Methodology in proving mind/body dualism

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I say that yes we have “material” and “immaterial” aspects, not differing substances, to us but in everyday life these aspects are so unified that no discernable difference can be made. From a theoretical perspective though we can study the different aspects of a thing in theory but that implies no metaphysical separation at all. I can say ponder about the chemical aspect, how it was made, of a bottle of wine and then ponder the economic aspect of it but while I’m standing in line to buy it those aspects are one and the same in everyday experience.

No they aren't. My consideration when purchasing a bottle of wine is whether the chemical/aesthetic value outweighs the economic value (the price tag). Of course I'm making that distinction in ordinary life!

The same goes for mind/body. I can make the distinction between my mental state and my physical state quite easily in ordinary life and do so all the time. When I talk about, for instance, my spiritual state and relationship to God, I am obviously not talking about physical things. Similarly, prayer is obviously not a physical act, though at times it may include physical actions such as speaking or kneeling. There are, after alll, mental actions.

I'm sorry, but the law of the excluded middle rather limits your options here: you end up being one of three things, a metaphysical reductionist (materialism/physicalism, or subjective idealism), a dualist (of one sort or another), or else a linguistic reductionist (Wittgenstein). And I submit that reducing everything to language is simply wishing the problem away and pretending that it doesn't exist.

The contradiction lies in the referential fallacy, that is (to those who may not know this) that a word must refer to some object to be meaningful, that it commits because it assumes that mind language must refer to some substance to be meaningful.

I'm not a referentialist about language. I simply think that it this case, the kind of language-games we are playing are referential in nature and involve two different referents. Where's the contradiction? I'm not going to go down the path of linguistic reductionism here.

We are composed of a “material” and “immaterial” nature but that they are so unified that we can only make a linguistic distinction between them that is two different language games.

But it isn't merely a linguistic distinction: it's a real distinction. The two natures (ousia or substantiae in Latin) are two different kinds of thing, not merely two different language-games for the same thing.

You know as well as I do that philosophers have abandoned this way of thinking.

Some philosophers, but not all in the post-Quine post-Wittgenstein era.

Again I think that the mystery of the incarnation prevents us from drawing any conclusions here.

Didn't stop the Church Fathers. Mystery or not, we have to wrestle with it. I would suggest also that the interaction of mind and body may turn out to be a mystery.

And here is that Nietzsche quote I promised, with commentary by myself.

I wouldn't call the problem he is addressing "mind/body," nor do I think his critique is even of substance metaphysics, but of the Platonic Cave. But the Platonic Cave is not necessary to substance metaphysics. Further, with language-games (and linguistic reductionism), Wittgenstein simply offers us a (community) tour of Plato's cave and claims that he's described reality.
 
No they aren't. My consideration when purchasing a bottle of wine is whether the chemical/aesthetic value outweighs the economic value (the price tag). Of course I'm making that distinction in ordinary life!

Well that is a good point that Frame made against Dooyeweerd as well. You are right that a sharp contrast cannot be made with these two. But Dooyeweerd seems to mean that the special theoretical study of economics is distinct from the special theoretical study of chemistry. But both are merely studying different aspects of the bottle of wine. So don’t look at this as a hard and fast separation of naïve verses theoretical reflection, or Husserl put it (I believe before Dooyeweerd did) pre-theoretical verses theoretical reflection.

An interesting side note, I read one time that when Heidegger was Husserl’s assistant he wrote in the margin of Husserl’s book the Logical Investigations, I believe that was it, something like “yeah and isn’t the pre-theoretical experience the more important one” (as you point out), just a little F.Y.I.


The same goes for mind/body. I can make the distinction between my mental state and my physical state quite easily in ordinary life and do so all the time. When I talk about, for instance, my spiritual state and relationship to God, I am obviously not talking about physical things. Similarly, prayer is obviously not a physical act, though at times it may include physical actions such as speaking or kneeling. There are, after alll, mental actions.

I'm sorry, but the law of the excluded middle rather limits your options here: you end up being one of three things, a metaphysical reductionist (materialism/physicalism, or subjective idealism), a dualist (of one sort or another), or else a linguistic reductionist (Wittgenstein). And I submit that reducing everything to language is simply wishing the problem away and pretending that it doesn't exist.

My point exactly, when you talk about your spiritual relationship with God you are talking about a real thing. That is that your language refers to some aspect of yourself without committing the referential fallacy by saying that your language must refer to some substance that is distinct from your body. We can only make a distinction theoretically speaking in talking about one aspect over another.

This view is dualistic in that it recognizes that we have immaterial aspects to our self along side our material aspects. But it isn’t a substantial dualism that claims that we are made up of two different sorts of metaphysical stuff. So this seems to avoid your 3 different positions. I reject the notion of linguistic reductionism that seems perfected by Daniel Dennett when he describes our mental phenomenon as being “real” but fictional in nature, it is like describing the world of Sherlock Holmes.




I'm not a referentialist about language. I simply think that it this case, the kind of language-games we are playing are referential in nature and involve two different referents. Where's the contradiction? I'm not going to go down the path of linguistic reductionism here.

Well remember that I am referring to the Cartesian type of substantial dualism here. You seem to be saying exactly what I am just in different language, no pun intended. Yes when we use soul-talk we are referring to a soul but that does not mean that our soul is an absolutely separate substance from our bodies. Our soul and our bodies are in reality so united to be only dinstinguishable by our being forced to develop differing language games to describe the same thing.

I follow Strawson in that the fact we must, and I don’t if he would agree with me here but this me using his ideas, say that because we can’t help but describe ourselves in non-material language means that we are in some aspect immaterial.


But it isn't merely a linguistic distinction: it's a real distinction. The two natures (ousia or substantiae in Latin) are two different kinds of thing, not merely two different language-games for the same thing.

If you mean that theoretically we are composed of two different natures, immaterial and material, that are united in reality but can be studied separately than yes I agree but if you mean that metaphysically speaking we are composed of two different substances that are in fact separate than I disagree.


Some philosophers, but not all in the post-Quine post-Wittgenstein era.

True and most philosophers are apparently materialist.


Didn't stop the Church Fathers. Mystery or not, we have to wrestle with it. I would suggest also that the interaction of mind and body may turn out to be a mystery.

