Good & Necessary: LBCF vs WCF

[Petty France]

Moderators, if you think this should be moved elsewhere, that's fine. Just seemed unnecessary to start a thread to reply to one point at hand.

WCF 1.4 The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men.Nevertheless, we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the Word:[and that there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature, and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed.

LBC 1.6: The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down or necessarily contained in the Holy Scripture, to which nothing is to be added at any time, either by new revelation of the Spirit, or by the traditions of men.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the Word.
There are some circumstances concerning the worship of God and church government which are common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word which are always to be observed.

I think the WCF and LBC are essentially stating the same thing here, just in different terms. Both are acknowledging that there are two ways to learn something from Scripture: 1) expressly set down in scripture 2) or necessarily deduced from scripture.
The only difference is whereas the WCF states "by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture" the LBC reads "necessarily contained in the Holy Scripture". They mean the same thing.

If you are going to argue that everything we know about the bible can only come from that expressly, or definitely, stated in scripture, then what do you do about the doctrine of the Trinity?

Thanks for saying that, brother Andrew. This change has been noted rather negatively in J.V. Fesko's "Word, Water, and Spirit" as well as "A Puritan Theology." Ryan McGraw in his booklet, "By Good and Necessary Consequences" comments positively, "This statement may not necessarily be corrective. It may have been changed to strengthen the assertion that the doctrines and practices that are deduced properly from scripture possess full divine authority because they are 'necessarily contained' in Scripture....In light of the fact that rejecting necessary consequence in the seventeenth century was ordinarily associated with heresy, it seems unlikely that the Baptists would have desired such an association."

What is rejected is the distinction between good consequences and necessary consequences. Gillespie argued that necessary consequences are "strong and certain." Good consequences "prove a suitableness or agreeableness of this or that to Scripture..." For Gillespie, the first are binding, the latter are not. A consequence may be good or necessary. Of course, the necessary consequence would also be good, but a good consequence is not necessarily necessary. For Baptists, it's all or nothing. Either it's necessarily contained in Scripture and thus binding or it isn't. Where the rubber hits the road, of course, is in positively instituted worship where positive revelation is required for our practice.

Benjamin Keach said, (And by quoting this I'm not trying to revive the debate, just putting this question of consequences in context) "What commission our brethren have got, who sprinkle their children, I know not. Let them fetch a thousand consequences, and unwarrantable suppositions for their practice, it signifies nothing if Christ has given them no authority or rule to do what they do in his name. Natural consequences from Scripture we allow, but such which flow not naturally from any Scripture we deny..." He goes on, "We affirm that in all positive or instituted worship (such as baptism is) which wholly depends upon the mere will and pleasure of the law-giver, it is absolutely necessary there should be an express command, or plain and clear examples, though in other respects we allow of natural deductions and consequences from Scripture for the confirming and enforcing of duties...But as there is neither express command nor example for infant-baptism; so it can't be proved by any consequence or inference, that naturally or genuously rises from any Scripture."

Taken rigidly, by confessing that "good" consequences are valid material from which to derive knowledge of "all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith and life," non-binding matters and conclusions are included within that which is never to be added unto. The Baptist confession says, "If it's good, it's necessary. If it's necessary, then it's good. If it isn't good, it isn't necessary. And if it isn't necessary, it isn't good."

The Baptist confession is more narrow than the WCF on this point, not more open. So there is a difference, but only a slight one.

For a more comprehensive explanation of this small difference with further research and documentation from paedobaptist and baptist sources, see Dr. James Renihan's essay in the Southern California Reformed Baptist Pastors' Conference Papers, here: SGCB | Book Search

 

[Afterthought]

I remember finding an old thread on this: http://www.puritanboard.com/f30/wcf-i-vi-lbc-i-vi-compared-58278/

 

[KMK]

I remember finding an old thread on this: http://www.puritanboard.com/f30/wcf-i-vi-lbc-i-vi-compared-58278/

Rev Winzer changed my thinking with this post from that thread:

It is good that men like Sam Waldron are trying to find common denominators between WCF and LBC, but sometimes they are governed by the modern Calvinist revival in Baptist circles rather than historical considerations. If the 17th century debates are taken into account, it will be seen that there was a genuine difference of opinion on how to establish the divine authority of a belief or practice. This is evident in the various exchanges between paedobaptists and antipaedobaptists. Whereas both parties agreed that Scripture explicit and implicit is the sufficient rule of faith, the paedobaptist considered "implicit Scripture" to include that which may be deduced by good and necessary consequence from the teaching of Scripture, whereas the antipaedobaptist restricted "implicit Scripture" to that which is contained in the text of Scripture. For example, in Samuel Richardson's response to Daniel Featley, it is argued, "many of our opposites confess, there is no express command or example to baptize infants, and that infants sprinkled by one of the Priests, is sufficient baptism; and yet they cannot tell us where we may find the place of Scripture where we may read it, that it is so as they say." This kind of objection repeatedly appears in the 17th century literature. Reference to "the place of Scripture" shows that the antipaedobaptists only allowed what could be proven to be implicit in the text itself. Remarkably, not a few debates on PB come down to much the same divergence as to what constitutes "implicit Scripture."

