The distribution of the divine will: The will of the sign and will of good pleasure
XXII. Now, nothing remains except that we should add a few things about the distribution of the divine will. By all means, the will of God is one and only one, yet it is distinguished by us into various modes, first on account of the different kinds of things that it wills, next on account of the different modes in which we see that it wills what it wills. Thus they distinguish the will of God, first, into the will of the sign and the will of good pleasure. The latter denotes the decree of God itself, either his effective decree of good or his permissive decree of evil: “He does whatever he pleases” (Ps. 115:3) and “Yes, Father, so it has pleased you” (Matt. 11:25–26; Luke 12:32). But the former generally denotes some sort of indication by which God wills something to be signified to us, either that it would be simply believed and acknowledged, to which pertains his prediction, fulfillment, and remembrance of things or deeds, or, that our actions would be obliged to it as a norm, to which pertains, first, his command, promise, exhortation, invitation, and persuasion; next, his prohibition, threatening, dissuasion, warning, and so forth. Specifically, however, in thus contrasting the former with the latter, we customarily look to the commandment, that is, the sign commanding or prohibiting a specific effect of the divine will, for which reason they also call the will of the sign the will of the commandment.
Secret and revealed will
XXIII. Furthermore, second, they divide God’s will into his secret and revealed will, according to Deuteronomy 29:29. Understand by the word secret those things that God decreed either to do or to permit and that he has so far not revealed, either by their outcome or by a prophecy. Consequently, they do not supply to us a way to know our norm; indeed, modesty requires that in investigating these things we would not be too curious. But the things that have been revealed to us oblige us immediately to assent and faith, and the things in them that are commanded for our doing or prohibited for our avoidance require obedience on the spot, and thus, putting aside all curiosity, we must carefully study their observance.
Absolute and conditioned will
XXIV. They employ, third, the distinction between God’s absolute and conditioned will, not of course with respect to the act of God who wills, for in that way all his will is absolute, but with respect to the things willed by God in this act. For God wills that some things occur absolutely but other things under a condition. Thus he wills regeneration, faith, and repentance in the elect absolutely, but in such a way that salvation comes to them under the condition of faith and repentance. But, seeing that this distinction is often stolen and used in a worse sense by the Pelagians and Pelagianizers (as we will teach on it a little further on),
10 it is generally disregarded by the orthodox.
Decretive and legislative will
XXV. But, fourth, the most accurate distinction of all is between God’s decretive and legislative will, or his will of plan and will of precept. Of these, by the former he determines events, that is, what is to be or not to be de facto, whether it is good or evil. By the latter, he determines what is to be or not to be de jure only. Included under God’s decretive will are: (1) predestination, election, reprobation, and preterition; (2) the covenant of grace, concerning the salvation of the elect, between the Father and the Son; (3) the absolute promises of regeneration, sanctification, faith, and perseverance; (4) the complements of these promises, by discriminating grace, and so forth. To God’s legislative will or will of precept belong precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats. Concerning this distribution, this must be carefully noted: just as the decretive will only determines the occurrence or futurity of a thing, but does not, however, determine its moral goodness and badness (for it determines promiscuously the occurrences of good and evil things), so the legislative will only determines the goodness and badness of the thing willed, while in the meantime it states nothing about the futurity or non-futurity of the same.
The double consequence
From this we evidently perceive (1) by what reckoning the will of God is always and universally effective: the former, that is, the decretive will, is so according to the event, and the latter legislative will is so according to our duty, while at the same time he wills in earnest by his legislative will many things that never occur, just as also many things occur by his decretive will that he does not will. And so we perceive from this as well (2) that there is nothing in these wills on God’s part that is repugnant, since they do not will the same thing or in the same way.
The use of this distribution
XXVI. Therefore, when this distinction is neglected you will in no way escape the following difficulties: (1) there would be contrary wills in God, by which God wills and does not will the same thing. (2) Certain wills of God would be ineffective because they do not achieve his intent. Consequently, (3) the will of God would not be omnipotent, and (4) he would not be blessed in every way, because what he wills in earnest he does not achieve. On the contrary, when you rightly distinguish the efficacy of the one from the other, as we have said, not only will you entirely avoid conflict and ineffectiveness in the divine wills, but you will also most fittingly free him from the idea of pretending, about which our adversaries continuously growl at us, saying that God (in our opinion, that is) indicates that he wills many things that he does not in fact will, and thus he pretends. Without any trouble we will answer back that God always wills in fact what he indicates that he wills. But what he wills by his legislative will, although he wills its goodness, yet he does not immediately will its futurity, nor does he indicate it.
