Evaluating the Thought of Cornelius Van Til with Keith Mathison and James Anderson

Semper Fidelis

2 Timothy 2:24-25
Staff member
This was a great interaction:https://clearlyreformed.org/podcast...n-til-with-keith-mathison-and-james-anderson/

One thing I wish they had delved into a bit is the archetypal/ectypal distinction in historical Reformed theology. Archetypal theology is the theology that God knows a se (In himself) while ectypal is that theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding.

Someone recently pointed out that the Princeton theologians sort of moved away from this important distinction, and I think our debates about even apologetic methods often ignore the limits of human apprehension.

I'm fine with Classical Apologetics, provided the apologist is not assuming a univocal theology (that is he believes he understands something as God does). William Lane Craig is a good example of this where he imagines that is he philosophically derives something that is "good" that God accords within his philosophical understanding. Even when he employs classical arguments, it is within not only a semi-Pelagian conception of an's ability but also a philosophical commitment that man's knowledge is univocal with God's.

I think that CVT (as the interview noted) used broad brushes, but I do think his apologetics consciously tracks the creature as a creature when he thinks theologically or philosophically. That, to me, is the most important thing to preserve when we are not only thinking about God but also how we give an answer to objectors. For example, if I present the Cosmological argument, it won't be in order to concede that God is just another object that the creature needs to determine how to categorize.
 
This was a great interaction:https://clearlyreformed.org/podcast...n-til-with-keith-mathison-and-james-anderson/

One thing I wish they had delved into a bit is the archetypal/ectypal distinction in historical Reformed theology. Archetypal theology is the theology that God knows a se (In himself) while ectypal is that theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding.

Someone recently pointed out that the Princeton theologians sort of moved away from this important distinction, and I think our debates about even apologetic methods often ignore the limits of human apprehension.

I'm fine with Classical Apologetics, provided the apologist is not assuming a univocal theology (that is he believes he understands something as God does). William Lane Craig is a good example of this where he imagines that is he philosophically derives something that is "good" that God accords within his philosophical understanding. Even when he employs classical arguments, it is within not only a semi-Pelagian conception of an's ability but also a philosophical commitment that man's knowledge is univocal with God's.

I think that CVT (as the interview noted) used broad brushes, but I do think his apologetics consciously tracks the creature as a creature when he thinks theologically or philosophically. That, to me, is the most important thing to preserve when we are not only thinking about God but also how we give an answer to objectors. For example, if I present the Cosmological argument, it won't be in order to concede that God is just another object that the creature needs to determine how to categorize.
There were a lot of things I wish we could have delved into, but there was a limited amount of time.

Keith
 
Welcome, Dr Mathison. Do you have any lecture series on classical apologetics? I know you did one talk on Thomas Aquinas on youtube.
Hi Jacob,

I do not. I've spoken a few times on things related (such as the lecture you mentioned), but no, I've never written a lecture series on classical apologetics.

Keith
 
Hello Dr. Mathison. After watching the dialogue I look forward to reading your book.

Part of the problem, as I see it, is that Van Tillian presuppositionalism is described as a method; but in reality it is a theology. Hence the exclusivity. It would be very difficult, after being convinced that this is the consistent outworking of reformed theology, to turn around and show an openness to other methods. That would require one to unlearn his theology or begin to act as if it doesn't matter.

The heart of the issue seems to me to have nothing to do with apologetics per se. It more pertains to being "reformed." The claim of being reformed means that a person confesses a specific "form" of Christianity. This affects apologetics because the aim is not simply to give a defence of Christianity in general but to give a defence of the reformed form of Christianity.

The other "methods" don't present the same way. Obviously there is a theology behind them but they do not self-consciously work through theological principles in a systematic way. They are seeking to defend a generic kind of Christianity. This is part of Van Til's critique of them.
 
There were a lot of things I wish we could have delved into, but there was a limited amount of time.

Keith
Welcome to the board! I didn't even know you were a member here.

It wasn't a criticism of anyone in the conversation but merely an observation.

For what it's worth, R.C. was instrumental in my conversion in 1997 from Roman Catholicism. I read Faith Alone on a plane ride to Okinawa and the light of the Gospel shone through from his writings. I am eternally in debt to his ministry.

I also remember, many years ago, you answering a question I had over email, and you were very gracious. I think it had to do with the doctrine of Sola Scriptura.

I found the conversation to be very respectful and appreciated the arguments you presented.
 
Hello Dr. Mathison. After watching the dialogue I look forward to reading your book.

Part of the problem, as I see it, is that Van Tillian presuppositionalism is described as a method; but in reality it is a theology. Hence the exclusivity. It would be very difficult, after being convinced that this is the consistent outworking of reformed theology, to turn around and show an openness to other methods. That would require one to unlearn his theology or begin to act as if it doesn't matter.

The heart of the issue seems to me to have nothing to do with apologetics per se. It more pertains to being "reformed." The claim of being reformed means that a person confesses a specific "form" of Christianity. This affects apologetics because the aim is not simply to give a defence of Christianity in general but to give a defence of the reformed form of Christianity.

The other "methods" don't present the same way. Obviously there is a theology behind them but they do not self-consciously work through theological principles in a systematic way. They are seeking to defend a generic kind of Christianity. This is part of Van Til's critique of them.
Hi Rev. Winzer,

That's an important point, and unfortunately, we didn't get to it in the online discussion. I did, however, address it in the book. I'll be interested in hearing your feedback when you get the chance to read it.

Welcome to the board! I didn't even know you were a member here.

It wasn't a criticism of anyone in the conversation but merely an observation.

For what it's worth, R.C. was instrumental in my conversion in 1997 from Roman Catholicism. I read Faith Alone on a plane ride to Okinawa and the light of the Gospel shone through from his writings. I am eternally in debt to his ministry.

I also remember, many years ago, you answering a question I had over email, and you were very gracious. I think it had to do with the doctrine of Sola Scriptura.

I found the conversation to be very respectful and appreciated the arguments you presented.
Hi Rich,

I joined a while back, but I haven't really participated in at least a decade. The problem was that right about the time I joined, I became involved in helping to build a new college for Dr. Sproul, and helping to get it started and get off the ground. That took a while.

I didn't take what you said as a criticism, by the way. I just saw the comment and thought now might be a good time to jump back in since that interview put my name back in the Reformed public eye for the moment. Both James and I said to each other afterword that we barely scratched the surface of what could have been discussed. Neither of us knew what questions would be asked, so we just ran with what came up.
 
Shameless plug here: though to my chagrin it has not been updated as much recently, Prof. Mathison's blog is great and I recommend it to all. Of course, Prof. Mathison, if you are going to post here more regularly, my chagrin will dissipate like the morning fog. :cool:

We now return to our regularly scheduled programming.
 
Shameless plug here: though to my chagrin it has not been updated as much recently, Prof. Mathison's blog is great and I recommend it to all. Of course, Prof. Mathison, if you are going to post here more regularly, my chagrin will dissipate like the morning fog. :cool:

We now return to our regularly scheduled programming.
Thank you for the kind words about it. You're right though. Sometimes months go by between updates.
 
Hard to find a good price on your new book Dr Mathison!
Yeah. Sorry about that. Unfortunately, the price that retailers are charging is completely out of my control. I think part of the reason for the price is because the publishing company is in Scotland. On the bright side, at least the publisher isn't Brill. It would probably be $195 were that the case.
 
Hello Dr. Mathison. After watching the dialogue I look forward to reading your book.