 

[Petty France]

I remember finding an old thread on this: http://www.puritanboard.com/f30/wcf-i-vi-lbc-i-vi-compared-58278/

One issue with that discussion (and many discussions on this topic) is that most readers of the WCF assume "good and necessary consequences" are one thing, whereas they are two different types of consequences. That is where the Baptist departure comes, as noted above.

 

[Petty France]

I remember finding an old thread on this: http://www.puritanboard.com/f30/wcf-i-vi-lbc-i-vi-compared-58278/

Rev Winzer changed my thinking with this post from that thread:

It is good that men like Sam Waldron are trying to find common denominators between WCF and LBC, but sometimes they are governed by the modern Calvinist revival in Baptist circles rather than historical considerations. If the 17th century debates are taken into account, it will be seen that there was a genuine difference of opinion on how to establish the divine authority of a belief or practice. This is evident in the various exchanges between paedobaptists and antipaedobaptists. Whereas both parties agreed that Scripture explicit and implicit is the sufficient rule of faith, the paedobaptist considered "implicit Scripture" to include that which may be deduced by good and necessary consequence from the teaching of Scripture, whereas the antipaedobaptist restricted "implicit Scripture" to that which is contained in the text of Scripture. For example, in Samuel Richardson's response to Daniel Featley, it is argued, "many of our opposites confess, there is no express command or example to baptize infants, and that infants sprinkled by one of the Priests, is sufficient baptism; and yet they cannot tell us where we may find the place of Scripture where we may read it, that it is so as they say." This kind of objection repeatedly appears in the 17th century literature. Reference to "the place of Scripture" shows that the antipaedobaptists only allowed what could be proven to be implicit in the text itself. Remarkably, not a few debates on PB come down to much the same divergence as to what constitutes "implicit Scripture."

As long as we keep in mind the context of "positively instituted worship," the Baptists' demands make sense (see Keach above). However, we have to be careful not to attribute to the Particular Baptists the idea that all doctrines must be established in precisely the same way or with the same demands for "the place of scripture."

 

[KMK]

However, we have to be careful not to attribute to the Particular Baptists the idea that all doctrines must be established in precisely the same way or with the same demands for "the place of scripture."

What do you mean by 'must'? Are you saying the PBs did not require the same demands for "the place of scripture" in all doctrines? Only in those where they disagreed with Westminster?

 

[Petty France]

The assertion was made that "it will be seen that there was a genuine difference of opinion on how to establish the divine authority of a belief or practice." The difference is explained as "Whereas both parties agreed that Scripture explicit and implicit is the sufficient rule of faith, the paedobaptist considered 'implicit Scripture' to include that which may be deduced by good and necessary consequence from the teaching of Scripture, whereas the antipaedobaptist restricted 'implicit Scripture' to that which is contained in the text of Scripture." And the example given is that of baptism. Then the conclusion is made that "Reference to 'the place of Scripture' shows that the antipaedobaptists only allowed what could be proven to be implicit in the text itself."

What I want us to be careful to understand is that the demand for the "place of scripture" takes place within the context of positively instituted worship (practice, not belief). It was within that context that consequences were not valid sources of prescribing how to practice an ordinance. However, the Particular Baptists accepted "consequences" and used the term favorably to justify many of their doctrinal beliefs.

But if we simply generalize the Baptist position as demanding "the place of scripture" for any belief, as opposed to demanding "the place of scripture" for how to practice positively instituted worship, then we are misrepresenting them and the confession.

 

[Petty France]

The generalization above likewise does not take into account what the rest of LBCF 1.6 says about the circumstances of worship. "There are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature." The light of nature is that which human reason can conclude apart from special revelation. Like, "Let's meet at 10:30 AM instead of 3 AM." A scripture reference is not demanded for such things.

Then you have to compare this to 22.1 which says, "The light of nature shews that there is a God, who hath lordship and sovereignty over all; is just, good and doth good unto all; and is therefore to be feared, loved, praised, called upon, trusted in, and served, with all the heart and all the soul, and with all the might. But the acceptable way of worshipping the true God, is instituted by himself, and so limited by his own revealed will, that he may not be worshipped according to the imagination and devices of men, nor the suggestions of Satan, under any visible representations, or any other way not prescribed in the Holy Scriptures."