I agree but the incarnation is too unique to be absolutly relevant. I can see what your saying that our language "seems" attached to substance metaphysics but I think this is only a surface feature of our creeds and not an essential feature of it.


I wouldn't call the problem he is addressing "mind/body," nor do I think his critique is even of substance metaphysics, but of the Platonic Cave. But the Platonic Cave is not necessary to substance metaphysics. Further, with language-games (and linguistic reductionism), Wittgenstein simply offers us a (community) tour of Plato's cave and claims that he's described reality.

Well I think that he is critiquing all of western thinking. But substance metaphysics is among that. His distinction between the “real” world and the “apparent” world is reminiscent of substance metaphysics.
 
But Dooyeweerd seems to mean that the special theoretical study of economics is distinct from the special theoretical study of chemistry. But both are merely studying different aspects of the bottle of wine.

But consider, in the case of a human, that with the mind, we are studying something that is obviously not the body. It's not simply that it is a different aspect, but that it is a different kind of thing. The mind is not physical. Quite obviously, then, it is another kind of substance. What exactly is the problem here with acknowledging the conditional unity of mind and body? How, in your view, would you explain the intermediate state?

when you talk about your spiritual relationship with God you are talking about a real thing. That is that your language refers to some aspect of yourself without committing the referential fallacy by saying that your language must refer to some substance that is distinct from your body. We can only make a distinction theoretically speaking in talking about one aspect over another.

So it's not a real distinction, then?

This view is dualistic in that it recognizes that we have immaterial aspects to our self along side our material aspects. But it isn’t a substantial dualism that claims that we are made up of two different sorts of metaphysical stuff.

All right, so what is the different between matter and mind if not a difference of substance? It seems to me that you are quibbling unnecessarily over the term substance as if advocating an older way of thinking was somehow bad. Personally, I'm quite willing to adopt older ways of thinking if I find them accurate. I follow a pre-modern religion, so I expect that my views will end up sounding strange to postmodern ears.

Well remember that I am referring to the Cartesian type of substantial dualism here.

And I'm talking about substance dualism in general. I really have no quibble with the way that, for instance, Occam and Duns Scotus use the terms.

Yes when we use soul-talk we are referring to a soul but that does not mean that our soul is an absolutely separate substance from our bodies. Our soul and our bodies are in reality so united to be only dinstinguishable by our being forced to develop differing language games to describe the same thing.

Here again you take away with one hand what you grant with the other. This is linguistic reductionism. Either mind and body are the same or they are not, but let's not go pretending that we can have our cake and eat it too through linguistic gymnastics. If we are describing the same thing, then we are reductionists. If not, then we are going to have to adopt some form of substance dualism. There's really no way around this one.

if you mean that metaphysically speaking we are composed of two different substances that are in fact separate than I disagree.

What's the problem, exactly? If I don't acknowledge the metaphysical distinction between mind and body, then I've become a linguistic reductionist. Remember that even saying that two things are different language-games implies a metaphysical story of what lies behind it. You're positing a noumena behind the phenomena.

I can see what your saying that our language "seems" attached to substance metaphysics but I think this is only a surface feature of our creeds and not an essential feature of it.

Really? So why, then, were the Church Fathers so willing to go to the mat of these distinctions? Why did the Westminster Divines see fit to include the language of substance in the confessions?

Well I think that he is critiquing all of western thinking. But substance metaphysics is among that. His distinction between the “real” world and the “apparent” world is reminiscent of substance metaphysics.

How so? I'm not sure I follow. I've never heard mention of "real" vs "apparent" substance. It seems to me that substance metaphysics is rather common-sense stuff.
 
But consider, in the case of a human, that with the mind, we are studying something that is obviously not the body. It's not simply that it is a different aspect, but that it is a different kind of thing. The mind is not physical. Quite obviously, then, it is another kind of substance. What exactly is the problem here with acknowledging the conditional unity of mind and body? How, in your view, would you explain the intermediate state?

Since I do not have to make any distinction metahphysically between the immaterial and the material I can't say what the intermediate will be like except that perhaps the Lord will provide us with a physical body to be in.


So it's not a real distinction, then?

It is a real distinction it just doesn't involve part of you, it involves all of you.


All right, so what is the different between matter and mind if not a difference of substance? It seems to me that you are quibbling unnecessarily over the term substance as if advocating an older way of thinking was somehow bad. Personally, I'm quite willing to adopt older ways of thinking if I find them accurate. I follow a pre-modern religion, so I expect that my views will end up sounding strange to postmodern ears.

Well since I have seen no good theory of interaction between the different substances I choose to reject it it total. If there is a good theory for reconciling the two than I am all ears but there doesn’t seem to be.


And I'm talking about substance dualism in general. I really have no quibble with the way that, for instance, Occam and Duns Scotus use the terms.

Well I am not aware of any substance dualism in general, if you could explain how they different from Descarte than I would be interested in that. They are nominalists right? Perhaps what your suggesting is different from what I am critiquing in which case my criticisms don't apply but you need to explain to me how they are different.


Here again you take away with one hand what you grant with the other. This is linguistic reductionism. Either mind and body are the same or they are not, but let's not go pretending that we can have our cake and eat it too through linguistic gymnastics. If we are describing the same thing, then we are reductionists. If not, then we are going to have to adopt some form of substance dualism. There's really no way around this one.

Well it may seem that way but that is not what I am suggesting. What I am saying is that soul-talk refers to a soul, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense, and body talk is refering to body, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense.


What's the problem, exactly? If I don't acknowledge the metaphysical distinction between mind and body, then I've become a linguistic reductionist. Remember that even saying that two things are different language-games implies a metaphysical story of what lies behind it. You're positing a noumena behind the phenomena.

No saying that I can describe the same event from different perspective only implies that my differing language-games refer to different aspects of the same thing.


Really? So why, then, were the Church Fathers so willing to go to the mat of these distinctions? Why did the Westminster Divines see fit to include the language of substance in the confessions?

Point well taken, I think we should reconsider our meaning here. In the same way that we do not have to accept all the theological opinions of the Divines to accept the WCF I would argue that we are equally not obligated to accept all the theological opinions of the church fathers.