Part of the problem, as I see it, is that Van Tillian presuppositionalism is described as a method; but in reality it is a theology. Hence the exclusivity. It would be very difficult, after being convinced that this is the consistent outworking of reformed theology, to turn around and show an openness to other methods. That would require one to unlearn his theology or begin to act as if it doesn't matter.

The heart of the issue seems to me to have nothing to do with apologetics per se. It more pertains to being "reformed." The claim of being reformed means that a person confesses a specific "form" of Christianity. This affects apologetics because the aim is not simply to give a defence of Christianity in general but to give a defence of the reformed form of Christianity.

The other "methods" don't present the same way. Obviously there is a theology behind them but they do not self-consciously work through theological principles in a systematic way. They are seeking to defend a generic kind of Christianity. This is part of Van Til's critique of them.
Very thoughtful response. As one who advocates his work as being a method of apologetics over an individual argument is because of how bankrupt, in my opinion, the TAG is. Atheists eat it up. But as a method it escapes those criticisms and becomes more fluid in application. For the record I agree with you that ultimately it is the "Reformed Apologetic" I just don't stress that aspect of it.
I think if people get the method than the rest will follow suit. That is one area I haven't studied in much detail, connecting the theology with the method, that's my fault of course. The other area is his criticisms of individual apologists, though I think his general criticisms should be looked at.
I know you weren't talking about me but as someone who does advocate the method as being primary in understanding his genius, I thought to respond in clarification.
 
Hi Rev. Winzer,

That's an important point, and unfortunately, we didn't get to it in the online discussion. I did, however, address it in the book. I'll be interested in hearing your feedback when you get the chance to read it.


Hi Rich,

I joined a while back, but I haven't really participated in at least a decade. The problem was that right about the time I joined, I became involved in helping to build a new college for Dr. Sproul, and helping to get it started and get off the ground. That took a while.

I didn't take what you said as a criticism, by the way. I just saw the comment and thought now might be a good time to jump back in since that interview put my name back in the Reformed public eye for the moment. Both James and I said to each other afterword that we barely scratched the surface of what could have been discussed. Neither of us knew what questions would be asked, so we just ran with what came up.
I loved the discussion and I completely agree with you that y'all didn't have time to scratch the surface. I look forward, as a vantillian, to reading your book. Probably gonna get it for Christmas.
I appreciated your response but I have one question on the antithesis, if you don't mind.
You rightfully point out the discrepancy between the antithesis in theory and in practice from an Epistemological POV, I thought that was fantastic, but I've always taken Van Til's method to be that that is the place to press the argument.
I know that the unbeliever is in a mixed category, awkward mixture as Bahnsen would put it, so I can press them there methodologically to show the inconsistency in their thinking. So rather than being a philosophical or theological point (it can be both) it is an apologetical point.
That seems to clean up the problem to me. It's not a either/or problem but a both/and issue. I hope that makes sense.
 
I loved the discussion and I completely agree with you that y'all didn't have time to scratch the surface. I look forward, as a vantillian, to reading your book. Probably gonna get it for Christmas.
I appreciated your response but I have one question on the antithesis, if you don't mind.
You rightfully point out the discrepancy between the antithesis in theory and in practice from an Epistemological POV, I thought that was fantastic, but I've always taken Van Til's method to be that that is the place to press the argument.
I know that the unbeliever is in a mixed category, awkward mixture as Bahnsen would put it, so I can press them there methodologically to show the inconsistency in their thinking. So rather than being a philosophical or theological point (it can be both) it is an apologetical point.
That seems to clean up the problem to me. It's not a either/or problem but a both/and issue. I hope that makes sense.
Hi Jamey,

Yes, and what you are pointing out is similar to what James pointed out in the video when he made the point that the common grace qualifications to the antithesis, the qualifications necessary for communication between the believer and unbeliever to take place, are an integral component of Van Til's system. No apologetic methodology can take place if the believer cannot even communicate with the unbeliever. So, for Van Til, the common grace qualifications are necessary for apologetic engagement, and the kind of apologetic engagement that takes place if one is to be consistently Reformed must be what he calls the method of presupposition.

I get what Van Til is saying, but what I tried to explain in the book is that the very qualifications that allow communication and thus apologetics to take place also create a tension in the relation between Van Til's system and his claims about methodology. In Part One of the book, I devote 5 chapters to explaining Van Til's system in a way I think most people can understand. Instead of explaining with philosophical categories, I chose to explain it in theological categories. I start with his doctrine of God and the divine decree because I believe it is necessary to understand what Van Til says on this point in order to understand anything else he says. So, the Triune God is independent, immutable, infinite, and personal and has independent, immutable, infinite, and personal knowledge of himself. God has also eternally and freely decreed whatsoever comes to pass and therefore has perfect knowledge of every fact that he has decreed. God knows every decreed fact in relation to himself and in relation to every other fact within his unified plan. This is important because knowledge is the key theme that runs through each major building block in Van Til’s system of thought. According to Van Til, in order for there to be true knowledge of any fact, there has to be knowledge of that fact in relation to every other fact and knowledge of the whole of which that fact is a part. Because God is omniscient, God has such infinite knowledge. God, therefore, grounds the very possibility of true human knowledge. Because God knows himself and every fact in relation to himself and to every other fact, God can also be said to have “pre-interpreted” every fact. Thus, there are no “brute facts.” The true meaning of any fact is ultimately determined by its place in the eternal plan of God. God’s knowledge of himself and of all things in relation to himself and in relation to his plan is, therefore, the ultimate true system of knowledge. God, therefore, is the ultimate principle of interpretation of all facts.

Then I moved to his statements about creation and revelation. In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth and all that is within them, thus introducing a metaphysical distinction between the Creator and the creature. Among God’s creatures were human beings whom he created in his image with rational and volitional faculties. Everything God created, including human beings, is exhaustively revelational of God and of the unified system of truth eternally known by God. Human beings were created in a covenant relationship with God and were, therefore, ethically required to interpret all facts in relation to God their Creator. Human beings were created to be derivative re-interpreters of that which God had eternally pre-interpreted, thus making God the final reference point of all interpretation. If God is not taken as the final reference point, human beings would have to be the final reference point and would, therefore, have to be omniscient, since true knowledge of any fact requires true knowledge of every fact. Human knowledge, however, does not have to be exhaustive because God’s knowledge is exhaustive. Human knowledge is required only to be analogical to God’s knowledge, meaning that it is to be a finite reflection of God’s exhaustive knowledge. Even though human knowledge is not exhaustive knowledge, it is true knowledge if it corresponds to God’s exhaustive knowledge of himself and all things.

From there I discuss Van Til's teaching on the fall and common grace. When Adam and Eve sinned, they chose autonomy, making themselves, rather than God, the final reference point of interpretation. As a result of the fall, every human faculty, including the reason and the will, has been corrupted. Human beings after the fall are covenant breakers who are hostile to God. Because knowledge is a unified whole and every fact is truly known only as it is understood in relation to God, man’s choice to make himself the final reference point of interpretation means that he no longer interprets any aspect of reality correctly. Fallen human beings do have a knowledge of God, in one sense, because they cannot escape God’s general revelation of himself, but because they hate God, they sinfully suppress that knowledge of God. Because they suppress the knowledge of God and reject the God-decreed and God-created nature of all things, not only do fallen human beings not know God truly, but they cannot truly know anything else either. The entire history of fallen man has been a history of human beings attempting to create a system of knowledge based on autonomous human thought, assuming man as the final reference point of interpretation. Because fallen human beings do not know created facts truly, they cannot reason from created facts to their Creator, and this means that all attempts at natural theology are futile. Because true knowledge of any fact requires knowledge of that fact in relation to God, fallen man cannot, in principle, know any fact truly. God, however, because of his common grace, restrains fallen human beings from carrying their principle of interpretation to its fullest extent. As a result of God’s common grace, fallen human beings can and do achieve some measure of knowledge about the natural world. Furthermore, no believer in this age carries out the Christian principle consistently either. The absolute antithesis will only exist in practice after the separation of the sheep from the goats.

