Hegelianism

[Claudiu]

I have a question about Hegelianism, which might lead to more questions down the road. Anyways, here goes.

Classical (Aristotelian) logic:
- Law of identity: A = A. A thing is identical to itself.
- Law of excluded middle: A v ~A. A thing is either something or not that thing.
- Law of non-contradiction: ~(A & ~A). A thing cannot be both true and untrue at the same instance.

Hegel took fault with this formulation of classical logic. His critique was that a thing is always more than itself, a thing can be both itself and others, and a thing in existence is both itself and not itself. I think this is a denial of classical logic. He takes this to the basics of metaphysics. He starts by stating that Being is more than Being. It also includes Nothing. And this movement between Being and Nothing results in the greater reality of Becoming. He then takes this basic idea to formulate the rest of his philosophy and how reason (Geist) is an evolution from an unconscious unity to a conscious disunity and finally a conscious unity.

My question is the first step in Hegel's philosophy. How does Hegel develop the idea that a thing is always more than itself. He takes this from Being = Nothing -> Becoming. I just fail to see how one could posit that Being is also Nothing, or that Being is more than Being and also includes its opposite, Nothing. He essentially got rid of contradiction by swallowing it up in his philosophy.

 

[RamistThomist]

I have a question about Hegelianism, which might lead to more questions down the road. Anyways, here goes.

Classical (Aristotelian) logic:
- Law of identity: A = A. A thing is identical to itself.
- Law of excluded middle: A v ~A. A thing is either something or not that thing.
- Law of non-contradiction: ~(A & ~A). A thing cannot be both true and untrue at the same instance.

Hegel took fault with this formulation of classical logic. His critique was that a thing is always more than itself, a thing can be both itself and others, and a thing in existence is both itself and not itself. I think this is a denial of classical logic. He takes this to the basics of metaphysics. He starts by stating that Being is more than Being. It also includes Nothing. And this movement between Being and Nothing results in the greater reality of Becoming. He then takes this basic idea to formulate the rest of his philosophy and how reason (Geist) is an evolution from an unconscious unity to a conscious disunity and finally a conscious unity.

My question is the first step in Hegel's philosophy. How does Hegel develop the idea that a thing is always more than itself. He takes this from Being = Nothing -> Becoming. I just fail to see how one could posit that Being is also Nothing, or that Being is more than Being and also includes its opposite, Nothing. He essentially got rid of contradiction but swallowing it up in his philosophy.

I am going to give my own summary of Hegel's reading (I've read Philosophy of Right; Philosophy of History, and half of Phenomenology of Geist). Give me a day or two to get my bearings on this. I am not a Hegelian, but I understand how important he is for understanding the modern mind. He needs to be critically interacted with and not simply dismissed.

 

[RamistThomist]

Here is a stab at it:

Contrary to popular opinion, Hegel really didn't say we should take a thesis, then negate it, which produces a synthesis. What he meant by that is whenever we see an object in reality and we make a statement on it (e.g, this is X), it necessarily includes a contradiction, because we haven't yet said all we can say about the object (those webs of relation, etc).

 

[Claudiu]

I know what you mean (the thesis, antithesis, synthesis is a simplistic, reductionist way to put it for people who don't want to deal with his philosophy because it takes so much time and is pretty complicated).

But how, and why can he say what he says about Being, which would then lead him to Nothing and Becoming. It doesn't seem to necessarily follow. The contradiction seems a bit forced.


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[RamistThomist]

When Hegel says "Nothing" or "Nothingness" he is not necessarily meaning a vacuum of existence. Nothing for Hegel can simply be "No-thing," or negating the thing.

As to the Identity of Being and Becoming, that is an old Greek move. The Greeks could never fully integrate Being (the One) with Becoming (the Many) and Hegel is simply a manifestation of it.

 

[Claudiu]

When Hegel says "Nothing" or "Nothingness" he is not necessarily meaning a vacuum of existence. Nothing for Hegel can simply be "No-thing," or negating the thing.

As to the Identity of Being and Becoming, that is an old Greek move. The Greeks could never fully integrate Being (the One) with Becoming (the Many) and Hegel is simply a manifestation of it.

One can say the old Greek ideas of Parmenides and Heraclitus were resolved in Plato as he allowed for the One and the Many. Hegel seems to take Heraclitus' side and turn it into becoming (even though interpreters claim being still fits in the system). But maybe I'm reading him wrong.

So what's the necessity in negating the thing, or allowing (perhaps forcing) contradiction? The problem I'm having with Hegel is that his system sounds really nice as it's a metaphilosophy and is comprehensive. My issue is with the foundation of it. It seems rather arbitrary and random. Admittedly, I have more to learn. I'm just trying to wrap my head around it all.