How so? I'm not sure I follow. I've never heard mention of "real" vs "apparent" substance. It seems to me that substance metaphysics is rather common-sense stuff.

The substance of a thing became unknowable in any real sense, Kant’s revolution. Berkeley worked it out before him but it endured and was abandoned by post-Kantian thinkers.
 
Since I do not have to make any distinction metahphysically between the immaterial and the material I can't say what the intermediate will be like except that perhaps the Lord will provide us with a physical body to be in.

That's a rather bizarre piece of speculation (and I'm not sure that Scripture supports it). And even so there would have to be a non-physical part of you to go into another body and which would then be put into a resurrected body.

It is a real distinction it just doesn't involve part of you, it involves all of you.

Explain how a physical account of the human being could involve all of you.

Well since I have seen no good theory of interaction between the different substances I choose to reject it it total.

That's like saying that because I'm unsatisfied with string theory and its alternatives, I refuse to believe in subatomic particles. Sorry, but all you need is a good reason to believe in the substances---you don't need an account of their interaction.

Well I am not aware of any substance dualism in general, if you could explain how they different from Descarte than I would be interested in that. They are nominalists right?

Substance dualism:

a) Mind is a type of substance
b) Body is a type of substance
c) Mind and body are not the same type of substance.

Neither Occam nor Duns Scotus were nominalists. Scotus has his own (very interesting) view of universals and particulars, while Occam is a conceptualist (though nominalists like to claim him). What you think that has to do with the pre-modern understanding of the mind's relationship to the body, I'm not sure.

What I am saying is that soul-talk refers to a soul, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense, and body talk is refering to body, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense.

I'm talking substance in the ordinary metaphysical sense. I don't particularly care how Descartes uses or misuses the term.

Substance (n): stuff, type of stuff.

The body is physical stuff and the mind is non-physical stuff.

No saying that I can describe the same event from different perspective only implies that my differing language-games refer to different aspects of the same thing.

But you are arguing that ultimately it is the same thing, which makes you a reductionist.

In the same way that we do not have to accept all the theological opinions of the Divines to accept the WCF I would argue that we are equally not obligated to accept all the theological opinions of the church fathers.

No---but we do have to subscribe. And the language of the WCF includes substance metaphysics, as do the creeds. The doctrine of hypostatic union is a doctrine that involves substance metaphysics.

The substance of a thing became unknowable in any real sense, Kant’s revolution. Berkeley worked it out before him but it endured and was abandoned by post-Kantian thinkers.

But why should I listen to Kant and Berkeley, when my positions are pre-modern to begin with? You are assuming that Kant and Berkeley are to be somehow taken for granted. You are assuming that the wrong turn began with Aristotle, whereas I say that it began with Descartes and his abuse of substance metaphysics and that the solution to Descartes was in Reid rather than in Kant. I simply don't agree with your reading of the history of philosophy, particularly of Scholastic substance metaphysics. Wittgenstein thought all metaphysics was confused, but to argue that, he ends up falling into metaphysics himself.
 
That's a rather bizarre piece of speculation (and I'm not sure that Scripture supports it). And even so there would have to be a non-physical part of you to go into another body and which would then be put into a resurrected body.

It is speculation but it’s not inconceivable. I don’t know what the intermediate state will be like. But I don’t see why we must accept substance metaphysics to make sense of things. I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.


Explain how a physical account of the human being could involve all of you.

It can’t, that’s my point you are forced by the failure materialism to except that we are not entirely material in nature. But that doesn’t mean that we are to run into the arms the substance thinkers either. Aspectual thinking allows you to say yes to both parties. In the sense that we can account for our behavior in immaterial terms as well as material terms but both language-games are describing the same thing not two different things.


That's like saying that because I'm unsatisfied with string theory and its alternatives, I refuse to believe in subatomic particles. Sorry, but all you need is a good reason to believe in the substances---you don't need an account of their interaction.

Fair enough. But my way seems to make more sense to me. It doesn’t seem to have the same metaphysical burdens that the opposing other parties have.


Substance dualism:

a) Mind is a type of substance
b) Body is a type of substance
c) Mind and body are not the same type of substance.

See I agree with this in a way but it seems leave open the problem of specific elements being tied to one or the other substance. A thought or feeling occurs in the mind substance. A brain process occurs in the body substance. But we know that neither of those statements is entirely true. So how do the two substances interact, say when I see red? We don’t know. In my scheme the question itself is irrelevant.


Neither Occam nor Duns Scotus were nominalists. Scotus has his own (very interesting) view of universals and particulars, while Occam is a conceptualist (though nominalists like to claim him). What you think that has to do with the pre-modern understanding of the mind's relationship to the body, I'm not sure.

It was just a question not relevant to our discussion. You seem more knowledgeable of scholastic philosophy than me.


But you are arguing that ultimately it is the same thing, which makes you a reductionist.

I would say that that actually makes a holist.


No---but we do have to subscribe. And the language of the WCF includes substance metaphysics, as do the creeds. The doctrine of hypostatic union is a doctrine that involves substance metaphysics.

Well subscription doesn’t necessarily imply a philosophy though. They used concepts to explain what they meant without, in my mind, subscribing to the actual metaphysics itself.


But why should I listen to Kant and Berkeley, when my positions are pre-modern to begin with? You are assuming that Kant and Berkeley are to be somehow taken for granted. You are assuming that the wrong turn began with Aristotle, whereas I say that it began with Descartes and his abuse of substance metaphysics and that the solution to Descartes was in Reid rather than in Kant. I simply don't agree with your reading of the history of philosophy, particularly of Scholastic substance metaphysics. Wittgenstein thought all metaphysics was confused, but to argue that, he ends up falling into metaphysics himself.

We do disagree on the history of philosophy here. I view in the continental sense. It is one grand struggle to work out the contradictions within itself. And to me Berkeley simply pointed out what was wrong with the whole thing. Kant really is the end result of that idea. It was once philosophers abandoned it that progress was made in a sense but they had their own problems to deal with.
 
I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.

