Methodology in proving mind/body dualism

[Claudiu]

I am interested in what a successful argument for mind/body would have to look like. That is, what is the correct method? Note, I am not interested in an argument for mind/body dualism.

A common critique against Cartestian Dualism is that Descartes jumps from epistemological claims to metaphysical ones. His argument can be restated as follows:

1. I know for certain that I exist as a thinking thing.
2. I do not know for certain that I have a body.
(implicit assumption: If I know for certain that some entity E has property A, but do not know for certain that E has property B, then A is essential to E, while B is not).
3. Therefore, mind and body are metaphysically different/separate kinds of things.
​

The charge against Descartes here is that he is assuming that what we know (epistemology) has implications on the way things are (metaphysics). Many people find this jump problematic. In short, there is a problem with his argument, and methodology. Keeping in mind the validity and soundness required for an argument, what would be some necessary features of an argument for mind/body dualism? Again, please note, I am not interested in actually arguing for mind/body dualism. Rather, I am taking a step back and seeking some fundamental requirements of what a possible argument would even look like (what are some necessary features?).

 

[Claudiu]

On the flip side, what kind of argument would, in principle, suffice (i.e. what kind of argumentative strategy would have to be employed) to produce an argument that would (if successful) show that dualism is false?

 

[jwright82]

He also violates the law of parsimony- “that entities are not to be posited unless it is necessary to do so….” (Penguin Reference Dictionary of Philosophy, 2000). This states that basically I do not need to posit a whole different “substance” or “mind” unless it is necessary to do so. Also this could be applied to the sock Goblin, who is always stealing my socks from the dryer. It seems unnecessary to posit this entity when simpler ways of explaining this phenomenon will suffice.

Also dual substance theories of mind suffer from the fact that the relationship in how the two different substances interact with one another has never been satisfactory explained by its proponents. How does my mind substance interact with my body substance? No ever could explain this.

Now the alternative Materialist positions suffer from different problems (there are 3 main theories that are different but I will lump them altogether here for space). They claim in various ways that our mental phenomenon (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.) are explainable by appeal to our physical brain alone. They suffer on one level in that they require us to mean different things than our commonsense assumptions would have us believe.

Take “love” for example when I say “I love my daughter” I do not mean the same thing as “I love ice cream”. I wouldn’t take a bullet for ice cream but I would for my daughter. But they would have to say that at most I really mean that both ice cream and my daughter stimulate some part of brain, at most my daughter may stimulate more parts but in essence they are same meaning. So they cannot explain why I mean two different things by these two statements but they “insist” that I in essence do.

There ideas are also empirically unverifiable. This is the key to their theory because if they say that “love” for ice cream and family is essentially the same thing than they claim that eventually science will explain this. But how could you ever empirically verify that my entire mental phenomenon is explainable in purely physical terms? You can’t.

My own alternative to these is basically a transcendental method but also leaves much mystery involved in not providing an alternative metaphysical theory. All I can say is that both “soul-talk” and “brain-talk” are both perfectly legitimate ways of explaining the same phenomenon without either side exhaustively explaining the phenomenon. This it seemed to me is the error of both Dualists and Materialists. They try to exhaustively explain the same phenomenon and fail. I know this is very complicated because I had to gloss over a lot but if you would like me, or anyone else, to elaborate on anything I will try. It is hard for me to sum up these issues in a space suitable for this website in one fail swoop.

 

[Claudiu]

Thank you for your response, James.

I was reading my professors book the other day and came upon a sentence that perfectly sums up the problem with some presuppositions in the materialist view. Professor Flanagan, in The Science of the Mind, put it well when he said that “an agent cannot know with certainty that he exists as a nonphysical thing, because there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things” (p. 15). I think it ultimately boils down to this. The dualist is trying to prove that we are part body (material) and part soul (immaterial). He claims to be able to do this, in part, because we have knowledge of the immaterial. But the materialist does not grant this. The materialist already assumes that there is no knowledge of the immaterial (e.g. Flanagan's quote). So the dualist is already doomed from the start.