Putting this in perspective,

For the Particular Baptists, the Abrahamic Covenant was not the Covenant of Grace, and circumcision was not an old form of baptism. Thus, in the New Covenant (the Covenant of Grace) if infant baptism was not commanded by God, it ought not to be practiced. Without a command, they felt no obligation, and indeed resisted it. Obviously, coming from the Paedobaptist perspective the Abrahamic Covenant was the Covenant of Grace, thus the command had been brought in back in Genesis 17. Ergo, in the New Covenant administration of the Covenant of Grace, you don't expel the children if God has not expelled them. Baptists asked for proof of this, Paedobaptists supplied Genesis 17. Baptists rejected that (for reasons stated above) and demanded a New Testament scripture reference. Paedobaptists did not agree and felt no obligation to supply one. The consequence of the nature of the administrations of the covenant of grace was sufficient ground for justifying their practice. Rinse, repeat, ad nauseam.

The debate needs to be about covenant theology, not baptism.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

What is rejected is the distinction between good consequences and necessary consequences. Gillespie argued that necessary consequences are "strong and certain." Good consequences "prove a suitableness or agreeableness of this or that to Scripture..." For Gillespie, the first are binding, the latter are not. A consequence may be good or necessary. Of course, the necessary consequence would also be good, but a good consequence is not necessarily necessary. For Baptists, it's all or nothing. Either it's necessarily contained in Scripture and thus binding or it isn't. Where the rubber hits the road, of course, is in positively instituted worship where positive revelation is required for our practice

This is not how Gillespie differentiates between necessary consequence and good consequence. Good consequences are, in fact, binding if they are congruous with a necessary principle.

Gillespie:

Fourthly, There are two sorts of consequences which Aquinas, part 1, quest. 32, art. 1, distinguished!: 1. Such as make a sufficient and strong proof, or where the consequence is necessary and certain, as, for instance, saith he, when reason is brought in natural science to prove that the motion of the heaven is ever of uniform swiftness, not at one time slower and another time swift*er. 2. By way of agreeableness or conveniency, as in astrology (saith he), this reason is brought for the eccentrics or epicycles, be*cause, by these (being supposed) the phenomena or apparentia sensibilia in the celestial motions may be solved: which he thinks is no necessary proof, because their phenomena may be solved another way, and by making another supposition. Now the consequences from Scripture are likewise of two sorts, some necessary, strong and certain, and of these I here speak in this assertion; others which are good consequences to prove a suitableness or agreeableness of this or that to Scripture, though another thing may be also proved to be agreeable unto the same Scripture in the same or another place. This latter sort are in divers things of very great use; but for the present I speak of necessary consequences.

When we go to Aquinas from where he draws the distinction, we find this:

Reply to Objection 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.

In other words, Gillespie is agreeing with Aquinas' principle that there are two ways to establish a point. The second way requires that the first way be necessary in order for it to be useful as an argument. In other words, a good consequence is when you've already established a necessary consequence and it can be shown to be confirmatory of the necessary consequence. To use a military term, the good consequences are "supporting fire" for the necessary consequences. In political dialog, the same data (low employment) is used as "good consequence" by political opponents in two completely different ways. If your first principle is "small government" then low employment confirms one thing while if you're "big government" it confirms something completely different. If you can demonstrate that one of the two principles is absolutely certain then low job numbers couldn't have been used to prove the first principle but it is absolutely confirmatory of the symptom if that first principle is true.

In fact, when a credo-Baptist is arguing for the examples from the Scriptures they've first established their necessary consequences about the nature of the NC and who the proper subjects of baptism are and then proceed to the examples (good consequences) in the NT as confirmatory of their necessary principle.

In light of the above, consider what Gillespie says afresh:

...others which are good consequences to prove a suitableness or agreeableness of this or that to Scripture, though another thing may be also proved to be agreeable unto the same Scripture in the same or another place.

In other words there are some Scriptures that can be read in different ways depending upon first principles (necessary consequences). Hermeneutics is absolutely controlled by first (or necessary) principles and if you goon that up then you goon up everything else that you appeal to as confirmatory of those principles. Witness how the Romand Catholic Church uses Scripture to confirm its dogma.

