rmwilliamsjr
Puritan Board Freshman
thanks for the links.
is it possible to get those authors to (re)post these messages here?
it looks that it is not simple to get into the Bahnsen group to read them there.
For those opposed to "Scripturalism"
- Thread starter Jon
- Start date
- Status
thanks for the links.
is it possible to get those authors to (re)post these messages here?
it looks that it is not simple to get into the Bahnsen group to read them there.
I hate to say this, but from the start there are several Straw men in this - starting with [1].
Now it may be the case that there are some who make this claim, but that's beside the point. And the "rocky-road" is hardly different from [1] which is a straw-man. Basically, Sudduth has found some errors in a few Scripturalist claims, claims that are not supported by the axiom of Scripturalism. But this is not a defeater of the axiom of Scripturalism, but a few claims made by some Scripturalists.
I can give this a more detailed response latter but in summary:
- [1] is strawman
[7] is an error in reasoning of some Scripturalism - technically we can not "know" or prove from a priori knowledge our axioms. But we can "know" in the sense of have total confidence or assurance. This is not epistemological knowledge - it's just simple Christian faith.
The part following [7] down to Cheung is beating the straw man.
[CS1] is the axiom which we already said can not be "know" epistemologically. Again it is a failure to understand the function of axioms in ALL epistemologies.
[CS3] technically, this is nothing more than saying that what we can not demonstrate from a-priori knowledge is opinion. Yep. That's right. Not a problem. If you can not deduce something from a-prior knowledge, it is opinion. Many things which we strongly believe are technically opinions. Any "problem" with this is psychological, not logical.
The rest is more picking on perceived inconsistencies with Cheung's presentation. Again, these are not defeaters of Scripturalism, just arguments against the same error Aquascum makes through-out his argument, claiming that Cheung must prove his axioms. Cheung's only error (not Scripturalism) is if he claims that one can know epistemologically the axiom of Scripturalism. But axioms must be assumed true, that's all. That's why it is called presuppositionalism. Scripturalism remains undefeated, even if a few Scripturalist have some bruises.
[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Civbert]
Civbert,
One quick response:
You said, "Now Aquascum would object to P1 saying I have not proven it, and I can not assume it. But that is the nature of the axiom. The Bible is God's Word, not based on some proof or extra-biblical data, but that is to be believed by the testimony of the Holy Spirit and on no other authority."
No, I think Aquascum would say that P1 cannot be an *object* of knowledge, not necessarily that it couldn't be proven. In that way, it is self-defeating.
One quick response:
You said, "Now Aquascum would object to P1 saying I have not proven it, and I can not assume it. But that is the nature of the axiom. The Bible is God's Word, not based on some proof or extra-biblical data, but that is to be believed by the testimony of the Holy Spirit and on no other authority."
No, I think Aquascum would say that P1 cannot be an *object* of knowledge, not necessarily that it couldn't be proven. In that way, it is self-defeating.
What is an "object of knowledge"? Nothing more than a proposition that is a justified true belief. Since one can not justify an axiom, it is left as a simple belief (assumed true). Saying it is not an "object of knowledge" means nothing more than we can not "know" it is true. I say that's right, but we can "believe" it is true. This is required for any axiom of epistemology.
Don,
Thanks for posting the arguments. It's an important issue that should be debated. It's worth study and I hope no one take anyone's word that Scripturalism is defeated any more than they should take mine that it is undefeated. There are greater minds who have take both positions, but our minds are not so poor that we can not consider the issue for ourselves.
Thanks!
Thanks for posting the arguments. It's an important issue that should be debated. It's worth study and I hope no one take anyone's word that Scripturalism is defeated any more than they should take mine that it is undefeated. There are greater minds who have take both positions, but our minds are not so poor that we can not consider the issue for ourselves.
Thanks!
Originally posted by Civbert
Don,
Thanks for posting the arguments. It's an important issue that should be debated. It's worth study and I hope no one take anyone's word that Scripturalism is defeated any more than they should take mine that it is undefeated. There are greater minds who have take both positions, but our minds are not so poor that we can not consider the issue for ourselves.
