How would you prove the God of the Bible exists?

[Philip]

This is true but no one wants to accept the consequences of this nihilistic view of things, postmodernism is dead and it killed itself.

I wouldn't say that this is nihilistic, merely despairing (in a Schaefferian sense).

As for the language-game, you can, in fact, judge others on the basis of a language-game. What you cannot do is judge another language-game. Thus, the liberal language-game could denounce Hitler, but it could not judge Nazism. It's an odd position, but not technically inconsistent.

Also I wouldn't be so cold hearted with a lay person on having a theory of ethics but I would ask for reasons why they held such beleifs.

But what you are finding there is the synthetic thread that they think binds the particulars together. The particulars are more basic than the theory--the purpose of the theory is to explain the particulars. If the person happens not to need a theory, there is nothing that compels him or her to do so.

This sounds a little empiricist in regards to beleif formation to me but I don't at all that you are not an empiricist.

Is it so wrong to say that certain basic beliefs are empirical? I also count as basic my beliefs that 2+2=4, or that God is there.

I would just ask them why?

Because they don't share your assumptions. You have to admit the premises, or the conclusion is uncompelling.

 

[jwright82]

I wouldn't say that this is nihilistic, merely despairing (in a Schaefferian sense).

As for the language-game, you can, in fact, judge others on the basis of a language-game. What you cannot do is judge another language-game. Thus, the liberal language-game could denounce Hitler, but it could not judge Nazism. It's an odd position, but not technically inconsistent.

True but not in an absolute sense. Hey I found this website about after postmodernism you might be interested in I will try to find it.
After Postmodernism. There it is, if the link works. They have papers and everything.

But what you are finding there is the synthetic thread that they think binds the particulars together. The particulars are more basic than the theory--the purpose of the theory is to explain the particulars. If the person happens not to need a theory, there is nothing that compels him or her to do so.

I wouldn't go so far as to say that that is the only way beleifs are formed, it sounds too empiricist to me. Also they do a need a theory if they are going to pronounce anything as right or wrong. You claim that the sentnce "murder is wrong" is basic but if it is basic than it must be analytically true, which it is not.

Is it so wrong to say that certain basic beliefs are empirical? I also count as basic my beliefs that 2+2=4, or that God is there.

Only if all beleifs are epiricist, but as I already said I know you don't believe that.

Because they don't share your assumptions. You have to admit the premises, or the conclusion is uncompelling.

What premises they gave no argument, also in a philosophical debate I can challenge any premise that I want, provided I can produce good reasons to doubt it.

 

[Der Pilger]

This reminds me of a discussion I had with my brother-in-law. After getting a little heated in our exchange he asked, "What does the Bible prove?" I stammered out something about creation and he cut me off, "No, what does it prove?" I was stumped. After pondering it for a bit I realized I had let hm form an errant line of reasoning in my mind. The Bible proves nothing. The Bible states truth. It is that by which truth is measured. It is the rule. The rule's authority is self evident and all else proves it's validity. Every true science is a study of the work of the Creator. All creation proves that God exists and that Scripture is true.

Herman Bavinck wrote this interesting point about the freedom of Scripture from the judgments of human reason: "If Christian revelation, which presupposes the darkness and error of unspiritual humanity, submitted in advance to the judgments of reason, it would by that token contradict itself. It would thereby place itself before a tribunal whose jurisdiction it had first denied."

 

[Peairtach]

The world the atheist posits, where the foundation stone of the God of the Bible is removed, is untenable and unlivable.

Take away God, and the atheist takes away "so much more" than God.

Basically they've got/would have a ruin of a world, without God. They'll deny this of course, while showing by their words and behaviour that they presuppose the God of the Bible, as they need to, to live and be atheists.

 

[Philip]

You claim that the sentnce "murder is wrong" is basic but if it is basic than it must be analytically true, which it is not.

Why does it have to be analytically true to be basic? I simply find myself believing that murder is wrong---that's as basic as it gets.

Only if all beleifs are epiricist, but as I already said I know you don't believe that.

True, not all beliefs are empirical, but some beliefs certainly are. Some of my basic beliefs---my belief that there is a lamp on my desk---are empirical. Exactly why does it follow from "some basic beliefs are empirical" that "all basic beliefs are empirical"? I see no connection between the two. Certainly the latter entails the former, but the former does not entail or imply the latter.

What premises they gave no argument, also in a philosophical debate I can challenge any premise that I want, provided I can produce good reasons to doubt it.

But what if they find your reasons for doubt uncompelling? Descartes' reasons for doubting my senses are uncompelling to me because I don't share his skeptical assumptions. His skepticism is just as question-begging as my common sense.

 

[jwright82]

Why does it have to be analytically true to be basic? I simply find myself believing that murder is wrong---that's as basic as it gets.

You are collapsing is with ought. To say that murder is wrong begs the question of why it is wrong. If you say that it is a basic beleif therefore murder is wrong than that is a little bit of circuler reasoning. You can only go in circles with that kind of logic. Claiming that I am a skeptic for asking such questions is a little to close to the fallacy of special pleading, that is your claim that your beleif is beyond questioning puts it in a special class of beleifs that cannot be questioned.

True, not all beliefs are empirical, but some beliefs certainly are. Some of my basic beliefs---my belief that there is a lamp on my desk---are empirical.