 

[NaphtaliPress]

I missed the reference, for those likewise wondering, this is from chapter 20 in George Gillespie's Miscellany Questions, "That necessary consequences from the written word of God do sufficiently and strongly prove the consequent or conclusion, if theoritical, to be a certain divine truth which ought to be believed, and, if practical, to be a necessary duty which we are obliged unto, jure divino"
A Treatise of Miscellany Questions: Wherein Many Usefull Questions & Cases ... - George Gillespie - Google Books

 

[Petty France]

What is rejected is the distinction between good consequences and necessary consequences. Gillespie argued that necessary consequences are "strong and certain." Good consequences "prove a suitableness or agreeableness of this or that to Scripture..." For Gillespie, the first are binding, the latter are not. A consequence may be good or necessary. Of course, the necessary consequence would also be good, but a good consequence is not necessarily necessary. For Baptists, it's all or nothing. Either it's necessarily contained in Scripture and thus binding or it isn't. Where the rubber hits the road, of course, is in positively instituted worship where positive revelation is required for our practice

This is not how Gillespie differentiates between necessary consequence and good consequence. Good consequences are, in fact, binding if they are congruous with a necessary principle.

I agree with your assessment of Gillespie. The phrase I would home in on is "if they are congruous with a necessary principle." In other words, good consequences are not in and of themselves binding. They do not self-evidently bind faith to believe a certain thing. When in relation to a necessary consequence, of course that changes. This just brings me back to the point that the Baptist confession does not deny consequences, or the use of reason and deduction in theology, not in the least. What it does is that it simply limits that which is binding to that which is necessarily contained. One could argue that both good and necessary consequences are "necessarily contained" within scripture, and I wouldn't really disagree with that. I would just say that the confession declines to include good consequences here.

I would repeat Keach, in case anyone missed his words: "Natural consequences from Scripture we allow, but such which flow not naturally from any Scripture we deny..." He goes on, "We affirm that in all positive or instituted worship (such as baptism is) which wholly depends upon the mere will and pleasure of the law-giver, it is absolutely necessary there should be an express command, or plain and clear examples, though in other respects we allow of natural deductions and consequences from Scripture for the confirming and enforcing of duties..."

To clarify, I'm not saying "Gillespie was wrong" or the "WCF is wrong." For that reason, I don't really disagree with your replies. I appreciate them. My burden is to show that the Particular Baptists supported the use of reason and deduction in theology, that they narrowed the focus of the confession on this point (it would seem) to decline including good consequences in that which is "necessary...for salvation, faith, and life," and that their writings make this clear. I also wanted to show that their demands for explicit scripture and their rejection of consequences in the Baptism debate cannot and should not be extrapolated to reflect all of their theological convictions (for the reasons just stated).

My concern has more to do with accurate historical understanding and representation of the Baptists than this issue itself. There is little disagreement beyond a slightly narrower focus in our confession.

To allay your concerns (should you have any), take this example: Nehemiah Coxe (most likely editor of the Confession) was tasked with taking down the errors of a Baptist named Thomas Collier who went off the deep end on just about every issue. Among his many errors, Collier denied the Trinity and denied that Christ was the Son of God in both natures. To support his views, Collier said "That which Scripture no where affirms, is unsound and unsafe for any man to affirm." Coxe replied, "If his meaning...be, that every notion that is not either exprest in terms in the Scripture, or by just consequence deduced from it (for ex veris nil nisi verum) is unsound, we grant it." Later Coxe repeats this Latin phrase and expands it to say "The just and necessary consequence of a true notion, is truth, and nothing else." If I add "ex veris nil nisi verum" to my signature, will you believe me?

Blessings.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I'm not trying to pick a fight here. I belived you'. I'm only trying to make things clearer.

I don't doubt that Baptists use necessary consequences. I also think they use good consequences as well in the manner that Gillespie defined it.

For example, a passage notes that Lydia's heart was opened and she received Paul's words with joy and was baptized. This is an example that, if one accepts the first principle of Baptist theology, it is confirmatory of the principle that the Church is to look for evidence of the new birth prior to baptism. One also sees these stories repeatedly appealed to as "good consequences" in the sense that Baptists will say: "See, every instance that we see people being baptized, the household has people who are confessing."

I think that, in principle, they may deny that their good consequences are binding but, in practice, Baptists have historically appealed to them as confirmatory of the necessary principle and, in that sense, they are binding because the historical examples they appeal to (that could be used either way depending upon first principles) are then used to inform normative practice.

As one example I just thought of, the Baptist insistence on "much water" is really a good consequence of the necessary consequence of how Baptists view the definition of baptizo. There is nothing necessary about the passages themselves but they become confirmatory and, therefore, normative for all Baptist practice.

In other words, I think Baptists have tried to deny the use of good consequence but it seems inescapable to me.