 

[Claudiu]

He needs to be critically interacted with and not simply dismissed.

Many people too easily dismiss Hegel. I too think he must be dealt with considering the impact he had in what followed after him. I wonder what Van Til or Bahnsen wrote in regards to his philosophy? In the Bahnsen reader of Van Til there is a short section that deals with Hegel, but I'm looking for something more in-depth.

 

[RamistThomist]

When Hegel says "Nothing" or "Nothingness" he is not necessarily meaning a vacuum of existence. Nothing for Hegel can simply be "No-thing," or negating the thing.

As to the Identity of Being and Becoming, that is an old Greek move. The Greeks could never fully integrate Being (the One) with Becoming (the Many) and Hegel is simply a manifestation of it.

One can say the old Greek ideas of Parmenides and Heraclitus were resolved in Plato as he allowed for the One and the Many. Hegel seems to take Heraclitus' side and turn it into becoming (even though interpreters claim being still fits in the system). But maybe I'm reading him wrong.

So what's the necessity in negating the thing, or allowing (perhaps forcing) contradiction? The problem I'm having with Hegel is that his system sounds really nice as it's a metaphilosophy and is comprehensive. My issue is with the foundation of it. It seems rather arbitrary and random. Admittedly, I have more to learn. I'm just trying to wrap my head around it all.

Plato's synthesis of One/Many was a lot neater than his predecessors, though its debatable if its fully satisfactory.

When Hegel negates a thing, he is not actively doing so. He would just say, "That's the way reality is." Whenever you speak of a thing, you can never speak of the entirety of the thing (this would be the negation), for you aren't mentioning the numerous webs of relationships.

 

[Claudiu]

Plato's synthesis of One/Many was a lot neater than his predecessors, though its debatable if its fully satisfactory.

When Hegel negates a thing, he is not actively doing so. He would just say, "That's the way reality is." Whenever you speak of a thing, you can never speak of the entirety of the thing (this would be the negation), for you aren't mentioning the numerous webs of relationships.

So when speaking of a table, for example, he wouldn't say table = table. That is, a table is a table. It is more than that. It is also a process. The web of relationships in this case would be a tree, and then the table, and then, say, ashes. In this sense, we can see more of the "becoming" picture. Instead of seeing things in a static sense, as just being, more can be said. And that would be the process. Is this correct?

 

[RamistThomist]

Plato's synthesis of One/Many was a lot neater than his predecessors, though its debatable if its fully satisfactory.

When Hegel negates a thing, he is not actively doing so. He would just say, "That's the way reality is." Whenever you speak of a thing, you can never speak of the entirety of the thing (this would be the negation), for you aren't mentioning the numerous webs of relationships.

So when speaking of a table, for example, he wouldn't say table = table. That is, a table is a table. It is more than that. It is also a process. The web of relationships in this case would be a tree, and then the table, and then, say, ashes. In this sense, we can see more of the "becoming" picture. Instead of seeing things in a static sense, as just being, more can be said. And that would be the process. Is this correct?

Basically, yes.

 

[Claudiu]

Jacob, you mentioned earlier that Hegel must be dealt with, and in part because of his influence and legacy. Could you say more about that?

For starters, one thing I can think of is that his metaphysics has direct implications on things like the state, for example. With the historical move in putting the geist in a state of becoming, it's very easy to see how the individual loses his place in Hegel's philosophy. As the spirit becomes a conscious unity, the "I" gives way to the "all." In time this unity is made more apparent in the state, as it is the state that better expresses the unity or mind of the people.

 

[RamistThomist]

Jacob, you mentioned earlier that Hegel must be dealt with, and in part because of his influence and legacy. Could you say more about that?

For starters, one thing I can think of is that his metaphysics has direct implications on things like the state, for example. With the historical move in putting the geist in a state of becoming, it's very easy to see how the individual loses his place in Hegel's philosophy. As the spirit becomes a conscious unity, the "I" gives way to the "all." In time this unity is made more apparent in the state, as it is the state that better expresses the unity or mind of the people.

For better or worse, modern thought uses the language of dialectic. Of course, Hegel didn't invent that, as any reader of Plato or Plotinus knows.

As to the state, when Hegel used that term he didn't mean what we mean by it. By State he meant the cultural life of a people (civil, church, military, linguistic), so in that case, especially in societies which are pre-melting pot and relatively religious homogenous, a state in fact does express the unity of a people.

 

[Claudiu]

Ah, yes. I forgot about that usage of the state.

I think Hegel's formulation of dialectic allows for contradiction in a system. This is apparent not just in the general relativism of our age, but even in theologians.