The next important point concerns God's work of redemption and the resulting antithesis. When God, as a result of his special grace, regenerates some human beings (his elect), he enables them once again to have true knowledge of God and of created facts. Regenerated human beings are now able to understand Scripture, and in the light of Scripture, they are now able to understand all facts as they truly are. Thus, as a result of God’s redemptive work, there is now an antithesis between two types of human beings – believers and unbelievers. Believers are able to reason analogically again, and because they are able to make God the ultimate principle of interpretation, they are able to have true, although not exhaustive, knowledge. Unbelievers continue to reason univocally, and because they make themselves the ultimate principle of interpretation, they cannot know anything truly when they use that principle consistently. Because they use two antithetical principles of interpretation, believers and unbelievers have nothing in common epistemologically even though they have everything in common metaphysically. As a result of the absolute epistemological antithesis, there can be no compromise or neutrality between the believer and the unbeliever. Their worldviews are mutually exclusive, and the conflict between them is an all-out war.

The final chapter of Part One is devoted to looking at what Van Til says are the apologetic implications of the antithesis. He explains that apologetics is the defense of the Reformed faith rather than of Christian theism in general. Traditional apologetics attempted to blend Christian theology with Greek systems of thought characterized by human autonomy and a belief in “brute facts.” This scholasticism, or “synthesis” thinking, annihilated the Creator-creature distinction and compromised every Christian doctrine. Scholasticism’s understanding of natural theology, therefore, has to be rejected. The apologetic method of presupposition is the Reformed alternative to traditional apologetic methods. The method of presupposition deals explicitly with the final reference point for the interpretation of all facts. This method is necessitated by the fallen man’s lack of any true knowledge of any fact or law. Because the method of presupposition rests upon the absolute antithesis between the believer’s knowledge and the unbeliever’s knowledge, it is a whole system vs. whole system method of apologetics. It involves two stages. In the first stage the believer steps into the shoes of the unbeliever and offers an internal critique showing how the unbeliever’s worldview reduces to absurdity. In the second stage, the believer invites the unbeliever to step into the shoes of the Christian in order to show the unbeliever that only on the presupposition of Christianity can he account for human knowledge and human predication.

In the five chapters of Part Two I explain some of the biblical, philosophical, theological, historical, and practical concerns that those of us who are non Van Tillians have.

So for Van Til, the system and the method are tied together. The apologetic method is necessitated precisely because of his system of knowledge. Where the difficulty arises is in the bold faced sentence above. If you trace Van Til's system, it's obvious that he qualifies the absolute antithesis in practice. He has to because to affirm the absolute antithesis in practice in this age goes against Scripture and it makes all apologetics, presuppositional or traditional, impossible. Van Til himself points that out. The absolute antithesis exists only in principle in this age. Because of common grace, unbelievers, in practice have knowledge of all kinds of things. But when he gets to the point of explaining the practical apologetic implications, he argues that the presuppositional method is necessitated precisely because fallen man has no true knowledge of any fact or law. In other words, the apologetic method of presupposition is necessitated in practice by the absolute antithesis. But in practice, the absolute antithesis doesn't exist yet. In practice, we have a qualified antithesis in which the unbeliever knows many facts and laws. Van Til admitted this was a problem. Frame admits this is a problem. The problem is that Van Til rests his case for the exclusivity and necessity of the method of presupposition on the absolute antithesis, but then as soon as he starts talking about the method, he has to introduce the common grace qualifications in order for anybody to use this method.

As I see it, you can't have it both ways. Either we have an absolute antithesis in principle AND in practice in this age, and we have some plausible grounds for saying that the only possible method is the method of presupposition. But if this is the case, as Van Til understands, we're going against what Scripture teaches and we have no way of even communicating with an unbeliever. The other option is that we have a qualified antithesis in this age and we can account for communication and the possibility of apologetics, but a qualified antithesis does not have the same apologetic implications for method as does an absolute antithesis. A qualified antithesis grants that unbelievers have all kinds of knowledge of facts and laws. If that is the case, the bold-faced line above is not true. If unbelievers have knowledge of facts and laws, then the method of presupposition is not necessitated, and condemning all of the Reformed theologians in the 400 years before 1940 is not necessitated.

In the discussion with James Anderson, he expressed some reservations about the way I moved from Part One into chapter 6 (Biblical Concerns). He granted that in chapters 1 - 5 I did a pretty good job of explaining Van Til's views with all the necessary qualifications, but he didn't understand why I spent several pages in chapter 6 arguing that the absolute antithesis is inconsistent with what Scripture says about communication between believers and unbelievers. He thought that was odd since I had already granted that Van Til qualifies the antithesis in order to account for things like communication.

The reason I spent a few pages on that was because of what Van Til does when he gets to the point of explaining the apologetic/methodological implications of the antithesis. As soon as he gets to that point, he's talking about the antithesis as if it is completely unqualified. Over and over and over again in numerous works, he says we have to get rid of the traditional apologetic methods and use the method of presupposition precisely because of the fact that the unbeliever and believer share nothing in common epistemologically (absolute antithesis). So, in chapter 6, I'm working backward from that point. I'm having to remind Van Til (as it were) of what he had already said earlier - namely that the antithesis is qualified in practice, and here's why. It's unbiblical and renders any apologetic method impossible. A few pages in, I note that Van Til qualifies the antithesis and that his view can explain communication. But he cannot explain communication by qualifying the antithesis and then turn around and set the qualifications aside to argue for the exclusivity of the method of presupposition. My point in all of it is that the problem both Van Til and Frame noted with regard to the common grace qualifications is significant. It saws off the very branch on which he is sitting.

The book gets into a lot more detail with the related philosophical and theological problems. But I have to get ready for some time with my granddaughter.

Hope everyone has a great day today and a blessed Lord's Day tomorrow.
 
Prof. Mathison, thank you so much for that wonderfully helpful and detailed overview. I'm looking forward to watching the video in the OP when I can get a chunk of free time to do so.

One concern I have about Van Til's method is alluded to in this sentence of yours: "He explains that apologetics is the defense of the Reformed faith rather than of Christian theism in general." Although I can't put it into words or explain how I arrive at this conclusion, I have a sense that for Van Til, logical consistency is important such that there's not really much middle ground between Reformed Christianity and unbelief. I'm sure he would qualify that in practice, but in theory the absoluteness of his distinctions seems to preclude such a middle ground. Arrival at faith seems to be "completed arrival" at a finished and consistent theological system. This goes against what I perceive to be Scripture's trajectory of the Christian life, which looks less like arrival at a rigorous intellectual system and more like a Spirit-led change of heart followed by growth in understanding and conduct.

In that vein, it would seem apologetics is precisely what he claims it isn't - a defense of Christianity, period. Of course, since Reformed Christianity is biblically sound and consistent Christianity, sound spiritual growth should proceed along those lines. But there has to be, both in practice and in theory, a recognition of the often gradual nature of the Christian's trajectory.
 