 

[Petty France]

In conjunction with a necessary consequence, yes I agree that Baptists do (and should) use good consequences.

I think what helps to put the confessional change of wording into perspective is Robert Ferguson's (a Scot) "The Interest of Reason in Religion" (1675) wherein he discusses this issue of consequences and how truth alone comes from truth, etc. But he also recognizes that the further we go in deduction, the more we find "liableness to mistake...And accordingly we desire no man to assent to the thing concluded till we have examined, or at least may, and be satisfied, that there is nothing false and sophistical in the way and manner of its deducement." Later he said, "We do not believe a conclusion to be an Article of Faith upon the formal reason of its deduction, but upon the authority of God in the Bible."

With that reasoning in mind, to decline to include "good consequences" in the articles of the faith (i.e. a confession and that which is "necessary for salvation," etc.) doesn't have to mean that Baptists cannot or do not appeal to or use good consequences, but rather that they decline to include them in that which is "necessary for salvation, faith, and life," etc. because they are not self-evidently true. It's kind of hard to think of a good consequence apart from a necessary consequence, but conceptually in a confession where what is "necessary for salvation, faith, and life" is controlling the statements, one can do so.

Outside of the baptism debate, have you found baptists to deny good consequences? Or is it just that they deny the paedobaptist good consequences when it comes to baptism? (obviously we're generalizing here.)

 

[py3ak]

Sam, do you know of any documentation of the distinction between good and necessary outside of Gillespie and Aquinas? The phrase "good and necessary" is used in other places where dividing between the two categories would be quite unnatural: that is, the two adjectives definitely describe the same noun. The fact that Gillespie makes that distinction doesn't mean it was enshrined in the Confession, so it's a topic I'd like to look into a little more thoroughly.

Thanks!

 

[Petty France]

Good question, one which I would love to see more work put into and more research brought to light. Still working from the article I referenced above, these offer evidence that would seem to support the distinction:

William Greenhill on Ezekiel wrote "Things fundamental and absolutely necessary, are most clearly laid down in the word; they are expressly commanded, or held forth in Scripture, whether they be matters of faith or practice; they are not things drawn out by remote consequences, and the strength of men's parts. But immediately from or in the word; and in these most may or do agree, not being many in number: so far as we have attained in these, let us walk; and, as king James saith, in other things place may be given to Christian liberty: and let us take heed how we charge men to hold fundamental errors; when fundamentals are few, Rom. x. 9; 1 John iv. 2, and men's errors are extra-fundamentals." (pg 269 of 1889 reprint)

Richard Baxter attributed sin to Protestants on this count: he said, "By calling good and lawful if not necessary things, Antichristian and Popish, you have made Religious people ridiculous and a scorn to many that have more wit than conscience, as if we were all such humorous novices as would run mad by being frightened with the name of Antichrist: and as they deride you for it as fanatical so they the less fear Popery itself."
He seems to at least draw a distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals via that language, much like Greenhill (and in a way, Gillespie). Side note: Why any self-respecting protestant and Reformed Christian would be favorable to Baxter in light of things like this is beyond me...

Btw, Keach told his readers to go read Greenhill on Ezekiel for this passage which leads me back to my previous statements about elevating "good consequences" or "non-binding consequences" to the level of the confession, etc.

Where do you find good and necessary to be used in a way that dividing them would be so unnatural? I would enjoy looking into that (some time).

 

[Petty France]

Ryan McGraw's little booklet views WCF 1.6 in the way we have been discussing (namely distinguishing the two), with Gillespie as the main explanation. That doesn't seal the deal, just gives some more reading and argumentation for your consideration.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Ruben,

That's a good question. It's interesting how many places in Reformed systematic theologies (Hodge, Brakel, Muller) the use "necessary consequence" is used apart from good consequence. Hodge even quotes Gillespie's understanding as normative for Reformed understanding of necessary consequences.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Outside of the baptism debate, have you found baptists to deny good consequences? Or is it just that they deny the paedobaptist good consequences when it comes to baptism? (obviously we're generalizing here.)

I think I'm just pushing back on any who, in the past, might have gotten rid of the idea of "good consequence" in their definition of what might be argued from the Scriptures as binding. You seem to indicate that this was done intentionally by the Baptists based on some perceived abuse of the category of argument.

My own (very limited) research of the distinction seems to note the distinction made by Aquinas. I am making a non-studied guess here but it seems to be so well accepted to use the term necessary consequence that this is a well-worn philosophical use. The more I contemplate the distinction, the more I find it to be an extremely helpful (and inescapable) distinction.