We completly agree here.

Exactly why does it follow from "some basic beliefs are empirical" that "all basic beliefs are empirical"? I see no connection between the two. Certainly the latter entails the former, but the former does not entail or imply the latter.

I wasn't making a logical argument, sorry it seemed that way. We agree on the place of epirical knowledge in our belief formation.

But what if they find your reasons for doubt uncompelling?

Your going to have to elaborate on what you mean by compelling. If you mean that they produce solid reasons why my doubts are uncompelling than that is fine. But if you mean that they don't even adresss my reasons for doubt and simply assert that they are not compelled than that isn't a valid argument at all, it is the fallacy of special pleading all over again. Their is so special that it is beyond reasonable debate or they are God and they know everything, that is what I would ask them.

His skepticism is just as question-begging as my common sense.

I still don't see why the world must be divided into common-sense-realists and straight skeptics. It seems that that is a false dichotomy either your one of us or one of them. Although I think that that is an essential beleif for the foundationalist because without it their whole argument goes away.

 

[Philip]

To say that murder is wrong begs the question of why it is wrong.

"Why" is less basic (epistemically) than "what."

Your going to have to elaborate on what you mean by compelling. If you mean that they produce solid reasons why my doubts are uncompelling than that is fine.

They don't have to if they can point out that your criticism depends on your worldview. Unless you can find a direct inconsistency (not a disconnect) in their thinking, there is nothing compelling about the argument and even if such is proved, there is no rational reason for them to accept your account.

I still don't see why the world must be divided into common-sense-realists and straight skeptics.

I see your point, but I happen to think that all of the alternatives to common-sense realism (whichever variation: Moorean, Reidian, Plantingian, etc.) ultimately lead to some sort of skepticism. Empiricism, rationalism, idealism, Kantianism, solipsism, Platonism, are all reductionist, elevating one part of our cognitive equipment over the others. The result is that all of these, though antagonistic, are united in being skeptical of most of our God-given faculties.

 

[MarieP]

If you were asked by a Christian to prove that the God of the Bible exists in a short manner, how would you go about it?

Romans 1

 

[jwright82]

"Why" is less basic (epistemically) than "what."

Do you mean less as in more important than what or less important? The difference, it seems to me, is that if it is more important than what than it establishes the what, murder is only wrong if you can show why it is wrong. If you mean less important than that makes the idea "murder is wrong" an eternal selfexistant truth that would be true even if God didn't exist kind of true, but atheism has never produced a why for this idea so that rules this option out.

They don't have to if they can point out that your criticism depends on your worldview. Unless you can find a direct inconsistency (not a disconnect) in their thinking, there is nothing compelling about the argument and even if such is proved, there is no rational reason for them to accept your account.

That is true if and only if the criticism is dependent on my worldview. For instance many of the positive arguments against materialism fail at this point, they make assumptions about reality (worldview) and then criticize another worldview on those assumption. That is why I stick to negative arguments about their theories and such. But they still have to come up with these reasons or their out of the game so to speak.

I see your point, but I happen to think that all of the alternatives to common-sense realism (whichever variation: Moorean, Reidian, Plantingian, etc.) ultimately lead to some sort of skepticism. Empiricism, rationalism, idealism, Kantianism, solipsism, Platonism, are all reductionist, elevating one part of our cognitive equipment over the others. The result is that all of these, though antagonistic, are united in being skeptical of most of our God-given faculties.

I actually agree with you here, but I'm not in favor of common-sense-realism, on the various philosophies. I believe that Van Til offers an alternitave to this debate, I know you would disagree with me here, that iswhy I go with him. But there is much in common-sense-realism that I like and can agree with.

 

[Philip]

Do you mean less as in more important than what or less important?

No. I mean that it is more basic---the what precedes the why chronologically and epistemically. For example, I am aware of divergent species before I am aware of theories of species diversification. I cannot have a theory (evolutionary, creationist, or otherwise) of species diversification unless I know of at least some of the divergent species.

That is why I stick to negative arguments about their theories and such. But they still have to come up with these reasons or their out of the game so to speak.

Unless they think that your reasons are dependent on your worldview---you want to have it both ways. You want to make it so that no materialist can criticize Christianity and yet you can criticize theirs. You can't do this: if you don't have to answer the materialist's objection, you cannot expect him or her to answer yours.

But there is much in common-sense-realism that I like and can agree with.

I think (if I may) that what you don't like is the idea that unbelievers can be rational. Part of my goal here is to show that Christian belief is rational (I also happen to believe that it is true) as a viable alternative among the philosophies of the world. My goal is to silence the Greeks who say "foolishness."

 

[jwright82]

No. I mean that it is more basic---the what precedes the why chronologically and epistemically. For example, I am aware of divergent species before I am aware of theories of species diversification. I cannot have a theory (evolutionary, creationist, or otherwise) of species diversification unless I know of at least some of the divergent species.

This may work fine in science but not in ethics. Ethics by its very nature demands a why to acompany the what. Also most people don't completly agree on what particular acts are considered murder. We all agree that going into someone's house and shooting them in cold blood is murder but not everyone agrees on abortion, euthanasia, infanticide, etc. The disagreements over these issues are nothing less than a disagreement in opposing theories. That is why worldview analysis is essential in these type of discussions.