Keith,

Thanks for the detailed explanation of where you are coming from. I quite agree that absolutizing the antithesis in every sphere of activity proves too problematic to be workable.

I rather think that, in an absolutizing way, Van Til is trying to get at the ultimate futility of knowledge if one ultimately rejects the Creator/creature distinction. Your summary is something that every Christian ought to agree with when it speaks to the reality (Romans 1) that we cannot escape a knowledge of God in any of our thinking or doing.

I was reflecting on the fact that the majority of apologetic encounters I hear from Christians grant to the unbeliever the "right" or even encourage the unbeliever in their unbelief as long as the unbeliever hasn't become convinced of some minimal theism. I spend a lot of time listening to the Unbelievable Radio program. It is the most popular form of apologetic to remove any offense and a willingness to sacrifice any article of Creator/creature reality in order for the skeptic/unbeliever to come to the autonomous conclusion that God has a right to exist in the person's mind. I think Van Til is at his best when he critiques Greek philosophy and the philosophy of Kant and Enlightenment thinking as incapable of hearing any voice but their own. In fact, if you haven't read Horton's new Shaman and Sage book, it is well worth reading.

Where I think presup goes off the rails is either denying the image of God in fallen man and his ability to still reason correctly (as far as it goes) or (the opposite error) of Christians who over-emphasize common grace to the point that they try to see in even the most wicked of ideas some "good" that is underneath the unbeliever's desire/thoughts.

As one example, I appreciated a book about the contributions of Robbie George to modern political/public discourse in arguments that make everyone think twice before denying the humanity of an unborn child. I believe that many spend far too much time in one camp trying to demonstrate that conservatives are out of whack and liberals are out of whack but that the Christain needs to somehow remain above the fray and not make a hard public decision. It's sort of the Kelleresque version of saying that conservatives care about children and liberals care about poverty but Christians should care about both. The "middle way" reduces criticism but the person in the pew is never instructed on how to form a reasoned argument and argue for it in the public sphere in a way that can change minds and promote public change. Just because a person denies he is thinking God's thoughts after Him doesn't mean that he can't be persuaded (now) that some ideas are so against the natural order that they are absurd.
 
Hi Jamey,

Yes, and what you are pointing out is similar to what James pointed out in the video when he made the point that the common grace qualifications to the antithesis, the qualifications necessary for communication between the believer and unbeliever to take place, are an integral component of Van Til's system. No apologetic methodology can take place if the believer cannot even communicate with the unbeliever. So, for Van Til, the common grace qualifications are necessary for apologetic engagement, and the kind of apologetic engagement that takes place if one is to be consistently Reformed must be what he calls the method of presupposition.

I get what Van Til is saying, but what I tried to explain in the book is that the very qualifications that allow communication and thus apologetics to take place also create a tension in the relation between Van Til's system and his claims about methodology. In Part One of the book, I devote 5 chapters to explaining Van Til's system in a way I think most people can understand. Instead of explaining with philosophical categories, I chose to explain it in theological categories. I start with his doctrine of God and the divine decree because I believe it is necessary to understand what Van Til says on this point in order to understand anything else he says. So, the Triune God is independent, immutable, infinite, and personal and has independent, immutable, infinite, and personal knowledge of himself. God has also eternally and freely decreed whatsoever comes to pass and therefore has perfect knowledge of every fact that he has decreed. God knows every decreed fact in relation to himself and in relation to every other fact within his unified plan. This is important because knowledge is the key theme that runs through each major building block in Van Til’s system of thought. According to Van Til, in order for there to be true knowledge of any fact, there has to be knowledge of that fact in relation to every other fact and knowledge of the whole of which that fact is a part. Because God is omniscient, God has such infinite knowledge. God, therefore, grounds the very possibility of true human knowledge. Because God knows himself and every fact in relation to himself and to every other fact, God can also be said to have “pre-interpreted” every fact. Thus, there are no “brute facts.” The true meaning of any fact is ultimately determined by its place in the eternal plan of God. God’s knowledge of himself and of all things in relation to himself and in relation to his plan is, therefore, the ultimate true system of knowledge. God, therefore, is the ultimate principle of interpretation of all facts.

Then I moved to his statements about creation and revelation. In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth and all that is within them, thus introducing a metaphysical distinction between the Creator and the creature. Among God’s creatures were human beings whom he created in his image with rational and volitional faculties. Everything God created, including human beings, is exhaustively revelational of God and of the unified system of truth eternally known by God. Human beings were created in a covenant relationship with God and were, therefore, ethically required to interpret all facts in relation to God their Creator. Human beings were created to be derivative re-interpreters of that which God had eternally pre-interpreted, thus making God the final reference point of all interpretation. If God is not taken as the final reference point, human beings would have to be the final reference point and would, therefore, have to be omniscient, since true knowledge of any fact requires true knowledge of every fact. Human knowledge, however, does not have to be exhaustive because God’s knowledge is exhaustive. Human knowledge is required only to be analogical to God’s knowledge, meaning that it is to be a finite reflection of God’s exhaustive knowledge. Even though human knowledge is not exhaustive knowledge, it is true knowledge if it corresponds to God’s exhaustive knowledge of himself and all things.

From there I discuss Van Til's teaching on the fall and common grace. When Adam and Eve sinned, they chose autonomy, making themselves, rather than God, the final reference point of interpretation. As a result of the fall, every human faculty, including the reason and the will, has been corrupted. Human beings after the fall are covenant breakers who are hostile to God. Because knowledge is a unified whole and every fact is truly known only as it is understood in relation to God, man’s choice to make himself the final reference point of interpretation means that he no longer interprets any aspect of reality correctly. Fallen human beings do have a knowledge of God, in one sense, because they cannot escape God’s general revelation of himself, but because they hate God, they sinfully suppress that knowledge of God. Because they suppress the knowledge of God and reject the God-decreed and God-created nature of all things, not only do fallen human beings not know God truly, but they cannot truly know anything else either. The entire history of fallen man has been a history of human beings attempting to create a system of knowledge based on autonomous human thought, assuming man as the final reference point of interpretation. Because fallen human beings do not know created facts truly, they cannot reason from created facts to their Creator, and this means that all attempts at natural theology are futile. Because true knowledge of any fact requires knowledge of that fact in relation to God, fallen man cannot, in principle, know any fact truly. God, however, because of his common grace, restrains fallen human beings from carrying their principle of interpretation to its fullest extent. As a result of God’s common grace, fallen human beings can and do achieve some measure of knowledge about the natural world. Furthermore, no believer in this age carries out the Christian principle consistently either. The absolute antithesis will only exist in practice after the separation of the sheep from the goats.

The next important point concerns God's work of redemption and the resulting antithesis. When God, as a result of his special grace, regenerates some human beings (his elect), he enables them once again to have true knowledge of God and of created facts. Regenerated human beings are now able to understand Scripture, and in the light of Scripture, they are now able to understand all facts as they truly are. Thus, as a result of God’s redemptive work, there is now an antithesis between two types of human beings – believers and unbelievers. Believers are able to reason analogically again, and because they are able to make God the ultimate principle of interpretation, they are able to have true, although not exhaustive, knowledge. Unbelievers continue to reason univocally, and because they make themselves the ultimate principle of interpretation, they cannot know anything truly when they use that principle consistently. Because they use two antithetical principles of interpretation, believers and unbelievers have nothing in common epistemologically even though they have everything in common metaphysically. As a result of the absolute epistemological antithesis, there can be no compromise or neutrality between the believer and the unbeliever. Their worldviews are mutually exclusive, and the conflict between them is an all-out war.