Thanks!
No problem, brother!
I've not exactly taken anyone's word for it, rather I've looked at both sides' arguments and the Clarkians tend to be the ones with wholly inadequate responses to criticism. I don't know if this is meant to be a jab or what, but I've never said nor intended to imply that our minds are so 'poor that we can not consider the issue for ourselves'. This is exactly my reasoning for posting the critiques, so people can consider it for themselves instead of being rhetoricized to death!
These critiques are within the original purpose of this thread, which have still not been satisfactorily answered. So your response is basically that it's one big strawman (and that we just posit Scripturalism, though we can't know it, but we can have confidence)? That's interesting that Sudduth won the 'Clark Prize' and attempted to deduce mathematics from Scripture before he abandoned Clark (per the VT Lists) yet he would try to refute Clark by arguing against all these strawmen. Maybe you could show how he's arguing against strawmen?
Anyway, good talking to you! I'm out!
Don
(Oh and I'm not basing my hopes that it's not a strawman b/c of Michael's past affiliation with Clark - that was meant for rhetorical purposes)
[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]
[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
Yep, Dr. Sudduth nailed it. There really is no rational basis for accepting epistemic Scripturalism. That has been one of my on-going difficulties with the system. Not only does it posit its own "verification principle," but, like logical positivism, it presents no knowable proposition denying the possibility of knowledge being obtainable outside of the axiom.
Now, at best, this simply strips Scripturalism of any claim to obligatory acceptance (since it cannot be known to be true), but it also clearly shows that the system is incomplete. Just as the lack of a theory of meaning cripples the Scripturalist's claim to be able to deduce theorems from the data of Scripture, the lack of a sound argument to justify the axiom also defeats the obligation to accept the system. One may not be correct in accepting the evidentialists' position on other reasons, but not because one has chosen something contrary to Scripturalism.
Given these criticisms of Scripturalism, I will nonetheless admit that I believe the general intent of the axiom, viz., that nothing not explicitly stated in Scripture or deducible from Scripture is an object of human knowledge. Obviously, I cannot demonstrate this. That has always been the problem with Scripturalism, especially as Clark had it. The system makes great claims to be able to justify all knowledge, but many of the assertions that Clark and other Scripturalists make are poorly demonstrated or not even demonstrated at all. My prior comment on Clark's extremely inadequate theory of language is one of these.
The reason I started this thread is to illustrate these very large holes in Scripturalism. I don't know if the problems can be solved or not. But one thing is certain, if it cannot be done, Scripturalism will quickly fade away like so many Greek philosophic schools of antiquity. On that count, I was wondering if anyone here had begun to take up some of these problems. As for me, I am currently working to demonstrate propositional logic from Scripture. After that, I plan to take up the problem of meaning.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
I think there is a big problem with this position. Maintaining that any logically valid system is true provided that it follows necessarily from its axioms allows for all manner of absurdities.
For instance, given the axiomatized proposition, "I am the king of the world," I could infer that, "The United States is a country of the world; therefore, I am the king of the United States." Now, the axiom, "I am the king of the world," does not contradict Scripture. Given the principles you have outlayed, this axiom, and the absurd theorem, would be true under Scripturalism simply because the inference is valid. Even more, if we accept that Euclidean geometry is true because its theorems follow from its axioms, then we must accept that I am king of the United States because it follows from the axiom, "I am king of the world." And, of course, since "I am king of the world" is an axiom, I need not demonstrate it. And since it does not contradict Scripture, I cannot be denied positing it.
This is why I argued that there can be no extra-biblical propositions accepted in the Scripturalist system whatsoever, else, the distinguishing between "appropriate axioms" (whatever those are) and "inappropriate axioms" within the Scripturalist system becomes a viciously circular process of reasoning. That is, given that axiom a1 is acceptable, what is it that determines axiom a2 is unacceptable?