But the point is that there is an immaterial part of us. Since the soul is not a material substance, then it is an immaterial one. Or are you going to argue that the soul is insubstantial? The only way I can see this working is if you end up subscribing to an occasionalist view of the human person, but even this is more readily associated with subjective idealism.

Aspectual thinking allows you to say yes to both parties. In the sense that we can account for our behavior in immaterial terms as well as material terms but both language-games are describing the same thing not two different things.

Of course they aren't. Is your mind your body? Yes or no. What you are essentially positing is a tertium quid beyond the mind and the body that each language-game only partially describes. But, you are also then claiming that the language-game of language games allows us to see behind the ordinary language to the ding-an-sich. See the problem?

It doesn’t seem to have the same metaphysical burdens that the opposing other parties have.

Most certainly it does because of the tertium quid you seem to be proposing.

A thought or feeling occurs in the mind substance. A brain process occurs in the body substance. But we know that neither of those statements is entirely true. So how do the two substances interact, say when I see red? We don’t know. In my scheme the question itself is irrelevant.

No, the question is still there, it's just a question of semantics. You solve the problem by playing the language card and thereby wishing it away. All you've done is to reduce it to grammar, and I'm not convinced that the question is grammatical in nature. Not all problems can be wished away in this manner.

And again, lack of an adequate theory of interaction is no point against substance dualism if the evidence is sufficient to suggest that mind and body are different substances. Substance dualists have various explanations and theories, but none of them are essential to the underlying theory.

Well subscription doesn’t necessarily imply a philosophy though. They used concepts to explain what they meant without, in my mind, subscribing to the actual metaphysics itself.

Of course they did. The bound variables they used do entail certain kinds of metaphysics. I recommend Quine's On What There Is for a fuller discussion of implied ontologies.

We do disagree on the history of philosophy here. I view in the continental sense.

I would not. I would say that the Cartesian attempt to rebuild the medieval synthesis on rationalistic grounds was wrongheaded and unnecessary. Kant is certainly the end result, but he's the end result of a project that was misguided to begin with, and which was challenged by Reid's reformulation of traditional philosophy. In the end I'm a philosophical conservative who would rather not reinvent the wheel (unlike, say, Heidegger, Husserl, and Wittgenstein).
 
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jwright82 said:
It is speculation but it’s not inconceivable. I don’t know what the intermediate state will be like. But I don’t see why we must accept substance metaphysics to make sense of things. I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.
Just wondering: How do you affirm WCF XXXII while affirming the above? It seems rather tricky to me for one to deny that there is a different kind of stuff than the body that is separated from it at death, considering that the "body" and the "soul" have different properties from each other and different subsistences, neither of which can be predicated of the other. Also, I think there's a difference between heaven the intermediate state and heaven the new heavens and earth? And that material descriptions of spiritual things do not necessarily mean the spiritual things are material (e.g., prayer described as offering incense does not mean prayer is material)?

"1. The bodies of men, after death, return to dust and see corruption: but their souls (which neither die nor sleep) having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them: the souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies. And the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day. Beside these two places, for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none.

2. At the last day, such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed: and all the dead shall be raised up, with the selfsame bodies and none other, although with different qualities, which shall be united again to their souls forever.

3. The bodies of the unjust shall, by the power of Christ, be raised to dishonour: the bodies of the just, by His Spirit, unto honour; and be made conformable to His own glorious body."
 
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Isn't the the question "How does the immaterial mind moves the material body" misdirected? Immaterial minds are not bound by scientific laws, so of course we can't explain in material terms how the mind moves the body. And we can't answer it in immaterial terms either, for we don't know how an immaterial mind works - we don't have "immaterial natural laws". So we will never be able to explain how the mind moves the body, for the mind is not bound by the same laws that the body. We, however, know that immaterial beings can interact with material ones, isn't God an immaterial being? And doesn't God interact with material things? We don't know how, but appealing to human ignorance does nothing to disprove the possibility of material-immaterial interactions - why would they be impossible? We do know that minds affect bodies, and bodies affect minds, and minds don't seem to be material, and there are probably good arguments for this. Also, I don't understand how can one affirm that minds are material and not identical with the brain at the same time.
 
Do we have to presuppose dualism for Man and the world to make sense, and do materialists show evidence of this?
 
But the point is that there is an immaterial part of us. Since the soul is not a material substance, then it is an immaterial one. Or are you going to argue that the soul is insubstantial? The only way I can see this working is if you end up subscribing to an occasionalist view of the human person, but even this is more readily associated with subjective idealism.

Yes there is an immaterial part to us. The “soul” as a word is equivalent to that immaterial part. What I am abandoning is a vocabulary to describe this “soul” and its relation to the body. One of the most fascinating things to me, that I we disagree on, about continental philosophy is that its massive critique or deconstruction of western metaphysics is not that it was destroying metaphysics but only a vocabulary of metaphysics, or a way of thinking about metaphysics. And some of them sought new ways of conceiving of metaphysics. The Existentialists are one example of this. So it is a way of describing what we are that I am rejecting not the intuition that we are material and immaterial in the same way.


Of course they aren't. Is your mind your body? Yes or no. What you are essentially positing is a tertium quid beyond the mind and the body that each language-game only partially describes. But, you are also then claiming that the language-game of language games allows us to see behind the ordinary language to the ding-an-sich. See the problem?

Yes my mind is both mind and body at the same time. That is you pose a false dichotomy between mind and body. My mind doesn’t have to either essentially be material or essentially be immaterial it can essentially both. It is only within a substance framework that you must be either/or, reject that framework and you don’t have a problem. Psychology is an excellent example of this.

Does the psychologist study the mind or the body? They study both but they seem to get along just fine without substantial dualism. The substantial dualist is faced with now having to divide up all the truths of psychology into either the mind camp or the body camp but the age old problem crops up as to what must go into which camp how do you decide? Also I think that question must be answered as to the fact that psychology gets along just fine without this viewpoint, it would seem that if substantial dualism is correct than psychology is the one science that would have to assume it just to get along.


Most certainly it does because of the tertium quid you seem to be proposing.

Well it is not “some third” but a different way of describing things that don’t have the same burdens that materialists, idealists, and substantial dualists have.