The final chapter of Part One is devoted to looking at what Van Til says are the apologetic implications of the antithesis. He explains that apologetics is the defense of the Reformed faith rather than of Christian theism in general. Traditional apologetics attempted to blend Christian theology with Greek systems of thought characterized by human autonomy and a belief in “brute facts.” This scholasticism, or “synthesis” thinking, annihilated the Creator-creature distinction and compromised every Christian doctrine. Scholasticism’s understanding of natural theology, therefore, has to be rejected. The apologetic method of presupposition is the Reformed alternative to traditional apologetic methods. The method of presupposition deals explicitly with the final reference point for the interpretation of all facts. This method is necessitated by the fallen man’s lack of any true knowledge of any fact or law. Because the method of presupposition rests upon the absolute antithesis between the believer’s knowledge and the unbeliever’s knowledge, it is a whole system vs. whole system method of apologetics. It involves two stages. In the first stage the believer steps into the shoes of the unbeliever and offers an internal critique showing how the unbeliever’s worldview reduces to absurdity. In the second stage, the believer invites the unbeliever to step into the shoes of the Christian in order to show the unbeliever that only on the presupposition of Christianity can he account for human knowledge and human predication.

In the five chapters of Part Two I explain some of the biblical, philosophical, theological, historical, and practical concerns that those of us who are non Van Tillians have.

So for Van Til, the system and the method are tied together. The apologetic method is necessitated precisely because of his system of knowledge. Where the difficulty arises is in the bold faced sentence above. If you trace Van Til's system, it's obvious that he qualifies the absolute antithesis in practice. He has to because to affirm the absolute antithesis in practice in this age goes against Scripture and it makes all apologetics, presuppositional or traditional, impossible. Van Til himself points that out. The absolute antithesis exists only in principle in this age. Because of common grace, unbelievers, in practice have knowledge of all kinds of things. But when he gets to the point of explaining the practical apologetic implications, he argues that the presuppositional method is necessitated precisely because fallen man has no true knowledge of any fact or law. In other words, the apologetic method of presupposition is necessitated in practice by the absolute antithesis. But in practice, the absolute antithesis doesn't exist yet. In practice, we have a qualified antithesis in which the unbeliever knows many facts and laws. Van Til admitted this was a problem. Frame admits this is a problem. The problem is that Van Til rests his case for the exclusivity and necessity of the method of presupposition on the absolute antithesis, but then as soon as he starts talking about the method, he has to introduce the common grace qualifications in order for anybody to use this method.

As I see it, you can't have it both ways. Either we have an absolute antithesis in principle AND in practice in this age, and we have some plausible grounds for saying that the only possible method is the method of presupposition. But if this is the case, as Van Til understands, we're going against what Scripture teaches and we have no way of even communicating with an unbeliever. The other option is that we have a qualified antithesis in this age and we can account for communication and the possibility of apologetics, but a qualified antithesis does not have the same apologetic implications for method as does an absolute antithesis. A qualified antithesis grants that unbelievers have all kinds of knowledge of facts and laws. If that is the case, the bold-faced line above is not true. If unbelievers have knowledge of facts and laws, then the method of presupposition is not necessitated, and condemning all of the Reformed theologians in the 400 years before 1940 is not necessitated.

In the discussion with James Anderson, he expressed some reservations about the way I moved from Part One into chapter 6 (Biblical Concerns). He granted that in chapters 1 - 5 I did a pretty good job of explaining Van Til's views with all the necessary qualifications, but he didn't understand why I spent several pages in chapter 6 arguing that the absolute antithesis is inconsistent with what Scripture says about communication between believers and unbelievers. He thought that was odd since I had already granted that Van Til qualifies the antithesis in order to account for things like communication.

The reason I spent a few pages on that was because of what Van Til does when he gets to the point of explaining the apologetic/methodological implications of the antithesis. As soon as he gets to that point, he's talking about the antithesis as if it is completely unqualified. Over and over and over again in numerous works, he says we have to get rid of the traditional apologetic methods and use the method of presupposition precisely because of the fact that the unbeliever and believer share nothing in common epistemologically (absolute antithesis). So, in chapter 6, I'm working backward from that point. I'm having to remind Van Til (as it were) of what he had already said earlier - namely that the antithesis is qualified in practice, and here's why. It's unbiblical and renders any apologetic method impossible. A few pages in, I note that Van Til qualifies the antithesis and that his view can explain communication. But he cannot explain communication by qualifying the antithesis and then turn around and set the qualifications aside to argue for the exclusivity of the method of presupposition. My point in all of it is that the problem both Van Til and Frame noted with regard to the common grace qualifications is significant. It saws off the very branch on which he is sitting.

The book gets into a lot more detail with the related philosophical and theological problems. But I have to get ready for some time with my granddaughter.

Hope everyone has a great day today and a blessed Lord's Day tomorrow.
First off thank you for the detailed response. I agree with your assessment of Van Til's thought here, I'm looking forward to reading your book.
Second off enjoy your time with your granddaughter. I'll post another question along these lines and if you want to please respond. If your whole point is to critique the claim of exclusivity, than I whole heartedly agree. I for one am tired of the infighting between Christians on this issue. I've said personally that I'd stand shoulder to shoulder with any Christian in the defense of the faith, with them using any method they choose.
I would and have only defended, to my knowledge, the legitimacy of the transcendental method of argumentation (as I said I don't like TAG) for what I perceive as it's practical benefits. I've personally seen it work. I've also highly praised William Edgar as being to me the best Vantillian out there because he uses the style of Schaefer with the method of Van Til. I know you're familiar with his work and no one can accuse him of being a mean, pompous internet troll type Vantillian.
Thanks again for your time and I pray for your time with your granddaughter. Look forward to more interactions and reading the book. If I understand you correctly we are more or less in agreement.
 
Hi Jamey,

Yes, and what you are pointing out is similar to what James pointed out in the video when he made the point that the common grace qualifications to the antithesis, the qualifications necessary for communication between the believer and unbeliever to take place, are an integral component of Van Til's system. No apologetic methodology can take place if the believer cannot even communicate with the unbeliever. So, for Van Til, the common grace qualifications are necessary for apologetic engagement, and the kind of apologetic engagement that takes place if one is to be consistently Reformed must be what he calls the method of presupposition.

I get what Van Til is saying, but what I tried to explain in the book is that the very qualifications that allow communication and thus apologetics to take place also create a tension in the relation between Van Til's system and his claims about methodology. In Part One of the book, I devote 5 chapters to explaining Van Til's system in a way I think most people can understand. Instead of explaining with philosophical categories, I chose to explain it in theological categories. I start with his doctrine of God and the divine decree because I believe it is necessary to understand what Van Til says on this point in order to understand anything else he says. So, the Triune God is independent, immutable, infinite, and personal and has independent, immutable, infinite, and personal knowledge of himself. God has also eternally and freely decreed whatsoever comes to pass and therefore has perfect knowledge of every fact that he has decreed. God knows every decreed fact in relation to himself and in relation to every other fact within his unified plan. This is important because knowledge is the key theme that runs through each major building block in Van Til’s system of thought. According to Van Til, in order for there to be true knowledge of any fact, there has to be knowledge of that fact in relation to every other fact and knowledge of the whole of which that fact is a part. Because God is omniscient, God has such infinite knowledge. God, therefore, grounds the very possibility of true human knowledge. Because God knows himself and every fact in relation to himself and to every other fact, God can also be said to have “pre-interpreted” every fact. Thus, there are no “brute facts.” The true meaning of any fact is ultimately determined by its place in the eternal plan of God. God’s knowledge of himself and of all things in relation to himself and in relation to his plan is, therefore, the ultimate true system of knowledge. God, therefore, is the ultimate principle of interpretation of all facts.