I haven't yet seen an example presented where a "good consequence" argument was made that didn't appeal to a first principle and was used to establish a dogma that would give rise to a historical concern that paedobaptists were playing fast and loose with consequences. What is the example where the credo-Baptists needed to say: "OK, well we don't want to do that so we'll get rid of good consequences as binding"? I'm not even sure the example of Baxter cited above proves that good consequences were being used improperly - it might only prove that he didn't accept some of the necessary consequences that would have made some arguments perfectly valid. It would also make him the chief of hypocrites as his book The Reformed Pastor is filled with good consequences that would seek to bind the conduct of ministers for generations to come.

One example that was offered was that Baptists asked for the warrant to baptize children and the paedobaptists responded with Genesis 17. As you noted, however, the issue was on the dispute of CT. If the Baptists had agreed on first principles about the nature of CT then Genesis 17 would be a perfectly appropriate response. Why? Because the asking of the question presumes a first principle rejection of paedobaptist CT. I also point out that it can be demonstrated that the Baptist insistence on mode of baptism is a good consequence argument based on their necessary consequence of the understanding of the Greek word baptizo.

I'm not trying to get into the debate over baptism any more than you are but simply to point out that I can't see any difference in the manner that Baptists argue for some of their principles both from necessary and good consequence and that some may have historically rejected the use of the latter while practically adopting it anyway.

As I stated before, I don't see any way around it. I'm perfectly fine with anybody using good consequence arguments. I don't have to accept their first (or necessary) principle even if I can understand that, in light of what they believe, that good consequence would make sense to insist upon as binding.

My problem (not with you), is when someone states that they don't use good consequences at all. Even in their criticism of those who do, they end up using a good consequence argument to prove that someone is violating the Scriptures by using good consequences.

Thanks so much for this thread. It's been very helpful to my thinking on the subject.

 

[py3ak]

Ruben,

That's a good question. It's interesting how many places in Reformed systematic theologies (Hodge, Brakel, Muller) the use "necessary consequence" is used apart from good consequence. Hodge even quotes Gillespie's understanding as normative for Reformed understanding of necessary consequences.

That's why I'm interested in more sources. Not everyone uses the language of good and necessary (e.g., Turretin): if we are to consider them distinct, where does "legitimate" fit in? Shaw seems to take it as a twofold description of a valid consequence, rather than as two kinds of consequences. Those who think Gillespie's understanding is typical take the "and" as listing two different qualities, instead of as conjoining them, almost making it, in effect, "or"; others seem never to have thought of making a distinction.

And in reference to other places where "good and necessary" appears as a twofold description indivisibly connected in their subject, I think William Prynne's line about just war, that it is waged for the good and necessary defence of the commonwealth is best taken that way (The Sovereign Power of Parliaments and Kingdoms, p.47). Lancelot Andrewes speaks similarly of water and its use in Apospasmatia Sacra; the statute restricting privateers from moving slaves without a license or owner's consent speaks of "good and necessary laws," not referring to two differents kinds of laws, but to laws which were necessary and good (presumably necessary with regard to restricting behavior people would otherwise engage in, and good on account of its effects or general wisdom). When Latimer says that horses are good and necessary for a king, it seems wildly unlikely that he thinks some horses are good and others are necessary (First Sermon before King Edward the Sixth)! In Walker's Hibernian Magazine Sunday School is considered a good and necessary work - again, both qualities inseparably united in one institution. No doubt further research would turn up more, but such a sidelight may not be worth pursuing in great depth.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I've seen in some resources all three: good and necessary, necessary, and good consequences.

I guess the question is that, when you find people conjoining them - do they intend to be precise? That is to say, are they just using the term without feeling the need to explain how they do or don't believe they ought to be differentiated? I've also seen the idea of good consequence used in other places where it isn't used at all as we've discussed.

I think we have to admit that this is a distinction that we wouldn't often think about ourselves and that simply because we see good and necessary used in a certain fashion indicates that the ideas are inseparably conjoined in their minds. I could just have easily been read in the past as using this term and I'm no authority on what GNC means but some might interpret my use as if the terms cannot be separated.

As I noted, I think that when an author is using the term precisely the terminology appears to be established philosophical language and I'm hoping to find some resource that would give that history. The problem with finding anything is that "necessary consequence" on the web appears to be dominated by Reformed people using the term to describe either good or necessary consequence.