No, the question is still there, it's just a question of semantics. You solve the problem by playing the language card and thereby wishing it away. All you've done is to reduce it to grammar, and I'm not convinced that the question is grammatical in nature. Not all problems can be wished away in this manner.

And again, lack of an adequate theory of interaction is no point against substance dualism if the evidence is sufficient to suggest that mind and body are different substances. Substance dualists have various explanations and theories, but none of them are essential to the underlying theory.

What actual evidence is there? Only that we are composed of material and immaterial parts not they are totally different substances. You are exaggerating the evidence. But I think that the problem will still come up. When you start to have to classify things and explain brain traumas and such you are logically forced to come up with some theory.


Of course they did. The bound variables they used do entail certain kinds of metaphysics. I recommend Quine's On What There Is for a fuller discussion of implied ontologies.

When we are forced to take up philosophical concepts to understand biblical revelation, we must take up the minimal amount of ontological commitments that a general theory of metaphysics has. Just because our confessions use the terms substance or soul doesn’t mean that we must all of substance metaphysics, that’s a false assumption.


I would not. I would say that the Cartesian attempt to rebuild the medieval synthesis on rationalistic grounds was wrongheaded and unnecessary. Kant is certainly the end result, but he's the end result of a project that was misguided to begin with, and which was challenged by Reid's reformulation of traditional philosophy. In the end I'm a philosophical conservative who would rather not reinvent the wheel (unlike, say, Heidegger, Husserl, and Wittgenstein).

Yeah but without dealing with the devastating critique of western metaphysics by those philosophers you leave yourself open to their criticisms. By assuming that Greek metaphysics is metaphysics is to shackle yourself to that boat, and Christianity by implication, if it sinks you go with it.
 
jwright82 said:
It is speculation but it’s not inconceivable. I don’t know what the intermediate state will be like. But I don’t see why we must accept substance metaphysics to make sense of things. I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.
Just wondering: How do you affirm WCF XXXII while affirming the above? It seems rather tricky to me for one to deny that there is a different kind of stuff than the body that is separated from it at death, considering that the "body" and the "soul" have different properties from each other and different subsistences, neither of which can be predicated of the other. Also, I think there's a difference between heaven the intermediate state and heaven the new heavens and earth? And that material descriptions of spiritual things do not necessarily mean the spiritual things are material (e.g., prayer described as offering incense does not mean prayer is material)?

"1. The bodies of men, after death, return to dust and see corruption: but their souls (which neither die nor sleep) having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them: the souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies. And the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day. Beside these two places, for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none.

2. At the last day, such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed: and all the dead shall be raised up, with the selfsame bodies and none other, although with different qualities, which shall be united again to their souls forever.

3. The bodies of the unjust shall, by the power of Christ, be raised to dishonour: the bodies of the just, by His Spirit, unto honour; and be made conformable to His own glorious body."

Since I am not affirming materialism there is no problem. There is an immaterial aspect that does survive away from our body after death but in this time our immaterial and material aspects are essentially one. Not one substance, material or immaterial, but essentially one.
 
Isn't the the question "How does the immaterial mind moves the material body" misdirected? Immaterial minds are not bound by scientific laws, so of course we can't explain in material terms how the mind moves the body. And we can't answer it in immaterial terms either, for we don't know how an immaterial mind works - we don't have "immaterial natural laws". So we will never be able to explain how the mind moves the body, for the mind is not bound by the same laws that the body. We, however, know that immaterial beings can interact with material ones, isn't God an immaterial being? And doesn't God interact with material things? We don't know how, but appealing to human ignorance does nothing to disprove the possibility of material-immaterial interactions - why would they be impossible? We do know that minds affect bodies, and bodies affect minds, and minds don't seem to be material, and there are probably good arguments for this. Also, I don't understand how can one affirm that minds are material and not identical with the brain at the same time.

Well you are right that we cannot use material language to describe immaterial things but this drives a dialectical wedge in the theory. Now we have given the materialist the upper hand because you must have some way to describe to make it a meaningful concept. And if it is beyond human description than it is unnecessary to propose that this immaterial thing exists.
 
Isn't the the question "How does the immaterial mind moves the material body" misdirected? Immaterial minds are not bound by scientific laws, so of course we can't explain in material terms how the mind moves the body. And we can't answer it in immaterial terms either, for we don't know how an immaterial mind works - we don't have "immaterial natural laws". So we will never be able to explain how the mind moves the body, for the mind is not bound by the same laws that the body. We, however, know that immaterial beings can interact with material ones, isn't God an immaterial being? And doesn't God interact with material things? We don't know how, but appealing to human ignorance does nothing to disprove the possibility of material-immaterial interactions - why would they be impossible? We do know that minds affect bodies, and bodies affect minds, and minds don't seem to be material, and there are probably good arguments for this. Also, I don't understand how can one affirm that minds are material and not identical with the brain at the same time.

Well you are right that we cannot use material language to describe immaterial things but this drives a dialectical wedge in the theory. Now we have given the materialist the upper hand because you must have some way to describe to make it a meaningful concept. And if it is beyond human description than it is unnecessary to propose that this immaterial thing exists.

If we can show that the mind is affected and affects the brain but it is not equal with it, then the immateriality of the mind can still be argued for. If there are great difficulties in explaining minds in merely material terms, I don't see why not to postulate that the mind is immaterial. I see no problem with being unable to talk about minds in physical terms, philosopher David Chalmers, for example, has argued that we should simply accept consciousness, as we accept matter and energy, as an irreducible element of reality, something with it's own laws and properties that could not be explained in terms of something else.
Is all this discussion only about how we speak of minds and bodies or do you disagree that minds are not material?
 
Do we have to presuppose dualism for Man and the world to make sense, and do materialists show evidence of this?


Yes, a curious feature of our language is that we just can’t seem to even conceive of things in purely materialistic terms. That is we inevitably think of things in both material and immaterial terms and there is a general failure of materialism to explain this. The fact that a lot of contemporary thinkers accept materialism, at least as far as philosophy of mind, doesn’t mean much because I think it is due more to the current cultural obsession with science. Science gives them a cop out in essence. They say well we affirm that all mind activity is just brain processes, this is highly simplistic, and one day science will hopefully figure it all out. This is just a way to dodge hard questions.
 