Then I moved to his statements about creation and revelation. In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth and all that is within them, thus introducing a metaphysical distinction between the Creator and the creature. Among God’s creatures were human beings whom he created in his image with rational and volitional faculties. Everything God created, including human beings, is exhaustively revelational of God and of the unified system of truth eternally known by God. Human beings were created in a covenant relationship with God and were, therefore, ethically required to interpret all facts in relation to God their Creator. Human beings were created to be derivative re-interpreters of that which God had eternally pre-interpreted, thus making God the final reference point of all interpretation. If God is not taken as the final reference point, human beings would have to be the final reference point and would, therefore, have to be omniscient, since true knowledge of any fact requires true knowledge of every fact. Human knowledge, however, does not have to be exhaustive because God’s knowledge is exhaustive. Human knowledge is required only to be analogical to God’s knowledge, meaning that it is to be a finite reflection of God’s exhaustive knowledge. Even though human knowledge is not exhaustive knowledge, it is true knowledge if it corresponds to God’s exhaustive knowledge of himself and all things.

From there I discuss Van Til's teaching on the fall and common grace. When Adam and Eve sinned, they chose autonomy, making themselves, rather than God, the final reference point of interpretation. As a result of the fall, every human faculty, including the reason and the will, has been corrupted. Human beings after the fall are covenant breakers who are hostile to God. Because knowledge is a unified whole and every fact is truly known only as it is understood in relation to God, man’s choice to make himself the final reference point of interpretation means that he no longer interprets any aspect of reality correctly. Fallen human beings do have a knowledge of God, in one sense, because they cannot escape God’s general revelation of himself, but because they hate God, they sinfully suppress that knowledge of God. Because they suppress the knowledge of God and reject the God-decreed and God-created nature of all things, not only do fallen human beings not know God truly, but they cannot truly know anything else either. The entire history of fallen man has been a history of human beings attempting to create a system of knowledge based on autonomous human thought, assuming man as the final reference point of interpretation. Because fallen human beings do not know created facts truly, they cannot reason from created facts to their Creator, and this means that all attempts at natural theology are futile. Because true knowledge of any fact requires knowledge of that fact in relation to God, fallen man cannot, in principle, know any fact truly. God, however, because of his common grace, restrains fallen human beings from carrying their principle of interpretation to its fullest extent. As a result of God’s common grace, fallen human beings can and do achieve some measure of knowledge about the natural world. Furthermore, no believer in this age carries out the Christian principle consistently either. The absolute antithesis will only exist in practice after the separation of the sheep from the goats.

The next important point concerns God's work of redemption and the resulting antithesis. When God, as a result of his special grace, regenerates some human beings (his elect), he enables them once again to have true knowledge of God and of created facts. Regenerated human beings are now able to understand Scripture, and in the light of Scripture, they are now able to understand all facts as they truly are. Thus, as a result of God’s redemptive work, there is now an antithesis between two types of human beings – believers and unbelievers. Believers are able to reason analogically again, and because they are able to make God the ultimate principle of interpretation, they are able to have true, although not exhaustive, knowledge. Unbelievers continue to reason univocally, and because they make themselves the ultimate principle of interpretation, they cannot know anything truly when they use that principle consistently. Because they use two antithetical principles of interpretation, believers and unbelievers have nothing in common epistemologically even though they have everything in common metaphysically. As a result of the absolute epistemological antithesis, there can be no compromise or neutrality between the believer and the unbeliever. Their worldviews are mutually exclusive, and the conflict between them is an all-out war.

The final chapter of Part One is devoted to looking at what Van Til says are the apologetic implications of the antithesis. He explains that apologetics is the defense of the Reformed faith rather than of Christian theism in general. Traditional apologetics attempted to blend Christian theology with Greek systems of thought characterized by human autonomy and a belief in “brute facts.” This scholasticism, or “synthesis” thinking, annihilated the Creator-creature distinction and compromised every Christian doctrine. Scholasticism’s understanding of natural theology, therefore, has to be rejected. The apologetic method of presupposition is the Reformed alternative to traditional apologetic methods. The method of presupposition deals explicitly with the final reference point for the interpretation of all facts. This method is necessitated by the fallen man’s lack of any true knowledge of any fact or law. Because the method of presupposition rests upon the absolute antithesis between the believer’s knowledge and the unbeliever’s knowledge, it is a whole system vs. whole system method of apologetics. It involves two stages. In the first stage the believer steps into the shoes of the unbeliever and offers an internal critique showing how the unbeliever’s worldview reduces to absurdity. In the second stage, the believer invites the unbeliever to step into the shoes of the Christian in order to show the unbeliever that only on the presupposition of Christianity can he account for human knowledge and human predication.

In the five chapters of Part Two I explain some of the biblical, philosophical, theological, historical, and practical concerns that those of us who are non Van Tillians have.

So for Van Til, the system and the method are tied together. The apologetic method is necessitated precisely because of his system of knowledge. Where the difficulty arises is in the bold faced sentence above. If you trace Van Til's system, it's obvious that he qualifies the absolute antithesis in practice. He has to because to affirm the absolute antithesis in practice in this age goes against Scripture and it makes all apologetics, presuppositional or traditional, impossible. Van Til himself points that out. The absolute antithesis exists only in principle in this age. Because of common grace, unbelievers, in practice have knowledge of all kinds of things. But when he gets to the point of explaining the practical apologetic implications, he argues that the presuppositional method is necessitated precisely because fallen man has no true knowledge of any fact or law. In other words, the apologetic method of presupposition is necessitated in practice by the absolute antithesis. But in practice, the absolute antithesis doesn't exist yet. In practice, we have a qualified antithesis in which the unbeliever knows many facts and laws. Van Til admitted this was a problem. Frame admits this is a problem. The problem is that Van Til rests his case for the exclusivity and necessity of the method of presupposition on the absolute antithesis, but then as soon as he starts talking about the method, he has to introduce the common grace qualifications in order for anybody to use this method.

As I see it, you can't have it both ways. Either we have an absolute antithesis in principle AND in practice in this age, and we have some plausible grounds for saying that the only possible method is the method of presupposition. But if this is the case, as Van Til understands, we're going against what Scripture teaches and we have no way of even communicating with an unbeliever. The other option is that we have a qualified antithesis in this age and we can account for communication and the possibility of apologetics, but a qualified antithesis does not have the same apologetic implications for method as does an absolute antithesis. A qualified antithesis grants that unbelievers have all kinds of knowledge of facts and laws. If that is the case, the bold-faced line above is not true. If unbelievers have knowledge of facts and laws, then the method of presupposition is not necessitated, and condemning all of the Reformed theologians in the 400 years before 1940 is not necessitated.

In the discussion with James Anderson, he expressed some reservations about the way I moved from Part One into chapter 6 (Biblical Concerns). He granted that in chapters 1 - 5 I did a pretty good job of explaining Van Til's views with all the necessary qualifications, but he didn't understand why I spent several pages in chapter 6 arguing that the absolute antithesis is inconsistent with what Scripture says about communication between believers and unbelievers. He thought that was odd since I had already granted that Van Til qualifies the antithesis in order to account for things like communication.