We are agreed here. Empiricism has great difficulties--crippling difficulties, even.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
Me too. I'm glad to be able to address these issues in a forum that is not immediately and irrationally hostile against the idea of Scripturalism.
I'm afraid I cannot see how this could possibly follow. What is the logical inference that conveys the meaning of the exclamation, "Dance!" What is the inference that conveys the meaning, "What year did Columbus discover America?" How does one deduce the meaning of the word, Jesus, from logic alone?
Logic is formal. It restricts the forms of inferences, not the content. Without content, logic has no sovereignty. Without meaning, logic is meaningless. Meaning is logically prior to logic (funny how that works). A word w1 must be w1 and not w2 before the inference that w1 is w2 can be determined to be invalid. Now, granted that logic covers statements of identity, but if identity had no meaning, the logical law of identity would not hold, for it would be meaningless.
In any case, I think it simply must be shown how meaning is deduced from logic before such an assertion can be maintained. Granted, logic will be required for a theory of meaning, but it is posterior to meaning. That is, from logic, one cannot get language. Try starting with symbolic logic and then deducing, "Here comes the ice cream truck!" from it. If you can do that, I will be proven quite wrong.
Logic can certainly say what language can and can't do, but it can't generate language.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
No time to cover all of this but a quick question:
What do you mean by "no rational basis for accepting epistemic Scripturalism"?
It appears that there are many reasons for accepting Scripturalism, just none that demands it. For example, it is explains our experiences, provides for morality, is comprehensive and coherent... basically, it has all the properties one would desire from a epistemology.
As for "no knowable proposition denying the possibility of knowledge being obtainable outside of the axiom", need it? Is there any reasonable alternative?
I believe there are "truths" outside of what we can know through Scripturalism, but that does not harm Scripturalism. I think the intent of Scripturalism is not to delineate the total of knowledge, but the delineate what truths we can justify knowing.
First there are the definitions of "dance" - which are propositions. Then there are rules of context (additional propositions). And what propositions describe the situation? These will determine if the meaning. It could be "the speaker is excited about seeing a dance, or dance advertisement".. or maybe it means "the speaker is commanding the listener to dance. " But whatever it take, it take rules and definitions to understand the exclamation"Dance!" and these are propositions from which we deduce the meaning.
Originally posted by Don
.... Maybe you could show how he's arguing against strawmen?
Anyway, good talking to you! I'm out!
Don
(Oh and I'm not basing my hopes that it's not a strawman b/c of Michael's past affiliation with Clark - that was meant for rhetorical purposes)
Sure thing.
It's a straw man because Scripturalism does not say that no extra-biblical propositions are true. It says the we can not justify the truth of extra biblical propositions - ergo we can not 'know" them epistemologically. We can know them in a colloquial sense, like I might say I know my car is safe to drive. Technically, I can not know that, for I can not see the future. So "alethic Scripturalism" is a straw man. This is merely Dr. Sudduth finding fault in the reasoning of certain Scripturalist, not defeating Scripturalism.
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
Good question. By no "rational basis" I simply mean no "logically necessary" basis.
As for me, I implement a Scripturalist apologetic because it is so effective at surmounting typical atheistic arguments. I accept the philosophy of Scripturalism also because I accept the axiom that the word of God is the lone source of knowledge for men.
Good question. By no "rational basis" I simply mean no "logically necessary" basis.
Yes, I agree. The problem is that if Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent, it becomes a case of begging the question to say anything that does not follow from the axiom is not an object of knowledge because the axiom itself does not follow from the axiom, and thus, is also not an object of knowledge. If we say this is true and simply maintain that one must trust the axiom to be true then we forfeit any rational basis for Scripturalism. As such, there is no reason to claim that an extra-biblical proposition is not an object of knowledge because the only basis we have for such a claim is belief in the axiom of Scripturalism. But if one does not believe in the axiom, we have no rational rebuttal to his disbelief.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Do you mean we can not claim an extra-biblical proposition is 'not true', or 'not knowable'? All true propositions are objects of knowledge because God knows them. But that does not mean we can know them. And I am using 'know' to mean justify the truth of the proposition.