Is all this discussion only about how we speak of minds and bodies or do you disagree that minds are not material?

Exactly! I do think that minds are not material in the sense that all the minds activities are substantially material. But we know that brain trauma affects our minds. So yes we must assume that part of our mind is immaterial but why must we assume that it substantially a different thing altogether? What is irrational about assuming that the immaterial and the material can be different things but essentially united in ourselves and the world?

If we can show that the mind is affected and affects the brain but it is not equal with it, then the immateriality of the mind can still be argued for. If there are great difficulties in explaining minds in merely material terms, I don't see why not to postulate that the mind is immaterial. I see no problem with being unable to talk about minds in physical terms, philosopher David Chalmers, for example, has argued that we should simply accept consciousness, as we accept matter and energy, as an irreducible element of reality, something with it's own laws and properties that could not be explained in terms of something else.

I can agree with this except that many words we use presuppose that they are in part immaterial. We must legitimize our immaterial language. Do you believe that the immaterial is indescribable or unexplainable in a mysterious sense?
 
Is all this discussion only about how we speak of minds and bodies or do you disagree that minds are not material?

Exactly! I do think that minds are not material in the sense that all the minds activities are substantially material. But we know that brain trauma affects our minds. So yes we must assume that part of our mind is immaterial but why must we assume that it substantially a different thing altogether? What is irrational about assuming that the immaterial and the material can be different things but essentially united in ourselves and the world?
I don't see it as irrational, but I don't really see the point of assuming this. We're just pushing the problem with dualism a step further, from "how can the immaterial mind interact with the material body?" to "how can the immaterial part of the mind interact with it's material one?". I know material and immaterial can interact (God and angels can interact with the universe), but I sincerely have no clue as to how. I'm starting to think the problem here might be about the boundaries of reason.

If we can show that the mind is affected and affects the brain but it is not equal with it, then the immateriality of the mind can still be argued for. If there are great difficulties in explaining minds in merely material terms, I don't see why not to postulate that the mind is immaterial. I see no problem with being unable to talk about minds in physical terms, philosopher David Chalmers, for example, has argued that we should simply accept consciousness, as we accept matter and energy, as an irreducible element of reality, something with it's own laws and properties that could not be explained in terms of something else.

I can agree with this except that many words we use presuppose that they are in part immaterial. We must legitimize our immaterial language.
Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.
Do you believe that the immaterial is indescribable or unexplainable in a mysterious sense?
I really want to answer "no", and in fact I think God can explain and describe the immaterial quite well, but I cannot think of a way in which to talk completely about the immaterial aspect of creation. I mean, I understand aspects of immaterial things, like the differences between material and immaterial and properties of immaterial things, but I don't see how we can describe non-material interactions, either immaterial-immaterial or material-immaterial ones.
 
I don't see it as irrational, but I don't really see the point of assuming this. We're just pushing the problem with dualism a step further, from "how can the immaterial mind interact with the material body?" to "how can the immaterial part of the mind interact with it's material one?". I know material and immaterial can interact (God and angels can interact with the universe), but I sincerely have no clue as to how. I'm starting to think the problem here might be about the boundaries of reason.

Well the point is that you are posing is a dualism between the immaterial and the material. We need to stop thinking in such dualisms to resolve these problems. Being essentially one means that the immaterial and the material in practice are one but in theory we can conceive of each separately.

Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.

Values, laws of logic, morals, etc.

I really want to answer "no", and in fact I think God can explain and describe the immaterial quite well, but I cannot think of a way in which to talk completely about the immaterial aspect of creation. I mean, I understand aspects of immaterial things, like the differences between material and immaterial and properties of immaterial things, but I don't see how we can describe non-material interactions, either immaterial-immaterial or material-immaterial ones.

Do immaterial and material things have to interact if they are essentially one? You see it is only when you separate things metaphysically that you run into this problem. If you say that we can separate them theoretically in our investigations of who we are than that is different.
 
What I am abandoning is a vocabulary to describe this “soul” and its relation to the body.

But it's the vocabulary of the church.

Well it is not “some third” but a different way of describing things that don’t have the same burdens that materialists, idealists, and substantial dualists have.

It's a nebulous linguistic reductionist. If it's a new vocabulary, how would you translate it?

When you start to have to classify things and explain brain traumas and such you are logically forced to come up with some theory.

Not necessarily---a via negativa is a perfectly reasonable option.

Just because our confessions use the terms substance or soul doesn’t mean that we must all of substance metaphysics, that’s a false assumption.

No, but we must use some form of substance metaphysics.

Yeah but without dealing with the devastating critique of western metaphysics by those philosophers you leave yourself open to their criticisms. By assuming that Greek metaphysics is metaphysics is to shackle yourself to that boat, and Christianity by implication, if it sinks you go with it.

I've read the critiques and agree in part but believe that too often they throw the baby out with the bathwater. The scorched-earth methodology employed by these thinkers leaves many of their conclusions suspect. They never turn the methodology on itself and therein lies the problem.

There is an immaterial aspect that does survive away from our body after death but in this time our immaterial and material aspects are essentially one. Not one substance, material or immaterial, but essentially one.

Nothing in this contradicts substance metaphysics.

Do immaterial and material things have to interact if they are essentially one?

Yes, because substance and essence are not the same thing.

EDIT: to clarify things, here are some questions so that I can clearly understand what you mean:

What are mind and matter, if not different substances and how are they distinguished? You seem to want to say that the distinction is not merely linguistic but picks out a feature of reality.

What would you propose to replace the vocabulary of substance? It seems to me that you have to have some theory of stuff.

Finally, why is getting rid of the problem of interaction so important here? A problem like this merely means that one hasn't thought of a good explanation and problems like this will arise in any theory because of our finitude. I really don't see how your thus-far-nebulous position is any more satisfying than the saner forms of substance metaphysics.
 
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But it's the vocabulary of the church.

And it is fine to continue using it.

It's a nebulous linguistic reductionist. If it's a new vocabulary, how would you translate it?