 

[Philip]

An argument for dualism would have to show that there are a) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to matter (materialism) b) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to mind (idealism). The objective would be to show that mind and matter are both necessary ways of speaking, meaning that dualism does not violate Occam's Razor. If dualism does not violate Occam's Razor, then it should be taken as true unless there are phenomena to be explained that fall into neither of the two categories in question.

On the flip side, what kind of argument would, in principle, suffice (i.e. what kind of argumentative strategy would have to be employed) to produce an argument that would (if successful) show that dualism is false?

What would a successful argument for either materialism or idealism look like?

 

[py3ak]

Also this could be applied to the sock Goblin, who is always stealing my socks from the dryer. It seems unnecessary to posit this entity when simpler ways of explaining this phenomenon will suffice.

Indeed. Once in a while, the dryer donates a free sock to your cause. Because it is a little cheap, it only donates one at a time.

 

[jwright82]

Also this could be applied to the sock Goblin, who is always stealing my socks from the dryer. It seems unnecessary to posit this entity when simpler ways of explaining this phenomenon will suffice.

Indeed. Once in a while, the dryer donates a free sock to your cause. Because it is a little cheap, it only donates one at a time.

The jury is still out for me on the sock goblin. I have only seen blury pictures and heard fuzzy audio so I am not convinced but Bigfoot told me he beleives in him so thats something. At least, if it exists, it donates something.

 

[jwright82]

Thank you for your response, James.

I was reading my professors book the other day and came upon a sentence that perfectly sums up the problem with some presuppositions in the materialist view. Professor Flanagan, in The Science of the Mind, put it well when he said that “an agent cannot know with certainty that he exists as a nonphysical thing, because there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things” (p. 15). I think it ultimately boils down to this. The dualist is trying to prove that we are part body (material) and part soul (immaterial). He claims to be able to do this be, in part, because we have knowledge of the immaterial. But the materialist does not grant this. The materialist already assumes that there is no knowledge of the immaterial (e.g. Flanagan's quote). So the dualist is already doomed from the start.

Right, that is basically C. S. Lewis’ argument from reason against Materialism. But you’re right about Dualism as well. I think both sides are trying to prove too much and that is the killer for both extremes. You’ll notice how modest my proposal is, it is a very humble explanation of things not a heavy duty metaphysical theory.

 

[Claudiu]

What would a successful argument for either materialism or idealism look like?

I guess the materialist would say that if we could prove that everything is material, then that rules out anything immaterial.

 

[Claudiu]

Now the alternative Materialist positions suffer from different problems (there are 3 main theories that are different but I will lump them altogether here for space). They claim in various ways that our mental phenomenon (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.) are explainable by appeal to our physical brain alone. They suffer on one level in that they require us to mean different things than our commonsense assumptions would have us believe.

Take “love” for example when I say “I love my daughter” I do not mean the same thing as “I love ice cream”. I wouldn’t take a bullet for ice cream but I would for my daughter. But they would have to say that at most I really mean that both ice cream and my daughter stimulate some part of brain, at most my daughter may stimulate more parts but in essence they are same meaning. So they cannot explain why I mean two different things by these two statements but they “insist” that I in essence do.

There ideas are also empirically unverifiable. This is the key to their theory because if they say that “love” for ice cream and family is essentially the same thing than they claim that eventually science will explain this. But how could you ever empirically verify that my entire mental phenomenon is explainable in purely physical terms? You can’t.

The materialist claims that we can reduce everything to the brain, including mental phenomena (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.), just as science has reduced other "folk" talk to science. For example, they will say that in folk talk we say "water", but in science we say "H2O". Similarly, we now say things like "love" in "folk psychology", but really it can be reduced to the brain. And if you say that you use "love" differently, well then it is just a different neuron that fires for the love of your daughter vs. the love of ice cream. In the water example we would still say "there is water" even though there are other molecules besides water (like sodium, etc.) because it looks like water. At the lower level, though, there is more than just H2O in the water. So, we use the word "water" even though there is a difference at the lower level. The materialist would say that this is how it works for "love" too. We use "love" even though there might be a difference at the lower level.