The reason I spent a few pages on that was because of what Van Til does when he gets to the point of explaining the apologetic/methodological implications of the antithesis. As soon as he gets to that point, he's talking about the antithesis as if it is completely unqualified. Over and over and over again in numerous works, he says we have to get rid of the traditional apologetic methods and use the method of presupposition precisely because of the fact that the unbeliever and believer share nothing in common epistemologically (absolute antithesis). So, in chapter 6, I'm working backward from that point. I'm having to remind Van Til (as it were) of what he had already said earlier - namely that the antithesis is qualified in practice, and here's why. It's unbiblical and renders any apologetic method impossible. A few pages in, I note that Van Til qualifies the antithesis and that his view can explain communication. But he cannot explain communication by qualifying the antithesis and then turn around and set the qualifications aside to argue for the exclusivity of the method of presupposition. My point in all of it is that the problem both Van Til and Frame noted with regard to the common grace qualifications is significant. It saws off the very branch on which he is sitting.

The book gets into a lot more detail with the related philosophical and theological problems. But I have to get ready for some time with my granddaughter.

Hope everyone has a great day today and a blessed Lord's Day tomorrow.

Excellent summary, Dr. Mathison, thank you. R.E.D.S. put out some great looking books this month. I'll plan to ask for your book as well as Harrison Perkins' over the holidays.

A question: in your book or in your research, did the historical debate over the "content" of the believer's and unbeliever's knowledge that occurred in the 1940s debate with Gordon Clark get mentioned? I have in mind such statements as this:

...according to Mr. Kuschke, "Dr. Clark regards man's intellect as occupying such high rank that the understanding of the natural man can grasp the meaning of the words 'Christ died for sinners' 'with the same ease' as the born-again man. If that is the case, the understanding does not need to undergo renewal like the rest of the human personality." Mr. Kuschke quoted and discussed at length the statement of the proposed answer that "regeneration, in spite of the theory of the Complaint, is not a change in the understanding of these words [Christ died for sinners]." He pointed out that the Bible teaches that all of man's faculties are corrupted by sin, and that every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is only evil continually. "If regeneration did not change our understanding of the words 'Christ died for sinners,' " he declared, "then we would never be saved!"

...The supporters of Dr. Clark's theology made valiant effort to defend the statement of the answer that "regeneration... is not a change in the understanding of these words [Christ died for sinners]." Mr. Kuschke, on the other hand, defended the position of the complaint and pointed out that, when content is injected into the sentence, the unregenerate man must invariably inject the wrong content and the regenerate man the true content.

While not by Van Til himself, Kuschke was a fellow complainant, and this is from a recording of the OPC's Philadelphia presbytery (April 10th, 1945) during which Van Til and Clark were both present. The implication of Kuschke's position is that if unbelievers do not even understand the same words or sentences as do believers, then your thesis appears to be reinforced: this conception of total depravity seems to rule out common grace at a most critical epistemic juncture.

I am tempted to quote another complainant (Stonehouse) from the same meeting given that his approach to the "content" of knowledge issue is from a different perspective - the context of the "content" of God's knowledge and man's knowledge - because it relates to your second and third paragraphs, but that will likely lead to this thread derailing into another Clark and Van Til debate I have no desire to participate in.

But I do wonder if you think - and I suppose that this is a separate question (you have already been more than generous) - if you think the above has any possibility of being rooted in Van Til's exposure to idealists who too strongly conceived of truth as "holistic" (to one extreme of, say, necessitarianism). That is, it is of course the case that Van Til affirmed, as you say, that God "freely" decreed whatsoever comes to pass. On the other hand, do you think it is at least possible that idealists may have so strongly pressed the problems against an atomized view of truth (another false extreme) that this may have had a trickle-down effect on Van Til's (and his cohorts') views, viz. if believers alone are able to "re-interpret" God's "pre-interpretation... of the unified system of truth," then unbelievers cannot really rightly understand sentences or words such as "Christ died for sinners"?
 
Prof. Mathison, thank you so much for that wonderfully helpful and detailed overview. I'm looking forward to watching the video in the OP when I can get a chunk of free time to do so.

One concern I have about Van Til's method is alluded to in this sentence of yours: "He explains that apologetics is the defense of the Reformed faith rather than of Christian theism in general." Although I can't put it into words or explain how I arrive at this conclusion, I have a sense that for Van Til, logical consistency is important such that there's not really much middle ground between Reformed Christianity and unbelief. I'm sure he would qualify that in practice, but in theory the absoluteness of his distinctions seems to preclude such a middle ground. Arrival at faith seems to be "completed arrival" at a finished and consistent theological system. This goes against what I perceive to be Scripture's trajectory of the Christian life, which looks less like arrival at a rigorous intellectual system and more like a Spirit-led change of heart followed by growth in understanding and conduct.

In that vein, it would seem apologetics is precisely what he claims it isn't - a defense of Christianity, period. Of course, since Reformed Christianity is biblically sound and consistent Christianity, sound spiritual growth should proceed along those lines. But there has to be, both in practice and in theory, a recognition of the often gradual nature of the Christian's trajectory.
Hi JP,

I don't think Van Til would deny that Christians grow in their theological knowledge and can gradually become more consistent - and thus Reformed. But he doesn't think Christian apologists should be defense of any kind of bare theism. It has to be a defense of the Reformed faith. I think that from his view the apologist defends the Reformed faith, and if the Spirit regenerates the unbeliever, that unbeliever begins with some basic theological knowledge and then is discipled in the Reformed faith until he or she gains a more complete knowledge of it.
 
Keith,

Thanks for the detailed explanation of where you are coming from. I quite agree that absolutizing the antithesis in every sphere of activity proves too problematic to be workable.

I rather think that, in an absolutizing way, Van Til is trying to get at the ultimate futility of knowledge if one ultimately rejects the Creator/creature distinction. Your summary is something that every Christian ought to agree with when it speaks to the reality (Romans 1) that we cannot escape a knowledge of God in any of our thinking or doing.

I was reflecting on the fact that the majority of apologetic encounters I hear from Christians grant to the unbeliever the "right" or even encourage the unbeliever in their unbelief as long as the unbeliever hasn't become convinced of some minimal theism. I spend a lot of time listening to the Unbelievable Radio program. It is the most popular form of apologetic to remove any offense and a willingness to sacrifice any article of Creator/creature reality in order for the skeptic/unbeliever to come to the autonomous conclusion that God has a right to exist in the person's mind. I think Van Til is at his best when he critiques Greek philosophy and the philosophy of Kant and Enlightenment thinking as incapable of hearing any voice but their own. In fact, if you haven't read Horton's new Shaman and Sage book, it is well worth reading.

Where I think presup goes off the rails is either denying the image of God in fallen man and his ability to still reason correctly (as far as it goes) or (the opposite error) of Christians who over-emphasize common grace to the point that they try to see in even the most wicked of ideas some "good" that is underneath the unbeliever's desire/thoughts.

