the way the semantics are changing here ... I see you might be saying that what we know is absolute truth is not knowledge that we ourselves can fathom for ourselves ... that I agree 100% upon and always have.

Yes, certainly God's truth accommodated to human capacity is a truth to which He has bound Himself -- blessed assurance! As long as the terms, "condescended," "accommodated" are properly accounted for then I don't think there is any problem with saying God is bound to it, whatever words one chooses to use.

Okay, from what I can see you have stated very clearly the differences, but what similitude exists ("in our image" and "in our likeness" seem totally meaningless unless there is *some* kind of similitude.) Of course we are created beings, and God is creator (the essence is different, if for no other reason than he is necessarily self-existent and we are necessarily not self-existent.) That does not mean there is no similarity or the "image" would seem not only superfluous, but misleading and false. What is the similitude?

Does the similitude have to be ontological in order to pay full respect to the idea of similitude? Ps. 115:8 says of idols, "They that make them are like unto them; so is every one that trusteth in them." Certainly there is no ontic connection between an idol and its maker. The likeness is more in the realm of senselessness, which is a moral consideration.

I would think that by God's condescension it is possible for God to have made man in a way that there is a common framework (not substance) by which God has revealed his immanence through to man in that man can sense that which God reveals.

Yes, but you are accrediting the "commonality" to condescension. If one ascribes "otherness" to God when He condescends to man, then it would seem necessary to ascribe "entire otherness" in a non-condescending existence.

This brings me back to where I started on this thread. It is at the point of God's condescending revelation that neo-orthodoxy must be confronted, not in a denial that He is wholly other.

 

[Brian Withnell]

The thing I always have a problem with is "wholly" in the context.

For instance. In the sense that God is omnipresent, he is present everywhere at all times (absolute omnipresence). My meager presences does not produce an occlusion of the presence of God, so in the sense that God is everywhere, and he causes me to be somewhere at particular points in time, then there is an intersection of my presence with his presence. I do not produce a small part of the universe in which God does not exist even during the small part of the time I am here. ("...for in Him we live and move and exist..."). It would seem that "wholly" other would preclude that statement, as there could be no common point between our existence.

I guess what I'm saying is that "wholly other" appears to deny anything in common, even if it is through the condescension of God.

 

[MW]

It would seem that "wholly" other would preclude that statement, as there could be no common point between our existence.

But is there a common point between your "existence?" You may very well have your being in Him, but He doesn't have His being in you. The space you occupy is not occupied by Him. He creates, fills and transcends the space you occupy. So there is no sense in which you have anything in common with God. All that you have in a way of communion is by a gracious condescension on God's part; there is nothing "necessary" or "natural" about what you share. Psalm 113:5, 6, "Who is like unto the Lord our God, who dwelleth on high, Who humbleth himself to behold the things that are in heaven, and in the earth!"

 

[Brian Withnell]

But is there a common point between your "existence?" You may very well have your being in Him, but He doesn't have His being in you.

Agreed, if what you mean is that his being is not contained by me.

The space you occupy is not occupied by Him. He creates, fills and transcends the space you occupy.

I would think this does not make sense ... if God fills the space I occupy, then he is there. I am also there. If the first sentence is true, would that not mean that wherever I am, he is not? Would not his not occupying the space that I occupy mean that for the fleeting moment I occupy a particular place in the universe (fleeting as it is) that if God does not occupy it, that he is not present there? At a particular point in time, I will be in a particular place ... even if that place is ever changing ... to say that God is not in that same place would seem to deny the imminence of God, or at least his omnipresence. Either God is here or he is not here.

I'm trying to reconcile his not being present where I am (which would be a point of commonality ... location) to his omnipresence. How do you do that (for even if he is here through condescension he would in fact be here, which would then mean the commonality is present and real, even if condescendingly so).

As an aside, I would almost put it the opposite way around though in a sense (that I exist and occupy a space through condescension, rather than he condescends to be imminent I'm not sure he could be anything other than omnipresent); if he did not keep my existence, I would not exist.

But even put that way, I do occupy a part of what he fills, even if by condescension. So it would seem that by condescension, I am not totally "other" in that I have existence and God also exists. My existence is not a necessary existence, but my existence is. God exists necessarily (it is his name in the sense that he says "I am" to Moses). And while other than just existing, there is nothing else about existence between us, that we both exist is true? It would seem that if God is wholly other, and that I exist, then he could not (and that is obviously not true). So either I don't exist, or both I exist and he exists. It may be by condescension that I exist, but I am here. Or at least was.

 

[MW]

I would think this does not make sense ... if God fills the space I occupy, then he is there.

But in this "natural" sense, He is there where the tree grows also. I thought we were talking about ontological commonality. As "Being," God does not occupy the space you occupy because He creates, fills, and transcends it.

How do you do that (for even if he is here through condescension he would in fact be here, which would then mean the commonality is present and real, even if condescendingly so).

But if you allow for condescension you are negating that it is God as He is in Himself. The discussion of "wholly other" only concerns God as He is in Himself.

God exists necessarily (it is his name in the sense that he says "I am" to Moses). And while other than just existing, there is nothing else about existence between us, that we both exist is true?

But surely you can see an equivocation in the word "existence" at this point. When God says "I AM" it means He IS existence. Infinite, eternal and unchangeable Being is true existence. On the other hand, we merely exist, as one among many other existences. God does not exist in this sense.