 

[Philip]

Right, that is basically C. S. Lewis’ argument from reason against Materialism. But you’re right about Dualism as well. I think both sides are trying to prove too much and that is the killer for both extremes. You’ll notice how modest my proposal is, it is a very humble explanation of things not a heavy duty metaphysical theory.

James, I'm in agreement with your position except for the part where you say that you are not a dualist. I humbly submit that if you are neither a materialist nor a subjective idealist, you are left with dualism of some kind. It may not be substance dualism, but it is dualism because you are positing 1) that mind and matter are two different sorts of thing 2) that the human being includes both. How is that not a sort of dualism?

In short, there is a problem with his argument, and methodology.

The problem with Descartes' argument is that premise 3) is one of two possibilities. The possibility remains that the body is a projection of the mind. Descartes' argument could also be turned into an argument for subjective idealism.

 

[jwright82]

Now the alternative Materialist positions suffer from different problems (there are 3 main theories that are different but I will lump them altogether here for space). They claim in various ways that our mental phenomenon (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.) are explainable by appeal to our physical brain alone. They suffer on one level in that they require us to mean different things than our commonsense assumptions would have us believe.

Take “love” for example when I say “I love my daughter” I do not mean the same thing as “I love ice cream”. I wouldn’t take a bullet for ice cream but I would for my daughter. But they would have to say that at most I really mean that both ice cream and my daughter stimulate some part of brain, at most my daughter may stimulate more parts but in essence they are same meaning. So they cannot explain why I mean two different things by these two statements but they “insist” that I in essence do.

There ideas are also empirically unverifiable. This is the key to their theory because if they say that “love” for ice cream and family is essentially the same thing than they claim that eventually science will explain this. But how could you ever empirically verify that my entire mental phenomenon is explainable in purely physical terms? You can’t.

The materialist claims that we can reduce everything to the brain, including mental phenomena (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.), just as science has reduced other "folk" talk to science. For example, they will say that in folk talk we say "water", but in science we say "H2O". Similarly, we now say things like "love" in "folk psychology", but really it can be reduced to the brain. And if you say that you use "love" differently, well then it is just a different neuron that fires for the love of your daughter vs. the love of ice cream. In the water example we would still say "there is water" even though there are other molecules besides water (like sodium, etc.) because it looks like water. At the lower level, though, there is more than just H2O in the water. So, we use the word "water" even though there is a difference at the lower level. The materialist would say that this is how it works for "love" too. We use "love" even though there might be a difference at the lower level.

Yeah I have a problem all forms of Materialism because at the end of the day they all seem to rest upon analogies of some kind. And analogies are useful in explaining what their getting at but can never proves their theories. Just because Dennett can compare his theory to a computer model is like o.k. so what, now prove that the mind is just a computer. But how would one go about proving that the mind is just brain processes? Lets just assume that one day they do map out all the corresponding brain processes with mental events (beliefs, pains, experiences, love, etc.) what would that prove?

1. Scientists have mapped all brain processes with mental events. This proves the Materialist view
2. Since science exhaustively explored the brain and found no evidence of any immaterial aspect or substance to the brain we must abandon the idea.
3. But the immaterial is by definition beyond the scope of science it can never be proven wrong by science.
4. Therefore the materialist argument falls short in its supposed “proof” and all that is proven is that some brain process corresponds to some mental event.

I don’t see how they can get around this. Logically they have proven that some versions of the immaterial are absurd but they have not proven that all versions of it are absurd. I also see another problem with in the heap paradox. I don’t if you are familiar with it but I’ll explain it to anyone isn’t. You take a single grain of sand and place it on a plate, is it a heap of sand? No it isn’t. So you continue to place grains of sand one at a time on the plate until you determine it is indeed a heap of sand. The question is at what number or quantity of grains is it to be considered a heap of sand and why is that the magic number? At 29,999 grains it is not a heap but magically 30,000 grains become a heap, why is that? Well we can dispense with this paradox by pointing out that the word heap is ordinarily not used to refer to an exact amount but is a rough subjective amount unique to everyone.