Unless they think that your reasons are dependent on your worldview---you want to have it both ways. You want to make it so that no materialist can criticize Christianity and yet you can criticize theirs. You can't do this: if you don't have to answer the materialist's objection, you cannot expect him or her to answer yours.

I never just asserted that the materialist cannot criticize christianity because of their worldview, I always provided an argument as to why their theory of metaphysics could not justify the use of reason it destroyed reason, Lewis' argument from reason. So I don't want it both ways I will never simply assert something, I will always provide an argument for my assertion. I also never ruled out answering the materialist's objections either. But a transcendental critique of their worldview is an answer to their objection. Case in point is th e treatment of the story of Jonah.

The atheist materialist loves to ridicule christians for beleiving that a man was swallowed by a fish and survived, so than what is their objection? Their objection stems from their worldview because in their worldview scientific materialism rules the day and this story is just a little to hoky to believe. So I will ask them if what they are saying is this could the God of the bible preform such a miracle? This diffuses their objection because their objection is that this story is irrational but since it is purely rational to believe that an all powerful God could preform such a miracle than their objection stems from their worldview, it only makes sense in their worldview.

I think (if I may) that what you don't like is the idea that unbelievers can be rational. Part of my goal here is to show that Christian belief is rational (I also happen to believe that it is true) as a viable alternative among the philosophies of the world. My goal is to silence the Greeks who say "foolishness."

But why do they say foolishness? This was Van Til's point because upon closer analysis, like my example above, they say foolishness because their worldview demands it. Also I don't object to their being rational it is just that they use their God given tool to "supress the truth in unrightoussness". The effects of their contrary use of reason is worldview hostile to christianity. But the fact that they are made in the image of God is a point of contact, and the fact they must live in the same creation as us is another point of contact.

 

[Philip]

Also most people don't completly agree on what particular acts are considered murder.

That doesn't necessarily constitute a basic difference in theory, it could be merely a difference of definition.

I never just asserted that the materialist cannot criticize christianity because of their worldview, I always provided an argument as to why their theory of metaphysics could not justify the use of reason it destroyed reason

And you still haven't established a need for said theory. Where exactly does the obligation lie? Do we have some moral obligation to do metaphysics? You beg the question by setting up a straw man: a fully-formed metaphysical theory.

Let's take this a step further: let us suppose that the worldview in question is not materialism but a worldview which (like so much of 20th Century philosophy) maintains that metaphysics is essentially meaningless and consists entirely of category mistakes.

But why do they say foolishness?

Because they know how to make it sound foolish. Our job is to show that belief in God is no less warranted or more foolish than belief that the sun will come up tomorrow or that there is a lamp on my desk.

But the fact that they are made in the image of God is a point of contact, and the fact they must live in the same creation as us is another point of contact.

I'd go a lot further than that. Not only do we live in the same creation, but that creation is revelatory in its essence. The idea that natural theology is autonomous only makes sense if you deny the reality of God's general revelation.

 

[jwright82]

That doesn't necessarily constitute a basic difference in theory, it could be merely a difference of definition.

Since one's over arching theory determines for the most part how one defines things I would say that there is not much difference in saying this or that.

And you still haven't established a need for said theory. Where exactly does the obligation lie?

Well I'll try to then,
1. Ideas and assumptions have logical consequences to them.
2. A worldview or theory of things makes assumptions about the nature of things, metaphysics (even implicitly).
3. A beleif of anykind has logical assumptions that it rests on that must also be true in order for it to be true.
4. If a theory about the nature of things (fill in the blank ______) cannot logically support a beleif in something (morality, reason, science, whatever) than the person cannot hold to both their metaphysical theory and their said beleif.
5. If a person posits a beleif about something than there are neccessary logical assumptions that must also be true in order for the beleif to be reasonable and true, wheither or not the person agrees with these assumptions or not.
6. If these assumptions have logical consequences that invalidate the original beleif than the person holding the beleif cannot consistantly hold to that beleif for the reasons they do.
7. Beleifs that are mutually exclusive cannot be held to be true by the person at the same time.

Let's take this a step further: let us suppose that the worldview in question is not materialism but a worldview which (like so much of 20th Century philosophy) maintains that metaphysics is essentially meaningless and consists entirely of category mistakes.

I like to point out to them that they do metaphysics anyway. All postmodernists have made theories of the natures of things, mostly language, than they de facto do metaphysics.

Because they know how to make it sound foolish. Our job is to show that belief in God is no less warranted or more foolish than belief that the sun will come up tomorrow or that there is a lamp on my desk.

I agree with this, but our point of departure might be different.

I'd go a lot further than that. Not only do we live in the same creation, but that creation is revelatory in its essence. The idea that natural theology is autonomous only makes sense if you deny the reality of God's general revelation.

I agree with this.

 

[Philip]

Since one's over arching theory determines for the most part how one defines things I would say that there is not much difference in saying this or that.

I would argue that ground motives determine our definitions---ground motives also determine our theories. If theory were all the trouble we had with unbelievers, there would be little need for argument. The trouble is that the fall has penetrated to our ground motives so that even if you could disprove the theory, the worldview would remain.

1. Ideas and assumptions have logical consequences to them.

Agreed.

2. A worldview or theory of things makes assumptions about the nature of things, metaphysics (even implicitly).

A worldview is more than just a "theory of things." It's a set of attitudes (cultural, intellectual, genetic, personal) that have theoretical manifestations.

