How do we differentiate immaterial things?

[John Bunyan]

I've read that monism has been argued from the supposed fact that there is no way to differentiate between immaterial objects, so they must be one and the same. After reading this, I've come to realize that, matter fact, I don't know how to properly differentiate immaterial objects, although it looks obvious, in my opinion, that different immaterial objects are different.

 

[John Bunyan]

most popular thread ever

 

[Tim]

John, can you provide an example?

 

[Philip]

Do you mean differentiate as in differentiating immaterial objects from material ones? Or do you mean differentiating immaterial objects from one another?

In the former case, I would suggest that the family resemblance does the trick. In the latter, it depends on what counts as an object. Is justice an object? I personally don't see a) why it should be b) how it could be. I would take the position that the only immaterial objects are minds.

 

[kappazei]

How about by the results they produce in the material world?

 

[John Bunyan]

Do you mean differentiate as in differentiating immaterial objects from material ones? Or do you mean differentiating immaterial objects from one another?

In the former case, I would suggest that the family resemblance does the trick. In the latter, it depends on what counts as an object. Is justice an object? I personally don't see a) why it should be b) how it could be. I would take the position that the only immaterial objects are minds.

I also hold this position. Minds and their thoughts are immaterial. Maybe there's some other immaterial object, but I've never needed to postulate it before, so lets stick to minds and thoughts. My question is related to the differentiation between immaterial objects.

John, can you provide an example?

Minds and thoughts. However, if you mean "example of an argument", I've read that Schopenhauer believed that since the "noumenon" was not physical, it must be immaterial and therefore undifferentiated, so all is one.

Schopenhauer regarded Kant as mistaken:

1) Kant: outside the empirical world there could be things in the plural –– Schopenhauer: outside space and time everything must be one and undifferentiated.

Hence, total reality = phenomenal realm (highly differentiated world of material objects in space and time) + noumenal realm (single, undifferentiated something that is spaceless, timeless, non-material, beyond the reach of causality) which is inaccessible to experience –– thus, the noumenon cannot cause the phenomenon –– so Schopenhauer concludes: the noumenon and phenomenon are the same reality apprehended in two different ways: the noumenon is the inner significance, the true but hidden and inaccessible being, of what we perceive outwardly as the phenomenal world.

Schopenhauer's ethics: humans are separate physical objects in space and time, temporary manifestations in the phenomenal world, of something noumenal –– this implies that in the ultimate ground of our being we are the same something –– so the wrongdoer and the wronged are in the last analysis the same –– this explains compassion.

After Schopenhauer had worked out these ideas he discovered that they were central to Hinduism and Buddhism.

 

[VictorBravo]

Not being familiar with the terminology, this may be inapposite, but wouldn't the law of addition in mathematics be immaterial?

And if so, would it not be distinguished from the laws of division?

Or perhaps even more fundamental, (because division might be in some way related to addition), isn't the law of identity (intuitively derived from self-awareness) distinct from the realization of self-awareness? I'd think both of those could be called immaterial, and, since they can be discussed, they would be objects in some sense.

 

[SRoper]

John, is what you are getting at is immaterial objects such as minds don't have physical properties--they don't have dimensions, they don't occupy a specific place, they don't have color or weight--so how can one immaterial object be distinguished from another? If they exist they must be identical in the fullest sense of the word.

 

[Philip]

I'd think both of those could be called immaterial, and, since they can be discussed, they would be objects in some sense.

Certainly they can be objects of conversation, but I don't know that I would call them objects in any other sense. They are descriptions of the way things work, not independently-existing objects. I don't know that ideas are objects.

John, is what you are getting at is immaterial objects such as minds don't have physical properties--they don't have dimensions, they don't occupy a specific place, they don't have color or weight--so how can one immaterial object be distinguished from another? If they exist they must be identical in the fullest sense of the word.

I think that part of the trouble could be dealt with if we understand that all immaterial objects are also immaterial subjects, that is minds with consciousness created individually by God.

 

[John Bunyan]

John, is what you are getting at is immaterial objects such as minds don't have physical properties--they don't have dimensions, they don't occupy a specific place, they don't have color or weight--so how can one immaterial object be distinguished from another? If they exist they must be identical in the fullest sense of the word.

That was his reasoning. Isn't this way of thinking, however, a category mistake? Different dimensions and existence in different points of space and time are physical characteristics. Physical objects are differentiated by their physical differences; immaterial objects, however, not being physical, cannot be judged by their (inexistent) physical characteristics. I mean, if a physical thing is not different from other either in space nor in time, then both are equal. Immaterial things, however, can't be judged by physical criteria, so the fact that they're not distinct physically doesn't mean that they are not distinct at all - after all, although two immaterial object do not exist in different places and times, they also do not exist at the same space and time; they are not physical at all.
What I look for is a good immaterial characteristic by which I can properly judge immaterial objects and see how one can differentiate between them.