It’s more Dooyeweerdian. A thing for him functions within all the various law spheres of creation that give creation meaning. So it is not that the biological law sphere is metaphysically separate from the others it only has its own theoretical science that investigates only it in abstract. He had a strange and mystical view of human beings but adopting this framework we can view the body and soul in this way. It is not that the soul and the body are separate but essentially one but our thinking about each one separately is perfectly legitimate.

Not necessarily---a via negativa is a perfectly reasonable option.

I don’t see how this would work. A person that is essentially one explains this phenomenon without problem.

No, but we must use some form of substance metaphysics.

But why is substance metaphysics the only framework that we can speak of these things?

I've read the critiques and agree in part but believe that too often they throw the baby out with the bathwater. The scorched-earth methodology employed by these thinkers leaves many of their conclusions suspect. They never turn the methodology on itself and therein lies the problem.

I view this the way that Dooyeweerd did as an example of scholasticism for him. That is that we must use Greek metaphysics or use nothing at all. I don’t see many contemporary theologians that shackled to Greek metaphysics.

Nothing in this contradicts substance metaphysics.

Yes but substance metaphysics says that we are composed of two different substances. I am not saying that.

EDIT: to clarify things, here are some questions so that I can clearly understand what you mean:

What are mind and matter, if not different substances and how are they distinguished? You seem to want to say that the distinction is not merely linguistic but picks out a feature of reality.

What would you propose to replace the vocabulary of substance? It seems to me that you have to have some theory of stuff.

In the Dooyeewerdian sense I laid out before. I can elaborate if you want.

Finally, why is getting rid of the problem of interaction so important here? A problem like this merely means that one hasn't thought of a good explanation and problems like this will arise in any theory because of our finitude. I really don't see how your thus-far-nebulous position is any more satisfying than the saner forms of substance metaphysics.

Because there are no separate substances that must interact with each other in some way or another. How would you address Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of this idea?

Ghost in the machine - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.

Values, laws of logic, morals, etc.
Aren't values, laws of logic and morals, if they all exist, one hundred percent immaterial?

If by that you mean that there is no place in material reality that I can and point at numbers than sure. But why must we think of them in terms of material and immaterial?
 
Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.

Values, laws of logic, morals, etc.
Aren't values, laws of logic and morals, if they all exist, one hundred percent immaterial?

If by that you mean that there is no place in material reality that I can and point at numbers than sure. But why must we think of them in terms of material and immaterial?

How are we to think of them, then? That's way people have been talking about them in a long time :p. (and it seems to be a good way)
 
It is not that the soul and the body are separate but essentially one but our thinking about each one separately is perfectly legitimate.

But they aren't essentially one, given that they are separable. The person is essentially one, but the soul and body are two different things.

A person that is essentially one explains this phenomenon without problem.

But a person is neither a soul nor a body---he is a composite of soul and body. A thing may be composite and still essentially one. The person is the principle of interaction.

But why is substance metaphysics the only framework that we can speak of these things?

Because it's the framework of the confessions.

I don’t see many contemporary theologians that shackled to Greek metaphysics.

Indeed---why have most contemporary theologians conceded their ground to Tillich and Heidegger?

How would you address Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of this idea?

1) The description given of dualism describes the Christian doctrine of the intermediate state, so if you're going to sign onto Ryle's critique of the dogma, then you deny the intermediate state.

2) The mind-body distinction is not a category mistake because it is distinguishing two categories. It is not necssarily asserting them as opposites on a spectrum, but as two different kinds of thing.

3) I am perfectly willing to take issue with Descartes on the principle of interaction. Instead, I would assert that the principle of interaction between mind and body is the human person.

4) Ryle's critique, on the other hand, is reductionistic.

But why must we think of them in terms of material and immaterial?

Because of the law of the excluded middle.
 
Sincere doubt right now: James, when you say that mind and body are not different substances, do you mean to say that there is no real distinction (except on a linguistic level) between a mind and a body? Could you clarify your position?
 
As a third party listening (or reading) this discussion, I think I am able to understand where both sides are coming from. Of course, If I am wrong about my thoughts or conclusions, please correct me as quickly as possible.

It seems that James does not like using the term 'substance' when it comes to differentiating between body and mind. I think I understand (and in a way, sympathize) with his concern. The reason for this is that obiviously the term 'substance' SEEMS to imply something material. Here is a quick dictionary definition of 'substance':

1. that of which a thing consists; physical matter or material: form and substance.

2. a species of matter of definite chemical composition: a chalky substance.

3. controlled substance.

4. the subject matter of thought, discourse, study, etc.

5. the actual matter of a thing, as opposed to the appearance or shadow; reality.

Now obviously this does not mean that EVERY use of the term 'substance' must imply a material-like thing. I think that this is what Philip implies when he uses the term 'substance', because he makes a good point when he talks about the discussion amongst the early church fathers of homoousios.

No one on this board should come to the conclusion that the early church fathers believed that the Father was made up of some sort of 'material' substance. Their use of the idea 'of the same substance' regarding the Father and the Son was simply the best way they could express and clarify their understanding of the nature of God.

Personally I have no problem using the term 'substance' in the way that others (like the church fathers) did. I know that the term does not have to refer to 'material' or 'physical' things. I also know that our ability to accurately describe the very nature of God is going to be limited (we are not omnisicient or eternal, and we live and think within space/time). With that said, I see no other by which we can best describe something such as the Trinity, and so that is why 'substance' is probably the best word that we have to use. What else could we use (other than perhaps the word 'thing')?

Is my analysis of the discussion so far relatively accurate? Please correct me if I am wrong.
 
But they aren't essentially one, given that they are separable. The person is essentially one, but the soul and body are two different things.

But if that true than you cannot attribute the same things to each substance. This is essentially Augustine’s problem with the senses. Each thing has its own attributes that make it unique that the other thing that does not have. But we can attribute the same thing to body and mind. When I reason in some way my soul is acting but at the same time a very distinct part of my brain is acting also. This means that the attribute is true of both things implying an identity greater than two separate things.

But a person is neither a soul nor a body---he is a composite of soul and body. A thing may be composite and still essentially one. The person is the principle of interaction.

But you still have a dialectic at work in which how does the person become the bridge between this dialectic?

Because it's the framework of the confessions.