3. A beleif of anykind has logical assumptions that it rests on that must also be true in order for it to be true.

Wrong. One may wrongly arrive at right conclusions.

4. If a theory about the nature of things (fill in the blank ______) cannot logically support a beleif in something (morality, reason, science, whatever) than the person cannot hold to both their metaphysical theory and their said beleif.

What exactly do you mean by "logically support"?

5. If a person posits a beleif about something than there are neccessary logical assumptions that must also be true in order for the beleif to be reasonable and true, wheither or not the person agrees with these assumptions or not.

Unprovable. I have no reason to accept this.

7. Beleifs that are mutually exclusive cannot be held to be true by the person at the same time.

Yet we do it.

I like to point out to them that they do metaphysics anyway. All postmodernists have made theories of the natures of things, mostly language, than they de facto do metaphysics.

Not necessarily: talking about how something works is not the same as talking about what something is. Are car mechanics talking physics?

 

[jwright82]

I would argue that ground motives determine our definitions---ground motives also determine our theories. If theory were all the trouble we had with unbelievers, there would be little need for argument. The trouble is that the fall has penetrated to our ground motives so that even if you could disprove the theory, the worldview would remain.

I completly agree in fact Dooyweerd said that the disagreement was based on the religous ground-motive.

A worldview is more than just a "theory of things." It's a set of attitudes (cultural, intellectual, genetic, personal) that have theoretical manifestations.

Agreed I wasn't trying to give an absolute definition of worldview just relating that aspect of it to my argument.

Wrong. One may wrongly arrive at right conclusions.

Agreed but what I had in mind here was not the premises of an argument but other beleifs that must be true in order for the other beleif to be treu, euthanasia rests on the assumption that sometimes it is ok to murder someone.

Wrong. One may wrongly arrive at right conclusions.

A good example would be the dalla lama. His metaphysical theory involves the beleif that desire leads to suffering yet he desires for the liberation of tibet, his one beleif cannot be supported by his over arching theory of reality and everything in it.

Not necessarily: talking about how something works is not the same as talking about what something is. Are car mechanics talking physics?

Your point would be correct if and only if postmodernists did not give a theory of language to back up their claims, but they all do even implicitly (we can go thrugh the list of them if you want).

Yet we do it.

Yes but theoretically they cannot support a rational argument on two excusive beleifs.

Unprovable. I have no reason to accept this.

I cannot believe that what hitler did was right and maintain that any and all genocide is wrong because in order for my beleif that what hitler did was right rests, logically, on the beleif that some genocide is ok. If I deny that some genocide is ok and side with my second beleif than I have given up the rational basis for my first beleif. That is what I am talking about. If atheism cannot produce an adequite theory of ethics than it has no rational basis withen their worldview to support their beleif that murder is wrong.

 

[Philip]

I completly agree in fact Dooyweerd said that the disagreement was based on the religous ground-motive.

And here's the point: the ground motive influences our interpretation of the facts and causes us to synthesize a theory from them.

Agreed but what I had in mind here was not the premises of an argument but other beleifs that must be true in order for the other beleif to be treu, euthanasia rests on the assumption that sometimes it is ok to murder someone.

No it doesn't. The question is whether it's murder or mercy-killing. The conflict is over what we mean by "murder."

A good example would be the dalla lama. His metaphysical theory involves the beleif that desire leads to suffering yet he desires for the liberation of tibet, his one beleif cannot be supported by his over arching theory of reality and everything in it.

Personal inconsistencies are not theoretical inconsistencies. Whether the Dalai Lama is able to overcome his personal desires is irrelevant to the question of whether or no Buddhism is true.

Your point would be correct if and only if postmodernists did not give a theory of language to back up their claims, but they all do even implicitly (we can go thrugh the list of them if you want).

I guess I'm making the assumption that you could have a consistent postmodern language analyst coming in with no metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of language.

I cannot believe that what hitler did was right and maintain that any and all genocide is wrong because in order for my beleif that what hitler did was right rests, logically, on the beleif that some genocide is ok.

It logically entails the belief that some genocide is right---you'd have to do a lot more arguing to get me to admit that "some genocide is right" is a theoretical precondition for saying that Hitler was right. What if I came to the conclusion that some genocide was right from the premise that Hitler was right?

If atheism cannot produce an adequite theory of ethics than it has no rational basis withen their worldview to support their beleif that murder is wrong.

No---just no logical connection between "there is no God" and "murder is wrong." It's a disconnect, not a contradiction. Disconnects are not inconsistencies.

 

[jwright82]

And here's the point: the ground motive influences our interpretation of the facts and causes us to synthesize a theory from them.

Agreed. I would go further and say that one's relation to God spiritually, regenerate or unregenerate, influences this motive at a deep level.

No it doesn't. The question is whether it's murder or mercy-killing. The conflict is over what we mean by "murder."

Actually in making their arguments they do attempt to justify that the state can take someone's life for some reason besides capital punishment, although they seem to be against this as well. They call it a mercy killing but that is just sophistry by itself. It logically rests upon the assumption that the state can take people's life in cases traditionaly defined as at least homicide.

Personal inconsistencies are not theoretical inconsistencies. Whether the Dalai Lama is able to overcome his personal desires is irrelevant to the question of whether or no Buddhism is true.