But the problem here is an interesting one I think in that it asks when does a change in quantity (number of grains of sand) become a change in quality or kind (non-heap vs. heap)? It is a fact that I love ice cream and my daughter in two different kinds (qualities) of love. So the Materialist must at the end of the day explain how a change in the number of brain processes involved becomes a change in the kind of love I am referring to.

James, I'm in agreement with your position except for the part where you say that you are not a dualist. I humbly submit that if you are neither a materialist nor a subjective idealist, you are left with dualism of some kind. It may not be substance dualism, but it is dualism because you are positing 1) that mind and matter are two different sorts of thing 2) that the human being includes both. How is that not a sort of dualism?

Yes I would make a distinction between Dualism and dualistic. Dualism separates things while looking at it dualistically only makes distinctions among two things that are essentially unified.

 

[jwright82]

Here is a good paper on this. PA143

 

[Philip]

Dualism separates things while looking at it dualistically only makes distinctions among two things that are essentially unified.

Not necessarily. Just because one is a dualist does not mean that one denies the unity of the human person. In addition, as a Christian, I have to affirm some sort of dualism, given my belief in the intermediate state.

 

[jwright82]

Dualism separates things while looking at it dualistically only makes distinctions among two things that are essentially unified.

Not necessarily. Just because one is a dualist does not mean that one denies the unity of the human person. In addition, as a Christian, I have to affirm some sort of dualism, given my belief in the intermediate state.

That is a good point, I guess what I am against (and most arguments are too) is substantial dualism of Cartisian kinds. Ones that seperate off the mind and body metaphysically.

 

[jwright82]

Oh that discussion I posted in the Apologetic Methods has Plantinga in it so you might like to check it out.

 

[Philip]

I guess what I am against (and most arguments are too) is substantial dualism of Cartisian kinds. Ones that seperate off the mind and body metaphysically.

But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.

 

[jwright82]

But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.

Because such dualisms bifurcate the person ontologically speaking, this is unnecessary to do. How do these two, entirely different, substances interact and why assume such a separate substance to begin with? Making a logical, or linguistic even, distinction never bifurcates the person at all, it is simply referring to two different aspects (with two different language games) of the unified thing. In the case of Christ we are dealing with a unique person.

Because they could never develop a coherent theory of interaction the person remained, in theory, a bifurcated being on the ontological level. I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.

 

[No Name #5]

But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.

Because such dualisms bifurcate the person ontologically speaking, this is unnecessary to do. How do these two, entirely different, substances interact and why assume such a separate substance to begin with? Making a logical, or linguistic even, distinction never bifurcates the person at all, it is simply referring to two different aspects (with two different language games) of the unified thing. In the case of Christ we are dealing with a unique person.

Because they could never develop a coherent theory of interaction the person remained, in theory, a bifurcated being on the ontological level. I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.

I just wanted to compliment you on how wonderfully you put this, James. People like you are a real benefit to this community.

 

[Philip]

I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.

Might we, though, say that a person is composed of two different substances? In physics, there are molecules, composed of different kinds of atoms, why not persons composed of different substances in metaphysics?

 

[jwright82]

But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.

Because such dualisms bifurcate the person ontologically speaking, this is unnecessary to do. How do these two, entirely different, substances interact and why assume such a separate substance to begin with? Making a logical, or linguistic even, distinction never bifurcates the person at all, it is simply referring to two different aspects (with two different language games) of the unified thing. In the case of Christ we are dealing with a unique person.

Because they could never develop a coherent theory of interaction the person remained, in theory, a bifurcated being on the ontological level. I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.

I just wanted to compliment you on how wonderfully you put this, James. People like you are a real benefit to this community.

Well thank you, I am very flattered. God bless.

 

[JohnGill]

Thank you for your response, James.