 

[RamistThomist]

Ah, yes. I forgot about that usage of the state.

I think Hegel's formulation of dialectic allows for contradiction in a system. This is apparent not just in the general relativism of our age, but even in theologians.

I'll take it a step further: Hegel sees any aspect of reality as embodying a contradiction, which thus calls for a further synthesis. I have my problems with it but on one level it kind of makes sense. It's like the saying "You can't step in the same river twice." I'll try to explain later.

 

[Philip]

Hegelianism is the most significant heresy of the last two centuries.

 

[Claudiu]

Hegelianism is the most significant heresy of the last two centuries.

Elaborate, please!

 

[Philip]

What I mean is this: Hegelianism believes in the inevitable upward progression of history, meaning that the new synthesis must be better than what preceded it. The creeping Hegelianism in the church has meant that new trends are embraced because they are new, and very slowly, without realizing it, we begin to remake God in our image. Hegelianism is the extreme form of natural theology that led the German church to embrace liberalism and then Nazism, and it's behind the push for Gay marriage in the church today. It puts synthesis in place of revelation and puts experience ahead of God's word.

 

[RamistThomist]

What I mean is this: Hegelianism believes in the inevitable upward progression of history, meaning that the new synthesis must be better than what preceded it. The creeping Hegelianism in the church has meant that new trends are embraced because they are new, and very slowly, without realizing it, we begin to remake God in our image. Hegelianism is the extreme form of natural theology that led the German church to embrace liberalism and then Nazism, and it's behind the push for Gay marriage in the church today. It puts synthesis in place of revelation and puts experience ahead of God's word.

that is true only in the broadest sweeps. Marx specifically rejected Hegel's proposal (Marx was offended that essence preceded existence) and then inverted it. I'm not so sure about the Nazi thing. I'm sure Hegel was involved, but more likely the German Church had been liberalizing much over the last few centuries regardless of Hegel.

 

[au5t1n]

What I mean is this: Hegelianism believes in the inevitable upward progression of history, meaning that the new synthesis must be better than what preceded it. The creeping Hegelianism in the church has meant that new trends are embraced because they are new, and very slowly, without realizing it, we begin to remake God in our image. Hegelianism is the extreme form of natural theology that led the German church to embrace liberalism and then Nazism, and it's behind the push for Gay marriage in the church today. It puts synthesis in place of revelation and puts experience ahead of God's word.

Well said.

 

[Claudiu]

What I mean is this: Hegelianism believes in the inevitable upward progression of history, meaning that the new synthesis must be better than what preceded it. The creeping Hegelianism in the church has meant that new trends are embraced because they are new, and very slowly, without realizing it, we begin to remake God in our image. Hegelianism is the extreme form of natural theology that led the German church to embrace liberalism and then Nazism, and it's behind the push for Gay marriage in the church today. It puts synthesis in place of revelation and puts experience ahead of God's word.

I wouldn't credit "new" things to Hegelianism necessarily. Certainly, before Hegel, people were also attracted to something "new" because it was taken to be better than what preceded it.

 

[RamistThomist]

Idealism was old hat long before Hegel. Much of Fichte and Schelling can be found in later German liberals (and I have documented references where liberal critical scholars were quite reticent of Hegel).

 

[Claudiu]

Idealism was old hat long before Hegel. Much of Fichte and Schelling can be found in later German liberals (and I have documented references where liberal critical scholars were quite reticent of Hegel).

And I forgot which one was even more pronounced (then Hegel, even, if I'm not mistaking) on the idea of the dialectic, triad, or synthesis.

 

[RamistThomist]

Idealism was old hat long before Hegel. Much of Fichte and Schelling can be found in later German liberals (and I have documented references where liberal critical scholars were quite reticent of Hegel).

And I forgot which one was even more pronounced (then Hegel, even, if I'm not mistaking) on the idea of the dialectic, triad, or synthesis.

Hegel never thought of himself as using the triad (though it is certainly present in his works). There is even a book written on Hegel's non use of the triad.

Placed in the backdrop of German Idealism, Hegel is unremarkable. I find Ficthe more interesting and Johann Herder more profound (though Herder was more a Romantic than an Idealist). Hegel gets a bad rap because of the way Talmudists, neocons/neolibs/marxists, etc took his method and destroyed traditional morality (Hegel's treatise of politics is traditional conservatism)

 

[Philip]

that is true only in the broadest sweeps. Marx specifically rejected Hegel's proposal (Marx was offended that essence preceded existence) and then inverted it. I'm not so sure about the Nazi thing. I'm sure Hegel was involved, but more likely the German Church had been liberalizing much over the last few centuries regardless of Hegel.