Your right that doesn't diprove Buddhism, I only argued that he was contradicting his own metaphysical beleifs by his lets say political beleifs. His metaphysical beleifs cannot support his political beleifs.

I guess I'm making the assumption that you could have a consistent postmodern language analyst coming in with no metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of language.

Well to be fair to you I think they would agree that they are not making metaphysical assumptions but they are, wheither or not they like it or not.

It logically entails the belief that some genocide is right---you'd have to do a lot more arguing to get me to admit that "some genocide is right" is a theoretical precondition for saying that Hitler was right. What if I came to the conclusion that some genocide was right from the premise that Hitler was right?

Well I don't know exactlly what entails means, if you could explain, if it means something close to pressupose than we agree there. Let me lay out the argument.

1. Either it is ok to commit some genocide or no genocide.
2. Hitler commited genocide
3. It is not ok to commit any genocide whatsoever.
4. Therefore what Hitler did was not ok.

Notice that that the ethical standing of what Hitler did rests upon whether or not it is ok to commit some genocide.

What if I came to the conclusion that some genocide was right from the premise that Hitler was right?

You would only be going circles. The premise that "Hitler was right" is not true on its own so it requires other propositions that must be true first in order for it to be true it self, my argument above.

"there is no God"

I think we can both agree that this does not exaust the worldview of Atheism. My argument was not over a simple definition of Atheism but over the logical consequences of their worldview.

No---just no logical connection between "there is no God" and "murder is wrong." It's a disconnect, not a contradiction. Disconnects are not inconsistencies.

Of course there is no direct logical connection between those two statments. What foundation could an atheist appeal to to justify an ethical statment?

 

[Philip]

Actually in making their arguments they do attempt to justify that the state can take someone's life for some reason besides capital punishment, although they seem to be against this as well. They call it a mercy killing but that is just sophistry by itself. It logically rests upon the assumption that the state can take people's life in cases traditionaly defined as at least homicide.

The traditional definition is what is under attack, that's the heart of the issue.

Your right that doesn't diprove Buddhism, I only argued that he was contradicting his own metaphysical beleifs by his lets say political beleifs. His metaphysical beleifs cannot support his political beleifs.

I see a disconnect, but no logical contradiction. Perhaps a moral one, but not a logical one. On a theoretical level he can hold both.

Well to be fair to you I think they would agree that they are not making metaphysical assumptions but they are, wheither or not they like it or not.

Such as?

Well I don't know exactlly what entails means, if you could explain, if it means something close to pressupose than we agree there. Let me lay out the argument.

The form looks logically the same, yes. However presuppose means that there is an assumption, whereas entailing means that there is a deduction.

Here's the form:

If A then B.

The question is whether B is assumed by A or whether it is a logical consequence of A. A methodistic approach would say the former, while a particularist would say the latter.

1. Either it is ok to commit some genocide or no genocide.
2. Hitler commited genocide
3. It is not ok to commit any genocide whatsoever.
4. Therefore what Hitler did was not ok.

Notice that that the ethical standing of what Hitler did rests upon whether or not it is ok to commit some genocide.

Or I do it this way:

1. What Hitler did was wrong.
2. What Hitler did was to commit genocide.
3. Therefore committing genocide is wrong.

I have synthesized a principle from the particular.

You would only be going circles. The premise that "Hitler was right" is not true on its own so it requires other propositions that must be true first in order for it to be true it self, my argument above.

Yet we use the form of this to say this:

1. God is always right.
2. God told us that murder is wrong.
3. Therefore murder is wrong.

I think we can both agree that this does not exaust the worldview of Atheism.

Actually, it does. What it does not exhaust is the worldview of particular atheists. Atheism is a tenet of many worldviews including materialism, some forms of existentialism, non-materialism, and Buddhism, as well as logical positivism, scientism, and modern humanism.

Which form of atheism were you referring to?

What foundation could an atheist appeal to to justify an ethical statment?

A transcendent system of values. I believe you could find some basis for this in Jung.

 

[jwright82]

I see a disconnect, but no logical contradiction. Perhaps a moral one, but not a logical one. On a theoretical level he can hold both.

How? As the dalla lama he has reached enlightenment and therefore has no desires but he desires the liberation of tibet, that is a cntradiction.

Such as?

Rorty: that language is selfcontained, it does not really tell us anything about reality there is no correspondance theory here.

Foucalt: all language is power. All language is is an attempt to excercize power over people, this is his view of truth as well.

Derrida: There is in language a false metaphysics of presence, as he called it. In fact all differences in langusge, he worked off of the linguist Sasaure here, are a hidden ontology of violence. In fact language is so slippery that an author can be "deconstructed" to mean nearly anything the critic wants them to.

The form looks logically the same, yes. However presuppose means that there is an assumption, whereas entailing means that there is a deduction.

Here's the form:

If A then B.

The question is whether B is assumed by A or whether it is a logical consequence of A. A methodistic approach would say the former, while a particularist would say the latter

Thank you very much!

Or I do it this way:

1. What Hitler did was wrong.
2. What Hitler did was to commit genocide.
3. Therefore committing genocide is wrong.

I have synthesized a principle from the particular.

Yes but how would you prove the first premise? It requires a whole theory of ethics to do so.