Originally posted by Civbert
Originally posted by Don
.... Maybe you could show how he's arguing against strawmen?
Anyway, good talking to you! I'm out!
Don
(Oh and I'm not basing my hopes that it's not a strawman b/c of Michael's past affiliation with Clark - that was meant for rhetorical purposes)
Sure thing.
It's a straw man because Scripturalism does not say that no extra-biblical propositions are true. It says the we can not justify the truth of extra biblical propositions - ergo we can not 'know" them epistemologically. We can know them in a colloquial sense, like I might say I know my car is safe to drive. Technically, I can not know that, for I can not see the future. So "alethic Scripturalism" is a straw man. This is merely Dr. Sudduth finding fault in the reasoning of certain Scripturalist, not defeating Scripturalism.
Well considering the majority of the article was not about alethic Scripturalism, I still don't really see your point. However, alethic scripturalism is definitely an optional position for the Scripturalist so I'm not quite seeing how your charges of 'strawman' are even relevant. If you don't take that position, then so what? I think Dr. Sudduth knew that some/most didn't and is why much of article is about *epistemic* scripturalism (did you read that far?). Like I said before, he deals with 3 or 4 types of Scripturalism.
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
This is just moving the problem to another level. You must still justify the meaning of the words that are used to define "dance." These words--the content, their meaning--do not follow from logic alone.
I think I might not be illustrating the problem well enough. I am talking about the problem of meaning not rules of grammar. The meaning of the sign, "tree," inheres in some proposition. That's true enough. But how does one arrive at the meaning of this proposition? I think the best way to illustrate this is through a logical fallacy, namely, accent.
I'll use Clark's example from Logic, which we're both familiar with. He gives the following example of the fallacy of accent, "We should not speak ill of the dead." There are many meanings to this sentence simply based upon how it is said.
1) We should not speak ill of the dead. (But it is okay if others do.)
2) We should not speak ill of the dead. (But we're going to, anyway.)
3) We should not speak ill of the dead. (But we will write nasty things about them.)
4) We should not speak ill of the dead. (But we can say nice things about them.)
5) We should not speak ill of the dead. (But we can insult his living brother.)
Here we have a single proposition with five different meanings, which are implied through various inflections. We can disambiguate this sentence by putting each of them into separate, coherent propositions, but Scripture does not always do this. Instead, there are many passages in Scripture that can be interpreted in different ways if they are read differently. Now, the science of exegesis can answer most of these challenges to the point of plausible conclusion, but sometimes there is no certainty. Even more, the simple practice of comparing biblical usage with secular usage is too much for the Scripturalist theory to bear because it relies on extra-biblical propositions to obtain the meaning of biblical propositions. How is this activity justified? Moreover, how do we know that the biblical authors are not making novel use of a given biblical term, such as John did with the Logos of Heraclitean and Stoic philosophy? Liberalism is a perfect example of how easily the Bible can be confused by unillumined minds. How do we rationally defend Scripturalism against the charge of novelty? How do we defend against the charge that our deductions are invalid because of equivocation?
In other words, how do you know the identity of a given word or phrase? How do you come to it? Logically, if the meaning of x is x, then all x is y, all y is z, all x is z, follows. But how do you know x is x? And how do you know y is y and z is z? In other words, you think the meaning of biblical proposition is x. But if I think the meaning is y, how do we determine who is right? Appealing to rules of grammar is fine, but these rules are not without exception and not so stringent as to prevent ambiguity. That is precisely why we have informal fallacies.
A theory of meaning is essential.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
Not an object of human knowledge is what I meant. I define knowledge as Plato did, which necessitates belief in the proposition for it to be properly knowable. That is, a proposition can be understood (cognition) by a disbeliever, but not known. So, I add belief to your requirements of "justified truth."
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
OK. I see where you are going. And yes, logic, in and of itself, can not give us knowledge (that is rationalism yes?). But language is impossible without logic. The question is, what content do we put into the forms of logic. How do we fill the blanks in the forms of logic with content that allow us to understand the meaning of propositions.