I was reading my professors book the other day and came upon a sentence that perfectly sums up the problem with some presuppositions in the materialist view. Professor Flanagan, in The Science of the Mind, put it well when he said that “an agent cannot know with certainty that he exists as a nonphysical thing, because there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things” (p. 15). I think it ultimately boils down to this. The dualist is trying to prove that we are part body (material) and part soul (immaterial). He claims to be able to do this be, in part, because we have knowledge of the immaterial. But the materialist does not grant this. The materialist already assumes that there is no knowledge of the immaterial (e.g. Flanagan's quote). So the dualist is already doomed from the start.

In answer to your OP, I would challenge the materialist on his assumptions. I think a necessary feature would be first to show the impossibility of the materialist claim that "there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things.” Or to put it another way, the argument would be an indirect argument.

 

[jwright82]

Might we, though, say that a person is composed of two different substances? In physics, there are molecules, composed of different kinds of atoms, why not persons composed of different substances in metaphysics?

I think I have mentioned to you before, I can’t remember, my absolute aversion to substance metaphysics. I agree with Berkley that we should just abandon it. Two different substances must intreract in some way. It is like the cell, the different parts of the cell interact with one another but are different physical substances. In the same way we cannot speak of the person as two different substances but rather as being composed of different aspects of a unified thing.

The substance view fails as it has been traditionally formulated as unable to show how the two substances interact. If there is a view out there that avoids the traditional problems than I am all ears but I doubt it. My view is less an explanation as it is the result of my perceived failure all the other views and what the consequences are of those failures. Throw in Wittgenstein and Dooyeweerd and there you go, my view.

 

[Philip]

In the same way we cannot speak of the person as two different substances but rather as being composed of different aspects of a unified thing.

Something can't be "composed of" aspects. We talk about "aspects" only when we want to avoid the language of composition altogether. We talk about God having "aspects" because we never want to say that God is anything other than one. God is not composed, but is a metaphysical simple.

Put another way: are your mind and your body two different kinds of thing?

The substance view fails as it has been traditionally formulated as unable to show how the two substances interact.

Why is this a failure unless it is claiming to show how? The claim is a claim that not a claim how. You are assuming that one or two forms of substance dualism that try. All that you have to claim to be a substance dualist is that the human being is composed of mind and body and that the two are different kinds of thing.

How did the two natures of Christ interact? Does your inability to provide such an account mean that we should throw out hypostatic union?

Throw in Wittgenstein and Dooyeweerd and there you go, my view.

Careful with Wittgenstein here: there are certain forms of physicalism that he's going to be perfectly happy with. As long as the language of mind is preserved, he doesn't care if we throw out the substance (pun intended). Because for him, reality is determined by language.

I think I have mentioned to you before, I can’t remember, my absolute aversion to substance metaphysics. I agree with Berkley that we should just abandon it. Two different substances must intreract in some way.

First, what's the big problem with substance metaphysics in general? Berkeley isn't on our side because he's a subjective idealist: he reduces everything, including matter, to mind. It's a fun philosophy, to be sure, but not terribly helpful.

I agree that the two substances interact in some way, no question. What's the problem? I don't see why, in order to hold to substance dualism, I have to provide an account of how the interaction takes place---I just have to believe that it takes place.

 

[jwright82]

Something can't be "composed of" aspects. We talk about "aspects" only when we want to avoid the language of composition altogether. We talk about God having "aspects" because we never want to say that God is anything other than one. God is not composed, but is a metaphysical simple.

Exactly my point.

Put another way: are your mind and your body two different kinds of thing?

I would say that they are referring to two different legitimate language games about the same phenomenon.

Why is this a failure unless it is claiming to show how? The claim is a claim that not a claim how. You are assuming that one or two forms of substance dualism that try. All that you have to claim to be a substance dualist is that the human being is composed of mind and body and that the two are different kinds of thing.

Because of the illogical nature of it, that has been pointed out before.

How did the two natures of Christ interact? Does your inability to provide such an account mean that we should throw out hypostatic union?

Beyond the Athanasian creed I cannot comment on Christ's natures.

Careful with Wittgenstein here: there are certain forms of physicalism that he's going to be perfectly happy with. As long as the language of mind is preserved, he doesn't care if we throw out the substance (pun intended). Because for him, reality is determined by language.