I think you are assuming too much. To say that the creeds use these ideas does not imply that we must accept the entire house of substance metaphysics. Just because two things have one thing in common does not mean that they have all things in common.

Indeed---why have most contemporary theologians conceded their ground to Tillich and Heidegger?

I meant reformed theologians. I know of no contemporary reformed theologian debating how accidents adhere to substances or any other problem that substance metaphysicians dealt with. I could be wrong here but that is the way it appears to me. That is not to say that these ideas as logical categories are not useful and essential to how we make sense of things only that in our philosophical pursuits we are not strapped to Greek metaphysics simply because we use some of the same terms.

1) The description given of dualism describes the Christian doctrine of the intermediate state, so if you're going to sign onto Ryle's critique of the dogma, then you deny the intermediate state.

2) The mind-body distinction is not a category mistake because it is distinguishing two categories. It is not necssarily asserting them as opposites on a spectrum, but as two different kinds of thing.

3) I am perfectly willing to take issue with Descartes on the principle of interaction. Instead, I would assert that the principle of interaction between mind and body is the human person.

4) Ryle's critique, on the other hand, is reductionistic.

Well I don’t know that by accepting Ryle’s critique means that you reject the intermediate state. You are assuming that the only way to make sense of this mysterious doctrine is through Greek philosophy. It is mysterious after all.

Also his critique rightly points out that we assume too much when we attribute more to a person’s behavior than we have reason to do so. This doesn’t mean that his positive position is correct only that we face a deeper problem that must be solved. I know what it means to reason but the only way I know that someone is “reasoning” is through different behaviors I see the person exhibiting. Those behaviors don’t necessarily presuppose a mind that contains “reason”, although this may be true only that previous ideas on this are flawed.

Because of the law of the excluded middle.

Only if you assume the two as mutually exclusive.
 
Sincere doubt right now: James, when you say that mind and body are not different substances, do you mean to say that there is no real distinction (except on a linguistic level) between a mind and a body? Could you clarify your position?

No think of the distinction as theoretical instead. I can explore the neurological aspect of pain and the social aspect of pain but at the same time it is the same pain that we are discussing not two different pains.
 
As a third party listening (or reading) this discussion, I think I am able to understand where both sides are coming from. Of course, If I am wrong about my thoughts or conclusions, please correct me as quickly as possible.

It seems that James does not like using the term 'substance' when it comes to differentiating between body and mind. I think I understand (and in a way, sympathize) with his concern. The reason for this is that obiviously the term 'substance' SEEMS to imply something material. Here is a quick dictionary definition of 'substance':

1. that of which a thing consists; physical matter or material: form and substance.

2. a species of matter of definite chemical composition: a chalky substance.

3. controlled substance.

4. the subject matter of thought, discourse, study, etc.

5. the actual matter of a thing, as opposed to the appearance or shadow; reality.

Yes but I would add that I think that we are not shackled to substance metaphysics as the only way to solve metaphysical problems.
 
When I reason in some way my soul is acting but at the same time a very distinct part of my brain is acting also. This means that the attribute is true of both things implying an identity greater than two separate things.

Indeed---the person is the principle of interaction.

But you still have a dialectic at work in which how does the person become the bridge between this dialectic?

I'm not sure I understand your meaning. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts here. The dialectic remains, it is true, but it may be that we have to embrace the tension here. It may be that the person is the synthesis between the thesis and antithesis of mind and matter (if I may be permitted to continue your reference to Hegel).

To say that the creeds use these ideas does not imply that we must accept the entire house of substance metaphysics.

Again, you assume that there is but one house.

I know of no contemporary reformed theologian debating how accidents adhere to substances or any other problem that substance metaphysicians dealt with. I could be wrong here but that is the way it appears to me.

That may simply be because none of them find that particular problem to be particularly interesting. I don't see what's at stake in that particular problem.

(side note: I don't think that accidents are the kind of thing that could "adhere" given that they are not components or independent things in their own right. If they had their own being, they wouldn't be accidents, but substances in their own right. Accidents are merely the properties of individual objects as distinguished from the properties of substances generally. Again, to draw analogy from chemistry, the properties of atoms generally (having mass, taking up space, etc.) could be seen as the properties of substance while the properties of molecules could be seen as the properties of individual objects. i.e. accidents.)

I meant reformed theologians.

I repeat my original question as to why we should concede this ground to Tillich and Heidegger.

Well I don’t know that by accepting Ryle’s critique means that you reject the intermediate state.

It would---to accept the intermediate state is to accept some sort of dualism, which means that Ryle's critique is wrong. Scriptural data means that certain critiques are necessarily wrong.

Also his critique rightly points out that we assume too much when we attribute more to a person’s behavior than we have reason to do so. This doesn’t mean that his positive position is correct only that we face a deeper problem that must be solved. I know what it means to reason but the only way I know that someone is “reasoning” is through different behaviors I see the person exhibiting. Those behaviors don’t necessarily presuppose a mind that contains “reason”, although this may be true only that previous ideas on this are flawed.

So you're wondering why we believe in other minds? To me this is a fairly basic common-sense assumption---that other human beings are rational creatures. To be rational means to be capable of some level of mental reasoning. The existence of other minds seems to me to be a fairly basic assumption. Ryle is assuming strict methodological empiricism here, an assumption which may be fine for him, but which flies in the face of common sense. He needs to show why rational behaviour is not sufficient evidence of rational thought-processes similar to my own. I don't see a good reason to be skeptical here.

Only if you assume the two as mutually exclusive.

Ok, let's translate these categories into logical terms:

Material: A.
Immaterial: Non-A.

Don't see how A and non-A are not mutually exclusive.

No think of the distinction as theoretical instead. I can explore the neurological aspect of pain and the social aspect of pain but at the same time it is the same pain that we are discussing not two different pains.

It is the same pain, but it may be that this pain functions at several different metaphysical levels due to the human as a metaphysical amphibian.

Yes but I would add that I think that we are not shackled to substance metaphysics as the only way to solve metaphysical problems.

But of course not, given that not all metaphysical problems are a) solveable by human reason b) concerned with substances. For example, I don't know that freedom and determinism would have anything to do with substances---a substance-metaphysical account of this problem would be a category mistake.
 
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