As one example, I appreciated a book about the contributions of Robbie George to modern political/public discourse in arguments that make everyone think twice before denying the humanity of an unborn child. I believe that many spend far too much time in one camp trying to demonstrate that conservatives are out of whack and liberals are out of whack but that the Christain needs to somehow remain above the fray and not make a hard public decision. It's sort of the Kelleresque version of saying that conservatives care about children and liberals care about poverty but Christians should care about both. The "middle way" reduces criticism but the person in the pew is never instructed on how to form a reasoned argument and argue for it in the public sphere in a way that can change minds and promote public change. Just because a person denies he is thinking God's thoughts after Him doesn't mean that he can't be persuaded (now) that some ideas are so against the natural order that they are absurd.
Hi Rich,

I certainly wouldn't advocate any kind of apologetic method that attempts, in your words, "to remove any offense and a willingness to sacrifice any article of Creator/creature reality in order for the skeptic/unbeliever to come to the autonomous conclusion that God has a right to exist in the person's mind."

I believe strongly in presenting the Gospel of Jesus Christ. That Gospel is naturally offensive to the unbeliever. It's a a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles. It will remain that until and unless the Holy Spirit regenerates that person. In the meantime, if the person has any questions, I try to answer those questions.
 
First off thank you for the detailed response. I agree with your assessment of Van Til's thought here, I'm looking forward to reading your book.
Second off enjoy your time with your granddaughter. I'll post another question along these lines and if you want to please respond. If your whole point is to critique the claim of exclusivity, than I whole heartedly agree. I for one am tired of the infighting between Christians on this issue. I've said personally that I'd stand shoulder to shoulder with any Christian in the defense of the faith, with them using any method they choose.
I would and have only defended, to my knowledge, the legitimacy of the transcendental method of argumentation (as I said I don't like TAG) for what I perceive as it's practical benefits. I've personally seen it work. I've also highly praised William Edgar as being to me the best Vantillian out there because he uses the style of Schaefer with the method of Van Til. I know you're familiar with his work and no one can accuse him of being a mean, pompous internet troll type Vantillian.
Thanks again for your time and I pray for your time with your granddaughter. Look forward to more interactions and reading the book. If I understand you correctly we are more or less in agreement.
Hi Jamey,

Even Dr. Sproul acknowledged that Van Til was helpful when it came to emphasizing the internal critique of the unbeliever's worldview. But that was never the issue. The issue was that Van Til claimed that those among the Reformed who used traditional methods were compromising Reformed theology. Look at pages 340 -341 of his Defense of the Faith. He has a long list of doctrines that the traditional method compromises. It compromises, he says, the biblical doctrine of God, man, sin, and redemption. It compromises God's distinction from creation, God's revelation, God's divine decree, the clarity of God's revelation, the necessity of supernatural revelation, the sufficiency of supernatural revelation, the authority of Scripture, man's creation in the image of God, covenant theology, of sin.

And since the traditional method was used by all of the Reformed theologians (with the possible exception of Calvin) for the 400 years prior to Van Til, they were all unwittingly compromising every major element of the Christian faith. The only method that can be used that doesn't compromise every element of our faith, according to Van Til, is the method of presupposition.

If Van Til had simply said I think the method of presupposition is a legitimate argument, I don't think this controversy ever would have started. What started it was the claim that the method of presupposition is the only argument consistent with Reformed theology and that anybody who disagrees is composing the Christian faith. That is a serious claim because it means that all of the 16th and 17th century Reformed theologians had a compromised theology. That's not good because those were the men who wrote our public confessions. The implication is that those confessions are also compromised to some degree.
 
Excellent summary, Dr. Mathison, thank you. R.E.D.S. put out some great looking books this month. I'll plan to ask for your book as well as Harrison Perkins' over the holidays.

A question: in your book or in your research, did the historical debate over the "content" of the believer's and unbeliever's knowledge that occurred in the 1940s debate with Gordon Clark get mentioned? I have in mind such statements as this:



While not by Van Til himself, Kuschke was a fellow complainant, and this is from a recording of the OPC's Philadelphia presbytery (April 10th, 1945) during which Van Til and Clark were both present. The implication of Kuschke's position is that if unbelievers do not even understand the same words or sentences as do believers, then your thesis appears to be reinforced: this conception of total depravity seems to rule out common grace at a most critical epistemic juncture.

I am tempted to quote another complainant (Stonehouse) from the same meeting given that his approach to the "content" of knowledge issue is from a different perspective - the context of the "content" of God's knowledge and man's knowledge - because it relates to your second and third paragraphs, but that will likely lead to this thread derailing into another Clark and Van Til debate I have no desire to participate in.

But I do wonder if you think - and I suppose that this is a separate question (you have already been more than generous) - if you think the above has any possibility of being rooted in Van Til's exposure to idealists who too strongly conceived of truth as "holistic" (to one extreme of, say, necessitarianism). That is, it is of course the case that Van Til affirmed, as you say, that God "freely" decreed whatsoever comes to pass. On the other hand, do you think it is at least possible that idealists may have so strongly pressed the problems against an atomized view of truth (another false extreme) that this may have had a trickle-down effect on Van Til's (and his cohorts') views, viz. if believers alone are able to "re-interpret" God's "pre-interpretation... of the unified system of truth," then unbelievers cannot really rightly understand sentences or words such as "Christ died for sinners"?
Hi Ryan,

You asked: "A question: in your book or in your research, did the historical debate over the "content" of the believer's and unbeliever's knowledge that occurred in the 1940s debate with Gordon Clark get mentioned?"

Short answer is yes. I do address that issue. It takes several pages to explain (pp. 64 - 66), but in a nutshell, when Van Til talks about the "content" of knowledge, you have to look at what he says about the "fact" of knowledge and the "act" of knowledge. For God, the content of knowledge includes both according to Van Til.

You also asked about Van Til's exposure to idealism. I devoted the entirety of chapter 7 to an attempt to sort that question out. Short answer: Yes. It's important. When get a chance to read the book, I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on it.
 
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Hi Rich,

I certainly wouldn't advocate any kind of apologetic method that attempts, in your words, "to remove any offense and a willingness to sacrifice any article of Creator/creature reality in order for the skeptic/unbeliever to come to the autonomous conclusion that God has a right to exist in the person's mind."

I believe strongly in presenting the Gospel of Jesus Christ. That Gospel is naturally offensive to the unbeliever. It's a a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles. It will remain that until and unless the Holy Spirit regenerates that person. In the meantime, if the person has any questions, I try to answer those questions.
I know. I wasn't implying you would. I'm simply stating that the prevalent form of apologetic these days is that kind.
 
Hi Rev. Winzer,

That's an important point, and unfortunately, we didn't get to it in the online discussion. I did, however, address it in the book. I'll be interested in hearing your feedback when you get the chance to read it.

I just located a copy for sale in Australia. I will keep an eye out for this particular discussion in the book.

How do you work with this from a reformed systematic standpoint? If it is part of the system it seems to me we cannot escape its exclusivity.
 
Keith, I want to know if you deal with this question in your book. In DF, pp. 340-341, he describes the traditional method as compromising a bunch of doctrines, but it seems to me that it is the traditional method as used by Roman Catholics and Arminians that does the compromising. When he deals with the Reformed (some of whom he freely acknowledges use the traditional method), his only claim is that they, in so doing, prevent "the development of a distinctly Reformed apologetic" (341). This leaves wide open the possibility that the traditional method is not seen by Van Til as being utilized in the same way by the Romanists/Arminians, on the one hand, versus the Reformed on the other. It also leaves open the possibility that Van Til is not accusing the entire Reformed tradition of compromising on those doctrines just because some of them use a traditional apologetic. Do you deal with this question/interpretation in your book?
 
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