The Elenctic Part
It is asked: 1. Is there such a will in God that depends upon a condition to be supplied by creatures?
XXVII. It is asked, first, whether there is such a will in God that depends upon a condition to be supplied by creatures. The crass Pelagians of old—whom now the Socinians join—out of a love for independent free choice, by which it could will anything without any predetermination of the divine will, stated that there is such a will in God that wills only if the creature wills, that desires, that chooses only as the creature wills, a will that is saddened, that is pained because the creature does not will what he wills. The semi-Pelagians, with whom the Jesuits, the Arminians, and others collude, out of a love for the same independent freedom, and so that they may suspend man’s conversion on his free choice, although they profess some sort of dependence upon a general influence of God’s providence, upon his concursus with the willing creature, upon his influence on what is effected, they notwithstanding want that first act of the creature’s will, by which it determines itself, to be thoroughly independent, and thus they teach such a will in God that anticipates that first determination and depends upon it. The Lutherans, out of hatred for an absolute divine will, especially in the matter of reprobation, and out of a love for a universal salvation of each and every person, admit such a will in which he wills their salvation under a condition: if only they themselves will it. They all agree on this, that in many things God’s willing is suspended upon a condition to be fulfilled in advance through the free choice of the creatures, and because this condition is not fulfilled, God is frequently frustrated in his intent. Thus, according to them, he wills, for example, that all his commandments be kept most exactly, if, that is, men will to do so. He likewise wills each and every one to be saved, if only they themselves will to believe in Christ, to repent from their sins, and to labor to do good works. Thus, in place of the absolute willing of God they admit nothing but a certain suspended willingness.
The Reformed, although they acknowledge a will in God that suspends this or that event upon this or that condition, for example, the salvation of Peter upon his faith, a will which likewise in this sense could be called conditioned, nevertheless do not acknowledge any will of God that depends upon any condition, because (1) Scripture, in the sense already spoken of, teaches only such a will of God that is absolute, the will by which “he does all that he wills” (Ps. 115:3): “My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my will” (Isa. 46:10). But a conditional will that depends upon the human will does not do anything, nor can it. (2) Scripture proclaims an absolute will, even in the things that presuppose man’s free choice: “He gives to will and to do for his own good pleasure” (Phil. 2:13), “The heart of a man will plan his way, but Jehovah will direct his steps” (Prov. 16:9), and “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he will turn it to whatever he wills” (Prov. 21:1). (3) Scripture teaches an absolute will of God, specifically even in the things that respect predestination, election, and reprobation: “He has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills” (Rom. 9:18), and, “It is not of him who wills or of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy” (Rom. 9:16; cf. vv. 19–22). (4) The will of God is the very essence of God, and the essence of God is entirely independent, as most all of our adversaries admit (though the Socinians dissent), while on the contrary, a conditioned will depends upon a condition. Thus, by this hypothesis, God will be dependent, that is, not God. (5) By this conditioned will, man’s free choice would be independent, and thus it would be God. (6) The will of God, by this rationale, would be mutable, and thus the essence of God would be mutable, so then we would have a mutable God, contrary to the Scriptures (Mal. 3:6; James 1:17). (7) Through the same rationale, God would not be omnipotent, for he is not able to do what the creature does not will. (8) Nor would he be most wise, because he wills in earnest what, at least according to the semi-Pelagians, he foresees will never exist. (9) Nor would he be blessed in every way, inasmuch as he does not always achieve what he wills in earnest. (10) Nor would he be the most absolute Lord of all things, inasmuch as to him does not belong power over that condition upon which his will depends, particularly not over man’s free choice and over all those things that depend upon that free choice.
The objections are resolved: Generally, by two observations.