That is why I brought Dooyeweerd into it. I think he solves the problems in Wittgenstein and I think that Wittgenstein solves the problems in Dooyeweerd.

First, what's the big problem with substance metaphysics in general? Berkeley isn't on our side because he's a subjective idealist: he reduces everything, including matter, to mind. It's a fun philosophy, to be sure, but not terribly helpful.

Well what I meant was that Berkley rejected matter, substance, because you cannot sense it or experience it in anyway. It makes no difference about the accidents of a thing whatsoever. It plays no part whatsoever in our knowledge of things so why not discard it? Nietzsche wonderfully put it in his paper on titled something like “how the real world finally became a myth” (I’ll look it up tomorrow and post it for any interested parties). Substance metaphysics failed in part because it made itself irrelevant to everything. If Kant had read Berkley closer I wonder how different his work might have been.

 

[Philip]

I would say that they are referring to two different legitimate language games about the same phenomenon.

So you're a physicalist, then? What about the intermediate state? Are persons metaphysical simples?

Because of the illogical nature of it, that has been pointed out before.

Where does the contradiction lie, exactly?

Well what I meant was that Berkley rejected matter, substance, because you cannot sense it or experience it in anyway. It makes no difference about the accidents of a thing whatsoever. It plays no part whatsoever in our knowledge of things so why not discard it?

Except that we recognize that there is a difference between mind and matter. We naturally understand that there are aspects of our being that are not material. If we say that they are two aspects of the same thing, then we end up conflating them, becoming monistic reductionists who are merely hiding behind language pretending not to be. The language of substance is there because we recognize that things like mind and matter are metaphysically different, not just linguistically different. The different language-games arise because we are talking about two different things. However, this does not have to undermine the essential unity of the human person at all, any more than the two natures of Christ undermined His essential unity.

Substance metaphysics failed in part because it made itself irrelevant to everything.

But did it have to develop on that path?

Beyond the Athanasian creed I cannot comment on Christ's natures.

And yet you believe that Christ had a Divine ousia (substance) and a human ousia. All of the Church fathers and the Christological and trinitarian formulations that they made, and which constitute orthodoxy, depend on substance metaphysics.

 

[Claudiu]

Here is a good paper on this. PA143

I find Bahnsen's position problematic. He doesn't want to advocate the monistic, materialistic, physicalist position on the one hand, or the dualist (whatever version) on the other. He just doesn't seem to be arguing for anything really. He uses dualistic language to describe some monistic metaphysical conception of what a person is.

 

[Claudiu]

By the way, thank you Phillip and James for your interaction thus far.

 

[Claudiu]

An argument for dualism would have to show that there are a) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to matter (materialism) b) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to mind (idealism). The objective would be to show that mind and matter are both necessary ways of speaking, meaning that dualism does not violate Occam's Razor. If dualism does not violate Occam's Razor, then it should be taken as true unless there are phenomena to be explained that fall into neither of the two categories in question.

Looking back ... Very well put! I think that get's to the heart of it.

 

[jwright82]

So you're a physicalist, then? What about the intermediate state? Are persons metaphysical simples?

I am not a physicalist because they say that all mind stuff is purely physical stuff. I say that yes we have “material” and “immaterial” aspects, not differing substances, to us but in everyday life these aspects are so unified that no discernable difference can be made. From a theoretical perspective though we can study the different aspects of a thing in theory but that implies no metaphysical separation at all. I can say ponder about the chemical aspect, how it was made, of a bottle of wine and then ponder the economic aspect of it but while I’m standing in line to buy it those aspects are one and the same in everyday experience.

Where does the contradiction lie, exactly?

The contradiction lies in the referential fallacy, that is (to those who may not know this) that a word must refer to some object to be meaningful, that it commits because it assumes that mind language must refer to some substance to be meaningful. Also it assumes that the two substances of mind and body interact in some way that cannot be demonstrated.