Yet we use the form of this to say this:

1. God is always right.
2. God told us that murder is wrong.
3. Therefore murder is wrong.

I must say that as a Van Tillian I am not comfortable with this argument because premise one appears to assume that right is a concept that can exist on its own apart from God. I would rather say that what is right or wrong is defined by God. So rightness only makes sense when it is defined by God.

Actually, it does. What it does not exhaust is the worldview of particular atheists. Atheism is a tenet of many worldviews including materialism, some forms of existentialism, non-materialism, and Buddhism, as well as logical positivism, scientism, and modern humanism.

Which form of atheism were you referring to?

Quite true you are right that I would have to tailor my argument for each different form of atheism but the denial of God in any form has certian logical consequences that cannot be escaped by any form of atheism.

A transcendent system of values. I believe you could find some basis for this in Jung.

I don't know if Jung could be called an atheist or not, was he? This would essentially be a platonic view of ethics and therefore have all those problems that he did. Plus an atheist would have to reconcile there non-beleif in a trancsendant being with a beleif in a trancsendant morality.

 

[Philip]

How? As the dalla lama he has reached enlightenment and therefore has no desires but he desires the liberation of tibet, that is a cntradiction.

He claims to have reached enlightenment?

Rorty: that language is selfcontained, it does not really tell us anything about reality there is no correspondance theory here.

And exactly how is this metaphysics? Theories of truth are theories of how truth works, not what truth is.

Foucalt: all language is power. All language is is an attempt to excercize power over people, this is his view of truth as well.

Again, this is a theory of how it works, not what it is.

Yes but how would you prove the first premise?

It's a given.

I must say that as a Van Tillian I am not comfortable with this argument because premise one appears to assume that right is a concept that can exist on its own apart from God. I would rather say that what is right or wrong is defined by God. So rightness only makes sense when it is defined by God.

All you really say here is that premise 1 is tautologous.

Quite true you are right that I would have to tailor my argument for each different form of atheism but the denial of God in any form has certian logical consequences that cannot be escaped by any form of atheism.

In other words, you could deduce from "There is no God" other statements. I am curious as to how from this premise, one could reach the conclusion that there is no basis for ethics. I am of the opinion that all you need for ethics is a halfway decent epistemology.

Again, transcendental argumentation works only if the other party assumes your burden of proof, and you still have not shown why he or she must do so. Do I have to have a theory of physics to build a car? No, just a working knowledge of mechanics. Do I have to have a metaphysical theory to be justified in ethical claims? No, just a functioning moral sense.

I don't know if Jung could be called an atheist or not, was he?

From the best I can gather, he was a non-theistic non-materialist.

This would essentially be a platonic view of ethics and therefore have all those problems that he did.

Such as?

Plus an atheist would have to reconcile there non-beleif in a trancsendant being with a beleif in a trancsendant morality.

A non-theist may well believe in a transcendent being (the term "being" is quite vague). And even if he doesn't, where exactly does the contradiction lie?

 

[jwright82]

He claims to have reached enlightenment?

Yes I heard Ravi Zacharias discussing this very issue.

And exactly how is this metaphysics? Theories of truth are theories of how truth works, not what truth is.

The fact that he is describing what language is makes it metaphysics. If I say that words do not correspond to reality than that is a statement about the nature of language.

Again, this is a theory of how it works, not what it is.

Actually it is a theory on the nature of language that it is nothing other than power plays. A theory of metaphysics will usually have something to say on how a thing functions as well. In fact Dooyweerd used the idea of function over and against essence as a primary metaphysical principle of what a thing is, he said that a thing is how it is meant to function in creation.

It's a given

Nothing is completly given. Plus to say that it is given is only to reason in a circle. Hey I am taking care of my grandmother today and I have to take her to a doctor's apointment so I will reply to the rest when I get back.

 

[jwright82]

In other words, you could deduce from "There is no God" other statements. I am curious as to how from this premise, one could reach the conclusion that there is no basis for ethics.

It would not be so simple but yes it is possible and long.

I am of the opinion that all you need for ethics is a halfway decent epistemology.

Again, transcendental argumentation works only if the other party assumes your burden of proof, and you still have not shown why he or she must do so. Do I have to have a theory of physics to build a car? No, just a working knowledge of mechanics. Do I have to have a metaphysical theory to be justified in ethical claims? No, just a functioning moral sense.

How do you know that your moral sense is functioning right? Also once a person makes a moral statement than I may legitmatly ask why, their answer will be their theory of ethics.

Such as?

The realm of ideas is problamatic because it ultimatly begs the question. If our world exists beacause of the realm of ideas than why does the realm of ideas exist? It pushes the question back one step without answering it. Also how do we know about the realm of ideas?

A non-theist may well believe in a transcendent being (the term "being" is quite vague). And even if he doesn't, where exactly does the contradiction lie?

Just like in the Bahnsen debate his opponant contradicted his argument by trying to place God in an epistomologically awkaurd class with the soul and other immaterial things only to turn around and claim that the laws of logic were immaterial. His method rested on trying to argue over how one knows these immaterial things and have him just point out that we can't know immaterial things. To turn around and base your theory of reason on its being immaterial is selfdefeating in this case.

 

[Philip]

The fact that he is describing what language is makes it metaphysics. If I say that words do not correspond to reality than that is a statement about the nature of language.