XXVIII. To the things objected on the contrary, you will make a satisfactory answer without any trouble, if first you carefully distinguish between God’s willing and what is willed, which two things meanwhile our adversaries confuse: what belongs to the thing willed they apply to God’s willing, and thus, for example, they refer that condition, such as the faith upon which the will of God suspended the salvation of Peter, to the will of God. You will also answer the objections if, second, you remember that his will must be distinguished into his decretive and legislative will, and accordingly you refer the promises and threats, so often given conditionally, to his legislative will, which determines nothing concerning the occurrence of the things willed, but only concerning their rightness, and which thus does not indicate anything but the mere connection of the thing promised with the prescribed duty. So then to the passages of Scripture raised in objection—Psalm 81:13–14, “Would that my people had heeded me! I would soon have subdued their enemies,” and its parallels (Isa. 48:18; Matt. 23:37; Isa. 5:4, 7; Luke 7:30), inasmuch as in them, God seems to have desired plainly enough a repentance and salvation of the Jews that he never achieved—the response is quite easy: in these and similar passages are contained encouragements to obedience and discouragements from sins, and these are fortified by promises and threats, which are illustrated in various ways, not only with similar things but also with examples, and thus, these encouragements and discouragements pertain to the legislative will, which determines nothing concerning the occurrence of what has been willed, but only denotes the individual connection of the duty with its promise; and by these things, God wills nothing but that men be bound, under the promises and threats, to their prescribed duties.
Specifically
And this is evident, for example, in the adduced passage in Psalm 81, in this way: God exhorts the Israelites that they should heed him (Ps. 81:8–9), he adds promises (v. 10) and threats (vv. 11–12), and finally concludes (v. 13) with “Oh! If my people had heeded me,” signaling that there was no other cause why he had not subdued their enemies and had not fed them with the “fatness of the wheat” than their own disobedience (vv. 14–16). It is a similar case in Isaiah 5:4, 7. The prophet’s design is to call the Jews back from the vices that had been remembered in a lengthy catalog in the last part of this chapter, and to this end he employs, among other things, an argument from God’s kindnesses, which are such that they cannot but clearly show how vigorously he approves of their obedience, which is drawn from them by so many kindnesses, and on the contrary, how he disapproves of their disobedience, which he willed to be connected with such great penalties. So also in Matthew 23:37, the Savior threatens the destruction of the Jews because they obstinately neglected the grace that he offered to them. Although they might also customarily respond in other ways to this passage: that Christ willed the salvation of the Jews, not as God but as man, in pious sympathy, or, if he also willed it as God, then he also achieved it in whom he willed, that is, among the sons of Jerusalem, although the Pharisees opposed him. Finally, in Luke 7:30, when he speaks of the counsel of God scorned by the Pharisees, he does not mean anything except the gospel, and by that, the salvation offered to them under the condition of faith.
2. Should the distinction of the divine will into antecedent and consequent will be sustained?
XXIX. It is asked, second, whether the distinction of the divine will into antecedent and consequent will ought to be tolerated. The first authors of this distinction seem to have been Chrysostom and John of Damascus, and from these the semi-Pelagians—as much the ancient ones as the modern ones, such as the Socinians, Jesuits, Remonstrants, and others—eagerly took it up so that they might more easily defend universal grace and independent human choice.
11 By this distinction, God is believed to will something for the rational creature antecedent to one of its acts, something that consequent to the same act, he does not will. Thus they want God to will salvation for all men antecedent to faith or unbelief, though he does not will it for most, having foreseen their unbelief. Their distinction in this matter is this, that God is quite often frustrated antecedently, but never consequently. The cause of this reality is the free choice of creatures, which by its unbelief makes it to happen that, once God’s prior will, which is good and best, and by which he wills a person’s salvation, is abandoned, he proceeds to the other will, by which is decreed a person’s eternal condemnation. Among the Reformed, there are not lacking great men—for example, Du Moulin in his Untying of Most Weighty Questions, Walaeus, Perkins, Twisse, and from the papists, Alvarez in his On the Helps of Divine Grace (bk. 5, disp. 34, no. 2)—who suppose that it can be tolerated in a wholesome sense, that is, if by antecedent will is understood that will of God by which he makes a connection between a certain antecedent and consequent, between a preceding condition (for example, faith and repentance) and some benefit, such that from this connection he promises that whoever believes will be saved, or, if Peter believes, he will be saved; and if by consequent will is understood the execution of the conditioned promise, for example, because Peter believes, he will be saved.
12 But indeed, in the Pelagian sense that we have presented, in which the will of God is understood as suspended upon a condition, this distinction cannot in any way be tolerated, for the reasons we argued in the preceding controversy. However, since in the preceding more wholesome sense the distinction is of meager importance and of equally meager use, and on the other hand, since there is a fairly great danger of abuse, it would be preferable not to allow it into the church. Moreover, to the extent that the sense is heterodox, it generally coincides with that which we considered in the two preceding paragraphs, and it falls apart by the reasons given there.
