God's Law, God's Character

[Ravens]

First of all, you've never seen my name in this particular forum. I don't go out, pick fights, and then come on here and ask for help... I've gotten that impression before from some threads on here. :bigsmile:

But I'm having a discussion with someone on a non-religion related site that has a religion board. I wasn't even going to get involved, but he's quite intelligent, and none of the people on there could really answer him. And so far I've pretty much handled him thoroughly, but I'm tryin' to think about somethin' and I'm just coming up with mental flatulence.

Its really a simple question, but maybe one I've never really thought about. I kinda vacillate on the Problem of Evil argument, whether to respond to it with "God is the standard and norm for goodness, so its not even possible to charge Him with evil, because whatever He does is necessarily good", or "He has a morally sufficient reason for ordaining the existence of evil."

But regardless. (I'm tired right now, but I wanted to get some feedback by tomorrow afternoon, hence posting tonight... but pretty fuzzy, excuse the lack of clear thought).

This guy is saying that if *man* would be in violation of the moral law if he saw someone being murdered, and failed to intervene and try to help the person (or saw an old lady getting robbed, or whatever)... then is God not being faithful to His own law by not intervening to stop murders and what not.

Like, if the law is a true reflection of His character, why does He not intervene?

I mean I know these are simple questions, they aren't "issues" with me whatsoever, and I have responses, I'm just looking for the *best* way to respond.

I mean I would just say that God's law is a perfect reflection of God's holy character, but it is God's character "embodied" in a manner appropriate to be lived out by man. That probably didn't make any sense. :bigsmile:

As in, God manifests His character in his own actions in a manner appropriate to His Deity and "Godness." Thus, we are not to judge (in the sinful sense), but God does indeed judge and send to Hell. Because it is "ontologically appropriate" for Him to do so. But what's the best way to phrase that?

Its not a debate on sovereignty... just, how does God not do things we are commanded to do, and still say that the moral law is a reflection of His character.

Once again, these are not problems for me, I just want to respond in the best possible manner, since I'm not in this for my ego, but honestly to try to just have a voice of faith & reason on that board.

I mean we're already like 20 days into the discussion. But anyway.

Hope you guys can detect my "point" amid all that gibberish.

 

[Ravens]

No thoughts?

 

[R. Scott Clark]

Originally posted by Mudandstars
No thoughts?

The answer, which will not satisfy the critic, is this: There is a distinction to be made between the way God knows and understands his law and its relations to his nature and the way he reveals his law and its relations to his character.

The critic is assuming univocal relations between the word "law" for God and the word "law" for us or univocity in content or referent of the word law for God and for us.

We do not assume univocity. We assume an analogy. God has spoken analogically, by acommodation to us. We cannot then, take God's revelation to us, and use it as fulcrum by which to lever God's acts.

This is why Scripture says in Isa 55 that God's ways and thoughts are not ours, they are higher than ours. There is analogy between God's understanding of the moral law and his relations to it and ours, but not identity. Hence Job 38. When Job dares charge God with injustice, God replies by reminding him of the Creator/creature distinction. We do not have standing to charge God with injustice. We're not ontologically or morally qualified.

This will not satisfy the critic who will bring God to the bar of fallen human rationality or rationalism, but it must do for Christians who accept the incarnation, the Trinity, and substitionary atonement as revelational data.

Can I explain, therefore, univocally, God's destruction of the firstborn of the Egyptians? No. We're talking about God. I can't explain anything about God univocally. I can only use the authorized analogies to try to approximate God's self-understanding. Approximation is not penetration or identity.

Is God unjust? No. Why not? It's not in his nature. Can I say exactly how? No. Can I mitigate it? Yes. Where? On the cross. Did God the Son have absolutely to suffer? No. God willed freely to become incarnate and act as a mediator and representative of the elect.

Well, I like that act but not the bit about the Egyptians.

Sorry, same God. Same divine nature. Same internal, incscrutable divine self-understanding.

"Who are you O man to say to God...?"

"But..."

There's no getting rid of mystery. There's analogy but not identity.

God will not be judged.

rsc

 

[py3ak]

Dr. Clark,

I enjoyed that post. What books would you recommend to expand on the points you highlighted above?

 

[JohnV]

Joshua:

I would work on the fact that it doesn't necessarily follow that God is unjust in allowing the lady to be robbed, while for us it would be a sin to stand by and watch it happen. If we all died the next instant, it would be our just reward under the penalty of sin. It is more an act of grace that she is able to be robbed, that she's around for it to happen, that she has something to be stolen or taken, etc. These things are there by grace, not justice. So for God to object to the robbery might not be as just as we think.

We, on the other hand, are also as much obects of grace as the lady. It would be a sin for us to not oppose sin. God is not standing by, merely watching. He stood at the tomb of Lazarus, weeping. Here was the eternal God, weepeing over the effects of sin, and also angry at its power over the people who doubted His love for them. "He wept." The most powerful verse in the Bible, it seems, considering who it was that wept, and for what reason.

We are separated from God, not just in being finite compared to His infinity, but in the fact that we are guilty and He is not. That point needs to be stressed for those who don't understand what they are objecting to.

[Edited on 12-15-2005 by JohnV]

 

[Puritan Sailor]

I would also go on the offensive with this guy. Ask him why he has a problem with evil. Then ask him to define it. Then ask him to rationally justify his standard of evil (which he can't). He will have to fall back to some silly argument like "evil is that which causes pain" which you can refute by demonstrating that some pain leads to good ends. If he concedes this, then you've just nailed him because now he has no grounds for blaming God to allow evil to occur to accomplish good ends if he allows it too.

 

[R. Scott Clark]

Originally posted by py3ak
Dr. Clark,

I enjoyed that post. What books would you recommend to expand on the points you highlighted above?

Well, it draws from a lot of 16th and 17th century orthodox theologians, most of which aren't in English. There's a good essay by W van Asselt in the Westminster Theol. Journal on the archetypal/ectypal distinction.

Michael Horton's book, Covenant and Eschatology, is quite good.

I deal with some of this in my essay in "Janus, the Well-Meant Offer of the Gospel and Westminster Theology," in David VanDrunen, ed., The Pattern of Sound Words: A Festschrift for Robert B. Strimple (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2004).

Cheers,

rsc

 

[py3ak]

Dr. Clark,

Thanks for the pointers. It sounds like those orthodox theologians need to be translated or someone needs to write a book-length treatment of these themes.