I think this is a matter of the Spirit. I think language and reason conform to the forms of logic, and these forms are the same used by God in his knowledge (as far as we know what God reveals), but the content is filled by the Spirit. This is what non-believers think is innate knowledge.
But it is also why Scripturalism needs to be seen as a system, because the content is formed by the system. a->b->c->...->x->y->a! We know the meaning of the content because the content is the system. Really, each proposition we know is inferred from prior propositions inferred from prior propositions ....etc. To figure out the meaning of the terms requires two things, a foundation, and a kick off point. The foundation is the God of knowledge, the kick off point is the Scriptures.
I see these examples you gave, not as one proposition, but as 5 propositions, because each has a different meaning. "A proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence" as Clark would say. It is not the prose, it is the meaning. And the meaning is an integrated structure, a system of interrelated propositions which if not for God to enlighten us, we could never know. But this is faith.
So if you see Scripturalism as the starting point of Scripture, logic and reason are the guides, and the Holy Spirit is the guaranteer. The whole thing is like a network that we attempt to construct using systematic theology, but it is not limited to "religion" but includes a whole philosophy for out world. And the only assurance we have that we understand the meaning of the propositions, is we have the enlightenment of the Spirit.
How do we know what the Scriptures are? We might induce candidate meanings, and then we test them against others. We know that Scripture does not contradict itself, and so we can eliminate those that are contradictory. We start with the obvious ones, and work from there.
As I type this I can see that I should really re-write this several times to make it coherent. But I think the main thing is that meaning is systematic, and Scripturalism gives us what we need to find meaning. I don't think there is any core true propositions, no "first" proposition. Even the meaning of God is part of the system of Scripture. What "God"? the God of Scripture.
[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Civbert]
JohnV
Puritan Board Post-Graduate
Dr. Sudduth's response is a lengthy formulation of something that goes through the mind instantaneously. It is mental block for the Christian, if you will, for accepting so many propositions that come to us from inauthoritative sources, proposed by men, and posited as being foundational in some way. Most of us do not have it worked out in propositional form such as Michael has done for us, but these are all there when things like Scripturalism are suggested.
For me the key is the phrase is "no extra-Biblical proposition", as if no truth can be known unless it is put in propositional form in Scripture. For example, the Bible does not begin with "In the beginning there was God, and God was...."; but "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." And if Scripture is revelation, then this is not incoherent, but revelatory.
As soon as man opines that he needs to formulate a Scripture-based grid in propositional form in order to "interpret" the Bible, then he has already defeated his purpose just in proposing it. He is proposing the very thing that compels and yet forbids him to this.
The question for someone like myself, then, is the necessity of Clarkian epistemology. Is it necessary? Is not the mere suggestion of its necessity not already a reason for rejecting it, even upon Clarkian arguments alone? And has Scripture at all revealed to me that I either should or shouldn't accept Clarkian epistemology prior to knowing Scripture?
In other words, is it possible that chocolates can say something better than words can?
I say "yes" to this, that it is possible that things can be "said" without words, whether through actions or other signs; and that things can be said in words that are not propositions, such as poetic licence allows for, whether by subtle connotation, symbolic representation, allegorical summations, or propositional juxtaposition instead of syllogism. Not only are all these found in Scripture, but there are many, many such things that may be gathered from general revelation as well, without necessarily proposing such a thing as the definitions of "neutrality" or "brute fact" that Presuppositionalism proposes.
I haven't bothered to read Clark, never really being compelled to it. I still believe that to understand Scripture I need both Scripture and the Spirit. And so knowing Scripture depends upon knowing the Spirit of Christ. So I seek Him in person, not just in idea or ideology. And I seek His personal presence in revealing to me what I must know, a presence of His Spirit which is willingly granted me by the foreknowledge of the Father through the Son.