 

[NaphtaliPress]

Interesting. One avenue to explore might be the logic text books of the period when men like Rutherford, Gillespie, etc. received their schooling. Ramus, Keckerman (the latter may be more the textbook of their day), others? The Puritan ministres in general would have some knowledge of Aquinas and surely would have known the distinction Gillespie is drawing from him. Rutherford seems (?) to use good and necessary interchangeably, or at least of kin to each other. He also uses "due consequence." See his many uses in
Due Right of Presbytery
Pretended Liberty of Conscience
Divine Right of Church Government (see p. 121 where he uses the phrase infallible and necessary consequence as opposed to fallible and unnecessary)
Lex Rex
Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himself

 

[NaphtaliPress]

There was also Dudley Fenner among other logic textbooks for the Puritans. This looks like an interesting read:
Puritan Logic books

 

[py3ak]

Rich, Gillespie is obviously intending to be precise (that's pretty much how he always rolls): so I recognize that it adds a layer of precision to distinguish between the two. What is not so clear to me is whether the Confession also intended to convey that same level of precision. Take David Dickson as an example. He is obviously familiar with "good and necessary" in the Confession, given his commentary on it; but in his commentary on Matthew 22 he speaks of a "good" consequence only. I don't think he meant to say that Christ's conclusion wasn't necessary. If it is possible for other writers to use the terms as necessarily implying (!) one another, it would be possible for the Confession to do as well.

Thanks for the links, Chris. I figured you would have some additional background information that could help sort things out. Keckermann seems like a likely place, but a quick glance through the table of contents didn't tell me where to look, so tracking it down might be quite an adventure.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Ruben,

I don't want to be dogmatic here but am only trying to determine whether Gillespie may be representing someone who spelled out more clearly what everyone might have taken for granted but, in spite of it, may have used other terms.

I found this from Rutherford's Against Separatism (Rutherfurd Against Separatism: Part One | Naphtali Press)

3. The evidence of knowledge of fundamentals is gravely to be considered. Hence these distinctions.

DISTINCTION ONE. One may believe that Christ is the Son of God by a Divine faith, as Peter does (Matt. 16:17), and yet doubt of the necessary fundamental consequences. Ergo, Christ must be delivered into the hands of sinners, and be crucified, as the same Peter doubted of this. For as one may fall in a grievous sin, though regenerated, and fail in act[ion], and yet remain in grace, in habitu [in condition], the seed of God remaining in him, so may Peter and the apostles doubt of a fundamental point of Christ’s rising from the dead (John 20:8, 9), in an act of weakness, and yet have saving faith in Christ, as it is like[ly] many of the saints at Corinth denied an article of their faith, the rising again of the dead. One act of unbelief makes not an infidel.

DISTINCTION TWO. A simple Papist and a Lutheran, not well educated, believes upon the same former ground, that Christ is true man, and has an habitual faith of this article, that Jesus Christ is truly the Son of David, and yet holds transubstantiation, or consubstantiation, that Christ’s body is in many sundry places in heaven, and earth, on this side of the sea, and beyond sea. Yet the connection between Christ’s humanity and this monster of transubstantiation not being possible, all error may be merely philosophic, that the extension of quantitative parts without or beyond part, is not the essence of a quantitative body, while as the rude man believes firmly that Christ is true man, and so believes contradictory things by good consequence. Therefore the quality of the conscience of the believer is to be looked into, since fundamental heresy is essentially in the mind, and pertinency and self-conviction does inseparably follow it.

It's an interesting discussion where Rutherford is discussing the various "levels of guilt" there are in denying fundamentals of the faith and acknowledges that some men affirm some "necessary fundamental consequences" but then they believe "contradictory things by good consequence". As I'm reading Rutherford here, he seems to maintain the distinction that Gillespie is using. I think his point is that the "good consequence" of a Lutheran or RCC theology of the Lord's Supper (i.e. Christ's body is in many places) is contradictory to the "necessary fundamental consequence they accept as an article of faith (Christ is fully God and fully man).

I suppose it could be demonstrated (as you say) that the use was never so formal. We may find good, necessary, or good and necessary consequence referring to essentially the same thing because they used them interchangeably.

I do think we need to also grant that it could have been a formal distinction and, like the situation today, distinctions are not always recognized by even the best of us and we may not employ them properly but, as long as people know what we're saying, it's still possible to communicate what you intend precisely.

 

[py3ak]

Rich, I would read Rutherford a little differently: I think the things the rude man believes are contradictory by good consequence, not that the rude man believes one of them by good consequence and the other by necessary.

Thus the rude man is believing two things: the implications of the one are incompatible with the implications of the other, and that incompatibility can be shown by good consequence - by a valid train of inferences. The rudeness of the man makes the unawareness of the incompatibility undertandable, because he hasn't gone through the chain of reasoning to see that one contradicts the other.