Just as a statement that gasoline is used in a car is a statement about the nature of a car engine. It is not, however, a theory about internal combustion.

Actually it is a theory on the nature of language that it is nothing other than power plays. A theory of metaphysics will usually have something to say on how a thing functions as well. In fact Dooyweerd used the idea of function over and against essence as a primary metaphysical principle of what a thing is, he said that a thing is how it is meant to function in creation.

The trouble is that Dooyeweerd gives no reason why I should accept that function equals being or essence.

It would not be so simple but yes it is possible and long.

I would be curious to see the argument.

How do you know that your moral sense is functioning right?

How does a mechanic know that his knowledge of cars is functioning right? How does the lawyer know that his knowledge of law is functioning right? I can't say how, but the fact is that they do.

Also once a person makes a moral statement than I may legitmatly ask why, their answer will be their theory of ethics.

Again, if this is your approach, you are bound to be disappointed.

The realm of ideas is problamatic because it ultimatly begs the question. If our world exists beacause of the realm of ideas than why does the realm of ideas exist? It pushes the question back one step without answering it. Also how do we know about the realm of ideas?

What if it was said that the realm of ideas is self-existent? How do we know about anything? This kind of philosophy actually has a fair shot at coming up with a counter-philosophy that can answer all your questions---it'll be wrong, but it'll be sufficient.

Just like in the Bahnsen debate his opponant contradicted his argument by trying to place God in an epistomologically awkaurd class with the soul and other immaterial things only to turn around and claim that the laws of logic were immaterial. His method rested on trying to argue over how one knows these immaterial things and have him just point out that we can't know immaterial things. To turn around and base your theory of reason on its being immaterial is selfdefeating in this case.

But we aren't talking about a materialist, but instead a non-materialist.

 

[jwright82]

Just as a statement that gasoline is used in a car is a statement about the nature of a car engine. It is not, however, a theory about internal combustion.

How does this prove that Rorty wasn't making statements about the nature of language?

The trouble is that Dooyeweerd gives no reason why I should accept that function equals being or essence

I can't say what reasons he would give, I suspect that he would claim that it is a consequence of a truly christian philosophy.

I would be curious to see the argument.

I don't have the space here to do it justice but I will start a thread laying it out, give me a couple of days.

How does a mechanic know that his knowledge of cars is functioning right? How does the lawyer know that his knowledge of law is functioning right? I can't say how, but the fact is that they do.

Your examples are misleading because in both cases it is the senses that are in view, morality is not some physical thing out there. So the two examples you gave are irrelavent to our discussion. How do you know that a serial killer's moral sense is not acting right and everyone elses' is off? Also in your view what place does sin play in this moral sense and its rightness or wrongness?

Again, if this is your approach, you are bound to be disappointed.

Why? I have never been disapointed in using this tactic, in fact it has worked quite well. The most popular response I get is the question what? Most people have never even been asked this question and so they try to come up with reasons for their beleif or say that it is so obvious that it is beyond dispute, I lay out the problems with their answers and they ussually resort to acusing me of saying that such act is right to do. At least serious atheists get the gravity of this question and their problem. I have heard, I cannot verify, that Richard Dawkins has gone so far as to say that we must give up the beleif in evil. Many of the most famous atheists have admitted that this is a serious problem for them.

What if it was said that the realm of ideas is self-existent?

How would you know that it was self-existent? Plus what proof is there that such a place actually exists?

How do we know about anything?

That depends on what the thing is that you are talking about.

This kind of philosophy actually has a fair shot at coming up with a counter-philosophy that can answer all your questions---it'll be wrong, but it'll be sufficient.

I don't know, the history of philosophy has produced plenty of criticism of Plato after all.

But we aren't talking about a materialist, but instead a non-materialist.

The non-materialist atheist has bigger problems than a materialist does because their stratagy must be different. The non-materialist still can be questioned about basic metaphysical issues as well. I must say that most atheists are materialists, although I know of one who does ask why atheists can't believe in immaterial things? He seems to believe that they can but gives no explination as to what these objects are or where they exist? He leaves all those questions for someone else to deal with I guess, which makes him not even worthy to respond to because there is nothing to respond to.

 

[Philip]

Just as a statement that gasoline is used in a car is a statement about the nature of a car engine. It is not, however, a theory about internal combustion.

How does this prove that Rorty wasn't making statements about the nature of language?

He's doing an internal review of how language functions because he thinks that this is all that can be said. Metaphysics is the attempt to see things from the outside.

Your examples are misleading because in both cases it is the senses that are in view, morality is not some physical thing out there. So the two examples you gave are irrelavent to our discussion. How do you know that a serial killer's moral sense is not acting right and everyone elses' is off? Also in your view what place does sin play in this moral sense and its rightness or wrongness?

Just because it isn't physical, doesn't mean I can't have a functioning sense of it. Humor isn't physical, yet I have a functioning sense of humor (yes, I think that a sense of the absurd is part of our cognitive equipment).

I can judge other moral senses by my moral sense.

Sin has indeed impaired the moral sense, but we can't expect, say, G. E. Moore to acknowledge this. Internally he is justified in his non-naturalistic non-divine view of ethics.