So when I am faced with a situation where all I have to rely on is Christ's say-so, that it will be as He says it will, then when I trust in Him and act according to that promise, then I find it is just as He promised, and even more so. And then when I turn again to His Word, the Scriptures, I am surprised to find that the new truth that I learned was in the Word all along, and now plainer to me. And yet also not surprised as well.
The short of it is that "knowing" Scripture is commensurate with "knowing" Christ Himself, not having some manufactured formula. It is not possible to know God without Him first knowing me. It is not possible to have God revealed to me without Him revealing Himself to me first. It is not possible to separate the gospel from Christ. It is not possible to separate the Word from God. Therefore it is not possible that even Scripture plus anything other than the Spirit will reveal truth to us. Yet it is true that God reveals Himself in creation as a first revelation, and in Scripture as a second and fuller revelation. So it is possible to know God and be known by God before being introduced to Scripture, but salvation is known only through Christ's Scripture; that calling by God is logically prior to justification and glorification through the Son, and by the Spirit.
So I think this can be discussed, but it does not have to be in Clarkian terms. I am not excluded because I don't follow Clark, or that I don't know his arguments.
For me the key is the phrase is "no extra-Biblical proposition", as if no truth can be known unless it is put in propositional form in Scripture. For example, the Bible does not begin with "In the beginning there was God, and God was...."; but "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." And if Scripture is revelation, then this is not incoherent, but revelatory.
As soon as man opines that he needs to formulate a Scripture-based grid in propositional form in order to "interpret" the Bible, then he has already defeated his purpose just in proposing it. He is proposing the very thing that compels and yet forbids him to this.
The question for someone like myself, then, is the necessity of Clarkian epistemology. Is it necessary? Is not the mere suggestion of its necessity not already a reason for rejecting it, even upon Clarkian arguments alone? And has Scripture at all revealed to me that I either should or shouldn't accept Clarkian epistemology prior to knowing Scripture?
In other words, is it possible that chocolates can say something better than words can?
I say "yes" to this, that it is possible that things can be "said" without words, whether through actions or other signs; and that things can be said in words that are not propositions, such as poetic licence allows for, whether by subtle connotation, symbolic representation, allegorical summations, or propositional juxtaposition instead of syllogism. Not only are all these found in Scripture, but there are many, many such things that may be gathered from general revelation as well, without necessarily proposing such a thing as the definitions of "neutrality" or "brute fact" that Presuppositionalism proposes.
I haven't bothered to read Clark, never really being compelled to it. I still believe that to understand Scripture I need both Scripture and the Spirit. And so knowing Scripture depends upon knowing the Spirit of Christ. So I seek Him in person, not just in idea or ideology. And I seek His personal presence in revealing to me what I must know, a presence of His Spirit which is willingly granted me by the foreknowledge of the Father through the Son.
So when I am faced with a situation where all I have to rely on is Christ's say-so, that it will be as He says it will, then when I trust in Him and act according to that promise, then I find it is just as He promised, and even more so. And then when I turn again to His Word, the Scriptures, I am surprised to find that the new truth that I learned was in the Word all along, and now plainer to me. And yet also not surprised as well.
The short of it is that "knowing" Scripture is commensurate with "knowing" Christ Himself, not having some manufactured formula. It is not possible to know God without Him first knowing me. It is not possible to have God revealed to me without Him revealing Himself to me first. It is not possible to separate the gospel from Christ. It is not possible to separate the Word from God. Therefore it is not possible that even Scripture plus anything other than the Spirit will reveal truth to us. Yet it is true that God reveals Himself in creation as a first revelation, and in Scripture as a second and fuller revelation. So it is possible to know God and be known by God before being introduced to Scripture, but salvation is known only through Christ's Scripture; that calling by God is logically prior to justification and glorification through the Son, and by the Spirit.
So I think this can be discussed, but it does not have to be in Clarkian terms. I am not excluded because I don't follow Clark, or that I don't know his arguments.