Hegel was the major impetus for all of this, though. Schleiermacher, the father of German liberalism, was a contemporary of Hegel and his ideas were embraced alongside Hegel and both together led to the so-called "German Christian" movement in the Nazi era. Marxism, likewise, is a materialist adaptation of Hegel's historicism.

Why was history such a driving concern for 19th century German liberal scholars? Because of Hegel.

I wouldn't credit "new" things to Hegelianism necessarily. Certainly, before Hegel, people were also attracted to something "new" because it was taken to be better than what preceded it.

Yes, but Hegelianism justified such a change by arguing for a progression of theology where one could say "The Westminster Standards were fine for the 17th century, but we're grown-ups now and that synthesis is long past." In other words, it's the philosophy of chronological snobbery. As Christians we should hold repugnant all forms of historicism.

 

[Claudiu]

I wouldn't credit "new" things to Hegelianism necessarily. Certainly, before Hegel, people were also attracted to something "new" because it was taken to be better than what preceded it.

Yes, but Hegelianism justified such a change by arguing for a progression of theology where one could say "The Westminster Standards were fine for the 17th century, but we're grown-ups now and that synthesis is long past." In other words, it's the philosophy of chronological snobbery. As Christians we should hold repugnant all forms of historicism.

Agreed. It's interesting to note how well Hegel's philosophy works with Darwinian evolution or with the idea of progression of thought, whether it be theology or anything else. Oddly enough, I've heard critiques against Reformed theology for doing this. Somehow, the systematic theology of the Reformed parallels the progression of theology. This usually comes from the "no creed but Christ" folks.

 

[Claudiu]

Idealism was old hat long before Hegel. Much of Fichte and Schelling can be found in later German liberals (and I have documented references where liberal critical scholars were quite reticent of Hegel).

And I forgot which one was even more pronounced (then Hegel, even, if I'm not mistaking) on the idea of the dialectic, triad, or synthesis.

Hegel never thought of himself as using the triad (though it is certainly present in his works). There is even a book written on Hegel's non use of the triad.

Placed in the backdrop of German Idealism, Hegel is unremarkable. I find Ficthe more interesting and Johann Herder more profound (though Herder was more a Romantic than an Idealist). Hegel gets a bad rap because of the way Talmudists, neocons/neolibs/marxists, etc took his method and destroyed traditional morality (Hegel's treatise of politics is traditional conservatism)

He made use of the triad, but not exclusively. There are even quadrads and so on.

 

[Philip]

Agreed. It's interesting to note how well Hegel's philosophy works with Darwinian evolution or with the idea of progression of thought, whether it be theology or anything else. Oddly enough, I've heard critiques against Reformed theology for doing this. Somehow, the systematic theology of the Reformed parallels the progression of theology. This usually comes from the "no creed but Christ" folks.

I would say that there can be a progress in theology, but it isn't Hegelian progress.

I would agree that latent Hegelianism gave credence to the mythology of evolution that followed Darwin's theory.

 

[RamistThomist]

Agreed. It's interesting to note how well Hegel's philosophy works with Darwinian evolution or with the idea of progression of thought, whether it be theology or anything else. Oddly enough, I've heard critiques against Reformed theology for doing this. Somehow, the systematic theology of the Reformed parallels the progression of theology. This usually comes from the "no creed but Christ" folks.

I would say that there can be a progress in theology, but it isn't Hegelian progress.

I would agree that latent Hegelianism gave credence to the mythology of evolution that followed Darwin's theory.

Maybe so, but Hegel specifically rejected Darwin's views.

All heresies have a grain of truth--historicism takes history seriously, something Christians should do, too.

 

[Philip]

Maybe so, but Hegel specifically rejected Darwin's views.

The Origin of Species was published in 1849. Hegel died in 1831. Regardless, the right Hegelians may have rejected evolution, but the left Hegelians ran with it.

All heresies have a grain of truth--historicism takes history seriously, something Christians should do, too.

True enough. Marxism takes class differences seriously, which is also something which Christians should do. Doesn't make it less insidious.

 

[RamistThomist]

Maybe so, but Hegel specifically rejected Darwin's views.

The Origin of Species was published in 1849. Hegel died in 1831. Regardless, the right Hegelians may have rejected evolution, but the left Hegelians ran with it.

All heresies have a grain of truth--historicism takes history seriously, something Christians should do, too.

True enough. Marxism takes class differences seriously, which is also something which Christians should do. Doesn't make it less insidious.

I'm aware of the dates. Darwin didn't invent evolution. Heraclitus did and Hegel was aware of primitive evolutionary theories.