Except that we recognize that there is a difference between mind and matter. We naturally understand that there are aspects of our being that are not material. If we say that they are two aspects of the same thing, then we end up conflating them, becoming monistic reductionists who are merely hiding behind language pretending not to be. The language of substance is there because we recognize that things like mind and matter are metaphysically different, not just linguistically different. The different language-games arise because we are talking about two different things. However, this does not have to undermine the essential unity of the human person at all, any more than the two natures of Christ undermined His essential unity.

Actually that is my point exactly. We are composed of a “material” and “immaterial” nature but that they are so unified that we can only make a linguistic distinction between them that is two different language games. By this I mean that my friend can use one language game and consoled me while my arm is in pain but a neurosurgeon can use a totally different language game to describe my pain that is totally different from my friends words but never the less true.

But did it have to develop on that path?

I guess not but it did develop along that path. So using it brings bad associations along with it. You know as well as I do that philosophers have abandoned this way of thinking.

And yet you believe that Christ had a Divine ousia (substance) and a human ousia. All of the Church fathers and the Christological and trinitarian formulations that they made, and which constitute orthodoxy, depend on substance metaphysics.

Again I think that the mystery of the incarnation prevents us from drawing any conclusions here.

I find Bahnsen's position problematic. He doesn't want to advocate the monistic, materialistic, physicalist position on the one hand, or the dualist (whatever version) on the other. He just doesn't seem to be arguing for anything really. He uses dualistic language to describe some monistic metaphysical conception of what a person is.

Yeah I think that Bahnsen can be confusing here too, I mean what does “materiality” even mean when describing what we are? But his criticisms are spot on.

By the way, thank you Phillip and James for your interaction thus far.

No problem I enjoy edifying the body of Christ and talking philosophy.

And here is that Nietzsche quote I promised, with commentary by myself.

HISTORY OF AN ERROR
.
The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man — he dwells in it, he is it.
(Oldest convincing form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposition ‘I, Plato, am the truth.’)

(James- this is Nietzsche’s diatribe against Greek thought in general but their metaphysics as well, which was substance metaphysics. They believed that only philosophers could attain “real” knowledge of “reality”. Aristotle introduced in many ways the idea of substance that was supposed to be ultimate reality for the world. All the sensible qualities of an object (color, size, feelingl, etc…) were hitched to the substance or essence like a wagon.)

The real world, unattainable for the moment, but promised to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man (‘to the sinner who repents’).
(Progress of the idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more incomprehensible — it becomes a woman, it becomes Christian . . .)

(James- Nietzsche is saying that previous philosophies failed in what they set out to do and Christianity came along and placed ultimate reality or purpose outside of the world both metaphysically and meaning of life wise. In his mind it was a last ditch effort to maintain what philosophers were trying to do.)

The real world, unattainable, undemonstrable, cannot be promised, but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative.

(Fundamentally the same old sun, but shining through mist and scepticism; the idea grown sublime, pale, northerly, Königsbergian.)

(James- This is Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant (Konigsbergian). If the “real” world is unknowable than why presuppose it? You know it is Kant because he uses the word “imperative” which is referring to Kant’s categorical imperative in ethics, for Nietzsche there is no difference metaphysics and ethics or knowledge.)

The real world — unattainable? Unattained, at any rate. And if unattained also unknown. Consequently also no consolation, no redemption, no duty: how could we have a duty towards something unknown?
(The grey of dawn. First yawnings of reason. ****-crow of positivism.)

(James- this is the last step towards Nihilism, we just don’t know any better. With positivism the world of our sense is all that is that is left, no “real” world or ethics or emotion. Nietzsche is saying that despite its efforts positivism failed to do what it wanted.)

The ‘real world’ — an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer — an idea grown useless, superfluous, consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Broad daylight; breakfast; return of cheerfulness and bons sens; Plato blushes for shame; all free spirits run riot.)
We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? . . . But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world

(James- this is Nietzsche’s way out of nihilism, abandon our previous notions that led us towards nihilism in the first place. Freedom from those ideas, which should make Plato blush for even conceiving of, is freedom from the nothingness they lead us to.)

(Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA)
– Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

My words begin with my name James.