Why? I have never been disapointed in using this tactic, in fact it has worked quite well. The most popular response I get is the question what? Most people have never even been asked this question and so they try to come up with reasons for their beleif or say that it is so obvious that it is beyond dispute, I lay out the problems with their answers and they ussually resort to acusing me of saying that such act is right to do.

Because hitherto you have dealt primarily with deontological (duty-based) views of reason where if you can't give a clear reason, you are somehow deficient in doing your epistemic duty. The problem comes when you have a non-deontological view of knowledge, such as I am suggesting. In my view, a person who could give no reasons at all would be justified in believing in God. Justification depends on what model you are operating under.

How would you know that it was self-existent? Plus what proof is there that such a place actually exists?

Well it's obvious that your sensus immaterialis is deficient. Under such a model, no "proof" would be needed.

I don't know, the history of philosophy has produced plenty of criticism of Plato after all.

Yes, and yet Platonism is still with us . . .

The non-materialist atheist has bigger problems than a materialist does because their stratagy must be different.

Yes and no---it's a much more serious challenge because it's less defined and more fluid.

 

[jwright82]

He's doing an internal review of how language functions because he thinks that this is all that can be said. Metaphysics is the attempt to see things from the outside.

If he thinks that that is all that can be said than that is a metaphysical statement. You have to be able to see outside to make a statement like that and others.

Internally he is justified in his non-naturalistic non-divine view of ethics.

What are you getting at here?

Because hitherto you have dealt primarily with deontological (duty-based) views of reason where if you can't give a clear reason, you are somehow deficient in doing your epistemic duty. The problem comes when you have a non-deontological view of knowledge, such as I am suggesting. In my view, a person who could give no reasons at all would be justified in believing in God. Justification depends on what model you are operating under.

It seems to me that, if I understand you, what is most important to ethics (standered for determining what is right or wrong, theory of ethics) is impossible because each person has their own theories or givens and that entitles them to believe these moral givens and never have to defend them because they are given. Now I know that you probally do not believe this and I don't want to misinterpret you here, so could you elaborate on the sensus thing you keep mentioning and the relation to epistemic justification?

Well it's obvious that your sensus immaterialis is deficient. Under such a model, no "proof" would be needed.

Why not? I don't believe I can place a beleif in a special catagory of unquestionable because I claim my sensus model is working fine.

I guess I just don't understand the model you are proposing and all its implications.

 

[Romans922]

Butting in and I can since I started this whole question. It is of my opinion, that at the current time in this whole thread, that the best answer is given to us courtesy of Joshua (although I can't find the post, although Rev. Winzer quotes him) when he said,

"I wouldn't try to "prove" that He exists. I would just affirm what the WLC says

"The very light of nature in man and the works of God declare plainly that there is a God, but His Word and Spirit only do sufficiently and effectually reveal Him unto men for their salvation.""

 

[jwright82]

Butting in and I can since I started this whole question. It is of my opinion, that at the current time in this whole thread, that the best answer is given to us courtesy of Joshua (although I can't find the post, although Rev. Winzer quotes him) when he said,

"I wouldn't try to "prove" that He exists. I would just affirm what the WLC says

"The very light of nature in man and the works of God declare plainly that there is a God, but His Word and Spirit only do sufficiently and effectually reveal Him unto men for their salvation.""

Sorry to have hijacked your thread. P. F. Pugh and I have been wrestling with our philosophical differences since I joined. I can't speak for him but I enjoy it because he has some fascinating things to say and he is very good at critical philosophy as well, our little ongoing discussions have only helped me to reasses my point of view where needed and strenghthen arguments when needed as well.

 

[Romans922]

No problem, continue on!

 

[Philip]

If he thinks that that is all that can be said than that is a metaphysical statement. You have to be able to see outside to make a statement like that and others.

Yes and no. I would like to think of the statement the way Wittgenstein (I) thought of the Tractatus: it's a ladder to get one somewhere and then to be discarded.

What are you getting at here?

All that is needed for internal justification is a) consistency with other propositions (non-contradiction) b) connection with some other premise in the set. External justification is, of course, properly basic.

It seems to me that, if I understand you, what is most important to ethics (standered for determining what is right or wrong, theory of ethics) is impossible because each person has their own theories or givens and that entitles them to believe these moral givens and never have to defend them because they are given. Now I know that you probally do not believe this and I don't want to misinterpret you here, so could you elaborate on the sensus thing you keep mentioning and the relation to epistemic justification?

The sensus here is our moral sense---conscience. Because of it, moral judgements are justified whether or not there is a clear theory to support them. There may be some implicit standard, but standards and theories are not necessarily the same. All theories are standards, but not all standards are theories. If there is no higher standard which can be appealed to reasonably, even an internal critique is impossible.

Why not? I don't believe I can place a beleif in a special catagory of unquestionable because I claim my sensus model is working fine.

I didn't say unquestionable---what the sensus model does is to turn the question from one of a de jure objection of justification into a de facto objection of actuality.

In Christian terms, the sensus Divinitatus (as per Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin model) makes it so that the only objection to Christian belief could be arguments for why Christian belief is false. The only cogent objection to this model (I believe) would be to argue against theism directly. The only way to prove the model false would be to prove that there is no God.

On the immaterialist non-theist model, we have to answer it by attacking the existence of a non-personal realm of transcendent . . . stuff (such a great metaphysical word, "stuff").