So much I agree with here except the assumption that there is some manufactured formula. Nothing has been manufactured, everything has been in place from the beginning. You can not separate Christ from the Gospel because Jesus is the Word. Scripturalism says revelation is the source of knowledge and logic is the form. You can not separate knowledge from thinking. You can not know Christ without knowing the Word. And you can not know anything without thinking which is all logic is, correct thinking.
I beg you to please read Clark. But I also would encourage you to discuss what is being discussed. There are many great books and if you are interested, I will send a copy of my own. (I'd buy you a Bible first but I sure you already have one.
)I really don't follow what you said here, so I hope you can explain further.
I just wanted to say that truth is propositional. You don't need to put it in propositional form, it already is fits the forms. But truth and meaning is not the prose and words written on a page, and not the sentences themselves, because we can say the same truth using different ways, different languages, different contexts and words.
For Clark, a proposition is the meaning of the prose. The purpose of putting the prose into logical forms is so we can better understand what the meaning is that is being conveyed. We do not lose meaning by rearranging the prose into propositional forms, we clarify meaning by doing this. We need to understand propositions in relation to other proposition.
To divorce meaning from logic is to assert meaninglessness. There is nothing to know if it can not be thought about. You don't lean from "feelings" or "sensations" but by thinking and understanding. Logic is the way we think when we think correctly. And this we know because we have the verbal revelation of God in Scripture. If the law of contradiction is lost, then nothing has any meaning and all I've said is the pizza is getting cold when Martha send the apple love baker too.
You can not argue against logic without using logic so any attempt to separate the form from the meaning is self-refuting. And you can not know Christ without knowing the Gospel and the Word because He is the Word and you use logic and reason to understand the Word. This is not some artificial grid that deforms meaning, it is the requirement for understanding the meaning of the Word. And you are already doing it as we are discussing these things.
Every word you write proves logic because your words have meaning and you want me to know what the meaning is. The alternative is utter non-sense and skepticism.
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
Yes, now you've got it.
Indeed, the doctrine of illumination clearly spells out how one comes to believe the propositions of the Bible: illumination by the Holy Spirit. I found Warfield's treatment of Calvin's doctrine of illumination (testimonium Spiritu Sancti) to be particularly helpful in understanding this (Warfield, Works, V, 70ff., Oxford, 1932). But what Warfield and Calvin teach is that the Spirit convinces us of the content of Scripture, i.e. causes us to believe the truth. Illumination is not an actual conveyance of knowledge. In fact, such would conclude us in a doctrine of Occasionalism, which has always been wrought with difficulties.
Augustine adopted Plato's doctrine of reminiscience in his De Magistro, doubtless influenced by John 1:9"”"That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (KJV). There are still problems with even this view, though, for one cannot help but ask why some men remember some things, whereas others remember different things. And why does one man remember much, but another remember little? Augustine appeals to sensation, to hearing in particular, but the Scripturalist has already insisted sensation furnishes no knowledge; thus, saying, "I know language because I remembered it by my parents talking to me," is obviously outside of the realm of possible arguments for the Scripturalist.
No doubt. But that is also one of the weaknesses of Scripturalism. So much of the very principle of the system relies on a great deal of scripturally derived "theorems" that one needs to have an arsenal of arguments prepared just to defend the assumption of Scripture. This has from the very beginning been an argument against not just Scripturalism, but presuppositionalism. But it is a philosophically untenable objection because the practicality of the system has no bearing on its truthfulness.
The problem really comes in the apparent fact that there are a lack of defensible arguments to defeat some of the best objections. Scripturalism promises much, but many of these promises seem to be nothing more than hopeful assertions and not demonstrations from the Bible. It seems we have much, much more work to do before we really have anything worth talking about. And then that sort of raises the question of whether we ought to be doing it or not. That is another problem that needs to be answered. That is, the axiom of Scripturalism needs to be demonstrated from Scripture.