In reading Gillespie or Aquinas, one obviously has to keep the distinction in mind and be ready to use it. My question is whether we have sufficient evidence to say that it also has to be kept in mind when it comes to the Confession. Perhaps the minutes shed some light on the subject?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Rich, I would read Rutherford a little differently: I think the things the rude man believes are contradictory by good consequence, not that the rude man believes one of them by good consequence and the other by necessary.

I didn't say the rude man believed the first by necessary consequence. I said that he confesses the necessary fundamental consequence that Christ is fully God and fully man. Necessary consequence is true, necessary consequence if it corresponds to ectypal theology (as God intends and reveals it). It does not depend upon man deciding what is a necessary consequence of the Scriptures. Rutherford is not saying that they've worked it all out and came to the conclusion, through the use of their reason, but they nevertheless hold that article of truth as true. He's sort of saying that people can confess something that is truly true even if they don't know why it is the case.

He then goes on to say that, in spite of the fact that they confess the fundamental truth about the Incarnation, they still might hold to transubstantiation as a matter of good consequence even though it contradicts what they confess (without understanding) in another case. He's not letting them off the hook for the contradiction but he's sort of saying that some people just don't think things through and might hold two things in contradiction

I guess I may be assuming too much to assert that Rutherford agrees with Gillespie's distinction here but, on the assumption that this is the case, I can see how the two are used here although I wouldn't stake my life on it.

I'll stop by saying that I agree that some definitive minutes or some other place that showed that it wasn't just Gillespie that held this distinction would be helpful.

 

[py3ak]

He then goes on to say that, in spite of the fact that they confess the fundamental truth about the Incarnation, they still might hold to transubstantiation as a matter of good consequence even though it contradicts what they confess (without understanding) in another case. He's not letting them off the hook for the contradiction but he's sort of saying that some people just don't think things through and might hold two things in contradiction

I guess I may be assuming too much to assert that Rutherford agrees with Gillespie's distinction here but, on the assumption that this is the case, I can see how the two are used here although I wouldn't stake my life on it.

I'll stop by saying that I agree that some definitive minutes or some other place that showed that it wasn't just Gillespie that held this distinction would be helpful.

I see where I was unclear; I agree with your opening paragraph. The different reading comes in with this:

Yet the connection between Christ’s humanity and this monster of transubstantiation not being possible, all error may be merely philosophic, that the extension of quantitative parts without or beyond part, is not the essence of a quantitative body, while as the rude man believes firmly that Christ is true man, and so believes contradictory things by good consequence.

What is the function of "by good consequence" in this sentence? The hypothetical unlettered papist or Lutheran believes that Christ is truly human: the implication of that is that transubstantiation is impossible, but this rude man doesn't see that. So does he hold to transubstantiation by a good consequence from a philosophic error? I.e., if we granted the error we would have to admit that transubstantiation does, in fact, follow? Or is it that he believes in the humanity of Christ, and by a mistake, in transubstantiation - two things which by good consequence are contradictory? I incline towards the latter. Having "contradictory things by good consequence" when the meaning is "things contradictory by good consequence" is an awkwardness within the parameters of Scottish diction.

It would certainly be quite fascinating to see if a distinction between good and necessary consequences would track with a division between fundamental and non-fundamental points; given the reluctance to delimit the list of fundamental points such a correlation would raise some interesting subsidiary questions, such as if there are places where there is uncertainty about whether a deduction is necessary or merely good.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Well, anyway, these kinds of discussions certainly help me to understand the issue more fully than I had considered it previously.

 

[Petty France]

It would certainly be quite fascinating to see if a distinction between good and necessary consequences would track with a division between fundamental and non-fundamental points; given the reluctance to delimit the list of fundamental points such a correlation would raise some interesting subsidiary questions, such as if there are places where there is uncertainty about whether a deduction is necessary or merely good.

I think that a variety of the quotations we have collected in this thread would bolster that kind of thinking. The further down the deduction-chain you go, the less stress you lay on that point, the less you divide over that point, and, in a manner of speaking, the less you enforce belief on that point. It seems that given the variety of terminology used and the way the terms are used within that variety, we should at least view consequences on a scale of certainty.

You could avoid the nitty gritty and just opt for "necessarily contained."

I jest, sort of...

 

[py3ak]

Rutherford remarks about something not being proven by the "thirteenth consequence" (similar to Andrew Marvell's identification as the disputer of this world as one who sees into the thirteenth, not the second consequence), where 13 appears to be proverbial for a long deductive train resulting in a very remote conclusion.

But I am having difficulty conceiving of a genuine distinction between a valid consequence and what is necessarily contained in Scripture. If Scripture legitimately implies something, how is it not necessarily contained therein?