3. Does God will, by his decretive will, that each and every person be saved?
XXX. It is asked, third, whether God wills that each and every person be saved. Once Origen supposed that God, by his decretive will, willed or had decreed from eternity that not only would each and every person at some point finally in actuality be saved, but even the demons themselves. That is, after they by the proper number of years, according to the proportion of the sins they committed, had paid the penalty in hell, they would at last be restored to eternal salvation. To this position came Francesco Pucci the Socinian, and Samuel Huber, a Swiss, who was at first a Reformed preacher, but due to his view of universal grace was removed from the ministry, and from there was supported by the Lutherans and promoted to the ministry, though when he began in their churches to propound with Origen the salvation of each and every person, he was ejected from the ministry all over again. These taught that each and every person would at last arrive at salvation. The Pelagians as well as the Socinians, as also the Jesuits and Arminians, that they might safeguard man’s self-determined
13 choice, taught that God indeed wills that each and every person would be saved, but only by his conditioned or antecedent will, if they themselves should have willed to believe and repent. The Lutherans, although they do not profess that the choice is self-determined, nevertheless do profess such a kind of choice which can positively not resist the Holy Spirit as he gives birth, as it were, to conversion and faith in us. They likewise state that God wills that each and every person would be saved. The Reformed indeed do believe that God wills all to be saved, because Scripture constantly testifies to this (1 Tim. 2:4; Ezek. 18:23; 2 Peter 3:9), but they do not believe that he wills that each and every person would be saved,
14 because Scripture nowhere says this. Therefore, they admit that God wills that all be saved, that is, anyone, or with Scripture as our interpreter, from every generation, people, and nation (Rev. 5:9), namely, as many as Christ would purchase, as many as would believe; not, however, each and every person. Then they also admit that God wills all to be saved by his antecedent will, in that sense which we designated in the previous paragraph, namely, that God willed that between faith and salvation there would be an inseparable connection by which each and every person who believes would not perish, but have eternal life (John 3:16), and from this connection, he wills to invite anyone, as much the elect as the reprobate, to faith, and under that condition, to offer salvation. But, since we already set aside that distinction of the divine will into antecedent and consequent in the preceding paragraph, we would prefer to state that God wills all to be saved by his legislative will, which determines nothing concerning its occurrence, that is, he has promised that whoever would believe would have eternal life, namely, due to the connection that we have already designated, and due to that connection he offers and promises salvation in earnest to all. He does not will, however, that each and every one will be saved by his decretive will, that is, he has not decreed that all would obtain salvation in actuality.
Arguments of the Reformed
And this, at last, is the true hinge of the controversy, such that if our opponents want to obtain anything against us, they ought to demonstrate that God has decreed that each and every person will be saved, something I know quite well that our adversaries will not undertake, because (1) Scripture expressly testifies that God does not will this—in fact, he wills the contrary (Prov. 1:24–29; Ps. 95:11; Matt. 20:18; John 17:9). (2) In this very business of salvation and predestination he expressly professes that he does not will that each and every person would be saved—in fact, he created the wicked for the day of punishment (Prov. 16:4), he hardens whom he wills (Rom. 9:18), he has prepared vessels of wrath for destruction (Rom. 9:22), and he has prescribed not a few for judgment (2 Peter 2:9). Furthermore, he testifies that (3) he denies the necessary means of salvation to the greatest number (John 17:9), and (4) he does not call each and every one to partake of grace (Ps. 147:20; Acts 14:16). In fact, (5) he forbids the gospel of salvation to be preached to many (Matt. 10:5; Acts 16:6–7). Also, (6) he does not will to give faith to each and every person (2 Thess. 3:2; Acts 13:48). So then it must be entirely denied that God, by his decretive will, wills that each and every person will be saved, unless (7) we wish (a) to lead the divine omnipotence into a most pressing crisis, inasmuch as it cannot achieve what it wills in earnest and intends would happen; (b) to establish contrary wills in God, of which one wills, for example, that Judas be saved, and the other does not; (c) to assert a mutable will for him who is in all things immutable, a will by which now he does not will what previously he earnestly willed; (d) likewise, to attribute an ineffective will to him who can do all that he wills; (e) to attribute to him a will that is dependent upon the creatures, and also temporary; and, in fact, (f) unless we wish to ascribe to the most wise being a fatuous will, a will by which he earnestly wills what he knows that he never will achieve.
