83r17h
Puritan Board Freshman
I have been slowly reading through the recent book The Mystery of the Trinity by Vern Poythress. It has some unique and stimulating insights about how the Trinity illuminates understanding the divine attributes. Some of these reflections in the first parts of the book were awesome to read and consider. I can see other analogies where the Trinity is helpful in illuminating a deeper understanding of the divine attributes. This is good, and something that is perhaps lacking in other places and authors.
However, I find myself confused, and I'm wondering what the thoughts of the board are on the portion of the book where Poythress critiques Turretin. It seems as though the traditional understanding of simplicity is that because the divine essence is one and simple, the attributes are ectypal, describing different aspects of how God's character works in creation and providence. Thus, the attributes are one, and not multiple parts that make up the divine essence. We make valid distinctions because God displays himself different ways and through different actions, and thus the attributes are a way for us (as finite) to know God analogically, since we cannot know God archetypally.
Poythress seems to disagree with this. On page 368-370, he gives a discussion on the distinction between different attributes, saying that "a distinction between two attributes may have its roots in a deeper distinction, namely, a distinction between two persons of the Trinity." He concludes the section with the statement "the diversity in attributes is an ectypal reflection of the archetype, the diversity in the persons."
This seems either unhelpful, or problematic. If he's saying that the root metaphysical ground of all diversity (including diversity in our theology) is the diversity of the persons, that's something. But that doesn't seem to be related to what Turretin is talking about, and doesn't really form any sort of a critique of Turretin. Turretin, as I understand (but please correct me if I'm wrong), is not discussing the metaphysical ground of all diversity, but explaining practically why we delineate multiple attributes, given that the divine essence is simple. He just leaves the metaphysical grounding of diversity (as a principle) an unaddressed topic.
On the other hand, if Poythress is trying to say that there are actual distinctions in the divine essence, and that these are the result of the diversity of persons, this seems problematic. If the view is that unity is from the essence, and diversity from the persons, wouldn't introducing diversity into the essence remove either the need for the persons as ultimate metaphysical diversity, or destroy the use of the essence as ultimate metaphysical unity? I don't think Poythress is saying this, but if he's not, then I don't understand what he actually thinks is the problem with Turretin, because Turretin doesn't seem to be making unity ultimate as a metaphysical principle (with no diversity). But since the divine essence is what is being discussed, and the divine essence is in fact, the ultimate principle of metaphysical unity, the attributes being one shouldn't be problematic.
Has anyone read this, or can help me understand Poythress' critique of Turretin? I'm not entirely sure what Poythress thinks the problem with Turretin is, and in the only two ways that I thought of understanding Poythress, the first one isn't a problem, and the second one seems to be problematic for Poythress, but not for Turretin.
However, I find myself confused, and I'm wondering what the thoughts of the board are on the portion of the book where Poythress critiques Turretin. It seems as though the traditional understanding of simplicity is that because the divine essence is one and simple, the attributes are ectypal, describing different aspects of how God's character works in creation and providence. Thus, the attributes are one, and not multiple parts that make up the divine essence. We make valid distinctions because God displays himself different ways and through different actions, and thus the attributes are a way for us (as finite) to know God analogically, since we cannot know God archetypally.
Poythress seems to disagree with this. On page 368-370, he gives a discussion on the distinction between different attributes, saying that "a distinction between two attributes may have its roots in a deeper distinction, namely, a distinction between two persons of the Trinity." He concludes the section with the statement "the diversity in attributes is an ectypal reflection of the archetype, the diversity in the persons."
This seems either unhelpful, or problematic. If he's saying that the root metaphysical ground of all diversity (including diversity in our theology) is the diversity of the persons, that's something. But that doesn't seem to be related to what Turretin is talking about, and doesn't really form any sort of a critique of Turretin. Turretin, as I understand (but please correct me if I'm wrong), is not discussing the metaphysical ground of all diversity, but explaining practically why we delineate multiple attributes, given that the divine essence is simple. He just leaves the metaphysical grounding of diversity (as a principle) an unaddressed topic.
On the other hand, if Poythress is trying to say that there are actual distinctions in the divine essence, and that these are the result of the diversity of persons, this seems problematic. If the view is that unity is from the essence, and diversity from the persons, wouldn't introducing diversity into the essence remove either the need for the persons as ultimate metaphysical diversity, or destroy the use of the essence as ultimate metaphysical unity? I don't think Poythress is saying this, but if he's not, then I don't understand what he actually thinks is the problem with Turretin, because Turretin doesn't seem to be making unity ultimate as a metaphysical principle (with no diversity). But since the divine essence is what is being discussed, and the divine essence is in fact, the ultimate principle of metaphysical unity, the attributes being one shouldn't be problematic.
Has anyone read this, or can help me understand Poythress' critique of Turretin? I'm not entirely sure what Poythress thinks the problem with Turretin is, and in the only two ways that I thought of understanding Poythress, the first one isn't a problem, and the second one seems to be problematic for Poythress, but not for Turretin.