You are quite right, but that raises the question that I had been trying emphasize all along. In Scripture, there are some sentences such as the one I have given. Given that the example I gave has five possible interpretations, and hence, five possible meanings, how does one say that the Scripture verse is meaning m1 over against meaning m2, m3 ... mn? Exegesis can be applied. But this empirical science cannot be justified by the axiom of Scripturalism alone. It requires a validly deduced theory to support it. But in some instances, exegesis cannot certainly resolve the matter, either. What about those cases?
I think I understand what you mean.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
Jon
Puritan Board Freshman
It's incoherent. In other words, it fails to justify itself because it does not imply itself (it contains no statement of identity). At this point, it is simply an incomplete system, one that one must take on faith, not on rigorous self-referential coherence. If it were true that Scripturalism can't be coherent, then the conclusion that it is irrational would have merit; however, that is precisely the point to be proven. I happen to think it can be shown to be coherent--just that it hasn't been done, yet. I plan to work on the problem myself in the future.
Soli Deo Gloria
Jon
JohnV
Puritan Board Post-Graduate
I was trying to convey the idea that one can discard Scripturalism without discarding Scripture; that one can discard Clarkianism without discarding Clark; that one can discard Van Tillianism without discarding Van Til; but most of all that one can discard JohnV-ism without discarding JohnV. Discarding all the former is not my intent, but discarding the latter is fully my intent.
Though I claim membership in Christ, and though I claim to know Him, and to be known by Him, yet it is also true that He reveals Himself to me also through others that also have relationship to Him. I am not superior to others because I have personal contact with Christ; for they too have personal contact with Him. This demonstrates the vast broadness of the knowledge that is through Him: none of us can contain sufficient knowledge so as to be independent of others who also have knowledge.
Any one system of epistemology, therefore, must by definition be insufficient to answer the need. It is far too complex to be reigned in by men's theories. I can be taught as much by Clark as I can by a little child's trusting and idealistic assertions. The reason for this, as I understand it, is that knowledge is not an apprehension of facts and propositions so much as it is a seeing of God Himself. To know Him is to know. Therefore knowledge can come through even a child as much as through a sophisticated theory, because it is based on His revelation of Himself, not merely of facts or propositions. No human theory can cover that, for it transcends formulation.
[Edited on 2-16-2006 by JohnV]
Theogenes
Puritan Board Junior
Jon said: Now, assuming the Scripturalist begins with the axiom of Scripture, how does he deduce language from the Bible? Even more, how can one avoid linguistic skepticism when attempting to deduce theorems from the Bible without begging the question? A good example of this is found in Clark's argument that man knows language (and this must be fallible) because Scripture says God talked to Adam; therefore, God must have given Adam the gift of language. I find this argument to be viciously circular, even as a semi-Scripturalist...
Jon,
It seems that you are trying to prove the axiom by the axiom and as Civbert has pointed out that if you attempt to do that then the axiom (in this case Scripture) is not your starting point. By revelation (Scripture) we know that the origin of language is from God and because He has created us in His image we have language because language is the ability to communicate rationally. Language is intelligible signs for ideas. Clark's theory of language is therefore deducible from Scripture, if Scripture is where you start. But if you try to start from somewhere else you certainly will not have the Truth but rather error. And, how do we know that Scripture is Truth ( and the only Truth), read WCF chap one. Jesus said in John 17, Thy Word is Truth. Doesn't that make Scripture self-referentially coherent??
In Christ, the Logos
Jim
Jon,
It seems that you are trying to prove the axiom by the axiom and as Civbert has pointed out that if you attempt to do that then the axiom (in this case Scripture) is not your starting point. By revelation (Scripture) we know that the origin of language is from God and because He has created us in His image we have language because language is the ability to communicate rationally. Language is intelligible signs for ideas. Clark's theory of language is therefore deducible from Scripture, if Scripture is where you start. But if you try to start from somewhere else you certainly will not have the Truth but rather error. And, how do we know that Scripture is Truth ( and the only Truth), read WCF chap one. Jesus said in John 17, Thy Word is Truth. Doesn't that make Scripture self-referentially coherent??
In Christ, the Logos
Jim
- Status
Similar threads
- Locked