4. Is the will of God the sole cause of every moral good? The difference of opinions
XXXI. It is asked, fourth, whether the will of God, just as it is the sole cause of every reality and possibility, is also the sole cause of every moral good. Descartes, together with his followers, as we have already observed above in chapter 13,
15 thinks that the cause and root of every moral good is in God’s will insofar as it is absolutely indifferent, willing this thing to be good and that thing to be not at all good. The Reformed (1) consider the will of God on the one hand in the identical sense (if I may use barbarous terms), insofar as it coincides with the very divine essence, and so accordingly it is as if you were asking whether the essence of God or God himself is the cause of every moral good; and in this sense, the Reformed do not answer in the negative. Or on the other hand, they consider the will of God in the formal sense, insofar as the divine essence is conceived by us as constructed with this or that relation: in this sense, the Reformed together deny that his will is the sole cause of all moral good. (2) They distinguish moral good into that which belongs to positive right—and this they acknowledge to depend upon the most free will of God: for example, resting from one’s works precisely on the seventh day is a moral good, but one belonging to positive right—and into that which belongs to natural right, that which rests upon nature itself, either the nature of God or the nature of man, just as in his original righteousness he bears the image of the divine holiness and righteousness, that is, not from God’s will, but from his very essence. (3) They think of any moral good either with respect to its essence or with respect to its existence. Thus, they confess that every good with respect to its existence is from the will of God, insofar as it is the commanding and executing principle in the production of all things (Rev. 4:11), but in respect to its essence, they hold that every natural moral good depends not upon God’s will as such, as a positive good, but upon his nature, as he is God. So think all the Reformed together, if you exclude one or perhaps two who suppose that whatever is right and good is so because God wills it, and not that God wills it because it is right and good.
The arguments of the Reformed
The reasons of the Reformed are that (1) Scripture testifies that God wills many things because they are good and right, which he therefore could not but will: “You will not also destroy the just with the unjust…. Far be it from you that you should do such a thing…. Shall not the judge of the all the earth do judgment,” that is, “do right?” (Gen. 18:23, 25; Rom. 1:32), and, “It is a righteous thing with God to repay with affliction” (2 Thess. 1:6). In fact, evil things are of such a kind and so great that they are repugnant to the purity and holiness of his nature, or of his eyes, such that he cannot look upon these things (Hab. 1:13). (2) If all good depended upon his will, and that will were indifferent from eternity, he would have been able not to prescribe that we know him, love him, revere him, and so forth. In fact, (3) he would have been able to command what is entirely contrary, for example, that we hate him, blaspheme him, rebel against him, and so forth. Indeed, (4) all these things, if he had willed them, would be good and laudable. (5) I will not add anything regarding the ideas in God, which coincide with the nature of God and are infinitely perfect, such that they can be expressed in the creatures in an infinite number of ways, ideas that according to this reckoning would be mutable. Nor also will I add (6) that then not even God himself would be holy, just, good, and so forth, before his will had determined itself to it, and thus he would be holy, just, and good only because he wills to be such. (7) Nor would we in laboring for holiness and righteousness be shaped according to his natural perfection, but only his voluntary perfection, which Scripture argues against (Matt. 5:48; Luke 6:36; 2 Peter 1:4).
Objections
The foundation of our adversaries’ opinion is in three things: (1) if all goodness were not by the will of God, then God would not be in all ways independent and perfect. I respond, It would be true if a good were given that did not depend upon God; but it is one thing to depend upon God and upon the nature of God, and another to depend precisely upon the will of God as such. (2) That otherwise we would have to say that objects have their essence through themselves and are prior, at least in their nature, to the divine will. I respond, Although several things do not depend upon the will of God as such, yet it is not that they do not depend upon God simply, for they depend upon his nature and essence as such. (3) That it would follow in this way that the divine will depends upon other goods, and thus is dependent. I respond, By no means, because those goods depend upon his most holy nature and not vice versa, that the nature of God depends upon them. See also our Gangrene of the Cartesian Innovations (section 2, ch. 9).
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5. Do affections properly belong to God?