 

[Philip]

What I look for is a good immaterial characteristic by which I can properly judge immaterial objects and see how one can differentiate between them.

I would argue that it's the fact that any immaterial object is also a conscious subject.

 

[John Bunyan]

What I look for is a good immaterial characteristic by which I can properly judge immaterial objects and see how one can differentiate between them.

I would argue that it's the fact that any immaterial object is also a conscious subject.

How so, and what difference does it make?

 

[Philip]

How so, and what difference does it make?

If the only immaterial objects are minds, then they would be individuated by the fact that each one has an unique consciousness.

 

[VictorBravo]

Certainly they can be objects of conversation, but I don't know that I would call them objects in any other sense. They are descriptions of the way things work, not independently-existing objects. I don't know that ideas are objects.

Well, that's interesting, and it introduces me to a completely different language. I always took "objects" to be something you could talk or think about--something that our consciousness can focus on independent of our being (which is supported by several of my dictionaries and at least a few philosophers I have read).

I suppose it would be helpful to define the technical use of the word everyone else seems to agree to, because in a general forum I tend to import my general understanding of such words. I still am in the habit of thinking of concepts as objects--things I look at in my mind, e.g., I would think something like the number 7 is an object, and the number 8 is an object too.

 

[Philip]

I always took "objects" to be something you could talk or think about--something that our consciousness can focus on independent of our being

I guess my main problem with this definition is that it would imply that they have independent existence. Would there be, for example, justice without just persons? If we include God in the category of "persons" then the answer has to be no.

I suppose it would be helpful to define the technical use of the word everyone else seems to agree to, because in a general forum I tend to import my general understanding of such words. I still am in the habit of thinking of concepts as objects--things I look at in my mind, e.g., I would think something like the number 7 is an object, and the number 8 is an object too.

I think that's part of what's at issue. To me, numbers are descriptors of mathematical relations, not independently-existing things. Maybe it's that I've become overly-suspicious and see Platonism lurking behind every tree.

 

[John Bunyan]

How so, and what difference does it make?

If the only immaterial objects are minds, then they would be individuated by the fact that each one has an unique consciousness.

Why?

 

[Philip]

How so, and what difference does it make?

If the only immaterial objects are minds, then they would be individuated by the fact that each one has an unique consciousness.

Why?

Why not? My thoughts aren't your thoughts---distinction of consciousness is, I think, fairly obvious.

 

[VictorBravo]

Maybe it's that I've become overly-suspicious and see Platonism lurking behind every tree.

Well, there's a very tempting thread derail.... I wish I had more time: I'm very pressed right now by the interface between disputes about actual historical facts, the application of abstract principles to them, and minimizing the potential consequences of that application (in other words, I'm preparing for a serious felony trial).

But I off-handedly wonder if the solution to the Platonic worry lies in acknowledging that God has created us in such a way that we recognize things like numbers as having a "realness" or existence simply because of innate pattern recognition.

 

[Philip]

But I off-handedly wonder if the solution to the Platonic worry lies in acknowledging that God has created us in such a way that we recognize things like numbers as having a "realness" or existence simply because of innate pattern recognition.

I would argue that these concepts are real---I merely doubt whether they exist in the sense that Platonic forms are supposed to exist (and I'm not trying to suggest that anyone here is a Platonist). Numbers, for example, would be organizing principles and concepts, but not things, as such. What would it mean for an 8 to exist? See what I'm driving at? Then too there are the problems that result. Looking back at my notes on Johannes Duns Scotus, he ends up coming with a long and complicated (and ultimately unsuccessful) account of how actually-existing universals would apply to particulars.

The other problem here is Occam's razor---I don't see how positing actually-existing universals (as opposed to conceptual universals) is necessary.

 

[John Bunyan]

How so, and what difference does it make?

If the only immaterial objects are minds, then they would be individuated by the fact that each one has an unique consciousness.

Why?

Why not? My thoughts aren't your thoughts---distinction of consciousness is, I think, fairly obvious.

It does seem obvious to me, but if it's not true by definition, then there must be a more in-depth explanation. Also, is consciousness = soul = mind?

 

[Philip]

Also, is consciousness = soul = mind?

Consciousness is not the soul, but every soul is conscious.

It does seem obvious to me, but if it's not true by definition, then there must be a more in-depth explanation.

What kind of explanation other than the fact that minds are in fact individuated are you looking for? I've provided a principle of individuation here, so I'm not sure exactly what you're asking.