XXXII. It is asked, fifth, whether affections properly belong to God, or whether the affections in God are disturbances of the divine will properly speaking, by which the will of God either is conveyed to an object or flees from it, disturbances from which hatred, wrath, pleasure, avoidance, joy, sadness, and other human affections result. The Anthropomorphites will not hesitate to profess that God is endowed with human members and also human affections, nor also will they hesitate to profess the mere willingness of the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians, that is, a willing that is imperfect and suspended upon free human choice, a willing that is in fact nothing except a desire and wish, a willing from which, in addition, wrath, hatred, avoidance, joy, and sorrow are produced. The Socinians, because they hold that God is dependent upon human free choice, also openly assert for him a mutable will and the desire, fear, joy, sorrow, anger, regret, and other affections that arise from it. The Reformed, although they do not at all deny that words that express affections, just as words that express body parts, are employed to speak of God in the Scriptures, and although likewise they acknowledge that when every imperfection is removed from the affections, the substance of those words is in God, even so do not dare to allow in God these disturbances, in which almost the whole nature of affections consists.
Arguments
And this is because (1) Scripture expressly answers the question in the negative (Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Rom. 9:29). In these passages, what is taught concerning the regret of God must be applied by analogy to all affections. Because (2) nature or right reason does not tolerate in the most perfect being the many imperfections of human affections, for example, (a) imperfect willing; (b) the dependence of the affections upon their objects, by which they are influenced; (c) the impotence by which you are not able to do what the affections demand, and the affections are frequently overcome and fade away when they are not satisfied; (d) various mutations, and sometimes such as are quite ignoble, because of which they are customarily called passions. Because of (3) the infinite blessedness of God, which cannot be augmented by any increase of good, nor be touched and violated by any sense of evil, and much less be driven around in so many cycles of the affections.
Objections
Nor do our adversaries respond sufficiently when they claim that whatever there might be of imperfection in these affections does not injure God in the least because it is absorbed by the immeasurable abundance of good that is in him. Indeed, they affirm that even what is especially adverse to him is turned, by his most perfect wisdom and power, to his own good. Indeed, this sort of clever remedy might be able somehow to comfort people who are disturbed by the boiling of their affections, but it cannot take away from God the imperfection with which he cannot be God. For whatever happens, when adverse things fall upon him and they move him, they do not cease to be unpleasant, nor can they finally be crushed by the immense abundance of his felicity without a fight, such that at least some measure of dissatisfaction, wrestling, and as it were, fire and burning of the soul for some time takes its seat in God and disturbs his blessedness, until at last that storm subsides. And our adversaries do not have anything to allege for themselves except that frequently in the Scriptures the affections of love, hatred, regret, etc. are attributed to God, to which the ready response is that: (1) the attributed affections are also expressly removed from him elsewhere, for example, regret is attributed to him in Genesis 6:6 and Jeremiah 18:8, yet on the contrary, the same is removed from him in Numbers 23:19 and 1 Samuel 15:29. And this teaches that affections are attributed to him not without a grain of salt, namely, (2) not according to the affections, or the motions and disturbances of the soul, but only in relation to the effective operations that those affections customarily excite in creatures: that is, the affections that are attributed to God in a human way must not be understood except in a way worthy of God. To the customary places adduced to the contrary (Ezek. 33:11; 2 Peter 3:9; 1 Tim. 2:4), you will thus be able to make a satisfying answer without any trouble, if first you should show generally from the things already said that the discussion is not about the decretive will, but only about the legislative will, by which God wills by ordering that they should convert themselves and receive his reward, eternal life, or, that conversion is their duty and the reward of conversion is life. Moreover, the discussion is not about specific individuals, but about any sort of person. Then second also, it could be responded individually to the passages cited that in Ezekiel 33:11 it does not say that God does not will the death of any sinner, but rather of the one who converts himself: “I do not will the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted and live,” that is, I do not will the death of him who is converted. So also in 2 Peter 3:9, the apostle does not say that God wills all altogether to be saved and none of them to perish, but only all believers: “He is patient toward us, not willing that any of us should perish.” Nor is it said in 1 Timothy 2:4 that God wills for each and every person to be saved, but only “all,” that is, every kind of person, that is, kings and magistrates as well as their subordinates, as the analogy of the context shows. Such a response, with the necessary adjustments, could be applied to a fair number of other Scripture passages.
